THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

IRVINE 

GIFT  OF 

Dr .   and  Mrs . 
JOHN  F.    BELL 


METAPHYSICS 


lit 


BORDEN   P.  BOWNE 

PBOF1880R  OF   PHILOSOPHY   IS   BOSTON   CNIT1BSITT 


NEW  YORK   •:•   CINCINNATI   •:•   CHICAGO 

AMERICAN    BOOK    COMPANY 


Copyright,  1883,  by  HARPER  &  BROTHERS 


Copyright,  1898,  by  HARPER  &  BROTHERS. 
Copyright,  1910,  by  BORDEN  P.  BOWNB. 

All  rightt  reicrvtd. 

w.  P.    9 


PREFACE 


THIS  work  is  a  revision  of  my  earlier  work  on  the  sub- 
ject. For  "  substance  of  doctrine  "  the  teaching  is  the  same. 
The  chief  changes  are  in  the  form  and  exposition.  The 
fundamental  doctrine  is  more  systematically  set  forth,  and 
is  unfolded  into  more  detailed  inferences;  but  the  general 
view  is  unchanged.  In  spite  of  many  well-meant  critical 
washings,  I  still  remain  wallowing  in  the  ancient  meta- 
physical and  idealistic  mire,  and  am  even  confirmed  in  my 
error  by  further  reflection. 

The  publication  of  the  Theory  of  Thought  and  Knowledge 
made  it  unnecessary  to  reproduce  the  epistemelogical  matter 
of  the  previous  editions.  Apart  from  this  fact,  the  most 
marked  feature  of  the  revision  is  the  greater  emphasis  laid 
on  the  idealistic  element.  This  has  been  made  more  prom- 
inent and  more  consistently  developed.  And,  on  the  other 
hand,  it  is  shown  that  on  the  traditional  realistic  view  both 
thought  and  being  are  impossible. 

At  the  same  time,  I  have  sought  to  save  idealism  from  the 
misunderstandings  which  are  the  great  source  of  popular 
objections  to  it,  and  also  to  make  a  place  for  inductive  sci- 
ence. This  is  done  by  the  distinction  between  phenomenal 
and  ontological  reality.  The  latter  belongs  to  metaphysics 
and  must  finally  be  viewed  as  active  intelligence.  The 
former  is  the  field  of  experience  and  is  perfectly  real  in 
that  field ;  that  is,  it  is  common  to  all  and  is  no  individual 


iv  PREFACE 

illusion.  And  anything  we  can  do  in  the  way  of  discover- 
ing uniformities  of  coexistence  or  sequence  in  that  field  is 
so  much  clear  gain.  The  discovery  of  these  uniformities  is 
the  great  work  of  inductive  science;  and  this  study  it  can 
pursue  without  being  molested  or  made  afraid  by  meta- 
physics. Of  course,  when  the  scientist  sets  up  these  uni- 
formities as  self-sufficient  and  self-executing  laws,  he  then 
becomes  a  metaphysician ;  and  criticism  is  in  its  full  right 
when  it  reminds  him  that  such  doctrine  is  not  science  but 
bad  metaphysics.  But  the  distinction  between  phenomenal 
and  ontological  reality  enables  us  at  once  to  save  the  truth 
of  appearances  and  such  science  of  them  as  we  may  have, 
and  also  to  go  behind  them  to  a  deeper  realm  if  thought 
should  demand  it. 

At  the  same  time,  it  must  be  noted  that  the  final  result 
is  to  deprive  all  concrete  science  of  its  absolute  character. 
The  successive  phases  of  phenomena  cannot  be  deduced  from 
antecedent  phenomena  by  any  proper  logical  process.  In 
every  theory  we  have  to  find  the  ground  of  the  seen  in  the 
unseen;  and  we  have  no  insight  into  that  hidden  realm 
which  will  lift  our  concrete  science  into  anything  more  than 
a  practical  expectation  which  serves  for  living  rather  than 
for  speculation.  There  is  an  agnosticism  which  springs  from 
a  sensational  philosophy,  and  this  can  only  be  viewed  as 
the  apotheosis  of  superficiality.  But  there  is  an  agnosticism, 
or  anti-dogmatism,  which  springs  from  a  real  insight  into 
the  nature  of  reason  itself.  This  agnosticism  is  more  whole- 
some, both  speculatively  and  practically,  than  the  crude 
gnosticism  of  popular  thinking.  Such  fictitious  gnosticism 
is  one  great  obstacle  to  progress  in  the  world  of  thought. 
It  is  the  prolific  source  of  speculative  conceits  and  of  mis- 
chievous practical  negations ;  and  one  of  the  chief  duties 
of  criticism  is  to  show  its  fictitious  character. 

The  method  pursued  in  the  discussion  depends  on  peda- 


PREFACE  V 

gogical  reasons.  A  direct  abstract  discussion  would  be  far 
shorter  and,  for  the  practised  reader,  more  satisfactory.  But 
it  would  be  intelligible  to  only  a  few,  and  they  would  not 
need  it.  For  the  sake  of  being  understood,  to  say  nothing 
of  producing  conviction,  it  is  necessary  to  start  from  the 
stand-point  of  popular  thought  and  to  return  to  it  at  each 
new  start.  In  this  way  it  becomes  possible  to  show  the 
thinker  on  the  sense  plane  the  dialectic  which  is  implicit 
in  his  own  position,  and  which  compels  him  to  move  on 
if  thought  is  to  reach  anything  sure  and  steadfast.  Unless 
this  method  is  borne  in  mind  it  would  be  easy  to  find  the 
discussion  in  constant  contradiction  with  itself.  A  great 
deal  of  the  argument  is  carried  on  on  the  basis  of  the  pop- 
ular realism,  but  only  for  the  sake  of  showing  the  popular 
speculator  the  impossibility  of  reaching  anything  final  on 
that  basis,  and  thus  preparing  him  to  appreciate  the  more 
excellent  way.  This  method  involves  much  repetition,  but 
it  is  pedagogically  necessary  in  the  present  stage  of  specu- 
lative development. 

That  there  is  a  place  for  metaphysics  would  be  more  gen- 
erally admitted  now  than  when  the  first  edition  of  the  work 
was  published.  Then  metaphysics  was  to  some  a  stumbling- 
block,  and  to  others  foolishness,  and  even  a  mark  of  mental 
degeneration.  In  King  Bomba's  army,  it  is  said,  a  part  of 
the  drill  consisted  in  making  ferocious  grimaces,  which  were 
expected  to  strike  terror  into  the  enemy.  Faccia  feroce 
was  the  word  of  command.  Many  of  the  opponents  of 
metaphysics  would  seem  to  have  adopted  similar  tactics 
and  make  ferocious  faces  whenever  the  subject  is  mention- 
ed. But  the  device  is  fast  becoming  ineffectual.  There  is 
a  growing  insight  into  the  fact  that  metaphysics  underlies 
all  thinking  and  all  science.  The  important  factor  in  both 
is  not  the  bare  fact  of  experience,  but  the  metaphysical 
notions  whereby  we  form  and  interpret  experience.  Most 


Vi  PREFACE 

beliefs  are  but  implications  of  a  system  of  metaphysics,  con- 
sciously or  unconsciously  held ;  and  they  run  back  to  that 
system  for  their  justification.  The  great  debates  of  the 
time  are  essentially  metaphysical.  The  debaters  seldom  sus- 
pect it ;  and  yet  both  parties  are  busy  with  the  nature  of 
being,  and  with  the  antitheses  of  matter  and  spirit,  neces- 
sity and  freedom,  mechanism  and  purpose,  appearance  and 
reality,  finite  and  infinite.  The  phenomena  of  the  system 
are  the  same  for  all ;  the  dispute  concerns  their  interpreta- 
tion; and  this,  in  turn,  depends  entirely  upon  our  meta- 
physics. And,  wittingly  or  unwittingly,  we  all  have  a 
metaphysics.  Since,  then,  we  must  use  metaphysical  con- 
ceptions, whether  we  will  or  not,  it  is  well  to  make  these 
notions  the  subject  of  a  special  inquiry,  with  the  aim  of 
fixing  their  value  and  significance.  This  is  all  the  more 
desirable  from  the  fact  that  the  pretended  renunciation  of 
metaphysics  always  has  the  practical  result  of  assuming 
without  criticism  a  very  definite  system  of  metaphysics— 
generally  a  mechanical  and  materialistic  fatalism.  This 
work  is  meant  as  such  an  inquiry.  It  is  by  no  means  a 
"  mental  philosophy,"  which  is  the  common  understanding 
of  metaphysics ;  it  is  rather  an  exposition  of  our  fundamen- 
tal philosophical  concepts,  their  contents  and  implications. 
The  clearing  up  of  these  concepts  is  the  supreme  condition 
of  philosophical  progress. 

We  note  this  first  in  cosmology.  Every  one  familiar  with 
cosmological  speculation  will  recognize  that  the  bulk  of  it 
has  rested  upon  the  crudest  possible  metaphysical  concep- 
tions, and  that  it  would  vanish  of  itself  if  these  conceptions 
were  clarified.  Popular  theories  of  evolution,  the  "  new 
philosophy,"  etc.,  operate  with  vague  notions  of  nature, 
mechanism,  continuity,  necessity ;  and  of  course  the  lower 
mechanical  categories  are  accepted  as  first  and  final  with- 
out the  slightest  suspicion  of  their  confusion  and  contradio- 


PREFACE  vii 

tion  when  thus  regarded.  Out  of  this  speculative  chaos  we 
can  emerge  only  by  subjecting  these  fundamental  notions 
to  a  searching  criticism. 

But  the  need  of  this  criticism  is  most  marked  in  psychol- 
ogy. Current  psychology,  especially  of  the  "synthetic" 
sort,  has  erred  and  strayed  from  the  way,  beyond  anything 
possible  to  lost  sheep,  because  of  the  unclear  or  inadmis- 
sible metaphysical  notions  with  which  it  operates.  We  have, 
first,  an  attempt  to  construe  the  mental  life  in  terms  of 
mechanism  or  of  the  lower  categories.  This  has  led  to  the 
most  extraordinary  mythology,  in  which  mental  states  are 
hypostasi/ed,  impossible  dynamic  relations  feigned,  logical 
identities  mistaken  for  objective  temporal  identities;  and 
then  the  entire  fiction,  which  exists  only  in  and  through 
thought,  is  mistaken  for  the  generator  of  thought.  Here 
again  nothing  but  criticism  can  aid  us.  We  must  inquire 
what  our  "  synthesis  "  is  to  mean,  and  what  the  factors  are 
which  are  to  be  "synthesized,"  and  what  are  the  logical 
conditions  of  such  a  synthesis.  This  inquiry  cannot  be  dis- 
pensed with  by  issuing  cards  of  questions  to  nurses  and 
young  mothers,  or  by  rediscovering  world-old  items  of 
knowledge  by  the  easy  process  of  constructing  new  names 
for  them.  The  dictionary  may  be  enriched  in  this  way, 
and  charming  stories  gathered  concerning  the  age  at  which 
"  our  little  one  began  to  take  notice,"  but  this  journalistic 
method  is  more  likely  to  contribute  to  the  "  gayety  of  na- 
tions "  than  to  psychological  insight.  Neither  can  we  long 
dispense  with  the  inquiry  by  the  severities  of  quotation- 
marks,  or  by  assuming  a  superior  manner  and  claiming  for 
the  new  psychology  everything  in  sight.  This  method  also 
is  losing  its  effectiveness. 

The  metaphysics  and  logical  structure  of  psychology  are 
in  great  need  of  critical  examination.  Its  practical  appli- 
cations are  in  equal  need  of  illumination.  The  mechanical 


Viu  PREFACE 

psychology  of  sense-bound  thought  has  overflowed,  with  no 
small  damage,  into  the  field  of  popular  education.  In  many 
cases  sheer  fictions  and  illusions  are  taught  for  truth,  or  are 
made  the  basis  of  educational  procedure.  And  when  no  posi- 
tive damage  is  done,  the  result  is  still  barrenness  and  waste 
of  time.  Much  of  the  information  given  seems  to  be  about 
on  a  level  with  that  which  M.  Jourdain  received  from  his 
teacher  in  philosophy.  He  learned  that  there  are  two 
classes  of  letters,  vowels  and  consonants,  and  two  kinds  of 
composition,  prose  and  poetry,  and  that  he  had  been  talk- 
ing prose  all  his  life  without  knowing  it,  and  that  when  he 
pronounced  the  vowel  O  he  pursed  his  lips  into  a  circular 
form,  and  elongated  them  when  pronouncing  A.  He  also 
learned  how  to  tell  by  the  almanac  when  the  moon  was 
shining.  M.  Jourdain  was  so  enchanted  with  this  informa- 
tion that  he  thought  hardly  of  his  parents  for  neglecting 
his  instruction  in  his  youth,  and  also  gave  himself  great 
airs,  on  the  strength  of  the  new  education,  when  he  met 
Madame  Jourdain  and  Nicole,  the  domestic.  Not  a  little 
of  popular  pedagogics  is  of  this  barren  and  inflating  sort. 
Knowledge  still  puifeth  up. 

And  sometimes  the  matter  is  even  worse.  This  thing  hav- 
ing become  the  fad,  the  intellectually  defenceless  among 
teachers  and  those  who  would  be  thought  wise  are  intimi- 
dated into  accepting  it.  Hans  Christian  Andersen's  story, 
a  little  modified,  well  illustrates  the  situation.  Two  knaves 
set  up  a  loom  in  the  market-place  and  gave  out  that  they 
were  weaving  fabrics  of  wondrous  beauty  and  value.  To 
be  sure,  nothing  could  be  seen ;  but  they  set  forth  that 
whoever  failed  to  see  the  goods  was  thereb}T  shown  to  be 
unfit  for  his  place.  Accordingly  everybody,  from  the  king 
down,  saw  the  things  and  praised  them ;  and  nobody  dared 
to  let  on,  for  fear  of  being  thought  unfit  for  his  place.  And 
they  bought  the  goods,  to  the  knaves'  great  profit,  and  ar- 


PREFACE  ix 

rayed  themselves,  and  marched  in  procession  in  their  imagi- 
nary attire.  And  still  nobody  dared  to  let  on,  until  a  small 
boy,  of  unsophisticated  vision,  called  out :  "Why,  they  haven't 
got  their  clothes  on  !"  This  broke  the  spell.  Intimidations 
of  this  sort  are  all  too  common  in  the  pedagogical  world  at 
present.  And  they  will  remain  until  an  era  of  criticism  sets 
in.  Then  we  may  hope  to  be  freed  from  the  mythologies  of 
the  mechanical  and  synthetic  psychology  and  from  the  mis- 
leading or  sterile  formulas  of  popular  pedagogics. 

For  this  desirable  pedagogical  reform,  it  is  necessary  that 
we  distinguish  more  carefully  between  theoretical  and  prac- 
tical psychology.  Most  theoretical  psychology  is  practically 
barren.  If  necessary  as  a  sufficient  reason  for  the  facts,  it 
nevertheless  often  leads  to  nothing.  Power  over  the  facts, 
whether  in  education  or  in  society,  is  not  gained  by  study- 
ing psychological  theories,  but  by  observation  and  practice 
and  by  experience  of  life  and  men.  Preparing  for  an  ath- 
letic feat  by  a  detailed  study  of  anatomy  would  not  be  more 
hopeless  or  irrational  than  preparation  for  teaching,  or  for 
practically  influencing  men,  by  a  devout  study  of  psycho- 
logical theory.  By  insisting  on  this  distinction  we  shall 
put  an  end  to  the  pathetic  and  costly  illusion  which  has  led 
to  so  much  misdirected  and  wasted  effort  on  the  part  of 
young  teachers.  And  this  is  to  be  desired,  even  if  some 
chairs  of  pedagogy  have  to  be  declared  vacant. 

My  previous  work,  the  Theory  of  Thought  and  Knowledge, 
finds  its  completion  in  this.  The  two  together  give  an  out- 
line of  the  problems  of  speculative  thought,  and  "  set  forth 
a  general  way  of  looking  at  things,  which,  I  trust,  will  be 
found  consistent  with  itself  and  with  the  general  facts  of 
experience." 

BOKDEN  P.    BOWNE. 
BOSTON,  May,  1898. 


CONTENTS 


PAO» 

INTRODUCTION 1 

Aim  and  Field  of  Metaphysics,  p.  1 ;  Theoretical  and  Practical  Im- 
portance of  the  Study,  p.  2 ;  Relation  of  Metaphysics  to  Expe- 
rience, p.  5 ;  Appearance  and  Reality,  p.  7  ;  Different  Kinds  of 
Reality,  p.  8. 


PART  I.— Ontology 

CHAPTER  I 
THE  NOTION  OP  BEING 13 

Different  Meanings  of  Being,  p.  13  ;  Pure  Being  a  Logical  Abstrac- 
tion and  Impossible  in  Reality,  p.  14 ;  Phenomenal  and  Ontological 
Reality,  p.  16  ;  Only  Active  Being  is  Ontological,  p.  17 ;  Doctrine 
of  Inherence,  p.  19  ;  Power  an  Abstraction,  p.  20. 

CHAPTER  II 
THE  NATURE  OF  THINGS 29 

Terms  Defined,  p.  29 ;  Nature  not  Found  in  Sense  Qualities,  p.  81 ; 
Herbart  Criticised,  p.  33  ;  Meaning  of  Quality,  p.  34  ,  Qualities  in 
General  cannot  Express  the  Nature  of  a  Thing,  p.  36;  Nature 
Found  in  the  Law  of  Activity,  p.  39. 

CHAPTER  IH 

CHANGE  AND  IDENTITY 44 

Change  Defined,  p.  46;  Being  as  Flowing  Process,  p.  47;  Attempts 
to  Reconcile  Change  and  Identity  :  Popular  View,  Physicists' 
View,  Herbart's  View,  p.  50 ;  Meaning  of  Sameness,  p.  54 ;  A 
Changing  Thing  a  Series  of  Different  Things,  p.  56 ;  Criticism  of 


Xii  CONTENTS 

the  Heraclitic  View,  p.  60  ;  Irreconcilability  of  Change  and  Iden- 
tity on  the  Impersonal  Plane,  p.  62 ;  Solution  Possible  only  in 
Conscious  Intelligence,  p.  63  ;  Intelligence  cannot  be  Understood 
through  its  own  Categories,  p.  66. 

CHAPTER  IV  PAG. 

CAUSALITY 68 

Inductive  and  Productive  Causality  Distinguished,  p.  68 ;  Logical 
Presuppositions  of  Interaction,  p.  71;  Popular  Explanations  of  In- 
teraction, p.  74 ;  Interaction  of  Independent  Things  a  Contradic- 
tion, p.  79 ;  The  Interaction  of  the  Many  Possible  only  through 
the  Immanent  Action  of  the  One,  p.  81 ;  Causality  in  Succession, 
p.  84  ;  Contradictions  in  the  Idea,  p.  85  ;  Unity  and  Causality  both 
Impossible  on  the  Impersonal  Plane,  p.  88. 

CHAPTER  V 
THE  WORLD-GROUND 94 

The  Infinite  not  Substance  but  Cause,  p.  94 ;  The  Finite  not  a  Part 
or  Mode  of  the  Infinite,  p.  96 ;  Impersonal  Things  only  Phenom- 
ena, p.  99  ;  The  Finite  Spirit  a  Creation,  p.  99  ;  Difficulties  in  Pan- 
theism, p.  102  ;  The  Nature  and  Purpose  of  the  Infinite  the  Sole 
Determining  Ground  of  the  Finite,  p.  104;  Truth  itself  Depend- 
ent on  the  Infinite,  p.  107;  Nothingness  of  Non-Theistic  Schemes, 
p.  Ill  ;  Origin  of  such  Schemes  in  Sense  Thinking,  p.  113  ;  Per- 
sonality of  the  Infinite,  p.  115. 


PART  II.— Cosmology 

CHAPTER  I 
SPACE 123 

Three  Views  of  Space,  p.  126  ;  Difficulties  in  Popular  View,  p.  128  ; 
Space  as  Order  of  Independent  Relations,  p.  134  ;  Space  as  Ideal, 
p.  137 ;  Misconceptions  of  the  Ideal  View,  p.  137 ;  Objections 
drawn  from  Epistemology,  p.  149 ;  Identity  of  the  Object  not 
Secured  by  Being  in  Real  Space,  but  by  Being  a  Factor  of  the  Ra- 
tional World,  p.  152  ;  Space  of  N  Dimensions,  p.  152. 


CONTENTS  xiii 

CHAPTER   II  PAGE 

TIME 164 

No  Proper  Intuition  of  Time,  p.  164  ;  Unclearness  of  Popular  View, 
p.  167  ;  Standing  and  Flowing  Time  alike  Contradictory,  p.  169  ; 
No  Assignable  Relation  between  Time  and  Events,  p.  171 ;  Un- 
successful Attempts  to  Reach  Timelessness,  p.  175 ;  Idealistic  View 
Expounded,  p.  180  ;  Failure  of  Ideal  View  so  long  as  Extra-Men- 
tal Reality  is  Allowed,  p.  183  ;  Time  must  be  Construed  with  Ref- 
erence to  Self-Consciousness,  p.  184  ;  Relativity  of  Time,  p.  188  ; 
Relation  of  the  Infinite  to  Time,  p.  189  ;  Result,  p.  193. 

CHAPTER  III 
MATTER,  FORCE,  AND  MOTION 195 

Matter,  p.  195  ;  Plausibility  of  Atomism,  p.  196  ;  Source  of  the  Il- 
lusion, p.  197  ;  Varieties  of  Atomism,  p.  198  ;  Strength  and  Weak- 
ness of  Corpuscular  Atomism,  p.  200 ;  Force,  p.  205  ;  Confusion  in 
the  Notion,  p.  206  ;  Laws  of  Force  -Variation,  p.  210  ;  Action  at  a 
Distance  both  Necessary  and  Absurd,  p.  213  ;  Motion,  p.  217;  Laws 
of  Motion  no  Necessities  of  Thought,  p.  227;  Theoretical  Mechan- 
ics an  Abstraction,  p.  241  ;  Mechanics  only  a  Science  of  Phenom- 
ena at  best,  and  largely  only  a  Device  of  Method,  p.  241. 

CHAPTER  IV 
NATURE 244 

Nature  as  an  Idea  of  the  Reason,  p.  244;  Nature  as  Matter  and  Force, 
p.  247;  Nature  as  Mechanism,  p.  248  ;  Complexity  and  Barrenness 
of  Ontological  Mechanism,  p.  251  ;  Nature  as  the  Order  of  Law, 
p.  257  ;  Nature  as  Continuous,  p.  263 ;  Confusion  in  the  Notion 
of  Continuity,  p.  263 ;  Continuity  of  Law  the  Only  Continuity, 
p  267 ;  Evolution,  p.  271  ;  Double  Meaning  of  Evolution,  p.  271  ; 
Evolution  as  a  Theory  of  Causation  is  Bad  Metaphysics  Produced 
by  Bad  Logic,  p.  276  ;  Natural  Selection,  p.  279;  Nature  as  the 
System  of  Finite,  p.  283  ;  Natural  and  Supernatural,  p.  285  ;  Mir- 
acles, p.  289  ;  Nature  as  Idea,  p.  294. 


PART  III.— Psychology 

CHAPTER  I 
THE  SOUL 299 

Meaning  of  Materialism,  p.  300  ;  Difficulties  of  Materialism,  p.  303 ; 


xiv  CONTENTS 

Monism,  p.  314 ;  Difficulties  of  Monism,  p.  314 ;  Psychology  of 
Materialism,  p.  316  ;  Epistemology  of  Materialism,  p.  319 ;  Nat 
ural  Selection  as  a  Principle  of  Belief,  p.  321 ;  Kant's  Objections 
to  Rational  Psychology  Considered,  p.  332 ;  Scruples  Concerning 
the  Being  and  Identity  of  the  Soul,  p.  336  ;  Result,  p.  344. 

CHAPTER  II  pAO« 

SOUL  AND  BODY 349 

Interaction  of  Soul  and  Body  as  Concomitant  Variation  of  Both, 
p.  350  ;  Conservation  of  Energy,  p.  352  ;  Body  as  Organism,  p.  355 ; 
Origin  of  the  Organism,  p.  356  ;  Mechanism  and  Vitalism,  p.  357 ; 
Difficulties  in  Both,  p.  357;  A  Special  Subject  Needed  for  the 
Apparent  Mental  Life,  p.  367 ;  The  Infinite  the  Source  of  both  Soul 
and  Body,  p.  368  ;  The  Concomitance  of  the  Physical  and  the 
Mental  Series  not  Absolute,  p.  370  ;  Origin  of  Souls,  p.  372  ;  Un- 
tenability  of  Traducianism,  p.  373 ;  Heredity,  its  Difficulties,  p. 
375  ;  The  Future  of  Souls,  p.  378  ;  Speculation  Destroys  Knowl- 
edge but  Makes  Room  for  Belief,  p.  379. 

CHAPTER  III 
OP  MENTAL  MECHANISM 381 

No  Mechanical  Representation  of  Mental  Activities  Possible,  p.  383  : 
Difficulties  in  the  Notion  of  a  Mental  Mechanism,  p.  384 ;  Her- 
bart's  View  Criticised,  p.  388 ;  The  English  Associationalists,  p. 
390  ;  Reproduction,  p.  391 ;  Memory  Explained  by  Nothing  but 
Itself,  p.  393  ;  Cerebral  Reproduction,  p.  396  ;  Mechanical  Explana- 
tion in  Psychology  purely  Fictitious,  p.  399. 

CHAPTER  IV 
FKEEDOM  AND  NECESSITY 404 

Freedom  Denned,  p.  405 ;  Freedom  in  Intelligence,  p.  406  ;  Signifi- 
cance of  Freedom  for  Science  and  Philosophy,  p.  407  ;  Metaphys- 
ics of  Necessity,  p.  410  ;  Mistaken  Notions  of  Freedom,  p.  410 ; 
Freedom  and  Science,  p.  413 ;  Freedom  and  the  Law  of  Causation, 
p.  414. 

CONCLUSION „ 431 


INTRODUCTION 


THE  problems  of  speculative  philosophy  may  be  summed 
up  in  two  questions:  How  is  knowledge  possible?  and, 
What  is  reality?  The  former  question  belongs  to  episte- 
mology ;  the  latter  belongs  to  metaphysics.  The  first  ques- 
tion has  been  discussed  in  a  previous  volume,  the  Theory  of 
Thought  and  Knowledge.  The  second  question  is  now  to 
be  considered. 

The  nature  of  reality,  then,  is  our  subject.  But  we  do 
not  aim  at  a  detailed  knowledge  of  particular  things,  such 
as  the  special  sciences  might  give,  but  rather  at  an  outline 
conception  of  reality,  within  which  all  knowledge  of  par- 
ticular things  must  fall,  and  by  which  such  knowledge  must 
be  judged.  There  are  certain  general  conceptions  which 
make  up  at  once  the  framework  of  knowledge  and  the 
framework  of  existence.  Such  are  the  categories  of  being 
and  cause,  change  and  identity,  space  and  time;  and  our 
knowledge  of  particular  things  will  depend  on  the  concep- 
tion we  form  of  these  basal  categories.  Epistemology  has 
shown  them  to  be  principles  of  thought;  metaphysics  in- 
quires into  their  real  significance.  Our  work  will  largely 
consist  in  a  study  of  the  ontological  meaning  of  the  cate- 
gories, either  in  themselves  or  in  their  specifications.  Thus 
we  mark  off  our  field  from  that  of  the  special  sciences. 

The  need  of  the  metaphysical  inquiry  has  a  double  root. 


2  METAPHYSICS 

In  the  first  place,  the  categories  are  primarily  principles  of 
thought.  Kant  claimed  that  they  are  only  such  principles, 
and  have  no  significance  for  reality  in  itself.  In  this  way 
he  overturned  his  own  system ;  for  reality  becomes  only  a 
form  of  words  when  the  categories  are  denied  all  objective 
validity.  At  the  same  time,  it  is  clear  that  there  is  a  great 
deal  that  is  purely  formal  and  relative  in  the  use  of  the 
categories,  and  that  by  no  means  corresponds  to  any  ob- 
jective fact.  We  may  also  be  quite  sure  of  the  validity  of 
the  formal  principle,  without  being  clear  as  to  the  form  in 
which  the  principle  must  be  objectively  conceived.  Thus, 
we  may  have  no  doubt  respecting  the  objective  reality  of 
causality  or  identity,  and  still  be  very  much  in  the  dark 
as  to  the  form  in  which  real  causality  or  identity  exists. 
Hence,  after  epistemology  has  established  the  formal  prin- 
ciples, it  remains  for  metaphysics  to  fix  their  ontological 
form  and  significance. 

In  the  next  place,  these  fundamental  notions  are  always 
loosely  and  often  contradictorily  conceived  in  popular  think- 
ing. There  is  a  natural  metaphysics  in  spontaneous  thought; 
but  it  is  not  wrought  out  into  any  clearly  conceived  and 
harmonious  system.  Our  practical  thinking  is  moulded  by 
practical  needs;  and  we  never  spontaneously  give  any 
greater  precision  to  our  ideas  than  practice  calls  for.  More- 
over, these  ideas,  in  unreflective  thought,  largely  take  their 
form  from  our  sense  -  experience,  and  thus  acquire  a  me- 
chanical and  materialistic  character.  This  does  little  harm 
while  thought  remains  instinctive ;  but  when  reflection  be- 
gins, and  these  loose  and  one-sided  notions  are  taken  for 
the  fact,  then  their  parallax  with  reality  is  magnified  until 
there  results  some  grotesque  absurdity  or  some  pernicious 
untruth.  Then  extended  matter  tends  to  become  the  typ- 
ical and  exclusive  conception  of  substance,  and  mechanical 
action  becomes  the  sum  of  causality.  The  result  is  a  reign 


INTRODUCTION  3 

of  materialism,  or  a  conflict  of  science  and  religion,  or  some 
other  such  unprofitable  aberration.  These  things  arise  al- 
most exclusively  from  imperfect  conceptions  of  the  cate- 
gories, and  especially  from  determining  their  contents  by 
appeals  to  sense  experience. 

Thus  the  metaphysical  inquiry  appears  to  be  a  matter  of 
both  theoretical  and  practical  importance.  It  is  theoretical- 
ly important,  in  order  to  escape  a  shallow  dogmatism  on 
the  one  hand,  and  a  self -destructive  subjectivism  on  the 
other.  It  is  practically  important,  in  order  to  lift  popular 
thought  from  the  sense-plane,  where  it  is  perpetually  tempt- 
ed to  run  off  into  necessity,  mechanism,  and  materialism. 
The  aberrations  of  philosophy  are  largely  due  to  miscon- 
ceptions of  the  categories ;  and  both  the  reform  and  the 
progress  of  philosophy  depend  on  a  profounder  insight  into 
their  true  meaning  and  implications. 

The  question,  What  is  reality  ?  can  only  be  answered  by 
telling  how  we  must  think  about  reality.  We  have  no 
means  of  dealing  with  reality  other  than  through  the  con- 
ceptions we  form  of  it.  This  fact  has  led  to  the  sceptical 
suggestion  that  we  can  never  tell  whether  our  conceptions 
correspond  to  reality.  To  this  the  answer  is  that  this  "cor- 
respondence "  is  itself  a  very  crude  and  obscure  notion.  The 
only  correspondence  which  our  conceptions  can  have  con- 
sists in  their  validity  for  the  things.  There  can  be  no  cor- 
respondence in  the  sense  that  we  can  first  know  things  by 
themselves,  and  then  form  conceptions  of  the  things  already 
known,  and  finally  compare  the  things  and  the  conceptions 
in  order  to  note  their  correspondence.  This  would  indeed 
be  a  roundabout  way  of  knowing,  and  would  involve  works 
of  supererogation.  The  validity  is  the  only  correspondence, 
and  this  can  be  determined  only  by  the  self  -  evidence  or 
necessity  with  which  the  conception  imposes  itself  upon  the 
mind. 


4:  METAPHYSICS 

Again,  the  sceptical  suggestion  is  out  of  place  here. 
Before  we  can  decide  whether  our  thought  of  reality  is 
valid  for  reality,  we  must  first  find  out  what  that  thought 
really  is.  "We  have  just  pointed  out  that  the  natural  meta- 
physics of  spontaneous  thought  is  loosely  and  carelessly  con- 
ceived. It  serves  for  practical  purposes  as  long  as  we  con- 
fine ourselves  to  the  daily  round,  but  it  by  no  means  gives, 
us  the  final  results  of  the  reflective  and  critical  reason. 
Hence,  before  we  raise  the  sceptical  question,  we  must  make 
a  critical  study  of  thought  itself,  with  the  aim  of  clarifying 
our  ideas,  adjusting  their  mutual  relations,  and  determining 
what  the  essential  utterances  of  reason  are  in  matters  of 
metaphysics.  To  consider  the  sceptical  question  before  mak- 
ing this  inquiry  is  to  open  the  way  to  endless  paralogism, 
and  logical  inconsequence.  And  when  the  final  utterances 
of  reason  have  been  reached,  if  they  prove  clear  and  con- 
sistent among  themselves,  and  cogent  in  their  evidence,  there 
will  be  little  difficulty  in  getting  them  accepted  in  spite  of 
the  sceptic. 

What  is  reality?  How  can  we  answer  this  question 
otherwise  than  by  opening  our  eyes  and  telling  what  we 
see?  or  by  looking  into  experience  and  reporting  what  we 
find  ?  This  is  a  very  natural  question,  and  for  all  those  on 
the  sense  plane  it  is  decisive.  But,  at  a  very  early  date  in 
the  history  of  reflective  thought,  it  became  clear  that  the 
conceptions  we  spontaneously  and  unreflectingly  form  are 
not  those  in  which  we  can  finally  rest.  If  we  attempt  to 
rest  in  things  as  they  appear,  we  find  ourselves  involved  in 
all  manner  of  difficulties;  and  thus  \ve  are  compelled  to 
revise  our  conceptions  until  we  make  them  mutually  con- 
sistent and  adequate  to  the  function  they  have  to  perform 
in  our  thought  system.  In  this  way  arises  the  distinction 
between  appearance  and  reality,  or  between  things  as  they 
appear  and  things  as  we  must  think  of  them;  and  thus, 


INTRODUCTION  5 

finally,  the  problem  of  metaphysics  becomes  a  question  for 
thought,  and  not  one  which  can  be  answered  by  sense 
intuition. 

Nevertheless,  the  facts  of  experience  furnish  the  data  of 
the  problem.  We  have  no  way  of  creating  reality,  and  we 
also  have  no  such  apriori  insight  into  its  nature  that  we  can 
tell  in  advance  what  reality  must  be.  Some  speculators, 
indeed,  have  fancied  that  some  such  thing  might  be  possible, 
but  this  dream  now  finds  few  upholders.  We  must  wait 
for  reality  to  reveal  itself,  and  our  utmost  hope  is  to  under- 
stand it. 

Our  method,  then,  is  critical,  not  creative.  Experience, 
as  a  whole,  is  our  datum,  and  the  question  is,  How  must  we 
think  about  reality  on  the  basis  of  this  experience  as  inter- 
preted by  thought  ?  We  take,  then,  everything  as  it  seems 
to  be,  or  as  it  reports  itself,  and  make  only  such  changes  as 
are  necessary  to  make  our  conceptions  adequate  and  har- 
monious. The  reasons  for  doubt  and  modification  are  to 
be  sought  entirely  in  the  subject-matter,  and  not  in  the 
possibility  of  verbal  doubt.  This  method  allows  reason  its 
full  rights,  and  it  also  saves  the  natural  sense  of  reality, 
which  can  never  be  needlessly  violated  with  impunity.  We 
take  the  theory  of  things  which  is  formed  by  spontaneous 
thought,  and  make  it  the  text  for  a  critical  exegesis  in  the 
hope  of  making  it  adequate  and  consistent.  The  method 
is  one  of  faith,  and  not  of  scepticism. 

This  thought  deserves  further  emphasis.  Oversight  of  it 
is  at  the  bottom  of  the  popular  notion  that  philosophy  leads 
to  scepticism,  and  also  of  the  popular  scepticism  of  philo- 
sophical conclusions.  Neither  science  nor  philosophy  denies 
anything  which  the  senses  give ;  though  both  find  reason 
for  denying  that  the  senses  give  as  much  as  uncritical 
thought  assumes.  Both  make  the  data  of  the  senses  a  start- 
ing-point, and  on  them  they  build  up  a  rational  system. 


6  METAPHYSICS 

But  this  system  is  never  a  matter  of  the  senses,  but  an  in- 
ference from  their  data.  Both  physics  and  metaphysics 
carry  us  at  once  into  a  world  of  realities  whose  existence 
and  nature  can  be  assured  only  by  thought.  The  conclu- 
sions drawn  in  both  cases  seem  monstrous  when  judged  by 
the  standard  of  the  senses;  but,  then,  they  are  not  to  be 
judged  by  that  standard.  And,  upon  reflection,  it  turns  out 
that  the  two  sets  of  views  are  not  properly  contradictory. 
The  sense  view  furnishes  the  data,  the  rational  view  inter- 
prets them.  In  so  doing  it  assumes  the  truth  of  the  sense 
view  within  its  own  sphere.  The  visible  heavens  and  the 
astronomical  heavens  are  not  in  contradiction.  The  astrono- 
mer makes  the  visible  heavens  his  starting-point,  and  he 
finds  that  they  force  him  to  affirm  the  astronomical  heav- 
ens. Each  view,  in  its  place,  is  correct,  and  neither  denies 
the  other.  But  if  the  rustic  should  attempt  to  demolish 
the  Copernican  theory  by  appealing  to  the  senses,  no 
one  would  pay  any  attention  to  him,  for  every  one  now 
recognizes  that  the  senses  have  no  jurisdiction  in  the 
matter. 

The  application  to  philosophical  theory  is  evident.  Here, 
too,  we  begin  with  the  data  of  experience,  but  we  do  not 
end  with  them.  We  find  ourselves  compelled  to  transcend 
them  by  giving  them  a  rational  interpretation.  And  as  it 
is  no  objection  to  physics  and  astronomy  that  the  atoms 
and  the  ether  cannot  be  seen,  or  that  the  heavens  seem  to 
contradict  Copernicus,  so  it  is  no  objection  to  philosophy 
that  its  theories  cannot  be  verified  by  the  senses.  If,  then, 
in  the  following  discussions,  many  things  are  found  which 
are  violent  and  even  monstrous  paradoxes,  when  measured 
by  sense-appearance,  the  reader  is  begged  to  remember  that 
we  do  not  recognize  that  standard  as  a  measure  of  rational 
truth,  any  more  than  the  physicist  recognizes  it  as  a  test 
of  his  theories.  In  both  cases,  if  the  conclusions  are  soundly 


INTRODUCTION  7 

inferred  from  unquestionable  premises,  they  must  be  al- 
lowed, no  matter  what  bends  or  breaks. 

But,  before  going  further,  this  distinction  of  appearance 
and  reality  needs  a  word  of  elucidation  to  save  us  from 
falling  into  a  verbal  snare.  Appearance  and  reality,  phe- 
nomena and  noumena,  are  phrases  which  are  often  loosely 
used.  Appearance  often  has  the  sense  of  illusion  and  decep- 
tion, a  fiction  of  the  disordered  fancy,  or  a  product  of 
pathological  conditions ;  and  this  meaning  has  so  infected  the 
word  itself  that  it  is  difficult  to  use  it  without  suggesting 
something  of  the  kind.  The  very  antithesis  of  appearance 
and  reality  seems  to  hand  appearance  over  to  unreality, 
and  thus  to  brand  it  as  fictitious.  The  antithesis  of  phe- 
nomena and  noumena,  because  of  its  connection  with  the 
Kantian  theory  of  knowledge,  has  the  same  misleading  sug- 
gestion. The  phenomenon  is  supposed  to  be  something 
which  ought  to  reveal  the  noumenon,  but  instead  of  so 
doing  hides  and  distorts  it.  The  noumenon,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  something  trying  to  peer  through  the  masking 
phenomenon,  but  failing  in  the  attempt. 

Now  it  is  plain  that  in  this  sense  the  apparent  or  phe- 
nomenal can  lead  to  no  insight  whatever.  The  appearance, 
as  fiction  and  illusion,  can  never  furnish  the  premises  for 
valid  conclusions  respecting  reality.  The  phenomenal,  as 
masking  or  distorting  the  noumenal,  can  never  give  any 
insight  into  the  real.  There  must,  then,  be  a  truth  in  the 
appearance  or  the  phenomenon,  if  it  is  to  help  us  to  any 
knowledge  of  the  real. 

The  true  order  is  this.  The  distinction  between  appear- 
ance and  reality  exists  for  spontaneous  thought  only  in  the 
form  which  makes  appearance  illusion.  But  as  thought  be- 
comes reflective  and  self-conscious,  we  discover  that  some 
elements  of  experience  are  given  in  sense-intuition,  and  that 
others  are  given  only  in  thought.  The  former  we  call  ap- 


8  METAPHYSICS 

pearances  or  phenomena ;  the  latter  we  call  noumena,  and, 
often,  reality.  If  the  term  noumenon  had  not  acquired  a 
misleading  connotation  through  its  Kantian  associations,  it 
would  exactly  express  the  antithesis.  It  is  the  thing  as 
thought,  in  distinction  from  the  thing  as  apparent.  Keality 
is  an  unhappy  expression  for  the  antithesis,  for  it  almost 
inevitably  suggests  that  the  appearance  is  illusion.  But 
the  apparent  also  is  real  in  a  way.  That  is,  it  is  no  illusion 
of  the  individual,  but  is  a  universal  or  common  element  in 
sense-intuition.  As  such  it  is  real,  in  distinction  from  phan- 
tasm and  error.  But,  as  being  an  effect  of  non- appearing 
causes,  it  is  nothing  substantial  and  is  only  apparent.  And 
reality,  as  the  antithesis  of  the  apparent,  can  only  mean  the 
ontological  and  causal  ground  of  the  apparent.  As  such  it 
can  be  reached  only  by  thought,  but  the  data  for  our  in- 
ference must  always  be  found  in  the  apparent. 

"We  may  say,  then,  that  both  the  phenomenal  and  the 
noumenal  are  real,  but  they  have  not  the  same  kind  of  real- 
ity. The  noumena  are  real  as  having  causality  and  sub- 
stantiality. The  phenomena  are  not  causal  or  substantial, 
but  they  are  real  in  the  sense  that  they  are  no  illusions  of 
the  individual,  but  are  abiding  elements  in  our  common 
sense-experience.  It  is  of  the  utmost  importance  for  under- 
standing the  movement  of  thought  that  these  two  senses  of 
reality  be  kept  distinct,  and  that  both  be  distinguished  from 
illusion  and  error. 

The  beginner  will  get  some  aid  to  understanding  by  re- 
flecting on  the  established  doctrine  concerning  the  sense- 
world.  There  is  universal  agreement  among  both  scientists 
and  philosophers  that  a  large  part  of  the  sense-world  has 
only  phenomenal  existence.  When  we  inquire  into  the 
causality  and  ontological  ground  of  that  world,  we  are 
taken  behind  it  into  a  thought-world,  and  are  told  that  this 
is  the  truly  real.  But  at  the  same  time  the  phenomenal 


INTRODUCTION  9 

world  remains  real  in  its  way.  It  forms  the  contents  of 
our  objective  experience,  and  is  the  field  in  which  we  all 
meet  in  mutual  understanding.  It  expresses,  then,  a  com- 
mon element  to  all,  and  is  no  private  fiction  of  the  individual. 
Concerning  it  the  proper  question  is  not,  Is  it  real?  but 
rather,  What  kind  of  reality  does  it  have  ? 

Let  us,  then,  instead  of  the  antithesis,  appearance  and 
reality,  or  phenomenon  and  noumenon,  rather  adopt  the 
antithesis,  phenomenal  reality  and  causal  or  ontological 
reality ;  and  let  the  task  of  metaphysics  be  conceived  as  an 
attempt  by  a  study  of  phenomenal  reality  to  pass  to  a  con- 
sistent and  adequate  conception  of  the  causal  reality.  When 
we  study  the  former  we  find  ourselves  unable  to  rest  in  it 
as  final ;  and  thus  are  compelled  to  pass  behind  the  intui- 
tions of  sense  to  the  unpicturable  constructions  of  thought. 

We  begin,  then,  with  the  data  of  experience  and  the  con- 
structions of  spontaneous  thought,  and  ask  what  changes 
the  reflective  and  critical  reason  calls  for  in  order  to  reach 
an  adequate  interpretation.  The  philosopher  has  no  recipe 
for  creation,  and  cheerfully  admits  that,  if  reality  did  not 
exist,  he  would  be  sadly  at  a  loss  to  produce  it.  Being  is 
a  perpetual  wonder  and  mystery,  which  our  logic  can  never 
deduce.  We  aim,  then,  to  tell,  not  how  being  exists  or  is 
made,  but  only  how  we  shall  think  of  it  as  it  exists,  or  after 
it  is  made.  If  we  were  trying  to  deduce  the  world  from 
the  absolute  stand-point,  we  might  take  the  high  apriori 
road  ;  but  as  our  aim  is  only  to  rationalize  and  comprehend 
experience,  we  must  begin  with  experience.  And  as  our 
most  fundamental  thought  of  reality  is  that  it  has  existence, 
we  begin  with  an  exposition  and  criticism  of  the  notion  of 
being. 


part  1 
ONTOLOGY 


CHAPTER  I 
THE  NOTION  OF  BEING 

BEING,  reality,  existence,  are  words  of  many  meanings. 
In  their  logical  use  they  are  not  limited  to  the  substantial, 
but  are  affirmed  of  thoughts,  feelings,  laws,  relations,  as  well 
as  of  things.  The  thought  we  think  is  real,  in  distinction 
from  others  which  we  do  not  think,  or  from  others — such 
as  contradictions — which  cannot  be  thought.  So,  also,  we 
speak  of  existing  laws  and  relations  as  real,  in  distinction 
from  others  which,  as  imaginary,  are  unreal.  Thus  it  ap- 
pears that  there  are  various  kinds  of  reality.  It  is  impor- 
tant to  keep  this  fact  in  mind,  and  to  remember  the  kind  of 
reality  which  is  possible  to  any  given  object  of  thought. 
Laws,  relations,  events,  appearances  are  real,  but  never  in 
the  sense  in  which  things  are  real.  The  reality  of  a  feeling 
is  in  being  felt,  that  of  an  event  is  in  its  occurrence,  that  of 
a  law  is  in  its  validity.  The  question  which  metaphysics 
proposes  is,  How  shall  we  think  of  the  reality  or  being  of 
things  ?  The  aim  is  not  to  construe  or  construct  existence, 
but  simply  to  find  out  what  we  mean  by  it,  or  what  con- 
ditions a  thing  must  satisfy  in  order  to  fill  out  our  notion 
of  being. 

And  first  we  must  guard  ourselves  against  a  logical 
snare,  the  fallacy  of  the  class  term  or  the  universal.  Log- 
ically considered,  every  object  is  a  determination  of  the  no- 
tion of  being.  The  category  appears  alike  in  all,  and  the 
difference  and  determination  are  found  in  the  attributes. 


14-  METAPHYSICS 

Logically,  then,  everything  is  an  accident  of  being ;  it  is  a 
determination  of  the  general  notion  to  a  particular  case  by 
means  of  some  specific  mark.  Hence  it  is  easy  to  imagine 
that  there  is  some  element  of  real  being,  corresponding  to 
the  concept,  which  is  common  to  all  objects,  and  which,  by 
receiving  particular  determinations,  becomes  the  particular 
and  specific  thing.  This  is  pure  being,  and,  as  such,  is  the 
necessary  presupposition  of  all  definite  and  particular  being. 
The  fallacy  here,  though  palpable,  has  been  the  source  of 
a  great  deal  of  speculation.  Logical  manipulation  has  been 
supposed  to  be  the  double  of  an  ontological  process.  The 
last  abstractions  of  logic  have  been  mistaken  for  the  basal 
forms  of  existence,  and  logical  subordination  has  passed  for 
ontological  implication.  We  borrow  from  logic  a  fe\v  prin- 
ciples bearing  on  the  matter : 

1.  Class  terms,  pure  being  among  the  rest,  may  be  valid 
for  reality,  but  they  never  can  be  ontological  facts.     Only 
the  definite  and  specific  can  be  real  in  this  sense.    The  con- 
cept, conceived  as  existing,  is  absurd. 

2.  Logical  manipulation  is  formal  only,  and  does  nothing 
to  the  things.     When  we  gather  many  individuals  into  a 
common  class,  they  remain  all  that  they  were  before.     No 
identity  is  created  and  no  difference  is  abolished. 

3.  In  concrete  and  complete  thinking  it  is  impossible  to 
pass  from  complexity  to  simplicity,  or  from  simplicity  to 
complexity,  from  definiteness  to  indefiniteness,  or  from  in- 
definiteness  to  definiteness,  so  long  as  we  remain  on  the 
impe^-onal  plane. 

These  principles  set  the  untenability  of  the  notion  of  pure 
being,  conceived  as  something  real,  in  a  clear  light.  Pure 
being  is  objectively  nothing ;  and  even  if  it  were  a  possible 
existence,  we  could  neither  reach  nor  use  it  without  bad 
logic.  Only  the  definite  can  exist ;  and  only  the  definite 
can  found  the  definite.  The  vast  amount  of  speculation, 


THE  NOTION   OF  BEING  15 

ancient  and  modern,  which  has  resulted  from  oversight  of 
this  principle  is  a  striking  testimony  to  the  power  of  the 
fallacy  of  the  universal.  All  the  schemes  for  evolving  def- 
initeness  from  indefiniteness,  difference  from  identity,  heter- 
ogeneity from  homogeneity,  are  cases  of  this  fallacy ;  and 
all  the  illustrations  of  the  process  consist  in  mistaking  in- 
definiteness for  the  senses,  or  with  relation  to  our  plans  or 
insight,  for  ontological  indefiniteness  in  reality  itself. 

But  this  result  is  more  negative  than  positive.  We  learn 
that  being  must  be  conceived  as  something  definite  and 
specific,  but  we  have  no  insight  into  the  meaning  of  being 
itself.  And  here  it  may  occur  to  us  that  no  such  insight 
can  be  given.  Being  is  a  simple  idea  and  admits  of  no 
explanation.  There  is  no  other  or  deeper  idea  by  which 
to  define  it. 

There  is  something  in  this,  but  it  is  irrelevant  to  our  pres- 
ent aim ;  for  if  we  allow  the  claim  just  made,  there  must 
always  be  some  mark  by  which  we  distinguish  being  from 
non-being,  or  because  of  which  we  declare  a  thing  to  exist 
rather  than  not  to  exist.  We  can  form  the  conception  of 
many  things,  some  of  which  may  exist  and  some  of  which 
may  not.  What,  now,  is  that  mark  common  to  the  existent 
and  absent  from  the  non-existent?  If  we  can  discover  this 
we  shall  have,  if  not  a  definition  of  being,  at  least  its  essen- 
tial characteristic. 

At  first  sight  this  question  seems  to  admit  of  a  very  easy 
answer.  Being  is  what  we  find  given  in  experience,  espe- 
cially in  sense  -  intuition.  All  of  these  things  and  persons 
about  us  are  what  we  mean  by  being.  The  mark  of  being 
is  to  be  found  pre-eminently  in  sense-phenomena.  The  real 
is  that  which  can  be  seen  and  touched.  But  even  common- 
sense  would  not  long  be  satisfied  with  this  view,  for  it  leads 
straight  to  idealism.  Common-sense  holds  that  things  exist 


16  METAPHYSICS 

when  unseen  and  untouched,  and  that  many  things  exist 
which  can  never  be  seen  or  touched.  Nor  would  common- 
sense  be  content  to  put  the  existence  even  of  material  ob- 
jects in  their  permanent  perceptibility  by  all  under  the 
proper  conditions.  A  regular  and  permanent  possibility  of 
phenomena  is  not  what  spontaneous  thought  means  by  a 
material  object.  It  holds  that  perception  recognizes  rather 
than  makes  things,  and,  hence,  that  their  being  is  more  than 
their  being  perceived. 

But  this  only  makes  it  the  more  important  to  know  what 
is  the  distinguishing  mark  of  being.  We  cannot  place  it 
in  the  presentation,  for  then  we  become  Berkeleians.  The 
essence  of  the  presentation  is  to  be  presented.  Its  being 
lies  in  its  being  perceived.  In  what,  then,  does  the  being 
of  the  thing,  which  is  more  than  perception,  consist  ?  After 
much  casting  about  in  thought,  it  appears  that  the  dis- 
tinctive mark  of  being  must  consist  in  some  power  of 
action.  Things,  when  not  perceived,  are  still  said  to  exist, 
because  of  the  belief  that,  though  not  perceived,  they  are 
in  interaction  with  one  another,  mutually  determining  and 
determined.  Real  things  are  distinguished  from  things  hav- 
ing only  conceptual  existence  by  this  power  and  fact  of 
action.  When  this  is  omitted,  the  things  vanish  into  pres- 
entations ;  and  unpresented  things  are  only  the  ghosts  of 
possible  presentations. 

We  reach  this  conclusion  as  the  only  means  of  saving 
ourselves  from  Berkeley.  We  reach  it  equally  by  observing 
the  function  of  the  notion.  The  phenomenal  world  mani- 
fests incessant  change  and  motion,  and  we  posit  being  as  its 
explanation.  We  cannot  rest  in  the  thought  of  a  groundless 
show,  and  we  have  to  pass  behind  these  movements,  these 
entrances  and  exits,  to  their  abiding  ontological  ground. 
We  supplement  the  phenomena  by  the  notion  of  an  agent 
or  agents  which  cause  them.  These  are  the  true  beings,  the 


THE  NOTION  OF  BEING  17 

real  grounds,  in  distinction  from  the  phenomenal  movement. 
Thus  it  appears  that  we  demand  of  being  that  it  shall  con- 
tain in  itself  the  ground  and  explanation  of  the  apparent 
order.  "When  we  grasp  this  fact  it  becomes  clear  that  being 
must  be  viewed  as  essentially  causal  and  active ;  for  any 
other  conception  makes  it  inadequate  to  its  function. 

The  formal  or  logical  category  of  being  may  possibly 
imply  nothing  beyond  itself.  But  when  we  ask  for  the 
metaphysical  significance  of  the  category,  it  turns  out  that 
the  notion  vanishes  altogether,  unless  it  take  up  into  itself 
the  thought  of  definiteness  and  the  thought  of  causality. 
Only  the  definite  and  only  the  active  can  be  viewed  as 
ontologically  real. 

The  great  difficulty  which  common  -  sense  will  find  in 
accepting  this  result  lies  in  its  failure  to  distinguish  between 
phenomenal  and  ontological  reality.  This  distinction  is 
undreamed  of  by  spontaneous  thought,  and  all  the  contents 
of  our  sense-intuition  are  viewed  as  equally  real,  and  as  real 
in  the  same  sense.  And  among  these  contents  we  find  a 
great  multitude  of  objects  which  are  undeniably  real,  and 
also  undeniably  inert  and  inactive.  Neither  the  notion  nor 
the  fact  of  being,  then,  has  any  necessary  connection  with 
causality. 

This  difficulty  vanishes  when  we~make  the  distinction 
referred  to.  By  common  consent,  there  is  a  great  deal  in 
the  apparent  world  which  is  no  ontological  fact.  If  we 
allow  matter  itself  to  be  a  true  substantial  existence,  and 
not  merely  a  manifestation  of  some  basal  power,  we  have 
to  admit  that  its  nature  is  altogether  different  from  what 
appears.  To  begin  with,  the  reality  of  matter  as  it  appears 
is  a  multitude  of  non-appearing  elements,  and  its  inaction  is 
only  in  seeming.  Apparent  matter  has  no  true  being ;  the 
elements  only  truly  exist.  And  these  elements  are  without 
the  properties  of  materiality  which  belong  to  the  mass,  but. 


^ 


crv 


18  METAPHYSICS 

by  their  interactions,  they  found  materiality.  Just  as  the 
elements  of  a  chemical  compound  have  not  the  properties  of 
the  compound,  but  produce  them,  so  the  elements  in  general 
have  not  the  properties  of  the  mass,  but  produce  them.  Xor 
does  the  mass  result  from  the  simple  juxtaposition  of  the 
elements,  as  a  heap  of  bricks  results  from  piling  single  bricks 
together,  but,  on  the  contrary,  the  relation  of  the  elements 
is  purely  dynamic.  The  solidity  of  the  mass  is  not  the  inte- 
gral of  the  solidities  of  the  elements,  but  depends  entirely 
upon  a  certain  balance  of  attraction  and  repulsion  among 
the  elements.  Its  resistance  to  fracture  and  extension,  also, 
depends  not  on  a  rigid  continuity  of  being,  but  on  the  attrac- 
tions which  hold  the  parts  together.  Hence  we  may  say 
that  materiality  is  but  the  phenomenal  product  of  a  dynam- 
ism beneath  it.  And  in  this  under-realm,  as  physics  teaches, 
all  is  incessant  activity.  Everything  stands  in  the  most  com- 
plex relations  of  interaction  to  everything  else.  When  this 
fact  is  fairly  grasped,  we  see  that  the  alleged  experience  of 
inactive  being  turns  out  to  be  only  an  experience  of  phe- 
nomena. Of  course  no  one  denies  the  phenomena  of  rest 
and  inaction,  but  physics  shows  that  they  are  only  the  phe- 
nomenal resultants  of  incessant  basal  activities.  Equilibrium 
is  balanced  action.  Rest  is  the  resultant  of  the  conspiring 
energies  of  the  system.  This  is  the  view  towards  which 
physics  tends,  and  any  other  would  result  in  making  matter 
a  pure  phenomenon.  Only  on  the  dynamic  theory  of  matter 
can  the  proper  existence  of  matter  be  affirmed. 

But,  it  will  be  further  urged,  surely  the  law  of  inertia  is 
one  of  the  best-established  laws  of  matter.  All  mechanical 
science  is  built  upon  it,  and  results  constantly  verify  it. 
This  objection,  also,  is  an  unfortunate  one.  It  rests  upon 
the  etymology  of  the  word  rather  than  a  knowledge  of  its 
meaning.  The  doctrine  has  a  double  signification.  It  first 
denies,  not  activity  on  the  part  of  a  material  element,  but 


THE  NOTION  OF  BEING  19 

only  spontaneity  with  regard  to  its  own  space -relations. 
An  element  cannot  change  its  own  space-relations  without 
the  aid  of  some  other.  If  at  rest,  it  must  remain  at  rest ;  if 
in  motion,  it  must  remain  in  motion,  unless  acted  upon  from 
without.  But  the  law  does  not  deny  that  a  series  of  ele- 
ments may,  by  their  mutual  interactions,  pass  through  a 
great  variety  of  changes.  Advantage  is  often  taken  of  the 
fact  that  the  name,  matter,  is  one,  to  forget  that  the  thing 
is  many ;  and  thus  the  conclusion  is  drawn  that  the  law  of 
inertia  forbids  any  action  on  the  part  of  the  elements.  The 
second  factor  of  the  doctrine  is,  that  every  material  thing 
opposes  a  resistance  to  every  change  of  its  space-relations ; 
hence  the  phrase,  force  of  inertia,  which  has  so  scandalized 
the  etymologists.  In  either  sense,  the  doctrine  is  far  enough 
from  affirming  a  mere  passivity  on  the  part  of  matter. 
There  is  nothing,  therefore,  in  our  experience  of  matter 
which  conflicts  with  the  doctrine  that  all  being  is  active  or 
causal. 

A  consideration  of  these  facts  will  remove  much  of  the 
paradox  of  the  claim  that  substantial  being,  in  distinction 
from  phenomenal  being^must  be  viewed  as  causal. 

We  have  carefully  put  pure  being  out  at  the  door,  and 
now  it  threatens  to  come  back  through  the  window.  It 
will  be  said  that  our  definition  of  being  is  not  a  definition, 
but  only  gives  a  mark  which  being  must  have.  But  back 
of  the  power  by  which  being  is  distinguished  from  non- 
being  lies  being  itself,  and  we  seek  to  know  what  this  is. 
The  notion  of  cause  admits  of  analysis  into  the  ideas  of  be- 
ing and  power,  and  hence  cause  is  the  union  of  the  two. 
The  being  has  the  power,  and  the  power  inheres  in  the  be- 
ing. In  reply  to  this  objection,  we  admit  the  separation  of 
the  ideas  in  thought,  but  deny  that  they  can  be  separated  in 
reality.  The  attempt  to  separate  them  in  fact  leads  to  in- 
soluble  contradictions,  and  this  shows  that  the  distinction  is 


20  METAPHYSICS 

a  logical  one.  We  have,  then,  to  discuss  the  metaphysical 
meaning  of  inherence. 

To  the  question,  In  what  sense  does  a  thing  have  or  pos- 
sess power  ?  the  common  answer  is,  that  the  power  inheres 
in  the  thing.  But  this  merely  shifts  the  problem,  for  the 
meaning  of  this  inherence  is  not  clear.  Uncritical  thought 
contents  itself  with  a  few  sense-images,  and  does  not  pursue 
the  problem  further.  Spokes  in  a  wheel,  or  pegs  in  a  beam, 
or  pins  in  a  cushion,  serve  to  illustrate  to  careless  thinking 
the  nature  of  inherence.  Matter,  which  to  the  dragon's  de- 
scendants is  ever  the  type  of  being,  is  not  in  itself  forceful, 
but  forces  inhere  in  it.  Thereby  matter  becomes  active, 
and  force  gains  an  object  or  fulcrum,  etc.  These  forces  do 
all  that  is  done ;  they  found  all  change,  quality,  and  differ- 
ence ;  but  the  matter  is  supposed  to  provide  them  a  resting- 
place.  This  is  the  current  conception,  and,  in  some  of  its 
forms,  it  rules  most  of  our  scientific  speculations. 

In  this  view  there  is  a  division  of  labor  in  reality.  There 
is  one  part  which  simply  exists  and  furnishes  the  being.  It 
does  nothing  but  be.  The  activities  are  next  supplied  by 
force  or  power,  which  finds  in  the^being  a  seat,  home,  ful- 
crum, etc.  We  have,  then,  a  certain  core  of  rigid  reality, 
which  exists  unchanged  through  the  changes  of  the  thing, 
and  supplies  the  necessary  stiffening;  and  around  this  we 
have  a  varying  atmosphere  of  activities,  which  are  said  to 
be  due  to  force.  But  it  is  plain  that  we  have  fallen  back 
again  into  the  abandoned  notion  of  pure  being.  The  being 
does  not  account  for  the  power.  It  is  a  pure  negation,  and 
is  utterly  worthless.  The  power  and  the  being  are  in  no  re- 
lation except  that  of  mutual  contradiction.  The  only  pos- 
sible reason  which  even  thoughtlessness  can  urge  for  positing 
such  being  would  be,  that  power  must  have  some  support ; 
but  it  is  plain  that  this  passive  negation  could  not  support 
anything.  The  force,  or  power,  in  such  a  case  would  be 


THE   NOTION  OF  BEING  21 

self-supporting,  and  thus  we  should  come  to  the  doctrine 
often  held,  that  reality  is  nothing  but  force.  The  existence 
of  force  would  never  warrant  the  affirmation  of  the  force- 
Jess,  and  the  forceless  could  never  be  viewed  as  the  origin 
of  force.  These  difficulties  serve  to  show  that  the  distinc- 
tion between  being  and  force,  or  power,  is  only  logical. 

The  truth  is,  that  in  this  separation  between  a  tiling  and 
its  power,  we  are  the  dupes  of  language.  In  order  to  speak 
of  anything,  we  must  adopt  the  form  of  the  judgment,  and 
put  the  thing  as  the  subject  and  the  attribute  as  the  predi- 
cate. In  this  wav  language  makes  an  unreal  distinction  be- 

v  o         o 

tween  the  thing  and  its  attributes,  and  unreflecting  common- 
sense  mistakes  the  logical  distinction  for  a  real  one.  Indeed, 
language  often  makes  a  distinction  between  a  thing  and  it- 
self. Thus  man  is  often  said  to  have  a  mind  or  a  soul. 
Here  man  appears  as  the  possessor  of  himself  ;  and  it  is  not 
until  we  ask  who  this  possessor  is,  and  how  he  possesses  the 
soul,  that  we  become  aware  that  language  is  playing  a  trick 
with  us,  and  that  man  does  not  have,  but  is,  a  soul.  Things 
as  existing  do  not  have  the  distinction  of  substance  and  at- 
tribute which  they  have  in  our  thought.  They  do  not  con- 

v  *• 

sist  of  subjects  to  which  predicates  are  externally  attached, 
as  if  they  might  exist  apart  from  the  predicates,  but  they 
exist  only  in  the  predicates.  Thus  we  say  that  a  triangle 
has  sides  and  angles ;  but  though  we  thus  posit  the  triangle 
as  having  the  sides,  etc.,  a  moment's  reflection  convinces  us 
that  the  triangle  exists  only  in  its  specific  attributes.  If  we 
should  allow  that  the  triangle  could  be  separated,  in  reality, 
from  its  attributes,  we  should  fall  into  absurdity.  We  could 
not  tell  how  the  triangle  exists  apart  from  attributes,  nor 
how  the  attributes  are  joined  to  it.  Now  the  distinction 
between  a  thing  and  its  power  is  of  this  sort.  It  is  perfectly 
valid  in  thought,  but  we  cannot  allow  it  to  represent  a  real 
distinction  in  the  thing  without  falling  back  into  the  notion 


22  METAPHYSICS 

of  pure  being  and  its  attendant  difficulties.  "We  come,  then, 
to  the  conclusion  that  being  and  power  are  inseparable  in 
fact,  and  that  they  are  simply  the  two  factors  into  which  the 
indivisible  reality  falls  for  our  thought.  The  causal  reality 
cannot  be  viewed  as  containing  in  itself  any  distinction  of 
substance  and  attribute,  or  of  being  and  power.  It  must  be 
affirmed  as  a  causal  unit,  and,  as  such,  uncompounded  and 
indivisible. 

In  further  justification  of  this  view,  we  next  point  out 
that  the  notion  of  power  is,  in  every  case,  a  pure  abstrac- 
tion, and,  as  such,  is  incapable  of  inherence.  What  sponta- 
neous thought  means  by  this  expression  is  no  doubt  true, 
but  the  meaning  is  incorrectly  expressed.  We  speak  of  the 
soul,  or  of  the  physical  elements,  as  having  various  powers, 
and  thus  the  thought  arises  that  these  powers  are  true  enti- 
ties in  the  thing,  which  underlie  all  activity.  Accordingly, 
it  is  not  the  elements  which  attract,  but  the  force  of  attrac- 
tion. It  is  not  the  atoms  which  act  in  chemical  combina- 
tion, but  affinity  does  the  work.  If  a  heated  or  an  electric 
body  produces  sundry  effects,  the  body  itself  is  not  the 
agent,  but  heat  or  electricity  is  called  in.  Thus  the  atom 
appears  as  a  bundle  of  forces,  each  of  which  is  independent 
of  all  the  rest,  but  all  of  which,  in  some  strange  way,  make 
the  atom  their  home. 

Now  this  will  never  do.  These  separate  forces  are 
only  abstractions  from  different  classes  of  atomic  action. 
If  there  be  any  atom,  the  actor  in  each  case  is  the  atom 
itself,  but  the  atom  is  such  that  its  activity  is  not  lim- 
ited to  a  single  direction,  but  falls  into  several  classes. 
This  fact  we  seek  to  express  by  the  notion  of  separate  in- 
herent forces,  but  these  are  never  more  than  descriptions  of 
the  fact  mentioned.  When  we  say  that  an  element  has  a 
power  of  gravity,  affinity,  etc.,  we  say  nothing  more  than 
that  the  element  can  act  in  these  several  ways.  The  powers 


THE  NOTION  OF  BEING  23 

are  not  separate  instruments  which  the  thing  employs,  but. 
only  abstractions  from  the  thing's  action.  Every  act  of 
the  atom,  in  whatever  form,  is  to  be  attributed  to  the  atom 
itself,  and  not  to  forces  in  it ;  and  every  act  of  the  atom  is 
an  act  of  the  entire  atom.  Any  other  conception  leads  to 
contradiction.  And  so  we  come  to  the  conclusion  that  power 
in  general  is  not  a  thing  or  an  instrument,  but  only  an  ab- 
straction from  the  activity  of  some  agent.  Hence  the  ques- 
tion. How  can  power  inhere  in  being?  disappears,  because 
the  phrase,  inherent  power,  represents  no  reality,  but  only  an 
abstraction.  The  reality  is  always  an  agent.  How  an  agent 
can  be  made,  we  do  not  claim  to  know ;  but  it  is  plain  that 
it  is  not  made  by  joining  the  two  abstractions  of  power  and 
pure  being.  How  an  agent  can  act  is  also  unknown ;  but  it 
is  plain  that  we  get  no  insight  into  the  possibility  by  posit- 
ing a  rigid  core  of  inert  reality  in  the  agent.. 

Inherence,  then,  has  no  metaphysical  meaning.  The  fact 
is  an  agent,  one  and  indivisible,  and  this  agent  is  active 
through  and  through.  But,  to  explain  the  agency,  we  are 
not  content  with  the  agent  itself,  but  form  the  abstraction 
of  power,  and  smuggle  it  into  the  thing.  When  the  forms 
of  agency  are  many,  we  form  a  corresponding  number  of 
these  abstractions,  and  give  each  a  separate  existence  in  the 
thing.  Then  it  becomes  a  tremendous  puzzle  to  know  how 
these  powers  inhere  in  the  thing,  or  how  the  thing  can  use 
them  without  an  additional  power  of  using  them.  The  puz- 
zle is  solved  by  the  insight  that  these  inherent  powers  or 
forces  are  only  abstractions  from  the  activity  of  the  one  in- 
divisible agent.  The  only  case  in  which  power  is  not  such 
an  abstraction  is  where  it  is  used  as  identical  with  being, 
as  when  we  speak  of  the  malign,  or  heavenly,  or  invisible 
powers.  Such  a  use  of  power,  instead  of  being,  has  the 
advantage  of  escaping  the  lumpish  implications  of  the  latter 
word ;  and  it  might  be  of  use  in  freeing  ourselves  from  the 


24  METAPHYSICS 

bondage  of  sense-experience  to  think  always  of  a  real  thing 
as  a  power.  In  this  sense  of  the  word,  we  should  say  that 
all  the  realities  of  the  universe  are  powers,  and  that  the 
phenomenal  universe  is  but  the  manifestation  of  hidden 
powers. 

When  we  form  the  conception  of  a  possible  object,  in 
order  to  realize  it,  we  have  to  use  the  material  furnished  by 
the  outer  world.  Then  we  say  the  thought  is  set  in  reality, 
or  is  given  existence.  In  this  way,  as  well  as  by  the  fallacy 
of  pure  being,  we  are  led  to  think  of  a  back -lying  raw 
material  which  is  simply  real,  and  which  serves  as  stuff  for 
making  things.  A  great  many  misread  analogies  of  sense- 
experience  lend  themselves  to  this  confusion.  Thus  finally 
we  reach  the  notion  that  things  exist  by  virtue  of  possess- 
ing a  bit  of  this  reality.  This  is  just  the  reverse  of  the  fact. 
Things  do  not  exist  by  having  a  kernel  or  core  of  real  stuff 
in  them,  but  they  acquire  a  claim  to  be  considered  real 
through  the  activity  whereby  they  affirm  themselves  as 
determining  factors  of  the  system.  Their  existence  is  man- 
ifested and  realized  only  through  their  activity.  Being  and 
action  are  inseparable ;  .the  inactive  is  the  non-existent. 

Hereupon  some  logical  scruples  emerge.  Thus,  it  may 
be  asked,  must  not  being  exist  before  action?  Certainly,  a 
thing  must  exist  in  order  to  act,  but,  on  this  theory,  it 
must  act  in  order  to  exist,  which  is  absurd.  This  difficulty 
rests  upon  a  confusion  of  logical  with  temporal  antecedence. 
The  postulate  of  action  is  an  agent,  but  this  agent  is  not 
temporally  antecedent  to  the  action.  Action  is  a  dynamic 
consequence  of  being,  and  is  coexistent  with  it.  Neither 
can  be  thought  without  the  other,  and  neither  was  before 
the  other.  Being  did  not  first  exist,  and  then  act ;  neither 
did  it  act  before  it  existed;  but  both  being  and  action  are 
given  in  indissoluble  unity.  Being  has  its  existence  only  in 
its  action,  and  the  action  is  possible  only  through  the  being. 


THE  NOTION  OF  BEING  25 

The  common  doctrine  of  inherence  makes  a  kind  of  spatial 
distinction  between  a  thing  and  its  activities ;  the  objection 
we  are  considering  seeks  to  make  a  corresponding  temporal 
distinction.  Both  views  are  alike  untenable.  Metaphysi- 
cally considered,  being  is  self-centred  activity,  without  dis- 
tinction of  parts  or  dates.  In  our  thinking,  we  separate  the 
agent  from  the  agency,  but,  in  reality,  both  are  posited  to- 
gether; indeed,  each  is  but  the  implication  of  the  other. 
We  would  not  accept  the  scholastic  doctrine,  that  being  is 
pure  activity ;  for  the  act  cannot  be  conceived  without  the 
agent.  But  we  deny  that  the  agent  can,  in  reality,  be  sep- 
arated from  agency ;  each  exists,  and  is  possible,  only  in 
the  other. 

Another  scruple  is  as  follows.  The  idea  of  being  admits 
of  no  comparison.  The  mightiest  exists  no  more  than  the 
feeblest.  Nothing  can  be  more  real  than  any  other  thing; 
and,  in  so  far  as  things  are  real,  they  are  all  on  the  same 
plane.  But  if  to  be  is  to  act,  it  follows  that  the  most  active 
has  the  most  being.  This  objection  rests  on  confounding 
the  logical  notion  with  real  existence.  Whatever  falls  into 
a  class  does  so  by  virtue  of  possessing  a  certain  mark,  but 
this  mark  may  itself  vary  in  intensity,  so  that,  while  all  the 
members  are  alike  in  the  class,  they  may  yet  fulfil  the  con- 
ditions of  membership  more  or  less  perfectly.  Whatever 
meets  certain  conditions  falls  under  the  notion  of  being ; 
and,  in  this  sense,  one  thing  exists  as  much  as  another. 
But  this  does  not  hinder  that  these  conditions  should  be 
fulfilled  more  or  less  extensive^  and  intensively  ;  and,  in 
this  sense,  one  thing  may  have  more  being  than  another. 
Whatever  moves  at  all,  moves ;  and  yet  it  is  allowable  to 
say  that  one  thing  has  more  motion  than  another.  What- 
ever acts,  acts ;  and  yet  some  things  act  more  intensively 
and  extensively  than  others,  and,  in  this  sense,  they  have 
more  being  than  others.  Indeed,  the  only  measure  of  being 


26  METAPHYSICS 

is  the  extent  and  intensity  of  its  action.  Being  is  not  meas- 
ured by  yards  or  bushels,  but  solely  by  its  activity.  All 
that  we  mean  by  saying  that  the  being  of  God  is  infinite,  is 
that  his  activity  is  unlimited,  both  in  intensity  and  range. 
With  this  understanding,  the  notion  of  the  ens  realissimum, 
which  many  philosophers,  notably  Herbart,  have  found  so 
obnoxious,  is  both  admissible  and  demanded. 

In  dealing  with  detailed  objections  there  is  always  danger 
of  losing  sight  of  the  main  points.  To  escape  this,  we  vent- 
ure to  repeat  the  argument  of  the  chapter  as  follows :  The 
notion  of  being  is,  in  itself,  purely  formal,  and  its  contents 
need  to  be  determined.  The  notion  of  pure  being  is  reject- 
ed, (1)  as  being  only  a  logical  concept,  and,  as  such,  incapa- 
ble of  real  existence ;  and,  (2)  as  inadequate  to  the  functions 
it  has  to  perform.  There  is  no  progress  from  it  to  definite 
being,  and  there  is  no  regress  from  definite  being  to  it. 
The  notion  of  passive  or  inactive  being  is  also  rejected  as  a 
whim  of  the  imagination,  which  founds  nothing,  and  falls 
back  into  the  notion  of  pure  being.  Hence,  all  reality  must 
be  causal.  But,  in  the  popular  thought,  reality  itself  is 
divided  into  two  factors,  being  and  power.  This  distinction 
is  only  a  logical  one,  and  cannot  be  admitted  in  reality, 
without  falling  back  into  the  doctrine  of  pure  being.  Again, 
in  the  popular  thought,  a  thing  exists  by  virtue  of  a  certain 
core  of  reality  which  is  in  it,  and  which  supports  the  activi- 
ties and  attributes  of  the  thing.  We  reject  this  core  as 
a  product  of  sense-bondage,  and  as  accounting  for  nothing, 
if  allowed.  We  reverse  this  popular  view  by  rejecting  the 
notion  of  a  stuff  which  simply  exists,  and  furnishes  things 
with  the  necessary  reality.  For  us,  things  do  not  exist  be- 
cause of  a  certain  quantity  of  this  reality  which  is  in  them, 
but  by  virtue  of  their  activity,  whereby  they  appear  as 
agents  in  the  system.  How  this  can  be  is  a  question  which 


THE  NOTION  OF  BEING  27 

involves  the  mystery  of  creation  or  the  mystery  of  absolute 
being;  but  creation  is  not  the  work  of  the  philosopher. 
The  question  we  have  to  answer  is,  What  things  shall  we 
regard  as  existing  ?  And  the  answer  is,  Those  things  exist 
which  act,  and  not  those  which  have  a  lump  of  being  in 
them  ;  for  there  is  no  fact  corresponding  to  the  latter  phrase. 
Things  do  not  have  being,  but  are;  and  from  them  the 
notion  of  being  is  formed.  These  agents,  again,  have  in 
them  no  antithesis  of  passive  being  and  active  energy,  but 
are  active  through  and  through.  Sense-associations  and  our 
own  feelings  of  weariness  render  it  difficult  to  conceive  of 
active  being  without  a  central  core  of  inert  solidity  on  which 
the  productive  activity  may  rest.  But  we  may  free  our- 
selves from  this  result  of  habit  by  persistently  asking,  (1) 
what  reason  there  is  for  positing  such  a  core,  and,  (2)  what 
it  could  do,  if  posited. 

This  view  cannot  be  pictured ;  it  must  be  thought.  Hence 
it  will  not  commend  itself  to  minds  which  think  only  in 
sense-images.  Such  minds  will  find  some  relief  by  ponder- 
ing on  the  distinction  between  phenomenal  and  ontological 
reality,  to  which  we  have  referred,  and  which  science,  as 
well  as  philosophy,  increasingly  emphasizes.  The  moment 
we  grasp  this  distinction  the  view  proposed  becomes  almost 
self-evident,  for  the  moment  we  go  behind  phenomena  we 
find  ourselves  in  the  presence  of  unwearying  energy  and 
ceaseless  activity.  The  confusion  of  the  phenomenal  and 
the  ontological  realms  leads  to  corresponding  confusion  in 
our  notion  of  being  and  our  doctrine  of  predication. 

We  make  no  attempt  here  to  draw  the  line  between  the 
phenomenal  and  the  ontological.  We  only  fix  the  mark  by 
which  the  line  must  be  drawn.  Very  possibly  inquiry 
would  compel  us  to  view  many  so-called  real  things  as 
phenomena ;  at  present  we  make  no  decision.  Possibly, 
also,  we  may  have  to  transform  the  notion  of  causality,  and 


28  METAPHYSICS 

thus  of  reality,  before  we  get  through.  But  everything 
cannot  be  said  at  once.  As  the  outcome  of  the  whole  dis- 
cussion, we  conclude  that  every  substantive  thing,  in  dis- 
tinction from  both  compounds  and  phenomena,  must  be 
viewed  as  a  definite  causal  agent. 

The  net  result  is  not  great,  but  it  is  something;  at  all 
events,  we  are  clear  of  the  lumpish  notions  of  being  which 
infest  sense-thinking,  and  which  are  so  apt  to  give  crude 
thought  a  mechanical  and  materialistic  turn.  Phenomenal 
reality  is  revealed  in  the  contents  of  sense  -  intuition ;  but 
ontological  reality  can  be  grasped  only  in  the  unpicturable 
notions  of  the  understanding.  Its  nature  is  a  problem  for 
thought,  not  for  sense.  "We  must  rise  from  the  world  of 
lumps  into  the  world  of  energy. 


CHAPTER   H 
THE  NATURE  OP  THINGS 

IN  the  previous  chapter  we  have  sought  to  show  that 
being  does  not  exist,  but  that  certain  specific  things,  or 
agents,  are  the  only  realities.  Being  is  only  a  class-notion, 
under  which  things  fall,  not  because  of  a  piece  of  existence 
in  themselves,  but  by  virtue  of  their  activity.  The  conclu- 
sion reached  was,  that  the  universal  nature  of  being  is  to  act. 
But  this  conclusion  determines  the  nature  of  things  as  dis- 
tinguished from  non-existence  only,  and  not  as  distinguished 
from  one  another,  or  as  capable  of  their  peculiar  manifesta- 
tions. The  present  chapter  is  devoted  to  a  discussion  of 
nature  in  the  latter  sense. 

This  which  we  call  the  nature  of  things  has  been  vari- 
ously denominated  as  the  essence,  the  what,  or  the  w hat- 
ness  of  things ;  and  all  of  these  terms  refer  not  to  the  exter- 
nal properties  of  things,  but  to  some  inner  principle,  whereby 
things  are  what  they  are.  But,  whatever  the  term,  the  idea 
is  entirely  familiar  to  our  spontaneous  thinking.  We  be- 
lieve that  everything  is  what  it  is  because  of  its  nature, 
and  that  things  differ  because  they  have  different  natures. 
There  is  one  nature  of  matter  and  another  of  spirit.  There 
is  one  nature  of  hydrogen  and  another  of  chlorine.  But  we 
are  not  content  with  simply  affirming  the  existence  of  such 
a  nature ;  we  also  seek  to  know  what  it  is.  The  nature  of 
a  thing  expresses  the  thing's  real  essence;  and  we  hold 
that  we  have  no  true  knowledge  of  the  thing  until  we 


30  METAPHYSICS. 

grasp  its  nature.  What  is  the  thing?  and  what  is  its 
nature?  are  identical  questions.  The  doubt  of  scepticism 
most  often  expresses  itself  by  questioning  whether  the  true 
nature  of  things  does  not  lie  beyond  the  possibility  of 
knowledge.  Such  is  the  theory  which  we  all  spontaneously 
form.  It  may  be  that  a  consideration  of  the  problem  of 
change  and  becoming  will  compel  us  greatly  to  modify  our 
doctrine  of  things ;  but  for  the  present  we  allow  that  things 
exist  in  the  common  meaning  of  the  word,  and  ask  how  we 
are  to  think  of  their  nature  or  true  essence.  What  is  the 
general  form  which  our  thought  of  a  thing's  nature  must 
take  on  ? 

An  answer  results  directly  from  the  conclusions  of  the 
previous  chapter.  We  there  found  that  activity  is  the 
fundamental  mark  of  all  being.  Whatever  truly  exists, 
whether  matter  or  spirit,  must  be  viewed  as  essentially 
active,  and  as  differing,  therefore,  only  in  the  form  or 
kind  of  activity.  The  so-called  passive  properties  of  things 
all  turn  out,  upon  analysis,  to  depend  on  a  dynamism  be- 
neath them,  and  leave  us  only  an  agent  in  action.  But,  in 
order  that  being  should  be  definite,  this  activity  must  have 
a  definite  form  or  law.  Activity  in  general,  like  being  in 
general,  is  impossible.  It  is  merely  the  logical  notion, 
from  which  the  specific  determinations  which  belong  to 
every  real  activity"  have  been  dropped.  Now  this  rule  or 
law  which  determines  the  form  and  sequence  of  a  thing's 
activities,  represents  to  our  thought  the  nature  of  the 
thing,  or  expresses  its  true  essence.  It  is  in  this  law  that 
the  definiteness  of  a  thing  is  to  be  found ;  and  it  is  under 
this  general  form  of  a  law  determining  the  form  and  se- 
quence of  activity  that  we  must  think  of  the  nature  of  the 
thing. 

But  when  we  say  that  things  differ  only  in  the  form  or 
kind  of  activity  we  are  not  to  conclude  that  they  all  have 


THE  NATURE  OF  THINGS  31 

a  common  being,  for  this  would  be  a  return  to  the  notion 
of  pure  being.  We  are  incessantly  tempted  to  think  of  a 
kind  of  raw  material,  which,  by  receiving  different  determi- 
nations, becomes  different  things,  and  we  must  guard  our- 
selves against  the  seduction.  Things  exist  only  in  their 
activities,  and  have  no  being  apart  from  them.  They  are,  in 
brief,  concreted  formulas  of  action.  But  this  conclusion  is 
so  remote  from  our  ordinary  modes  of  thinking  that  we 
must,  by  a  criticism  of  other  conceptions,  show  that  we  are 
shut  up  to  it. 

The  first  thought  of  common-sense  in  this  matter  is  to 
find  the  nature  of  things  in  their  sense-qualities.  Accord- 
ingly, when  we  ask  what  a  thing  is  in  itself,  common-sense 
enumerates  its  sense  -  qualities.  Vinegar  is  sour,  aloes  are 
bitter,  sugar  is  sweet.  But  a  moment's  reflection  shows  the 
invalidity  of  this  crude  conception.  To  begin  with,  it  ap- 
plies only  to  sense-objects,  while  the  notion  of  a  nature  ap- 
plies to  all  being.  In  the  next  place,  sense-qualities  never 
reveal  what  a  thing  is,  but  only  how  it  affects  us ;  and  now 
we  know  that  sense-qualities  are  purely  phenomenal,  and 
have  no  likeness  to  anything  in  the  thing.  There  is  neither 
hardness  in  the  hard,  nor  sweetness  in  the  sweet;  but  cer- 
tain things,  by  their  action  on  us,  produce  in  us  the  sensa- 
tions of  hardness  or  sweetness.  Again,  things  are  in  mani- 
fold interaction  with  one  another;  and  this  interaction,  also, 
is  an  expression  of  their  nature.  This  fact  renders  it  strict- 
ly impossible  to  find  the  nature  of  things  in  their  sense- 
qualities,  or  to  tell  what  things  are  by  enumerating  their 
sense-qualities.  Things  have  much  more  to  do  than  to  ap- 
pear to  us. 

Moreover,  even  crude  common-sense  finds  reason  in  ex- 
perience for  changing  its  views.  The  same  thing  is  found 
to  have  different  sense  -  qualities.  The  vinegar,  which  is 
sour,  is  also  colored,  fluid,  heavy,  etc.  But  these  qualities 


32  METAPHYSICS 

are  incommensurable  among  themselves ;  so  that,  if  one  is 
supposed  to  reveal  the  nature,  the  others  do  not,  unless  we 
suppose  that  a  thing  has  as  many  different  natures  as  it  has 
sense-qualities.  In  that  case,  a  thing  with  various  qualities 
would  not  be  a  unit,  but  a  complex  of  things.  But  this 
supposition  so  clearly  destroys  the  unity  of  the  thing  that 
it  has  never  been  held  by  common-sense.  Thus  the  attempt 
to  find  the  nature  of  a  thing  in  its  sense-qualities  shatters 
on  its  inner  contradiction.  If  the  assumption  of  a  thing 
distinct  from  a  complex  of  phenomena  is  to  be  maintained, 
the  nature  of  that  thing  cannot  be  found  in  any  or  all  of 
its  sense-qualities. 

This  fact  led  speculators,  at  a  very  early  date,  to  adopt 
another  view,  according  to  which  the  thing  retreats  behind 
the  qualities,  as  their  support,  and  the  qualities  appear  as 
states  of  the  thing.  The  essence  is  no  longer  revealed  in 

yS  the  qualities,  but  is  their  hidden  and  mysterious  ground. 
The  thing  is  no  longer  colored,  extended,  etc.,  but  is  the 
unreachable  and  unsearchable  essence  which  appears  as 
such.  Thus  we  are  on  the  highway  to  agnosticism  and 

I  scepticism.  The  thing  in  itself  has  retreated  from  sight, 
and  reports  its  existence  in  manifestations  which,  after  all, 
do  not  manifest.  And,  since  the  manifestations  are  all  that 
is  immediately  given,  there  seems  to  be  no  longer  any 
ground  for  affirming  that  dark  essence  which  can  never  be 
reached.  This  notion  of  a  thing  with  various  and  changing 
states  is  the  foundation  of  most  of  our  spontaneous  meta- 
physics, and  of  very  many  of  our  philosophical  puzzles. 
Like  the  notion  of  inactive  being  with  inherent  forces,  it  is 
an  attempt  to  solve  some  of  the  most  important  problems 
of  metaphysics.  The  value  of  the  solution  will  come  up 
for  future  discussion.  The  notion  is  of  interest,  as  showing 
that  the  human  mind  has  recognized  the  problem  and  has 
attempted  a  solution. 


THE  NATURE  OF  THINGS  33 

Two  views  have  resulted  from  the  need  of  putting  being 
back  of  its  apparent  qualities,  instead  of  finding  it  in  them. 
The  first  is,  that  being,  in  itself,  is  without  quality  of  any 
sort ;  the  second  is,  that  being  has  qualities,  but  what  they 
are  is  entirely  unknown.  The  first  view  is  our  old  friend, 
pure  being,  back  again.  Being  is  the  ground  and  support 
of  the  definite  qualities;  but  in  itself,  as  the  unmanifested 
reality,  it  is  without  quality  altogether.  This  view  we  have 
sufficiently  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter,  when  speak- 
ing of  pure  being  and  of  inherence.  That  which  is  without 
quality  of  any  sort  can  found  and  support  nothing.  The 
formless  clay,  which  we  mould  into  form,  is  itself  a  perfectly 
definite  compound  of  definite  elements,  and  it  is  suscepti- 
ble of  being  moulded  only  because  of  its  definite  and  pe- 
culiar properties.  The  formless  nebula,  which  condenses 
into  a  solar  system,  is  indefinite  only  in  seeming.  The 
reality  is  a  host  of  definite  elements,  with  definite  laws, 
and  in  definite  relations  of  interaction  with  one  another. 
The  chemical  elements  have  not,  indeed,  the  qualities  of 
their  compounds;  but  some  qualities  they  must  have  to 
make  the  compounds  possible.  Neither  oxygen  nor  hy- 
drogen has  any  of  the  properties  of  water,  but  both  must 
have  fixed  properties  of  their  own  in  order  to  produce 
water. 

The  second  view  has  been  more  definitely  formulated  by 
Herbart  than  by  any  other  philosopher ;  but  the  majority 
of  agnostics  would  accept  it  in  one  form  or  another.  Her- 
bart held  that  the  nature  of  being  is  unknown,  but  that, 
whatever  it  may  be,  it  falls  under  the  notion  of  quality. 
There  is  some  simple  quality,  x,  which,  if  we  could  only 
reach  it,  would  fully  and  truly  express  the  nature  of  the 
thing.  In  our  sense-experience  we  never  press  through  to 
the  realities  of  things.  Our  experience  is  of  compounds  and 
their  qualities ;  but  we  cannot  doubt  that  the  realities  them- 


34  METAPHYSICS 


have  qualities  which  found  those  of  the  compounds. 
Herbart  escaped  the  difficulties  involved  in  the  plurality 
and  incommensurability  of  sense-qualities  by  viewing  things 
as  they  appear,  as  only  complexes  of  phenomena,  and  by 
denying  plurality  of  qualities  to  the  real.  These  conclu- 
sions he  reached  by  a  very  ingenious,  but  highly  artificial 
and  '  unsatisfactory,  theory  of  knowing,  in  which  he  con- 
stantly confounds  the  independent  something  in  sensation 
with  absolute  being.  In  his  theory,  every  real  thing  is 
simple,  and  its  true  nature  is  expressed  in  some  simple  qual- 
ity. This  quality  is  not  an  effect,  like  sense-qualities,  but 
reveals  the  essence  of  the  thing.  How  this  can  be  we  may 
understand  from  the  Cartesian  doctrine  of  attributes.  Ac- 
cording to  Descartes,  the  attribute  expresses  the  essence, 

/  and  tells  what  the  thing  is  in  itself,  and  apart  from  all 
else.  So  the  universal  attribute  of  matter,  and  hence  its 
universal  essence,  is  extension.  The  essence  of  mind  is 

&  thought.  Each  of  these  attributes  tells,  not  what  its  subject 
does,  but  what  it  absolutely  is.  Of  course,  Herbart  did  not 
accept  these  results,  but  he  held  to  the  notion  that  some 
unknown  quality  exists  which  expresses  the  nature  of  its 
subject  as  completely  as  Descartes  thought  that  extension 
expresses  the  essence  of  matter. 

But,  to  make  this  doctrine  clear,  the  meaning  of  quality 
must  be  explained.  If  by  quality  only  kind  be  meant,  the 
statement  that  the  nature  of  everything  falls  under  the  no- 
tion of  quality  is  a  pure  tautology,  for  quality  is  taken  to 
mean  nature.  The  word  is  often  used  in  this  sense.  "When 
we  say  that  all  being  must  have  some  quality,  we  mean  only 
that  all  being  must  have  some  definite  nature,  or  be  of  some 
definite  kind.  If  this  were  all  Herbart  meant  by  quality,  it 
was  not  necessary  to  insist  upon  it,  and  he  might  have  con- 
fined himself  to  affirming  the  simplicity  of  being.  But 
qualities  fall  into  two  classes,  those  which  are  discerned  in 


THE   NATURE   OF  THINGS  35 

intuition,  and  those  which  are  reached  by  reasoning  and 
comparison.  The  former  class  comprise  adjectives  and  the 
abstract  nouns  founded  upon  them ;  and  it  is  this  class  from 
which  the  notion  of  quality  is  originally  obtained.  There 
is,  too,  a  sense  of  reality  in  an  intuition  which  no  amount 
of  reasoning  can  ever  produce ;  and  there  is  also  an  appa- 
rent entrance  into  reality  when  it  is  revealed  in  our  senses 
which  we  never  enjoy  in  thinking.  Hence,  when  we  allow 
that  our  senses  cannot  attain  to  the  true  nature  of  reality, 
we  still  cherish  the  hope  that  there  may  be  a  supersensible 
intuition  possible  to  other  beings,  and  perhaps  to  ourselves 
in  some  other  life,  which  shall  reveal  things  as  they  are. 
In  our  experience  of  color,  fragrance,  and  harmony,  we 
enter  into  their  inmost  nature,  and  are  conscious  that  there 
is  no  back-lying  color  or  tone  "in  itself"  which  refuses  to 
come  into  knowledge.  It  never  occurs  to  us  to  think  of  the 
color  we  perceive  as  the  hiding  of  another  color  which 
remains  forever  invisible.  Such  spectres_haunt  thought,  but 
not  intuition.  And  so,  whenever  we  conceive  of  a  state  in 
which  we  shall  know  things  as  they  are,  we  always  retain 
this  feature  of  intuition  in  opposition  to  reflection.  Quali- 
ties', then,  may  express  some  possible  intuition,  or  they  may 
express  a  complex  of  relations.  Herbart  seems  to  have  un- 
derstood them  in  the  former  sense,  for  in  the  latter  they  are 
incompatible  with  the  basal  conceptions  of  his  system.  He 
views  his  elemental  beings  as  simple  and  unrelated.  Each 
one  has  a  simple  and  self-centred  existence,  and  hence  can- 
not have  qualities  implying  relation  and  complexity.  Our 
senses  do  not  reveal  the  true  nature  of  things,  but  only  the 
effect  upon  us.  We  say  the  thing  is  hot  or  cold,  sweet  or 
bitter,  black  or  white,  etc.,  but  none  of  these  things  express 
more  than  subjective  effects,  which  are  referred  to  some 
objective  cause.  But  there  is  some  unknown  sense  which, 
if  we  had  it,  would  reveal  the  thing  as  it  is  in  itself.  In 


3t>  METAPHYSICS 

that  case,  the  nature  would  be  revealed  in  intuition,  and 
not  in  reflection. 

But,  however  this  may  be,  neither  adjectives  nor  abstract 
nouns  are  capable  of  expressing  the  true  nature  of  things. 
We  have  already  pointed  out  that  changeless  things  will 
not  account  for  phenomena ;  and  qualities,  in  this  sense,  are 
essentially  changeless.  They  may  come  and  go,  but  their 
content  is  invariable.  Red  may  give  place  to  black,  but 
red  cannot  change  to  black.  We  say  that  things  change 
their  color,  but  never  that  one  color  becomes  another. 
Common-sense,  therefore,  has  always  put  change  in  things, 
and  never  in  qualities.  The  latter  never  change,  but  are 
exchanged.  As  Plato  taught,  things  may  glide  from  the 
realm  of  one  idea  to  that  of  another,  but  the  ideas  them- 
selves are  fixed  in  their  contents  and  mutual  relations. 
Thus  they  constitute  a  realm  apart  from  all  change,  and  in 
this  realm  alone  could  Plato  find  the  fixedness  which  is  de- 
manded by  knowledge.  It  was  this  constancy  of  the  ideas 
with  which  he  refuted  the  Sophists,  who  sought  to  draw  all 
things  and  truths  into  perpetual  flow.  If,  now,  we  are  to 
view  the  nature  of  things  as  expressed  by  a  quality  of  the 
kind  in  question,  we  must  bring  the  thing  under  this  notion 
of  simplicity  and  unchangeability,  and  thereby  we  should 
make  it  incapable  of  explaining  change,  and  hence  inade- 
quate to  the  demands  upon  it.  We  should  fall  back  into 
the  Eleatic  doctrine,  which  excludes  all  change  from  being, 
or  we  should  have  to  affirm  a  doctrine  of  absolute  and 
groundless  becoming,  and  deny  the  existence  of  things 
altogether.  Both  of  these  views  will  be  dwelt  upon  in  the 
next  chapter.  Here  we  point  out  that  no  theory  which  ad- 
mits the  reality  both  of  things  and  of  change  can  view  any 
simple  quality  as  expressing  the  nature  of  a  thing. 

This  fact  deserves  further  consideration.  In  a  perfectly 
changeless  universe,  we  might  think  that  in  some  change- 


THE  NATURE  OF  THINGS  37 

less  quality  we  discern  the  true  nature  of  things.  Even 
no\v,  when  some  quality  is  always  present,  as  the  so-called 
primary  qualities  of  matter,  we  are  apt  to  view,  that  quality 
as  expressing  the  essence.  But  in  a  changing  world  things 
have  a  past  and  a  future,  as  well  as  a  present ;  and  these, 
also,  must  be  expressions  of  the  nature.  Yet  a  present  qual- 
ity, at  best,  only  expresses  what  a  thing  now  is,  and  not 
what  it  has  been  or  will  be.  Again,  in  a  dynamic  system 
the  essential  thing  is  activity,  and  the  law  of  this  activity, 
also,  must  be  taken  into  account.  Even  the  uncritical  think- 
ing of  daily  life  recognizes  that  the  same  thing  may  mani- 
fest the  most  different  properties  at  different  times,  yet 
without  losing  its  identity ;  and  that  very  different  things 
may,  at  times,  be  indistinguishable  by  the  senses,  yet  with- 
out any  approach  to  identity  of  nature.  It  may  be  that  no 
two  things  in  the  universe  are  alike  in  all  respects,  and  that 
the  apparent  likeness,  even  of  the  chemical  elements  of  the 
same  class,  is  but  a  parallelism  within  the  limits  of  obser- 
vation of  essentially  different  things.  The  attempt  to  tell 
what  a  thing  is  by  its  present  qualities  would  confound  such 
cases.  It  may  be  that  common-sense  is  mistaken  in  assum- 
ing identity  under  different  forms,  but  the  same  common- 
sense  which  affirms  the  notion  of  quality  also  affirms  the 
identity.  We  must,  therefore,  try  to  reconcile  common- 
sense  with  itself  before  declaring  it  mistaken.  But  if  this 
identity  through  change  is  to  be  maintained,  we  must,  in 
determining  the  nature  of  a  thing,  take  into  account  what  it 
has  been  and  what  it  will  be ;  just  as,  in  an  equation  of  a 
curve,  we  must  know  the  relations  of  the  co-ordinates  not 
merely  for  one  point,  but  for  all  points.  Any  formula 
which  fails  to  give  this  universal  relation  is  not  the  true 
equation. 

If,  then,  some  quality  were  present  throughout  the  thing's 
history,  it  could  not  be  identified  with  the  nature  of  the 


38  METAPHYSICS 

thing,  for  the  nature  must  account  for  the  changing,  as  well 
as  the  changeless,  qualities.  Hence,  if  we  should  view  ex- 
tension as  an  essential  quality  of  matter,  we  could  not  re- 
gard it  as  expressing  the  nature  of  the  material  elements ; 
for  they,  if  real,  have  many  other  qualities,  which  must  also 
be  founded  in  the  nature  ;  and,  besides,  extension  is  an 
effect,  and  not  a  passive  quality.  In  fact,  the  view  we  are 
combating  belongs  to  the  pre-speculative  period  of  thinking, 
when  being  was  viewed  as  inactive  and  changeless.  Al- 
though it  was  recognized  that  sense-qualities  cannot  reveal 
the  essential  nature  of  the  thing,  still  it  was  conceivable 
that  some  occult  quality  might  do  so.  But  as  soon  as 
being  was  seen  to  be  essentially  active  and  changing,  this 
view  became  untenable.  On  these  two  accounts,  therefore 
— (1)  the  unchangeability  of  qualities,  and  (2)  the  necessary 
changeability  of  things — we  deny  that  any  simple  quality 
or  combination  of  qualities  can  ever  represent  the  nature  of 
a  thing. 

The  outcome  of  the  previous  argument  is,  that  no  intui- 
tion or  action  of  the  receptivity  can  reveal  the  nature  of  a 
thing.  This  nature  must  forever  remain  supersensible,  and 
its  determination  must  always  be  a  problem  of  reason,  not 
of  sense.  Hence  we  must  give  up  all  attempts  to  grasp  the 
nature  of  reality  b}^  asking  how  it  looks.  The  nature  can 
never  be  expressed  by  a  quality,  but  only  by  a  rule  or  Jaw 
according  to  which  the  thing  acts  and  changes.  And  this 
conception,  in  some  of  its  aspects,  is  entirely  familiar  to  our 
daily  thinking.  When  water  appears  no\v  as  ice  and  now 
as  vapor,  common -sense  never  doubts  that  there  is  some 
principle  which  determines  the  kind  and  sequence  of  these 
states.  Or,  when  an  egg,  under  the  appropriate  circum- 
stances, develops  through  various  stages  into  the  typical 
form,  we  say  that  there  is  a  la\v  which  determines  the  form 


THE  NATURE  OF  THINGS  39 

and  sequence  of  this  development ;  and  we  should  unhesitat- 
ingly view  the  nature  of  the  bird,  not  as  the  external 
product,  but  as  the  law  by  which  the  development  was  or- 
dered so  as  to  reach  the  product.  Or,  when  two  or  more 
chemical  elements  enter  into  various  chemical  combinations, 
and  manifest  particular  properties  in  each,  we  say  that  the 
nature  of  the  elements  determines  the  result.  Again,  when 
the  soul  runs  through  various  stages,  and  manifests  various 
forms  of  action,  we  say  that  the  nature  of  the  soul  de- 
termines the  form  and  sequence  of  these  stages.  Thoughts, 
feelings,  and  volitions  are  not  lawless  and  unrelated,  but 
their  existence  and  their  inter-relations  are  determined,  by 
some  one  principle,  which  we  call  the  nature  of  the  soul. 
We  utter,  then,  no  strange  thought,  but  one  in  perfect  ac- 
cord with  daily  thinking,  when  we  define  the  nature  of  a  1 
f  thing  as  that  law  or  principle  which  determines  the  form  J 
V  and  character  of  its  activity. 

The  objection  which  common-sense  has  to  making  this 
definition  universal  arises  from  failing  to  distinguish  phe- 
nomenal from  ontological  being.  Hence,  we  seem  to  have 
abundant  experience  of  inactive  and  unchanging  things, 
and,  hence  again,  we  must  not  look  upon  the  nature  of 
things  as  a  law  of  action.  But  when  the  distinction  is 
made  the  difficulty  disappears. 

But,  it  may  be  asked,  in  what  are  we  better  off  than  be- 
fore (  If  then  we  had  to  define  a  thing  as  that  which  has 
certain  properties,  now  we  have  to  define  it  as  that  which 
has  a  certain  law,  and  thought  is  in  no  way  advanced.  So 
far  as  insight  into  creation  is  concerned,  this  is  true  ;  but  it 
is  not  true  for  thought.  The  theory  which  finds  the  essence 
of  a  thing  in  some  simple  quality  makes  no  provision  for 
activity  and  change ;  or,  if  it  provides  for  change,  it  makes 
no  provision  for  identity.  That  thing  whose  nature  is 
expressed  now  by  one  quality,  and  now  by  another  and  in- 


40  METAPHYSICS 

commensurable  one,  has  no  identity  with  itself.  The  theory 
which  finds  the  essence  of  a  thing  in  a  law  which  governs 
both  its  coexistent  and  its  sequent  manifestations  does  make 
provision  for  activity,  and,  in  some  sense,  for  identity. 

But  how,  it  will  be  further  asked,  can  a  law  be  the  nature 
of  a  thing?  A  law  is  only  a  formula  in  thought,  while  a 
thing  is  a  reality.  A  quality  does,  at  least,  represent  the 
way  in  which  a  thing  appears,  or  the  way  in  which  it  affects 
us.  It  stands,  therefore,  closer  to  the  true  nature  of  the 
thing  than  a  law,  which  is  purely  a  mental  product.  If, 
then,  we  cannot  regard  a  quality  as  expressing  the  nature 
of  a  thing,  still  less  can  we  find  in  a  law  the  essence  which 
we  seek.  A  law  is  not,  and  cannot  be,  a  thing.  This  ob- 
jection would  have  validity  against  the  absolute  idealists  of 
the  later  German  philosophy,  who  identified  thought  with 
thing.  If  it  were  possible  for  us  to  get  a  perfect  formula 
for  the  nature  of  anything,  that  formula  would  not  be  the 
nature  as  real,  but  the  nature  as  conceived.  The  ineffable 
difference  between  a  thought  and  a  thing  would  remain  an 
impassable  gulf  for  human  thought.  But  this  is  only  our 
ancient  admission  that  we  cannot  make  reality,  nor  tell  how 
it  is  made.  Hence,  whatever  the  nature  of  reality  may  be, 
whether  quality  or  law,  it  can  appear  in  our  minds  only  as 
conceived,  and  never  as  the  reality  itself.  And  since  we 
can  only  think  about  things,  not  make  them,  the  only  pos- 
sible question  is,  Must  we  think  of  this  nature  under  the 
form  of  a  quality,  or  as  a  law  or  rule  of  action  ?  The  at- 
tempt to  think  of  it  as  a  quality  fails,  and  we  decide  that 
the  form  of  our  thought  must  be  that  of  a  law  of  activity. 
This  is  the  only  conception  which  provides  for  change  and 
action.  The  further  question,  how  a  law  can  be  set  in  real- 
ity so  that,  from  being  a  thought,  it  becomes  a  thing,  in- 
volves the  mystery  of  creation,  or  of  absolute  being.  We 
do  not  pretend  to  know  how  being  is  made.  We  only  know 


THE  NATURE   OF   THINGS  41 

that  it  is  not  made  by  taking  an  idea  and  stuffing  it  with  a 
formless  reality.  But  when  being  is  made,  it  is  simply  a 
concrete  formula  of  action.  Care,  however,  must  be  taken 
not  to  overlook  the  significance  of  the  term  concrete,  for  it 
contains  that  mystery  of  reality  which  no  thought  can  ever 
define. 

Without  doubt  the  reader  remains  unsatisfied,  and  urges 
that  the  being  is  deeper  than  the  law — that  it  has  the  law, 
follows  the  law,  realizes  the  law,  etc.  There  is  needed  a 
stuff,  a  raw  material  of  some  kind,  which  is  to  receive  the 
law  and  substantiate  it.  But  this  is  only  the  old  error,  and 
i:  can  be  answered  only  by  repeating  what  we  have  said 
again  and  again.  This  notion  has  a  certain  warrant  in  our 
own  experience  with  the  outer  world.  We  are  not  creators, 
but  only  users  of  given  material.  The  notion  has  a  further 
application  to  all  compounds.  These,  also,  presuppose  an 
antecedent  existence,  from  which  they  are  compounded. 
But  when  we  apply  the  theory  to  a  proper  reality  or  agent, 
we  only  fall  back  into  the  nothingness  of  pure  being.  Be- 
ing could  neither  have,  nor  follow,  nor  realize  a  law,  if  the 
law  were  not  essential  to  the  being,  or  if  the  being  were 
other  than  the  realized  law.  A  double  temptation  besets  us 
here.  On  the  one  hand,  we  are  tempted  to  make  the  being 
deeper  than  the  law,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  we  are  tempted 
to  make  the  law  deeper  than  the  being.  In  both  cases,  we 
mistake  the  separations  of  thought  and  language  for  separa- 
tions in  the  thing.  The  nature  is  not  in  the  thing,  and  the 
thing  does  not  have  the  nature.  The  thing  itself  is  all ;  and, 
as  it  is  not  compounded  of  being  and  power,  no  more  is  it 
compounded  of  being  and  nature.  The  fact  is  the  unitary 
thing,  and  this  thing  acts  in  certain  definite  ways.  From 
the  fact  of  activity  we  form  the  notion  of  power.  From 
the  form  and  sequence  of  the  activity  we  form  a  rule,  which 
we  call  the  law  of  its  action.  But  the  definite  thing  is  the 


42  METAPHYSICS 

only  reality ;  and  the  distinction  of  thing  and  law  is  in  our 
thought.  Being  without  law  is  nothing;  and  law  without 
being  is  also  nothing. 

Manifestly  this  definition  of  the  nature  or  the  essence  is 
purely  formal.  It  tells  how  we  shall  think,  but  never  what 
we  shall  think.  To  determine  what  the  nature  of  any  given 
thing  may  be,  we  must  fall  back  upon  observation  ;  and,  as 
this  can  never  be  exhaustive,  we  can  never  be  sure  that  we 
have  an  exhaustive  knowledge  of  anything.  The  manifes- 
tations of  finite  things  depend,  also,  upon  their  relations  to 
other  things,  and  it  is  not  possible  to  tell  what  new  proper- 
ties they  might  manifest  in  new  relations.  It  is  a  common 
suggestion  that  the  nature  of  the  soul  is  only  faintly  re- 
vealed in  consciousness  as  yet,  and  that,  therefore,  we  are 
the  profoundest  mystery  to  ourselves.  It  is  often  suggested, 
likewise,  that  even  the  physical  elements  may  have  many 
possibilities  which  are  unsuspected.  To  overcome  this  un- 
certainty, it  would  be  necessary  to  know  the  purpose  for 
which  the  thing  exists.  If  this  were  possible,  we  should 
have  an  exhaustive  knowledge  of  the  thing,  and  we  should 
know  that  it  would  never  pass  beyond  the  implications  of 
the  purpose.  But  we  have  no  such  knowledge.  In  our 
experience,  everything  seems  confined  to  a  limited  round  of 
manifestation.  Things  move  in  closed  curves,  and  not  in 
open  ones.  But  this  may  be  due  to  the  relative  constancy 
and  equilibrium  of  the  conditions  in  which  they  exist.  All 
things  may  be  framed  for  some  fixed  altitude,  and  they 
may  be  comprised  in  an  upward  movement.  Leibnitz  con- 
ceived of  all  finite  reality  as  called  to  endless  progressive 
development.  Of  course,  this  applies  to  the  physical  ele- 
ments only  on  the  supposition  of  their  reality.  But  we  have 
not  yet  sufficiently  determined  the  notion  of  being  to  say 
whether  the  physical  elements  fill  out  the  notion  of  being. 
If  they  do,  we  must  allow  the  possibility  mentioned. 


THE  NATURE  OF  THINGS  43 

Being  in  distinction  from  non-being  finds  its  mark  in 
causality.  Tilings  find  the  definiteness  which  they  must 
have  in  Border  to  exist  at  all  in  the  law  of  this  causality. 
Differing  things  find  the  ground  of  their  difference  in  the 
different  laws  of  the  respective  causalities.  To  know  this 
law  is  to  know  the  thing  in  itself,  or  in  its  inmost  essence. 
The  only  insoluble  question  in  such  a  case  is  how  the  law 
can  be  set  in  reality  or  made  substantial ;  and  this  question 
does  not  belong  to  human  philosophy.  It  may  be  that 
further  study  may  compel  us  to  give  up  things  altogether 
in  distinction  from  phenomena ;  but  so  long  as  we  hold 
them,  we  must  view  them  not  as  picturable  objects,  but  as 
concrete  and  definite  principles  of  action. 


£//  r.  x*--     '  ^ 


CHAPTER  HI 
CHANGE  AND  IDENTITY 

THE  notion  of  being  has  already  undergone  manifold 
transformations,  and  the  end  is  not  yet.  The  most  promi- 
nent factor  in  the  common  notion  of  a  thing  has  not  yet 
been  mentioned.  This  is  the  element  of  permanence.  We 
think  of  a  thing  as  active,  but  still  more  as  abiding.  It  has 
changing  states,  but  nevertheless  it  is  always  equal  to  and 
identical  with  itself.  The  laws  of  thought  themselves  seem 
to  demand  this,  for  a  thing  is  nothing  for  us  except  as  it 
comes  under  a  fixed  idea.  We  have  now  to  inquire  wheth- 
er this  element  of  permanence  can  be  retained ;  and  if  so, 
how  ?  This  introduces  us  to  a  problem  of  a  higher  order  of 
difficulty  than  any  yet  considered. 

The  source  of  our  puzzles  on  this  point  is  the  fact  of 
change.  Change  is  the  most  prominent  feature  of  experi- 
ence, and  since  we  view  being  as  the  source  of  all  outgo 
and  manifestation,  we  must  provide  for  change  in  being. 
I  Otherwise  we  fall  into  the  Eleatic  conception  of  a  rigid, 
motionless  being ;  and  this  conception  makes  being  inade- 
quate to  its  function,  and,  hence,  philosophically  worthless. 
But  the  admission  that  we  cannot  positively  describe  how  a 
thing  is  made  does  not  allow  us  to  form  a  notion  of  things 
which  shall  contain  an  inner  contradiction.  The  notion 
that  we  form  must  be  self-consistent,  and  must  meet  the  de- 
mands of  thought  upon  it.  Yet  a  manifest  contradiction 
seems  to  exist  in  the  common  notion  of  a  changing  thing. 


CHANGE  AND  IDENTITY  4.5 

This  assumes  not  merely  a  change,  as  that  A  should  vanish, 
and  B  take  its  place,  but  that  A  itself  changes,  and  yet 
remains  the  same.  The  former  conception  may  be  illustrat- 
ed by  a  change  of  color.  In  this  case,  one  color  does  not 
become  another,  but  is  replaced  by  another.  The  blue  does 
not  change  to  black,  but  is  displaced  by  black.  So  with 
every  change  of  qualities ;  they  are  exchanged,  but  do  not 
themselves  change.  And  no  one  would  think  of  saying  that 
black  can  change  to  white,  and  still  less  would  one  think  of 
saying  that,  if  black  did  change  to  white,  it  would  still  re- 
main the  same  black.  If  one  quality  should  become  anoth- 
er, it  would  change  through  and  through  ;  and  we  should  all 
regard  it  as  absurd  to  speak  of  it  as  remaining  the  same 
quality  after  the  change  as  before.  But  why  is  it  any  less 
absurd  to  speak  of  a  thing  as  changing,  and  yet  remaining 
the  same,  than  it  is  to  speak  "thus  of  qualities  ?  The  latter 
we  never  do,  but  the  former  we  all  do.  Plainly  we  have 
here  a  speculative  problem  of  the  profounder  sort,  and  we 
must  attempt  its  solution.  Can  change  and  identity  be 
reconciled,  and  if  so,  how  ?  This  is  the  problem. 

This  problem  is  grievously  complicated  by  the  failure  to 
distinguish  the  several  meanings  of  sameness  or  identity, 
and  by  oversight  of  the  distinction  between  phenomenal 
and  ontological  reality.     Thus,  we  may  have  logical  identity,  ) 
phenomenal  identity,  and  metaphysical  identity  ;  and  unless 
we  are  on  our  guard  it  is  very  easy  to  confound   them. 
Logical   identity   is    simply    the    sameness    of    definition. 
Phenomenal  identity  is  often  the  equivalence  of  appear-    <^ 
ance,  and  sometimes  it  means  the  continuity  of  equivalent 
appearance.     Metaphysical  identity  is  quite  another  thing.    J? 
It  applies  to  the  reality  behind  the  appearance.     Without  it 
we  lose  ourselves  in  a  groundless  becoming  in  which  phe- 
nomena,  which  are  phenomena  of  nothing,  come  and  go 
without    any    reason    whatever.     But    how    metaphysical 


46  METAPHYSICS 

identity  is  to  be  conceived  is  a  problem  of  no  easy  solution. 
Possibly  we  shall  better  work  our  way  into  the  problem  and 
better  understand  the  course  of  spontaneous  thought  by 
pursuing  a  somewhat  roundabout  method  and  tracing  the 
dialectic  of  popular  thought.  This  seems  pedagogically 
more  promising  than  a  direct  and  abstract  exposition. 

But,  before  attacking  the  problem,  we  must  define  more 
carefully  the  meaning  of  change.  Change,  in  the  abstract, 
may  denote  any  and  every  change,  including  the  most  law- 
less and  chaotic  sequences,  continuous  and  discontinuous. 
In  this  sense,  change  would  be  simply  a  departure  from  the 
present  order  in  any  direction  whatever.  But  neither  science 
nor  philosophy  understands  by  change  a  lawless  and  ground- 
less sequence ;  for  such  a  conception  would  make  both  im- 
possible. Both  assume  a  causal  continuity  between  the 
successive  states  of  reality  whereby  each  is  founded  in  its 
predecessor,  and,  in  turn,  founds  its  successor.  Both  alike 
exclude  the  positivistic  notion  of  antecedence  and1  sequence 
as  the  only  relation  between  past  and  future ;  for  this  view 
would  reduce  everything  to  an  absolute  and  groundless  be- 
coming. In  that  case,  the  present  would  not  be  founded  in 
the  past,  and  would  not  found  the  future.  All  continuity 
would  be  •  dissolved,  and  ever}7  phenomenon  would  be  a 
groundless  and  opaque  fact.  But  even  Heraclitus,  who  first 
taught  that  all  things  flow,  and  who  made  becoming  the 
principle  of  existence,  held  that  the  preceding  moments  in 
the  flow  condition  the  succeeding,  and  that  the  course  of 
the  flow  is  subject  to  inexorable  necessity ;  something  as 
we  might  say  that  the  laws  of  mechanics  rule  the  ongoings 
of  the  physical  universe.  Fixity  in  the  flow,  marking  out 
its  channel  and  determining  its  bounds,  was  to  him  as  prom- 
inent a  principle  as  the  flow  itself.  No  more  does  the  sci- 
entist or  philosopher  regard  change  as  groundless ;  it  must 
have  both  law  and  ground.  Hence  it  is  not  a  change  of 


CHANGE    AND    IDENTITY  47 

anything  into  everything,  but  the  direction  of  change,  for 
everything  is  fixed.  For  physics  we  might  formulate  the 
doctrine  of  change  as  follows :  A  given  element,  A,  may, 
under  the  proper  conditions,  pass  into  Av  Av  Ay  etc. ;  and, 
by  reversing  the  conditions,  we  may  pass  from  A3  back 
to  A  again.  Likewise  another  element,  B,  may,  under  the 
proper  conditions,  run  through  the  series  J5V  By  Bz,  etc. 
C  may  pass  through  the  series  CVCV  Cy  etc.  From  any 
member  of  the  series,  as  a  base,  we  can  pass  to  any  other, 
l>v  properly  arranging  the  conditions.  But,  throughout 
this  process,  there  is  nothing  lawless  and  groundless.  A 
can  pass  into  Al  only  under  some  definite  condition,  and 
cannot  pass  into  anything  else  under  that  condition.  Hence 
change,  in  its  scientific  and  philosophic  sense,  implies  causal 
continuity  of  being,  and  is  identical  with  becoming.  The 
past  founded  the  present,  and  the  present  founds  the  future, 
but  everywhere  there  are  ground  and  law. 

The  demand  for  permanence  in  being  and  the  necessity 
of  recognizing  change  and  providing  for  it  in  being  have 
resulted  in  two  conceptions  of  the  basal  reality.  At  an  early 
date  the  Eleatics  defined  the  basal  principle  as  being,  which 
they  viewed  as  unitary  and  changeless  existence.  They 
thought  under  the  lawr  of  identity  and  provided  for  per- 
manence. At  about  the  same  date  Heraclitus  defined  the 
basal  principle  as  becoming,  which  he  regarded  as  a  contin- 
uous  process.  He  thought  under  the  law  of  connection  and 
sufficient  reason  and  provided  for  change.  For  him  noth- 
ing ever  is  in  the  sense  of  a  fixed  existence,  but  only  in  the 
sense  of  a  continuous  becoming.  The  process  alone  abides ; 
its  phases,  which  we  call  things,  are  forever  coming  and 
going.  This  view  has  had  such  influence  in  philosophy  that 
it  deserves  further  exposition. 

The  Heraclitic  conception  of  being  as  a  flowing  process 
may  be  illustrated  by  the  case  of  variable  motion.  In  this 


48  METAPHYSICS 

case,  the  moving  body  never  has  a  fixed  velocity  for  any 
two  consecutive  moments,  but  is  constantly  acquiring  one; 
and  we  measure  its  velocity  at  any  instant  by  the  space  it 
would  pass  over  in  the  next  moment  if  its  velocity  should 
instantly  become  uniform.  Now  at  any  indivisible  instant 
the  body  has  a  fixed  velocity,  but  this  fixed  velocity  is  in- 
cessantly changing  to  another.  We  might  say,  therefore, 
that  the  velocity  never  is,  but  perpetually  becomes.  Again, 
a  point  moving  in  a  curve  has  a  fixed  direction  for  only  one 
indivisible  instant — that  is,  for  no  time;  but  we  define  its 
direction  to  be  that  of  the  tangent-line  to  the  curve  at  the 
point,  and  instant,  of  measurement.  For  purposes  of  cal- 
culation, we  say  that  the  point  moves  in  a  straight  line  for 
an  infinitesimal  distance,  but,  in  truth,  the  point  never  moves 
in  a  straight  line.  Now,  in  this  case,  we  must  say  that  the 
point  has  a  fixed  direction  only  for  an  indivisible  instant. 
Any  direction  which  it  may  have  at  any  instant  is  inces- 
santly giving  place  to  another.  "We  may  say  here,  again, 
that  the  direction  of  the  point  never  is  in  the  sense  of  en- 
during, b'ut  is  forever  becoming. 

This  illustrates  the  conception  of  being  which  rules  in  the 
system  of  becoming.  Nothing  is  in  the  sense  of  enduring, 
but  is  always  becoming.  There  are  perpetual  coming  and 
going ;  and  as  soon  as  a  thing  is,  it  passes,  and  gives  place 
to  its  consequent.  All  being  is  comprised  in  an  order  of 
antecedence  and  sequence ;  and  the  antecedent  must  yield 
to  its  consequent,  which,  in  turn,  becomes  antecedent,  and 
likewise  passes.  There  is  nothing  fixed  but  law,  which  de- 
termines the  order  and  character  of  the  flow.  Even  when 
there  is  seeming  fixedness,  as  when  A  remains  J.,  instead 
of  passing  into  Ar  Av  Ay  etc.,  thus  producing  the  appear- 
ance of  change — even  this  is  not  to  be  viewed  as  an  ex- 
ception to  the  universal  flow  of  being,  but  is  to  be  regarded 
as  a  continuous  reproduction  of  A,  so  that  the  series  is  as 


CHANGE  AND  IDENTITY  49 

real  as  in  the  other  cases ;  only  being  of  the  form  A,  A,  A, 
there  is  no  appearance  of  change.  The  J.,  in  this  case,  is 
like  a  wave  where  two  currents  meet,  or  like  a  musical  note. 
Both  appear  constant  only  because  they  are  incessantly  re- 
produced. Or  it  is  like  the  flame  of  a  lamp  when  undis- 
turbed. It  seems  to  be  a  resting  thing ;  but  it  is  only  the 
phenomenon  of  a  continuous  process  of  combustion.  We 
call  it  a  thing,  while  it  is  really  a  process.  In  the  case  of 
the  changing  velocities,  no  one  of  them  abides ;  that  which 
is  permanent  is  the  order  of  change  itself.  So,  in  the  doc- 
trine of  becoming,  the  process  alone  is  permanent.  The 
forms  of  the  process,  which  we  call  things,  are  forever  com- 
ing and  going. 

Many  have  sought  to  find  a  contradiction  in  the  notion 
of  becoming,  but  they  fail  to  notice  the  continuity  and  uni- 
versality of  the  process.  Of  course,  if  we  affirm  a  perma- 
nent and  changeless  substratum  in  being,  there  is  no  diffi- 
culty in  showing  that  change  cannot  be  combined  with  such 
a  factor.  But  the  disciple  of  Heraclitus  denies  the  existence 
of  any  such  factor.  For  him,  all  is  changing,  except  the 
changeless  laws  of  change.  If  A  becomes  Ar  the  objector 
conceives  A  as  first  ceasing  to  be  J.,  and  then,  after  a  void 
period,  becoming  Ar  Such  a  notion  of  change  would,  in- 
deed, be  absurd ;  but  the  Heraclitic  holds  no  such  view. 
He  holds  that  A  does  not  first  cease  to  be  A,  and  then  be- 
come Av  but  it  ceases  to  be  A  in  becoming  Alj  and  it  be- 
comes A^  in  ceasing  to  be  A ;  just  as  a  body  with  variable 
motion  does  not  first  lose  one  velocity  and  then  acquire  an- 
other, but  it  loses  one  in  acquiring  another.  The  losing  and 
the  acquiring  are  the  same  fact  seen  from  opposite  sides. 
So,  also,  the  ceasing  of  A  and  the  becoming  of  Al  are  the 
same  fact  seen  from  opposite  sides.  Seen  from  behind,  it  is 
the  ceasing  of  A ;  seen  from  before,  it  is  the  becoming  of 
Ay  Now  it  is  only  in  this  sense  that  change  implies  that 


50  METAPHYSICS 

A  is  both  A  and  Al  at  the  same  time.  There  is  no  indivis- 
ible instant  in  which  A  rests  as  both  A  and  Av  but  one  in 
which  A  ceases  to  be  A  and  becomes  A1 ;  precisely  as  a 
moving  point  never  moves  with  two  velocities  in  the  same 
direction  at  the  same  moment ;  but,  in  an  indivisible  instant, 
it  ceases  to  move  with  one  velocity  and  begins  to  move  with 
J/  another.  But  the  fact  that  the  one  indivisible  flow  divides 
itself  for  our  thought  into  two  factors — a  ceasing  and  a  be- 
coming— involves  no  more  contradiction  than  the  fact  that 
the  same  curve  is  both  concave  and  convex  when  seen  from 
opposite  sides.  With  this  understanding  of  the  doctrine  of 
change  or  becoming,  we  return  now  to  the  problem  with 
which  we  started :  Can  change  and  identity  be  reconciled ; 
and,  if  so,  how  ? 


The  Eleatics  denied  the  possibility  of  reconciliation.  Ei- 
ther, they  held,  excludes  the  other;  and  as  being  was  the 
exclusive  category  of  their  system,  they  denied  the  reality 
of  change.  This  view  has  been  partially  reproduced  in 
modern  times  by  Herbart.  The  Hegelians,  also,  have  held 
to  the  necessary  contradiction  between  change  and  identity, 
but  only  with  the  aim  of  illustrating  their  principle,  that  all 
reality  consists  in  the  union  of  contradictions.  All  definite 
existence,  in  their  view,  is  formed  by  the  union  of  being 
and  non-being.  The  solution  of  the  difficulty  furnished  by 
spontaneous  and  uncritical  thinking  consists  in  the  notion 
of  a  changeless  thing  with  changing  states  or  changing 
qualities.  These  change,  but  the  thing  remains  constant. 

We  have  in  this  popular  view  a  division  of  labor  similar 
to  that  in  the  popular  conception  of  being.  There  we  had 
a  rigid  core  of  duration,  which  simply  existed  and  supplied 
the  being.  In  addition  to  this,  there  was  a  certain  set  of 
forces,  in  somewhat  obscure  relations  to  the  being,  which 
furnished  the  activity.  Here  we  have  the  same  core  of 


CHANGE  AND  IDENTITY  51 

duration,  which  provides  for  the  identity,  and  a  swarm  of 
conditions,  states,  and  qualities,  which  look  after  the  change. 
The  identity  is  located  in  the  core  of  being,  and  the  change 
is  attributed  to  the  states  and  qualities.     Without  doubt, 
the  children  of  the  dragon's  teeth  will  find  in  this  view  the 
final  utterance  of  reason  and  an  end  of  all  discussion ;  but, 
still,  we  must  insist  that  this  conception  of  the  changeless  ; 
thing  with  changing  states  is  only  a  spontaneous  hypothesis  • 
of  the  mind,  whose  adequacy  to  the  work  assigned  it  must 
be  inquired  into. 

A  moment's  reflection  serves  to  show  the  untenability  of 
this  popular  view.  A  state  of  a  thing  is  not  something  ex-> 
ternally  attached  to  the  thing,  but  is  really  a  state  of  the 
thing,  and  expresses  what  the  thing  is  at  the  time.  Any 
other  conception  throws  us  back  into  the  external  concep- 
tion of  inherence,  which  we  have  rejected,  and  makes  the 
thing  useless  as  an  explanation  of  its  states.  For,  if  the 
thing  itself  does  not  change  in  the  changes  of  its  states, 
there  is  no  reason  why  the  states  should  change,  or  why 
their  changes  should  follow  one  direction  rather  than  an- 
other. The  thing  itself  must  found  and  determine  its 
changes,  or  they  remain  unfounded  and  groundless.  But, 
to  do  this,  the  thing  itself  must  undergo  an  essential  change; 
for  if  A  remain  J.,  instead  of  becoming  Ar  there  is  no 
ground  why  any  of  the  manifestations  of  A  should  change. 
The  external  change  must  be  viewed  as  the  external  mani- 
festation of  an  internal  change.  A  change  between  things 
must  depend  upon  a  change  in  things.  Now  when  we  re- 
member that  the  only  reason  for  positing  things  is  to  pro- 
vide some  ground  for  activity  and  change,  it  is  plain  that 
the  changeless  core  is  of  no  use,  and  must  be  dropped  as 
both  useless  and  unprovable.  It  will,  indeed,  go  very  hard 
with  the  dragon's  children  to  give  up  this  core  of  rigid 
reality,  but  even  they  may  free  themselves  from  the  delu- 


52  METAPHYSICS 

sion  by  persistently  asking  themselves  what  proof  there  is 
of  such  a  core,  and  of  what  use  it  would  be,  if  it  were  there. 
There  is  no  help  for  it ;  if  being  is  to  explain  change,  change 
must  be  put  into  being,  and  being  must  be  brought  into  the 
circle  of  change.  In  what  sense  a  thing  remains  the  same 
we  shall  see  hereafter;  here  we  point  out  that  it  is  impos- 
sible to  reserve  any  central  core  of  being  from  change,  but 
sing  must  be  viewed  as  changing  through  and  through. 
Another  attempt  to  solve  the  problem  differs  in  word 
rather  than  in  meaning.  This  theory  assumes  that  things, 
Y"  in  themselves,  are  changeless,  but  their  relations  change, 
and  thus  there  arises  for  us  a  changing  appearance,  which, 
however,  does  not  affect  the  underlying  realities.  This  is 
the  common  view  of  physicists.  It  resolves  the  phenomenal 
world  into  an  appearance,  and  places  a  mass  of  changeless 
and  invisible  atoms  beneath  it.  This,  like  the  previous 
view,  is  sufficient  for  practical  purposes,  but  it  is  equally  un- 
tenable, for  that  change  of  relations  must  be  accounted  for. 
If  we  conceive  these  changeless  elements  in  a  given  relation, 
A,  there  is  no  reason  why  they  should  ever  pass  into  a  new 
relation,  B.  Conversely,  if  they  do  pass  into  the  new  re- 
lation JB,  this  is  thinkable  only  on  the  supposition  of  a 
change  in  the  activity  of  some  or  all  of  the  elements ;  and 
this,  as  we  have  seen,  implies  a  change  in  the  things  them- 
selves. Without  this  admission  the  relations  remain  in- 
dependent of  the  things,  and  unexplained  by  them.  It  is 
impossible  to  find  relief  in  this  conception. 
*f  The  same  criticism  applies  to  Herbart's  notion  of  "  acci- 
dental views"  (zufallige  Ansichten).  According  to  him, 
the  changes  of  things  are  only  in  appearance,  and  are  due 
y  entirely  to  the  changing  position  of  the  observer.  Thus 
the  same  line  might  be  a  side,  a  chord,  a  tangent,  a  sine,  a 
cosine,  or  a  diameter,  according  to  its  relation  to  other  lines, 
and  yet  it  would  be  the  same  line  in  all  these  relations. 


CHANGE   AND   IDENTITY  53 

The  relations  would  be  accidental.  According  to  the  posi- 
tion of  the  observer,  therefore,  the  same  thing  may  appear 
in  widely  different  relations,  yet  without  any  change  in  it- 
self. The  change,  then,  is  phenomenal  and  accidental,  rather//^ 
than  essential.  But  this  view,  when  applied  to  the  exter- 
nal world,  is  utterly  incredible.  It  denies  all  change  in  the 
substantial  universe,  and  reduces  the  manifold  changes  of 
the  system  to  occurrences  in  us.  But,  even  if  this  view 
were  credible,  the  difficulty  would  not  be  escaped,  but  trans-, 
ferred.  Change  would  be  removed  from  the  outer  world  to 
the  inner;  but,  as  the  knowing  mind  also  belongs  to  the 
realm  of  being,  and  is,  indeed,  the  only  being  of  which  we 
have  immediate  experience,  the  difficulty  remains  the  same. 
Apart,  then,  from  the  inherent  incredibility  of  Herbart's 
view,  it  fails  to  meet  the  purpose  of  its  invention.  The 
same  considerations  apply  to  the  proposition  to  view  change 
simply  as  a  succession  of  phenomena,  as  when  qualities  suc- 
ceed one  another,  or  when  images  succeed  one  another  on 
a  screen.  It  may  be  that  the  physical  world  is  only  a  suc- 
cession of  phenomena  in  our  minds;  but  that  succession 
must  be  caused  by  something  and  perceived  by  something; 
and  thus  the  change,  which  is  eliminated  from  the  phenom- 
ena, must  be  found  in  the  producing  agent  and  in  the  per- 
cipient mind.  We  may,  then,  locate  the  change  variously, 
but  it  is  strictly  impossible  to  eliminate  change  from  being, 
or  to  reserve  any  core  in  being  from  the  cycle  of  change. 
We  are  forced  to  bring  the  substances  of  the  universe  into 
the  stream  of  change,  and  resign  them,  in  some  sense,  to 
the  eternal  flow.  Being  is  process.  Things  are  forever  pro- 
ceeding from  themselves,  and,  in  proceeding,  they  become 
something  else. 

But,  before  going  further,  some  objections  must  be  con- 
sidered, which  have  long  been  struggling  for  utterance.  It 
will  be  said  that,  in  the  series  A,  Ar  Av  etc.,  Av  Av  etc., 


54  METAPHYSICS 

are  all  states  of  A,  and  that  A  is  the  same  throughout. 
The  answer  is,  that  At  is  no  more  a  state  of  A  than  A  is  a 
state  of  Av  or  of  Av  etc.  Which  of  these  forms  shall  be 
taken  as  the  base  depends  upon  experience.  When  a  given 
form  is  familiar  to  us,  we  regard  it  as  the  thing,  and  other 
possible  forms  as  its  states ;  but,  in  truth,  any  one  form  is 
as  much  the  thing  as  any  other.  Thus  we  view  water  as 
the  thing,  and  speak  of  ice  and  vapor  as  states  of  water; 
but,  in  fact,  ice  and  vapor  are  no  more  states  of  water  than 
water  is  a  state  of  them.  But  here  it  will  be  further  urged 
that,  through  all  these  states,  the  substance  remains  the 
same.  It  is  the  same  essence  of  being  which  appears  now 
as  J.,  and  now  as  Av  etc.  But  we  have  seen,  in  the  previous 
chapter,  that  the  essence  itself  is  nothing  but  the  concrete 
law  of  action,  and  that  there  is  no  rigid  core  of  being  in  the 
thing.  Hence  the  identity  of  a  thing  does  not  consist  in  a 
changelessness  of  substance,  but  in  the  continuity  and  con- 
stancy of  this  law. 

In  further  criticism  of  the  objection,  we  must  ask  what 
is  meant  by  sameness ;  and,  for  the  sake  of  progress,  we 
venture  the  following  exposition :  A,  under  the  appropriate 
circumstances,  can  run  through  the  series  Av  Av  Ay  etc. 
B  runs  through  the  series  Br  Bv  B3,  etc.  C  runs  through 
the  series  Cr  <?2,  <73,  etc.  Now,  as  long  as  we  remain  in 
the  physical  realm,  these  series  can  be  reversed  by  reversing 
the  conditions,  so  that  from  An  we  can  recover  A.  But,  in 
thus  reversing  the  series,  provided  all  the  other  conditions 
remain  the  same,  there  is  a  complete  quantitative  and  qual- 
itative equivalence  between  the  members  restored  in  the 
regress  and  the  corresponding  members  lost  in  the  progress; 
that  is,  Am  will  be  in  all  respects  the  same,  whether  reached 
by  a  progress  from  Am_}  or  by  a  regress  from  Am+l.  The 
indestructibility  of  matter  means  nothing  more  than  the 
possibility  of  working  these  series  back  and  forth  without 


CHANGE  AND  IDENTITY  55 

quantitative  loss.  When  it  is  made  to  mean  more,  it  is  al- 
ways on  the  strength,  not  of  facts,  but  of  some  alleged  in- 
tuition into  the  nature  of  substance.  Now  the  only  sense 
in  which  Al  is  the  same  as  A,  or  in  which  the  substance  of 
Al  is  the  same  as  that  of  A,  is  that  Al  can  be  developed 
from  A,  and,  conversely,  A  can  be  developed  from  Ar 
There  is  a  continuity  between  A,  Av  Av  etc.,  which  does 
not  exist  between  A,  B,  and  (7,  and  that  continuity  is  the 
fact  that  Av  Av  etc.,  can  be  developed  from  A,  and  not 
from  B  or  C.  These,  in  turn,  can  only  produce  Br  Bv 
etc.,  or  Cr  Cv  etc.  "Without  doubt,  the  disciple  of  the 
senses  will  fancy  that  there  is  a  core  of  being  which  holds 
Av  Av  etc.,  together,  and  differentiates  them  from  B  and 
(7;  but  this  fancy  has  been  sufficiently  considered.  Such  a 
core  explains  nothing  to  the  reason,  and  is  only  an  embar- 
rassment. We  repeat,  then,  that  in  impersonal  ontology  a 
thing  in  different  states  is  the  same  only  in  the  sense  of  a 
continuity  of  law  and  relation.  Absolute  sameness  or  change-  1  / 
lessness  is  impossible  in  impersonal  reality.  This  concep-  p 
tion  of  sameness  is  incompatible  with  change  of  any  kind, 
and  must  be  repudiated. 

But  our  view  of  change  suggests  another  difficulty,  as 
follows :  If  A  really  becomes  Ar  and  ceases  to  exist  as  J., 
the  unity  of  the  thing  seems  to  disappear,  and  A,  Av  Av 
etc..  appear  as  different  things.  This  difficulty  we  have 
now  to  consider.  The  charge  that  our  view  cancels  the 
unity  of  the  thing  rests  upon  the  assumption  that  A  is  com- 
posed of  Al  plus  Av  etc.  In  this  case,  A  would  not  be  a 
unit,  but  the  sum  of  J.,  plus  Av  etc.  But  this  view  is  an 
error.  When  A  exists,  it  is  simply  and  solely  A,  and  Av 
Av  etc.,  have  no  existence  whatever.  A  is  strictly  a  unit, 
but  such  a  unit  that,  under  the  proper  circumstances,  it 
becomes  Ar  Ar  again,  when  it  has  become,  is  the  only 
member  of  the  series  which  is  real.  It  does  not  contain  A 


56  METAPHYSICS 

concealed  within  itself;  it  is  purely  itself.  Misled  by  the 
Aristotelian  notions  of  potentiality  and  actuality,  specula- 
tors have  largely  assumed  that  Av  Av  etc.,  exist  preformed 
and  potentially  in  A ;  but  this  means  only  that  A  is  such, 
not  that  it  will  develop  AVAV  etc.,  but  that  it  will  develop 
into  them ;  and  when  developed  into  them  it  is  A  no  long- 
er.  In  any  other  sense,  potential  existence  is  no  existence. 
We  may  say,  rhetorically,  that  the  oak  exists  in  the  acorn ; 
but,  in  truth,  the  oak  does  not  exist  at  all,  but  an  acorn 
exists.  This  acorn,  however,  is  such  that,  under  the  proper 
conditions,  an  oak  will  be  developed.  The  phrase  potential 
/^/existence  is  due  to  an  effort  of  the  imagination  to  compre- 

'  hend  how  one  thing  can  develop  into  another;  and  the 
fancy  is  entertained  that  the  problem  is  solved  if  we  con- 
ceive the  future  development  to  be  already  concealed  in 
the  present  reality.  But,  in  fact,  this  view  denies  develop- 

/>  ment ;  for,  in  the  case  assumed,  there  is  no  development, 
but  only  a  letting  loose  of  potentialities,  which  are  also,  and 
always,  realities.  Where  there  is  a  true  development,  the 

y  thing  developed  absolutely  becomes.  Our  doctrine  of  change, 
therefore,  does  not  conflict  with  the  unity  of  the  thing,  for 
the  thing  is  never  A  and  A^  and  A2  at  the  same  time,  but 
only  some  one  member  of  the  series,  and,  as  such,  is  one 
and  indivisible. 

But  this  makes  the  other  part  of  the  objection  still  more 
prominent.  How  can  A,  Av  Av  etc.,  be  distinguished  from 
a  series  of  different  things  ?  They  do,  indeed,  follow  one 
another  according  to  a  certain  law,  but  each  ceases  to  be 
when  its  consequent  begins.  Al  is  not  A,  although  it  is 
produced  from  J.,  no  more  than  ice  is  water  because  it  can 
be  produced  from  water.  It  is  not  meant  that  these  differ- 
ent things  are  externally  produced,  for  they  really  proceed 
from  one  another ;  but  when  they  are  produced,  they  are 
different  things,  The  members  of  the  series  J.,  Ar  Av  etc., 


CHANGE   AND  IDENTITY  57 

are  related  as  cause  and  effect,  although,  by  reversing  the 
conditions,  any  one  may  be  cause  and  any  one  may  be  effect. 
But  there  is  no  reason  for  affirming  any  further  unity  in  the 
series  than  this ;  and  there  is  no  reason  for  declaring  that 
they  are  only  different  states  of  one  and  the  same  thing. 
One  member  is  as  much  the  thing  as  any  other,  and  one 
member  is  as  much  a  state  as  any  other.  And,  since  the 
notion  of  the  same  thing  in  different  states  is  well  calculated 
to  mislead  us,  we  point  out  that,  in  a  system  of  absolute  be- 
coming, this  notion  of  a  state  is  inapplicable.  To  warrant 
its  use,  there  must  be  some  permanent  factor  which  can 
abide  through  the  changes  and  distinguish  itself  from  them. 
But  in  this  system  there  is  no  such  factor.  Indeed,  the  con- 
scious self  is  the  only  thing  we  know  of  which  is  capable  of 
having  states.  It  distinguishes  itself  from  its  affections,  and 
affirms  itself  as  abiding  through  them.  But,  where  all  is 
flow,  the  thing  and  the  state  vanish  together;  and  we  can- 
not speak  of  the  next  member  as  a  state  of  the  preceding, 
for  the  preceding  member  has  disappeared.  A  permanent 
factor  of  some  sort  is  necessary,  to  justify  the  conception  of 
one  thing  with  various  states ;  and  thus  it  becomes  still 
clearer  that  A,  Av  Av  etc.,  must  be  regarded  as  different 
things,  having  no  other  connection  than  a  mutual  inter- 
convertibility  according  to  a  certain  law,  like  'the  various 
forms  of  energy. 

And  here  we  must  say  that  the  conception  is  sufficient 
for  all  purposes  of  science  and  daily  life.  The  possibility 
of  working  the  series  back  and  forth,  under  definite  con- 
ditions, without  quantitative  loss,  is  all  that  the  physicist 
needs  to  know.  Whether  it  be  the  same  substance  through- 
out the  series,  or  substance  incessantly  reproducing  itself 
according  to  a  fixed  law,  is  quite  indifferent  to  physical 
science.  Doubtless  it  would  not  be  difficult  to  find  some 
one  with  an  "  intuition  "  of  the  absurdity  of  the  latter  view ; 


58  METAPHYSICS 

but  intuitions  are  seldom  resorted  to,  unless  argument  fails. 
Certainly  no  one  whose  opinion  deserves  attention  will 
claim  any  intuition  on  this  point.  Thus  we  fall  back  again 
into  the  doctrine  that  all  things  flow.  Reality  is  incessant- 
ly reproducing  itself,  either  in  the  form  A,  A,  A,  thus  pro- 
ducing the  appearance  of  permanence,  or  in  the  form  ^4, 
AL,  Av  etc.,  thus  producing  the  appearance  of  change ; 
but  the  flow  is  as  real  in  one  case  as  in  the  other.  Now 
in  the  series  A,  Av  Ay  Ay  etc.,  which  is  the  thing  ?  "We 
cannot  make  the  thing  the  sum  of  the  series,  for  that  would 
destroy  the  unity  of  the  thing,  and  would  imply  that  all 
the  members  of  the  series  co-exist.  The  truth  is,  that  each 
member  is  the  thing,  whenever  that  member  acts,  and  the 
several  members  are  the  same  thing  only  in  the  sense  that 
each  may  be  developed  from  the  other.  In  any  other  sense 
they  are  different  things.  Conceived  ontologically,  every- 
thing changes  to  its  centre,  and,  by  changing,  becomes 
something  else,  similar  or  dissimilar. 

The  current  notion  of  a  thing,  we  have  said,  is  that  of  a 
changeless  substance  with  changing  states.  The  change- 
lessness  we  have  been  forced  to  give  up ;  and  now  it  seems 
that  we  must  abandon  any  ontologicai  distinction  between 
the  thing  and  its  states.  The  same  thing  ontologically,  it 
would  seem,  cannot  exist  in  different  states,  for,  in  taking 
on  a  new  state,  it  becomes  a  new  thing.  We  may  illustrate 
this  view  by  the  conservation  of  energy  as  rhetorically  mis- 
understood. In  the  correlations  of  energy  there  is  nothing 
which  glides  unchanged  from  one  phase  to  another,  but 
each  phase  expresses  the  entire  energy  as  long  as  it  lasts ; 
and  when  it  produces  a  new  phase  it  vanishes  into  its 
effect.  Nothing  is  constant  but  law  and  numerical  relation. 
So  a  thing,  viewed  ontologically,  is  identical  with  its  phases 
while  they  last,  and  when  it  passes  from  one  to  another 
the  cause  disappears  in  the  effect.  We  have  next  to  add 


CHANGE  AND  IDENTITY  59 

that  this  separation  of  phases  is  largely  arbitrary.  In  the 
series  A,  Av  Av  A3,  etc.,  any  one  member  is  as  much  the 
thing  as  any  other;  but  these  members  are  only  arbitrary 
units  in  a  continuous  process,  like  the  moments  into  which 
we  divide  time.  Time  is  not  composed  of  moments,  but  is 
strictly  continuous.  So  the  process  which  we  call  a  thing 
is  also  continuous,  and  the  sections  into  wrhich  we  divide  it 
are  only  products  of  our  thought.  A,  Av  Av  Ay  etc.,  are 
only  segments  of  a  process  which  appears  now  as  one 
member  of  the  series,  and  now  as  another.  It  cannot  be 
detained  as  any  one,  and  it  no  sooner  comes  than  it  goes. 
Being  in  incessant  progress,  it  forces  itself  from  form  to 
form,  nor  tarries  in  one  stay.  This  is  the  conception  of 
being  which  rules  in  all  systems  of  philosophical  evolution. 
Being  is  perpetual  process,  and  exists  only  in  its  incessant 
procession.  Motion  and  change  are  omnipresent.  Things 
as  they  appear  are  only  stages  of  the  eternal  flow,  or 
transient  eddies  in  the  flood.  The  incessant  weaving  is 
attended  by  incessant  unweaving,  and  sooner  or  later  all 
things  pass,  except  the  procession  of  being  itself. 

This  result  is  in  the  highest  degree  paradoxical,  and  to 
many  must  seem  absurd.  There  is  no  escape  from  it,  how- 
ever, so  long  as  we  conceive  the  world  of  things  as  existing 
apart  from  intelligence  and  founding  the  world  of  change. 
With  such  a  view  the  world  of  substances  must  be  brought 
into  the  cycle  of  change  and  resigned  to  the  eternal  flow. 
Spontaneous  thought  is  very  possibly  right  in  demanding 
permanence  and  identity,  but  it  is  certainly  wrong  in  its 
way  of  getting  them.  It  is  looking  for  them  apart  from 
intelligence ;  and  these  buffetings  result.  No  reflection 
upon  a  world  of  change,  according  to  the  law  of  the  suffi- 
cient reason,  will  ever  find  a  world  of  changeless  substances. 
On  this  line  there  is  no  escape  from  the  Heraclitic  flow. 


60  METAPHYSICS 

But  the  Heraclitic  must  not  triumph.  For  while  spon 
taneous  thought  cannot  find  its  identities  in  an  extra-mental 
\vorld,  just  as  little  can  the  doctrine  of  change  be  made  in- 
telligible without  reference  to  an  abiding  intelligence.  The 
extra-mental  identities  are  no  worse  off  in  this  respect  than 
the  extra-mental  changes.  "When  all  things  flow  and  pass, 
without  permanence  or  identity  of  any  sort,  the  Heraclitic 
doctrine  is  intelligible  only  because  it  is  false.  If  being 
were  strictly  changeless  the  illusion  of  change  could  never 
arise;  and  if  all  things  flowed  the  illusion  of  permanence 
would  be  impossible.  There  must  be  some  permanent 
factor  somewhere,  to  make  the  notion  possible.  A  flow 
cannot  exist  for  itself,  but  only  for  the  abiding.  The 
knowledge  of  change  depends  on  some  fixed  factor,  which, 
by  its  permanence,  reveals  the  change  as  change.  If,  then, 
all  things  flowed — the  thinking  subject  as  well  as  the  ob- 
ject— the  doctrine  itself  would  be  logically  impossible.  It 
is  commonly  overlooked  by  speculators  that  succession  and 
change  can  exist,  as  such,  only  for  the  abiding.  Something 
must  stand  apart  from  the  flow,  or  endure  through  it,  be- 
fore change  can  be  conceived.  Hence,  as  a  matter  of  theory, 
we  must  have,  at  least,  an  abiding  or  permanent  knower,  to 
make  the  theory  intelligible ;  and,  as  a  matter  of  conscious- 
ness, we  have  immediate  experience  of  such  a  knowing  sub- 
ject— the  conscious  self.  In  what  this  permanence  consists 
we  shall  see  hereafter. 

Thus  it  appears  that  the  doctrine  of  the  flow  of  being 
must  be  limited  by  the  permanence,  in  some  sense,  of  the 
mental  subject.  Episternology  further  reminds  us  that  the 
flow,  if  it  is  to  be  anything  for  thought,  must  be  cast  in 
intellectual  moulds.  A  mere  flow,  external  to  all  thought 
and  expressing  no  thought,  could  be  no  object  of  cognition, 
and  would  indeed  be  nothing  for  intelligence.  Finally, 
logic  reminds  us  that  formal  identity  or  the  fixity  of  the 


CHANGE  AND  IDENTITY  61 

idea  is  the  absolute  condition  of  any  articulate  thought 
whatever.  Hence  any  change  which  we  can  recognize  must 
be  subject  to  these  conditions. 

With  this  insight  it  becomes  plain  that  the  question  of 
change  and  identity  must  be  considered  from  the  stand- 
point of  intelligence,  if  we  would  reach  any  solution.  The 
abstract  identity  of  the  Eleatics  cannot  be  found,  when  we 
look  for  it ;  and  the  abstract  change  of  the  Heraclitics 
would  make  thought  impossible.  And  we  must  also  bear 
in  mind  the  various  sorts  of  identity,  which  common-sense 
never  distinguishes.  For  the  entire  phenomenal  world,  the 
similarity  and  continuity  of  appearance  are  the  only  identity 
we  have  any  occasion  to  affirm.  For  the  physical  world, 
the  continuity  of  law  and  relation  are  the  sufficient  identity. 
These  are  the  only  fixed  elements  we  find,  and  these  are  all 
we  need.  But  for  the  knowability  of  that  world  it  is  neces- 
sary that  its  successive  phases  shall  admit  of  being  gather- 
ed up  into  a  law-giving  expression  which  shall  express  for 
thought  the  nature  of  the  thing.  In  the  series  A,  Ar  Av  etc.,  \l\ 
no  one  member  f  ully  expresses  the  thing,  but  only  the  whole  ' 
series  and  the  law  which  unites  and  implies  the  members. 
Such  a  thing,  however,  is  absurd  and  impossible  apart  from 
intelligence,  while  it  is  perfectly  clear  on  the  plane  of  in- 
telligence. 

We  have  here  an  antithesis  of  the  real  and  the  ideal 
which  is  somewhat  peculiar,  and  which  demands  a  word  of 
explanation.  Commonly  by  the  real  we  mean  the  actual, 
existing  apart  from  the  mind  in  space  and  time ;  and  by 
the  ideal  we  mean  that  which  exists  only  subjectively  or  in 
idea.  But  now  it  begins  to  appear  as  if  the  idea  were 
needed  to  constitute  and  define  the  real,  so  much  so  that 
the  real  threatens  to  vanish  otherwise.  If  we  understand 
by  the  real  that  which  is  in  time  and  has  its  existence  in 
succession,  logic  shows  that  the  real  cannot  be  known ;  for 


62  METAPHYSICS 

if  A  be  A  only  for  an  indivisible  instant,  it  is  not  A  long 
enough  for  us  to  say  anything  about  it,  or  to  make  it  worth 
while  to  say  anything  about  it.  Before  we  can  say  it  is  A, 
it  is  no  longer  A,  and  thus  eludes  us  altogether. 

We  must,  then,  link  the  successive  phases  together  by 
some  law-giving  idea  before  we  can  grasp  the  thing  at  all. 
But  this  idea,  on  the  other  hand,  is  timeless  and  thus  un- 
real. Without  the  idea  the  changing  thing  vanishes  from 
thought  altogether ;  but  it  is  not  immediately  clear  how  the 
idea  can  take  on  the  temporal  form.  The  thing  exists  suc- 
cessively ;  the  idea  has  no  succession  in  it.  We  need  the 
full  idea  to  express  the  existence  of  the  thing,  but  the  ex- 
isting thing  never  expresses  or  realizes  the  full  idea.  Com- 
mon-sense will  not  allow  the  idea  to  be  real,  and  logic  will 
not  allow  the  thing  to  be  real. 

There  is  no  way  out  of  this  puzzle  so  long  as  we  try  to 
define  reality  without  reference  to  intelligence.  The  diffi- 
culty can  be  removed  only  as  we  conceive  the  idea  to  be 
realized  successively,  or  under  the  temporal  form;  and  to 
complete  the  thought,  we  are  thrown  back  upon  the  con- 
ception of  an  underlying  intelligence  which  is  at  once  the 
seat  of  the  idea  and  the  source  of  the  realizing  energy. 
Otherwise  we  can  only  oscillate  between  an  impossible  real- 
ism and  an  impossible  idealism. 

With  this  result  reality  and  identity  acquire  special  mean- 
ings. The  reality  of  the  thing  might  mean  the  temporal 
manifestation  of  the  productive  energy,  or  it  might  mean 
the  idea  expressed  thereby,  and  identity  might  mean  the 
continuity  of  the  realizing  process,  or  the  oneness  of  the 
underlying  idea.  And  this  is  the  view  to  which  we 
must  finally  come  concerning  the  reality  of  all  impersonal 
things.  They  have  their  existence  through  an  energy  not 
their  own,  and  they  have  their  identity  solely  through  the 
intellect  which  constitutes  them  identical.  This  will  appear 


CHANGE  AND  IDENTITY  63 

more  fully  later  on;  meanwhile  we  get  a  hint  of  the  diffi 
culty  in  defining  reality  without  reference  to  intelligence. 

The  law  of  the  sufficient  reason  never  brings  us  beyond 
the  continuous  in  existence.  Continuity  of  some  kind  is 
necessary  to  escape  the  groundless  becoming  and  the  disso- 
lution of  both  reason  and  existence.  But  this  continuity  in 
itself  makes  no  provision  for  knowledge.  Something  truly 
abiding  must  be  found,  if  we  are  to  escape  the  eternal  flow. 
And  fortunately  this  something  is  revealed  in  experience. 
In  personality,  or  in  the  self-conscious  spirit,  we  find  the 
only  union  of  change  and  permanence,  or  of  identity  and 
diversity.  The  soul  knows  itself  to  be  the  same,  and  dis- 
tinguishes itself  from  its  states  as  their  permanent  subject. 
This  permanence,  however,  does  not  consist  in  any  rigid 
sameness  of  being,  but  in  thought,  memory,  and  self-con- 
sciousness, whereby  alone  we  constitute  ourselves  abiding 
persons.  How  this  is  possible  there  is  no  telling;  but  we 
get  no  insight  into  its  possibility  by  affirming  a  rigid  du- 
ration of  some  substance  in  the  soul.  The  soul,  as  sub- 
stance, forever  changes ;  and,  unlike  what  we  assume  of  the 
physical  elements,  its  series  of  changes  can  be  reversed  only 
to  a  slight  extent.  The  soul  develops,  but  it  never  un- 
develops  into  its  former  state.  Each  new  experience  leaves 
the  soul  other  than  it  was ;  but,  as  it  advances  from  stage 
to  stage,  it  is  able  to  gather  up  its  past  and  carry  it  with  it, 
so  that,  at  any  point,  it  possesses  all  that  it  has  been.  It  is 
this  fact  only  which  constitutes  the  permanence  and  identity 
of  self. 

Here  it  will  be  urged  that  this  view  is  only  another  form 
of  Locke's  theory,  which  made  identity  to  consist  in  memo- 
ry ;  and  as  Locke's  view  was  exploded,  even  in  his  own  gen- 
eration, our  view  may  be  regarded  as  demolished  in  ad- 
vance. The  objection  to  Locke's  view  is  that  memory  does 


64  METAPHYSICS 

not  make,  but  reveals,  identity;  and,  if  Locke  denied  the 
continuity  of  being  in  the  sense  in  which  we  have  explained 
it,  the  objection  is  fatal.  Memory  does  not  make,  but  re- 
veals the  fact  that  our  being  is  continuous.  If  our  being 
were  discontinuous,  or  if  we  were  numerically  distinct  from 
ourselves  at  an  earlier  date,  memory  would  be  impossible. 
But  we  have  seen  that  continuity  is  not  identity.  It  is  itself 
a  flow,  and  means  only  that  the  being  which  now  is  has 
been  developed  from  the  being  which  was.  This  is  all  that 
is  commonly  meant  by  identity.  But  the  question  we  raise 
is  how  to  bring  a  fixed  factor  into  this  flow,  and  thus  raise 
continuity  to  proper  identit}^  or  sameness.  And  this  ep"  be 
done  only  as  the  agent  himself  does  it ;  and  the  agent  does 
it  only  by  memory  and  self-consciousness,  whereby  a  fixed 
point  of  personality  is  secured,  and  the  past  and  present  are 
bound  together  in  the  unity  of  one  consciousness.  The  per- 
manence and  identity,  therefore,  are  products  of  the  agent's 
own  activity.  We  become  the  same  by  making  ourselves 
such.  Numerical  identity  may  be  possible  on  the  imper- 
sonal plane;  but  proper  identity  is  impossible,  except  in 
consciousness.  And  that  numerical  identity  is  never  for  the 
thing  itself,  but  only  for  the  conscious  observer. 

At  first  view  this  position  is  an  extravagant  and  even 
absurd  paradox;  but  we  must  remember  that  the  soul,  as 
substance,  oomes  under  the  perpetual  flow.  We  are  not 
conscious  of  a  permanent  substance,  but  of  a  permanent 
self ;  and  this  permanence  is  not  revealed,  but  constituted 
by  memory  and  self-consciousness ;  for,  if  we  abolish  them, 
and  allow  the  soul  to  sink  to  the  level  of  an  impersonal 
thing,  identity  is  degraded  into  continuity,  and  permanence 
passes  into  flow.  Consciousness,  then,  does  not  simply  re- 
veal permanence  in  change ;  it  is  the  only  basis  of  perma- 
nence in  change.  Of  course,  we  do  not  pretend  to  tell  how 
personality  is  made ;  we  leave  that  for  the  disciple  of  the 


CHANGE  AND  IDENTITY  65 

senses.  He  finds  no  difficulty  in  manufacturing  a  person 
by  simply  providing  a  lump  of  rigid  substance,  and  then 
stocking  it  with  divers  faculties.  But,  while  nothing  can 
exceed  the  cheerfulness  with  which  we  admit  that  we  can- 
not construe  the  possibility  of  personality,  nothing,  also,  can 
exceed  the  stubbornness  with  which  we  deny  that  the  rigid 
substance  furnishes  the  least  insight  into  the  possibility. 
If,  then,  the  idea  of  being  must  include  permanence  as  well 
as  activity,  we  must  say  that  only  the  personal  truly  is. 
All  else  is  flow  and  process. 

These  results  are  so  paradoxical,  and  so  easily  misunder- 
stood, that  a  final  caution  must  be  added.  In  general,  com- 
mon-sense understands  by  identity  merely  numerical  identity, 
or  continuity  of  being.  In  this  sense  we,  also,  affirm  iden- 
tity, and  agree  entirely  with  spontaneous  thought.  But  the 
question  we  raise  lies  inside  of  this  numerical  identity.  The 
thing  which  is  thus  numerically  identical  and  continuous  is 
itself  discovered  to  be  a  flowing  principle  of  action ;  and 
here  our  break  with  the  current  view  begins.  Common- 
sense  aims  to  secure  identity  in  diversity  by  the  doctrine  of 
a  permanent  or  changeless  thing  with  changing  states ;  and 
this  view  we  have  been  forced  to  reject.  Change  penetrates 
to  the  centre  of  the  thing;  the  only  thing  which  is  per- 
manent is  the  law  of  change,  and  even  this  is  largely  a  logi- 
cal permanence.  Reality,  then,  is  process,  and  yet  not  a  proc- 
ess in  which  nothing  proceeds ;  for  being  itself  proceeds, 
and,  by  proceeding,  incessantly  passes  into  new  forms,  and 
changes  through  and  through.  If,  by  being,  we  mean  some- 
thing which  unites  identity  and  diversity,  we  must  say  that 
the  personal  only  is  able  to  fill  out  the  notion  of  a  thing. 

Logic  shows  that  thought  can  deal  with  the  temporal 
only  as  it  brings  it  under  a  timeless  idea;  and  when  we 
inquire  how  the  timeless  idea  can  be  set  in  reality  we  find 
only  one  way.  An  active  intelligence  must  realize  the  idea 


66  METAPHYSICS 

under  the  temporal  form.  But  when  we  seek  to  under- 
stand intelligence  itself  we  find  that  intelligence  cannot  be 
understood  through  its  own  categories,  but  rather,  con- 
versely, the  categories  must  be  understood  through  our  ex- 
perience of  intelligence  itself.  Apart  from  this  they  are 
purely  formal,  or  else  mere  shadows  of  living  experience. 
Only  in  the  unity  of  consciousness  can  the  category  of 
unity  be  realized.  In  the  consciousness  of  self  as  identical 
throughout  change  we  have  the  only  example  of  identity 
in  change.  The  conception  of  a  permanent  thing  with 
changing  states  is  founded  as  conception,  as  well  as  real- 
ized in  being,  in  the  fact  of  the  conscious  self.  Apart  from 
this  personal  reference,  the  categories  defy  all  attempts  to 
give  them  any  metaphysical  significance.  The  formal  iden- 
tities of  logic  are  intelligible  on  their  own  plane ;  but  the 
metaphysical  identities  of  things  are  simply  shadows  of  self- 
identifying  intelligence.  Instead,  then,  of  interpreting  per- 
sonality from  the  side  of  ontology,  we  must  rather  interpret 
ontology  from  the  side  of  personality.  Only  personality  is 
able  to  give  concrete  meaning  to  those  ontological  cate- 
gories by  which  we  seek  to  interpret  being.  Only  person- 
ality is  able  to  reconcile  the  Eleatic  and  Heraclitic  phi- 
losophies, for  only  the  personal  can  combine  change  and 
identity,  or  flow  and  permanence.  The  impersonal  abides 
in  perpetual  process.  It  may  hereafter  appear  that  the  im- 
personal is  only  a  flowing  form  of  activity,  to  which,  because 
of  its  constancy,  we  attribute  thinghood,  but  which  is,  in 
reality,  only  a  form  of  the  activity  of  something  deeper 
than  itself.  If  this  should  be  the  case,  the  conclusion  would 
be  that  the  absolute  person,  not  the  absolute  being,  is  the 
basal  fact  of  existence. 

Here  we  rest  the  case  at  present.  The  question  cannot 
be  finally  dismissed  until  the  nature  of  time  has  been  con- 
sidered. Meanwhile  we  see  that  we  must  have  identity  and 


CHANGE  AND  IDENTITY  67 

tve  must  recognize  change;  and  we  also  see  that  the  two 
can  never  be  reconciled  on  the  impersonal  plane.  As  ab- 
stract principles,  change  and  identity  are  in  mutual  contra- 
diction, and  they  remain  so  until  they  are  carried  up  to  the 
plane  of  self-conscious  thought,  and  are  interpreted  not  as 
abstract  conceptions,  but  as  concrete  manifestations  of  the 
living  intelligence  whicn  is  tne  source  and  reconciliation  of 
both. 


CAUSALITY 

WE  have  already  seen  how  the  conception  of  the  cate- 
gories in  popular  thought  is  confused  by  the  failure  to  dis- 
tinguish the  phenomenal  from  the  ontological  order.  The 
same  fact  finds  further  illustration  in  the  case  of  causality. 
The  popular  conception  of  this  category  is  in  the  highest 
degree  confused.  Minds  on  the  sense  plane  are  prone  to  con- 
ceive efficiency  itself  in  a  mechanical  and  materialistic  fash- 
ion ;  and,  owing  to  the  confusion  just  referred  to,  efficient 
causes  and  phenomenal  conditions  are  inextricably  mingled. 
The  only  thing  clear  is  that  causality  must  be  affirmed  ; 
but  the  form  under  which  it  is  to  be  conceived,  and  the 
place  of  its  location,  are  left  very  indefinite.  Very  much 
of  our  metaphysics  on  this  subject  has  been  built  up  under 

y^the  influence  of  our  sense  thinking;  and  for  such  thinking 
it  is  always  doubtful  if  anything  exists  which  cannot  be 
sensuously  presented.  The  first  step  out  of  this  confusion 
consists  in  emphasizing  the  distinction  between  causality  in 
the  inductive  .sense  and  causality  as  metaphysical  efficiency. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  we  find  that  events  occur  under 
certain  conditions.  When  the  conditions  are  fulfilled,  the 

V  event  appears.  We  may  call  the  total  group  of  conditions 
the  cause,  and,  upon  occasion,  we  may  call  any  one  of  the 
conditions  the  cause.  The  complete  cause,  and  the  only 
adequate  cause,  is  the  whole  group;  nevertheless,  if  the 
group  were  given  with  the  exception  of  one  member,  we 


CAUSALITY  09 

should  call  that  member  the  cause  of  the  event  which  would 
follow  its  addition  to  the  group.  Any  event  with  complex 
antecedents  would  have  only  one  adequate  cause,  but  it 
might  also  be  said  to  have  as  many  causes  as  antecedents, 
for  any  one  of  these  might,  upon  occasion,  complete  the 
group,  and  thus  be  viewed  as  the  cause.  This  is  causality 
in  the  inductive  sense ;  it  has  nothing  to  do  with  efficiency, 
but  only  with  the  order  in  which  events  occur. 

Tli at  the  study  of  this  order  is  of  the  utmost  practical 
importance  is  plain  upon  inspection.  The  chief  part  of 
practical  wisdom  lies  in  a  knowledge  of  it.  The  study 
must  be  pursued  inductively  and  not  speculatively.  It  can 
be  prosecuted  on  any  theory  of  metaphysics,  and  need  not 
concern  itself  except  in  the  most  general  way  about  meta- 
physics at  all.  It  is  to  be  regretted,  however,  that  the 
name  of  causation  should  be  given  to  these  phenomenal  re- 
lations. It  is  not  necessary ;  for  nothing  is  in  question  but 
the  empirical  conditions  under  which  events  occur.  And 
it  is  misleading:  for  no  one  has  yet  succeeded  in  talking 
long  about  inductive  causation  without  dropping  into  met- 
aphysics; while  a  large  number  of  those  who  thus  talk 
have  simply  caught  the  phrase  without  understanding  it. 
Striking  illustration  is  found  in  the  case  of  those  psycholo- 
gists who  set  out  to  investigate  inductively  the  interaction 
of  mind  and  body,  and  who  fail  to  perceive  that,  inductive- 
ly, the  causality  is  mutual.  Physical  states  condition  men- 
tal states  no  more  certainly  than  mental  states  condition 
physical  states.  Both  alike,  then,  are  causes  in  the  induc- 
tive sense.  But  the  investigators  soon  let  it  appear  that 
they  have  some  other  conception  of  causation  in  mind. 
Accordingly  they  allow  mental  states  to  attend  physical 
states,  but  they  will  not  hear  of  their  conditioning  them. 
This  uncertainty  shows  that  it  is  possible  to  learn  a  phrase 
without  mastering  the  corresponding  idea. 


70  METAPHYSICS 

But  whatever  we  call  it,  it  is  clear  that  the  inductive  in- 
quiry  should  be  distinguished  from  the  metaphysical.  The 
phenomenal  conditions  under  which  events  occur  are  quite 
distinct  from  the  metaphysical  agency  by  which  they  are 
brought  about;  and  they  may  be  studied  by  themselves. 
By  insisting  on  this  distinction  we  make  a  field  for  induc- 
tive study  unembarrassed  by  metaphysical  scruples ;  and  we 
also  rescue  the  metaphysical  problem  from  the  confusion 
which  results  from  confounding  the  phenomenal  and  the 
ontological  points  of  view. 

Causality,  then,  in  the  sense  of  productive  efficiency  or 
dynamic  determination,  is  the  subject  of  the  present  dis- 
cussion. As  formal  category  the  idea  is  simple  and  admits 
of  no  definition,  but  this  by  no  means  decides  the  form  in 
which  the  concrete  category  must  be  conceived.  We  are, 
indeed,  commanded  to  look  for  a  causal  ground  for  events ; 
but  it  might  turn  out  upon  inquiry  that  that  ground  must 
be  conceived  under  a  volitional  form.  It  might  also  appear 
that  such  phrases  as  physical,  mechanical,  material  causa- 
tion are  only  crude  and  untenable  applications  of  the  causal 
idea,  which  vanish  before  critical  reflection,  as  either  empty 
or  inconsistent. 

In  popular  thought  causation  manifests  itself  in  three 
great  forms,  the  interaction  of  things,  the  determination  of 
consequents  by  their  antecedents,  and  in  volitional  self- 
y  determination.  "We  examine  these  in  their  order. 

Owing  to  the  form  of  our  sense  -  experience  common- 
sense  never  doubts  that  we  are  surrounded  by  a  great 
multitude  of  mutually  independent  things,  each  of  which 
might  well  continue  to  exist  if  all  the  rest  should  fall  away. 
Each  has  its  being  in  itself  and  has  its  own  hard-and-fast 
self -identity  and  individuality.  "  But  common-sense  is  not 
long  in  observing  that  these  things  are  comprised  in  an 


CAUSALITY  71 

order  of  mutual  change  and  concomitant  variation.  This 
fact,  together  with  the  systematic  tendency  even  of  spon- 
taneous thought,  soon  leads  to  the  conviction  that  things 
also  form  a  system,  and  that  the  place  and  functions  of 
the  individual  are  determined  by  its  relations  to  the  whole. 
But  how  can  things  which  are  mutually  so  independent 
and  indifferent  in  their  being  be  brought  into  any  system- 
atic connection  ?  According  to  common-sense,  this  is  done 
by  interaction.  Things  are  endowed  with  forces  whereby 
they  mutually  determine  one  another,  and  thus  the  system 
of  things  is  founded.  In  estimating  this  view  we  must 
consider,  first,  the  logical  presupposition  of  any  system  ;  / 
secondly,  the  given  facts  of  experience  ;  and,  thirdly,  the 
nature  of  interaction  itself. 

In  order  that  any  system  whatever  shall  exist  for  thought, 
its  members  must  admit  of  being  brought  into  relations 
of  likeness  and  difference  under  the  various  categories  of 
thought,  and  of  being  united  into  a  logical  whole.  This 
implies  a  complex  system  of  logical  relations  among  the 
members,  and  a  mutual  logical  dependence.  Hence,  what- 
ever the  dynamical  relations  of  the  members  may  be,  or 
however  those  relations  may  be  founded,  an  amenability  to 
thought  and  to  thought  laws  is  implicit  in  the  conception 
of  an  intelligible  system.  For  spontaneous  thought  there 
is  no  mystery  or  wonder  here,  for  the  knowability  of  things 
is  a  matter  of  course.  Reflection,  however,  .shows  that  this 
knowability  is  one  of  the  greatest  wonders  of  existence,  and 
that  it  has  complex  and  far-reaching  implications. 

Again,  a  real  system,  in  order  to  be  anything  for  us, 
must  be  a  system  of  law,  so  that  definite  antecedents  shall 
have  the  same  definite  consequents;  and  this  in  turn  de- 
mands an  exact  adjustment  or  correspondence  of  all  the 
interacting  members  to  all  the  rest.  Otherwise,  anything 
might  be  followed  by  everything  or  by  nothing.  The  whole 


i     A 
Tl  ^ 


72  METAPHYSICS 

system  of  law  upon  which  science  builds  is  but  the  ex- 
pression of  this  metaphysical  adjustment  or  correspond- 
ence. How  this  correspondence  is  secured  is  an  obscure 
enough  problem,  but  the  fact  must  be  affirmed  in  any  case 
as  a  postulate  of  all  objective  science.  Every  scientific 
conception  of  the  causality  of  the  system  assumes  that  sim- 
'ilar  causes  must  have  similar  effects,  and  that  there  is  some 
ixed  quantitative  and  qualitative  relation  between  the  cause 
and  the  effect.  Tinder  given  conditions  there  can  be  only 
one  result.  To  any  given  action  every  other  element  must 

^.correspond  with  a  fixed  reaction.  But  if  this  is  to  be  the 
case,  then  everything  must  be  adjusted  to  every  other  in  an 
exact  and  all-embracing  harmony. 

But  this  general  commensurability  and  adjustedness  of 
tilings,  while  a  pre-condition  of  system,  founds  none.  It 
determines  the  possibility  of  combination  rather  than  its 
actuality.  In  the  case  of  a  conceptual  system,  two  things 
are  necessary  :  first,  the  commensurability  of  the  contents 

,.  )  of  the  conceptions  themselves ;  and,  secondly,  the  unity  of 
^the  thinking  mind.  The  mind  must  comprise  the  many 
conceptions  in  the  unity  of  one  consciousness,  must  distin- 
guish, compare,  and  relate  them,  and  thus  unite  them  into 
one  systematic  whole.  The  unity  of  the  thinker  is  the  su- 
preme condition  of  the  existence  of  any  conceptual  s}Tstem. 
But  in  popular  thought  things  are  not  in  our  minds,  nor, 
for  that  matter,  in  any  mind.  They  do  not  form  a  concept- 
ual system,  but  a  real  system  apart  from  all  mind.  And 
thus  it  becomes  a  problem  to  know  what  it  is  in  the  real 
system  which  takes  the  place  of  the  unitary  thinker  in  the 
conceptual  system,  and  makes  the  concrete  system  possible. 
If  we  confine  ourselves  to  the  hard-and-fast  individuals  of 
popular  thought,  we  reach  no  system,  but  only  an  aggregate, 
and  even  this  exists  only  for  the  observer.  If  the  real  sys- 
tem were  founded  and  maintained  by  a  supreme  thinker, 


CAUSALITY  73 

we  should  have  the  necessary  bond,  and  one  analogous  to 
the  bond  which  \ve  have  in  the  case  of  the  conceptual  sys- 
tem. But  this  view  is  altogether  too  airy  for  common- 
sense.  The  true  systematic  bond  of  things  is  the  fact  of 
interaction. 

The  fact  itself  is,  for  spontaneous  thought,  beyond  all 
question  clear;  but  the  clearness  is  illusory.  It  arises  from 
the  superficiality  of  sense-thinking  and  the  confusion  of  the 
phenomenal  and  the  metaphysical  points  of  view.  For  un- 
tutored thought  things  are  undeniably  given  as  separate 
individuals  in  space;  and  all  the  reality  there  is  is  there  in 
plain  sight.  By  and  by  an  order  of  mutual  change  and 
concomitant  variation  is  discovered,  and  this  awakens  the 
demand  for  causation ;  and  as  there  is  nothing  in  sight  to 
play  the  part  of  cause  but  the  things  of  sense-perception, 
very  naturally  they  are  intrusted  with  the  role.  And  all  of 
this  is  formally  correct.  There  is  a  demand  for  causation, 
and  spontaneous  thought  affirms  it.  The  mutual  changes 
among  things  demand  a  causal  explanation;  and  spontane- 
ous thought  finds  it  in  their  interaction.  But  the  critical 
doubt  concerns  not  the  reality  of  causation  in  the  case,  but 
its  form  and  location.  It  may  be  that  the  physical  is  only 
phenomenal,  and  that  its  causality  is  not  within  it,  but  be- 
hind or  beneath  it.  Common-sense  is  quite  right  in  demand- 
ing a  causal  ground  for  the  reciprocal  changes  of  things,  but 
one  may  still  doubt  whether  its  theory  of  that  ground  be 
correct. 

And  this  brings  us  to  the  second  point  mentioned  some 
pages  back,  the  facts  of  experience  in  what  we  call  inter- 
action. The  fact  is  that  we  have  no  proper  experience  of 
interaction  whatever.  It  may  be  thought  that,  in  the  case 
of  volition  producing  physical  motion,  we  have  immediate 
experience  of  interaction  between  the  soul  and  body ;  but 
this  is  a  mistake.  All  we  experience  is  that,  upon  occasion 


74  METAPHYSICS 

of  a  specific  volition,  certain  physical  changes  occur,  but 
of  the  nature  of  the  connection  we  know  strictly  nothing. 
To  be  sure,  the  physical  state  does  not  enter,  except  as  a 
sequence  upon  the  mental  state ;  but  why  the  one  should  be 
followed  by  the  other,  or  what  the  nature  of  the  bond  may 
be,  is  as  unknown  as  in  the  case  of  gravitation.  We  are 
often  misled,  at  this  point,  by  our  sense -experience.  We 
imagine  that  we  feel  our  own  power  flowing  over  upon  the 
body  and  controlling  it.  A  certain  sense  of  effort  mani- 
fests itself,  and  we  seem  so  to  permeate  the  body  that  our 
own  spiritual  force  comes  in  contact  with  the  reality.  But 
the  sense  of  tension  and  effort  in  the  muscles,  in  such  cases, 
is  but  the  reaction  of  the  organism  against  the  volition,  and 
has  merely  the  function  of  teaching  us  how  to  measure  our 
activity.  In  itself,  the  will  is  as  boundless  and  as  passion- 
less as  the  conception,  and  when  the  limits  of  physical  pos- 
sibility are  reached  it  is  not  the  will  which  has  failed,  but 
the  machine.  That  in  the  physical  world  we  have  experi- 
ence only  of  mutual  change  or  of  antecedence  and  sequence 
is  too  plain  to  need  more  than  mention.  Interaction,  then, 
is  a  thought  problem  rather  than  a  datum  of  experience. 

We  come  now  to  consider  the  various  conceptions  of  in- 
teraction with  the  aim  of  showing  that  this  which  we  call 
interaction  is  not  something  which  takes  place  between 
things  as  independent  agents,  but  rather  something  which 
takes  place  in  things  as  dependent  on  one  fundamental 
reality.  How,  then,  can  things,  conceived  as  mutually 
independent,  interact — that  is,  mutually  determine  one  an- 
other? 

The  answers  given  to  this  question  by  popular  thought 
are  such  only  in  appearance.  For  instance,  it  is  said  that 
a  thing  transfers  its  state  or  condition  to  the  thing  acted 
upon,  and  this  transference  is  the  act.  But  this  notion  is 


CAUSALITY  75 

due  to  hopeless  bondage  to  the  senses.  It  is  simply  one  of 
the  spontaneous  hypotheses  of  common-sense,  and  gives  a 
little  comfort  to  the  imagination.  Action  is  conceived  as 
a  thing  which  may  be  passed  along  from  one  to  another. 
But  when  this  view  is  taken  in  earnest  it  meets  at  once  the 
fatal  objection  that  states,  conditions,  and  attributes  are 
nothing  apart  from  a  subject.  As  such,  they  admit  of  no 
transference.  The  adjective  is  meaningless  and  impossible 
without  the  noun.  The  facts  which  have  led  to  this  notion 
of  transference  of  conditions  are  chiefly  those  of  transmitted 
heat  and  motion.  Here  we  see  effects  which  may  well 
enough  be  described  as  the  transference  of  a  condition. 
The  moving  body  puts  another  body  in  motion,  and  loses 
its  own.  The  heated  body  warms  another,  and  cools  itself 
in  the  same  proportion.  The  magnet  brings  another  body 
into  the  magnetic  state,  and  seems  to  have  forced  its  own 
condition  upon  it.  These  are  facts  for  interpretation.  Spon- 
taneous thought  says  that  the  agent,  in  such  a  case,  trans- 
fers its  condition ;  but  this  is  only  a  description,  not  an  ex- 
planation. Indeed,  it  is  inexact,  even  as  a  description ;  for 
what  we  really  see  is  propagation,  not  transmission  or  trans- 
ference. A  condition  cannot  be  transmitted  or  transferred, 
because  the  notion  of  a  state  or  condition  without  a  subject 
is  impossible  in  thought.  The  fact  is,  that  the  moving,  or 
heated,  or  magnetic  body,  in  some  totally  mysterious  way, 
propagates  its  state.  Of  the  inner  nature  of  the  process  we 
know  nothing,  and  the  pretended  explanation  is  only  an  in- 
different description.  Even  in  cases  of  impact  the  process 
is  equally  mysterious.  We  see  the  result,  and  fancy  we 
understand  the  method ;  but  there  is  nothing  whatever  in 
spatial  contact  to  explain  the  results  of  impact,  unless  there 
be  a  deeper  metaphysical  relation  between  the  bodies,  which 
generates  repulsion  between  them.  Added  to  these  con- 
siderations is  the  further  fact  that  interaction  does  not 


76  METAPHYSICS 


that  the  effect  shall  be  like  the  cause  ;  and,  in  the 
mass  of  interaction,  the  effect  is  totally  unlike  the  cause. 
A  new  condition  is  produced  in  the  thing  acted  upon,  but 
one  quite  unlike  that  of  the  agent  itself. 

Empty  as  this  view  of  the  transference  of  conditions 
seems,  when  looked  at  closely,  it  has  still  had  a  great  in- 
fluence in  speculation.  The  famous  phrase  "  Only  like  can 
affect  like"  is  the  same  view  in  another  form.  This  pre- 
tended principle  has  found  its  chief  application  in  discuss- 
ing the  interaction  of  soul  and  body,  and  both  idealistic  and 
materialistic  conclusions  have  been  based  upon  it.  If  one 
started  with  the  reality  of  the  body,  the  soul  was  degraded 
to  material  existence.  If  the  soul  was  made  the  starting- 
point,  of  course  it  was  impossible  to  reach  a  real  body  ex- 
cept by  an  act  of  faith.  Hence,  also,  the  occasionalism  of 
the  Cartesians  and  Malebranche's  theory  of  the  vision  of 
all  things  in  God.  Now  this  maxim,  that  like  affects  only 
,  like,  is  mainly  based  upon  the  notion  that  in  interaction 
/  something  leaves  the  agent  and  passes  into  the  patient.  On 
this  assumption  we  see  the  necessity  of  the  maxim;  for 
how  could  a  material  state  pass  into  a  spiritual  being  ?  and 
how  could  a  spiritual  state  pass  into  a  material  thing  ?  The 
spiritual  state  must  partake  of  the  nature  of  spirit,  and  the 
material  state  must  partake  of  the  nature  of  matter.  The 
wo,  then,  must  be  incongruous.  Hence,  it  was  concluded 
that  body  and  soul  could  not  affect  each  other.  No  more 
could  any  two  things  affect  each  other,  so  far  as  they  were 
unlike.  The  only  truth  in  this  doctrine  is  that  things  to- 
^  tally  and  essentially  unrelated  can  never  pass  into  relations 
|  of  interaction,  and,  hence,  that  all  true  being  must  consti- 
tute a  series,  without  any  absolute  oppositions.  The  real 
difficulty  is,  not  to  know  how  like  can  affect  unlike,  but  how 
any  two  things  can  affect  each  other.  Why  should  the 
state  of  one  thing  determine  the  state  of  another  ? 


f 

\/t\ 


CAUSALITY  77 

Another  verbal  explanation  of  the  problem  is  found  in 
the  notion  of  a  passing  influence  which,  by  passing,  affects 
the  object.  But  the  same  objection  lies  against  this  view 
as  against  the  preceding.  If,  by  influence,  we  mean  only 
an  effect,  we  have  merely  renamed  the  problem ;  but,  if 
we  mean  anything  more,  we  make  the  influence  a  thing; 
and  then  we  must  tell,  (1)  what  the  thing  is  which  passes; 
(2)  in  what  this  passing  thing  differs  from  the  things  be- 
tween which  it  passes;  (3)  what  the  relation  of  the  passing 
thing  is  to  the  thing  from  which  it  passes;  (4)  where  the 
acting  thing  gets  the  store  of  things  which  it  emits ;  and, 
(5)  how  the  passing  thing  could  do  any  more  than  the  orig- 
inal thing  from  which  it  proceeds.  An  attempt  to  answer 
these  questions  will  convince  one  of  the  purely  verbal  char- 
acter of  this  explanation  by  passing  influences.  The  great 
difficulty  with  many  speculators  is  to  conceive  how  a  thing 
can  act  across  empty  space ;  and  hence  they  think,  if  some- 
thing would  go  across  the  void,  and  lie  alongside  of  the 
thing  to  be  acted  upon,  all  difficulty  would  vanish.  They 
make  action  at  a  distance  the  real  puzzle  in  interaction. 
But,  to  reason,  the  difficulty  is,  not  to  act  across  empty 
space,  but  to  act  across  individuality.  If  we  conceive  two 
things,  viewed  as  independent  and  self-centred,  occupying 
even  the  same  point  of  space,  we  have  not  advanced  a  step 
towards  comprehending  why  they  should  not  remain  as  in- 
different as  ever.  Contiguity  in  space  helps  the  imagina- 
tion, but  not  the  understanding.  It  is  plain  that  this  notion 
of  a  passing  influence  is  a  mere  makeshift  of  the  imagina- 
tion, which  gives  no  light  when  taken  in  earnest. 

Akin  to  this  view  is  that  current  among  physicists,  ac- 
cording to  which  forces  play  between  things  and  produce 
effects.  But  this  view  also  is  a  device  of  the  imagination, 
and  solves  nothing.  The  fact  to  be  explained,  when  re- 
duced to  its  lowest  terms,  is  this :  "When  A  changes,  B,  C, 


78  METAPHYSICS 

D,  etc.,  all  change,  in  definite  order  and  degree.  To  ex- 
plain this  fact,  it  is  said  that  forces  play  between  A,  B,  C\ 
etc.  But  here,  as  in  the  case  of  the  influence-theory,  the 
force  must  be  either  a  mere  name  for  a  form  of  activity,  or 
it  must  be  a  thing,  and  either  alternative  is  inadmissible. 
If  force  be  a  mere  name,  it  explains  nothing ;  and,  if  it  be 
a  thing,  it  leaves  the  problem  darker  than  before.  All  the 
questions  asked  about  the  influence  would  arise  about  the 
force.  Thus  our  difficulties  are  increased,  and  no  insight  is 
gained.  Besides,  we  have  seen  that  force  is  only  an  ab- 
straction from  the  forms  of  a  thing's  activity.  Things  do 
not  act  because  they  have  forces ;  but  they  act,  and  from 
this-  activity  the  mind  forms  the  abstraction  of  force.  To 
say  that  things  are  held  together  by  their  attractions  is  only 
to  describe  the  fact.  The  attractions  are  nothing  between 
the  things,  like  subtle  cords,  which  bind  them  together. 
They  are  merely  abstractions  from  the  fact  that  coexistent 
material  things,  in  certain  conditions,  tend  towards  one  an- 
other. They  do  not  give  the  slightest  insight  into  the  fact 
or  its  possibility. 

Again,  things  are  often  said  to  have  spheres  of  force 
about  them ;  but  this,  too,  is  only  a  description  of  facts. 
The  sole  reality  is  things,  and  between  and  beyond  them 
is  nothing ;  but  these  things  are  not  mutually  indifferent, 
but  are  implicated  in  one  another's  changes.  This  relation 
may  be  illustrated  as  follows :  If  we  conceive  a  perfectly 
elastic  system  in  equilibrium,  any  permanent  displacement 
of  any  part  would  demand  a  readjustment  of  all  the  other 
parts,  in  order  to  restore  equilibrium.  Thus,  a  change  in 
any  part  would  involve  a  change  in  all  parts.  The  actual 
S}rstem  implies  a  like  community  of  being.  The  position 
and  condition  of  each  have  a  significance  for  the  whole,  and 
for  any  change  in  any  one  part  there  is  a  corresponding 
change  in  all  the  rest.  But  how  can  independent  things 


CAUSALITY  79 

stand  in  such  relations  of  community  and  interaction  ?  The 
scientific  doctrine  of  forces  which  play  between  things 
merely  describes  the  fact  itself ;  taken  as  an  explanation,  it 
is  grotesquely  untenable.  Indeed,  the  admission  that  these 
go-between  forces  are  only  abstractions  from  the  fact  to  be 
explained  reduces  the  physical  theory  to  the  harmony  of 
Leibnitz.  Each  thing  is  supposed  to  be  individual,  and  it 
gives  and  receives  nothing.  Things  move  in  parallel  lines, 
and  that  is  all.  But  this  is  essentially  Leibnitz's  theory. 
The  physical  theorists  have  long  been  oscillating  confusedly 
between  this  view  and  some  monistic  conception  of  causa- 
tion. 

The  traditional  notions  of  interaction  thus  appear  in  their 
superficiality  and  untenability.  They  derive  all  their  force 
from  the  conviction  that  there  must  be  causality  some- 
where, added  to  the  naive  assumption  of  sense-thought  that 
the  objects  of  perception  are  true  ontological  beings,  and 
that  they  are  the  only  realities  in  the  neighborhood.  Mean- 
while the  laws  of  the  reciprocal  changes  of  things  may  be 
called  their  interaction,  and  the  inductive  study  of  these 
laws  is  confounded  with  the  metaphysical  problem. 

This  brings  us  to  consider  the  notion  of  interaction  itself, 
and  to  point  out  the  contradiction  which  lies  in  the  neces- 
sary interaction  of  mutually  independent  things. 

Resuming  the  thought  of  a  previous  paragraph,  we  point 
out  once  more  the  exact  adjustment  of  every  member  of  an 
interacting  system  to  every  other,  so  far  as  interacting.  In 
such  a  system  every  member  must  do  what  it  does,  because 
every  other  member  does  what  it  does.  The  causality  of 
each  is  relative  to  the  causality  of  all.  The  formula  for 
the  activity  of  any  one  must  be  given  in  terms  of  the  activi- 
ties of  all  the  rest.  But  this  implies  that  the  being  of  each 
is  relative  to  the  being  of  all,  for  the  being  itself  is  irapli- 


80  METAPHYSICS 

cated  in  the  activity.  We  have  before  seen  that  there  is  no 
lump  or  core  of  being  in  a  thing  to  which  the  activities  are 
externally  attached,  or  into  which  they  are  thrust.  Hence, 
in  addition  to  saying  that  things  do  what  they  do  because 
other  things  do  what  they  do,  we  must  say  that  things  are 
what  they  are  because  other  things  are  what  they  are.  Both 
the  being  and  the  activity  are  implicated  in  the  relation ; 
and  it  would  be  impossible  to  define  the  being  except  in 
terms  of  the  relation.  Such  being  is  necessarily  relative. 
It  does  not  contain  the  ground  of  its  determinations  in  itself 
alone,  but  also  in  others.  And  this  must  be  the  case  with 
all  things  which  are  included  in  a  scheme  of  necessary  in- 
teraction. 

And  thus  the  contradiction  in  the  notion  of  the  neces- 
sary interaction  of  mutually  independent  things  is  placed  in 
a  clear  light.  By  definition,  the  independent  must  contain 
the  ground  of  all  its  determinations  in  itself,  and,  by  anal- 
ysis, it  is  plain  that  whatever  is  subject  to  a  necessary  in- 
teraction must  have  the  grounds  of  its  determinations  in 
others  as  well  as  in  itself.  The  two  conceptions  will  not 
combine.  Every  attempt  to  bridge  the  chasm  between  in- 
dependent things  by  some  passage  of  forces,  or  influences, 
results  in  a  purely  verbal  explanation  which  leaves  the 
essential  contradiction  untouched. 

If,  then,  A,  B,  C,  Z>,  etc.,  are  assumed  ontological  units 
which  are  comprised  in  an  order  of  necessary  interaction, 
we  cannot  allow  that  they  are  either  absolutely  or  mutually 
independent.  They  exist  only  in  relation  to  one  another 
within  the  system.  What,  then,  is  independent?  A  de- 
pendent which  depends  on  nothing  is  a  contradiction ;  and 
equally  so  is  an  independent  made  up  of  a  sum  of  depen- 
dents. If  A,  B,  C,  and  D  are  severally  dependent,  then 
A  +  B  +  C+  D  are  likewise  dependent.  There  is  nothing 
in  the  sign  of  addition  which  is  able  to  transform  depen- 


CAUSALITY  81 

dence  into  independence.  A  first  thought  would  likely  be 
that  the  system  itself  is  independent,  and  that  the  members 
depend  on  it ;  but  this  is  only  a  logical  illusion,  so  long  as 
A,B,  C,  D,  etc.,  are  supposed  to  be  the  only  true  existences. 
In  that  case  the  system  would  be  only  a  sum,  or  conceptual 
product,  and  would  be  ontologically  nothing.  And  such  it 
would  remain  unless  we  reversed  the  order,  and  instead  of 
trying  to  construct  the  system  from  A,  B,  C,  etc.,  as  true 
units  of  being,  rather  regarded  the  system  itself  as  the  true 
existence,  and  A,  5,  (7,  etc.,  as  its  dependent  implications. 
The  self-centred,  the  true  ontological  fact  would  be  the  sys- 
tem, and  all  else  would  depend  upon  it.  But  system  is  not 
a  good  term  for  this  conception.  The  idea  is  that  of  a  basal 
reality  which  alone  is  self-existent,  and  in  which  all  other 
things  have  their  being. 

The  reciprocal  changes  of  phenomena  are  the  fact  of 
experience ;  or,  if  we  regard  these  phenomena  as  things, 
then  the  reciprocal  changes  of  things  are  the  fact  of  experi- 
ence. The  explanation  of  these  changes  is  a  speculative 
problem,  whose  solution  is  not  immediately  obvious.  But 
one  thing  is  clear.  "We  cannot  explain  them  by  anything 
in  the  phenomena,  or  in  the  things  themselves.  In  order 
to  escape  the  contradiction  involved  in  the  necessary  inter- 
action of  mutually  independent  things,  and  also  that  in- 
volved in  reaching  an  independent  being  by  summing  up 
dependent  things,  we  must  transcend  the  realm  of  the  rela- 
tive and  dependent,  and  affirm  a  fundamental  reality  which 
is  absolute  and  independent,  and  in  the  unity  of  whose  ex- 
istence the  possibility  of  what  we  call  interaction  finds  its 
ultimate  explanation.  The  interaction  of  the  many  is  pos- 
sible only  through  the  unity  of  an  all-embracing  one,  which 
either  co-ordinates  and  mediates  their  interaction,  or  of 
which  they  are  in  some  sense  phases  or  modifications. 

Two  conceptions  of  the  relation  of  the  many  to  the  one 

6 


82  METAPHYSICS 

are  possible.  We  may  regard  the  many  individuals  as  on- 
tologically  distinct  from  the  one  and  from  one  another,  and 
as  brought  into  interaction  only  through  the  mediation  of 
the  basal  one  which  posits  and  co-ordinates  them  accord- 
ing to  the  plan  of  the  whole.  The  real  ground  of  their  co- 
ordination is  not  anything  which  the  many  themselves  do, 
but  rather  that  which  is  done  for  them  and  with  them  by 
the  co-ordinating  one.  Their  interaction,  then,  is  only  ap- 
parent, and  is,  in  fact,  the  direct  action  of  the  one  in  ad- 
justing them  to  the  demands  of  the  system.  This  view  re- 
duces to  a  universal  occasionalism,  so  far  as  the  interaction 
of  the  finite  is  concerned.  The  one  incessantly  adjusts  and 
co-ordinates  the  relations  of  the  many. 

The  other  possible  conception  of  the  relation  of  the  one 
to  the  many  is  that  the  many  have  no  proper  existence  or 
thinghood  in  themselves,  and  are  only  modes  or  phenom- 
ena of  the  one,  which  alone  truly  is.  In  our  thought  these 
modes  assume  the  appearance  of  individual  things  in  inter- 
action, but  in  reality  there  is  nothing  but  the  one  true  be- 
ing and  its  modes.  In  the  nature  of  this  being  these  modes 
are  mutually  determined,  because  they  are  all  modes  of  the 
one,  and  because  the  same  being  is  present  in  all  as  tfheir 
ground  and  reality. 

The  latter  view  is  the  one  to  which  reflection  inclines 
for  the  physical  world  ;  for  thought  is  rapidly  reducing  this 
world  to  phenomenal  existence,  and  making  it  the  mani- 
festation of  an  energy  not  its  own.  Besides,  in  this  world, 
what  is  given  is  not  individual  ontological  things,  but  mani- 
fold phenomena,  and  when  this  fact  is  grasped  it  is  easy  to 
accept  a  single  ontological  ground  as  their  only  adequate 
explanation.  But  the  former  view  of  the  relation  is  the 
one  which  must  be  held  in  the  case  of  the  finite  spirit ;  for 
here  we  have  a  being  endowed  with  the  wonderful  power 
of  selfhood,  whereby  it  is  enabled  to  become  an  individual, 


CAUSALITY  83 

in  distinction  from  all  others,  and  to  know  itself  as  such. 
Things  whose  activities  are  exhausted  in  interaction  have 
only  being  for  others,  and  may  well  be  only  phenomenal ; 
but  things  which,  in  addition,  have  inner  life,  have  being 
for  themselves,  and  cannot  be  dissolved  into  phenomena. 

A  great  many  questions,  whose  consideration  we  post- 
pone for  the  present,  emerge  at  once  in  contemplating  this 
result.  The  one  conclusion  which  now  concerns  us  is  that 
the  popular  conception  of  interaction  must  be  transformed. 
The  demand  for  a  causal  ground  for  the  mutual  changes  or 
reciprocity  of  things  is  entirely  justified,  but  the  conception 
which  finds  that  ground  in  interaction,  or  the  transitive 
causality  of  independent  things,  is  untenable.  Interaction 
cannot  be  conceived  as  a  transitive  causality  playing  be- 
tween things ;  it  is  rather  an  immanent  causality  in  a  fun- 
damental unitary  being. 

Possibly  it  may  occur  to  us  that  the  same  argument 
which  we  have  used  is  equally  valid  to  disprove  any  inter- 
action of  the  finite  and  the  infinite.  We  have  all  along  as- 
sumed the  possibility  of  an  interaction  between  the  two; 
and  yet  the  infinite  is  certainly  individual,  and  the  finite  is 
certainly  distinct  from  the  infinite.  Here,  then,  we  seem 
to  need  a  new  bond  to  connect  these  new  members,  and  so 
on  in  infinite  series.  The  reply  is  simple.  Our  argument 
has  been  based  on  the  assumed  independence  of  both  mem- 
bers of  the  interaction,  and  applies  only  to  that  assumption. 
"When  two  things  are  mutually  independent,  interaction  can 
take  place  only  through  a  mediating  third,  which  embraces 
both  of  them.  But  the  independent  may  freely  posit  the 
dependent,  and  may  also  posit  a  continuous  interaction 
between  itself  and  the  dependent ;  but  such  interaction  is 
throughout  a  self-determination,  and  is  not  forced  upon  it 
from  without. 

This  point  seems  too  obscure  for  any  influence ;  and  yet 


84  METAPHYSICS 

confusion  here  is  at  the  bottom  of  the  philosophy  of  tha 
unconditioned.  In  particular,  Mansel  sought  to  show  that 
God  could  not  be  thought  of  as  cause,  because  as  cause  he 
must  be  related  to  his  effect.  He  cannot,  then,  be  creator, 
because  as  such  there  must  be  a  relation  between  God  and 
the  world.  But  this  objection  overlooks  the  fact  that  re- 
lation in  the  abstract  does  not  imply  dependence.  The 
criticism  would  be  just  if  the  relation  were  necessary  and 
had  an  external  origin.  But  as  the  relation  is  properly 
posited  and  maintained  by  himself,  there  is  nothing  in  it 
incompatible  with  his  independence  and  absoluteness. 

But  this  conclusion  concerning  interaction  only  makes 
the  problem  of  causation  more  obscure  and  difficult.  As 
long  as  we  had  separate  and  distinct  individual  things,  we 
could  easily  picture  them  in  their  mutual  otherness  and  ex- 
ternality, and  could  as  easily  supplement  the  perception  of 
their  reciprocal  changes  by  the  thought  of  forces  resident  in 
the  things;  and  thus  the  problem  seemed  to  be  satisfacto- 
rily solved.  But  now  that  we  are  driven  out  of  this  notion, 
we  seem  to  be  wandering  in  unpicturable  and  impalpable 
darkness,  where  all  sense  of  direction  and  reality  is  lost.  If 
we  think  of  the  many  they  fuse  into  the  one ;  if  we  think 
of  the  one  it  breaks  up  into  the  many.  We  are  in  the  midst 
and  depths  of  the  Heraclitic  flux ;  and  all  its  waves  and  bil- 
lows go  over  us. 

This  reference  to  Heraclitus  recalls  some  of  the  results  of 
the  last  chapter.  We  there  saw  that  the  thing,  A,  instead 
of  remaining  rigidly  A,  runs  through  the  series  A,  Av  Av 
etc. ;  and  when  we  asked  in  what  the  objective  unity  of 
such  a  thing  consists,  we  found  it  to  consist  in  the  causal 
continuity  whereby  the  members  of  the  series  are  bound 
together.  The  formal  unity  of  thought  is  simply  the  fact 
that  we  call  the  thing  one ;  and  such  unity  may  be  given  to 


CAUSALITY  85 

any  plurality  whatever.  But  the  real  unity  lies  in  the  fact 
of  a  causal  relation ;  the  earlier  members  produce  the  later 
ones,  and  in  producing  them  become  them  or  vanish  into 
them.  This  brings  us  to  consider  the  second  general  appli- 
cation of  the  causal  idea,  the  transformation  of  antecedence 
into  causality. 

And  here,  as  elsewhere,  the  two  points  so  often  referred 
to  must  be  borne  in  mind.  We  must  distinguish  between 
the  phenomenal  and  the  metaphysical  question.  We  must 
also  distinguish  between  the  conviction  that  causality  is 
really  in  play,  and  the  form  in  which  we  try  to  conceive  it. 
Without  doubt  there  must  be  some  dynamic  bond  under- 
lying the  successive  phases  of  the  thing,  but  the  form  in 
which  we  must  think  it  is  not  immediately  evident. 

Let  us  take,  then,  the  series,  A,  Av  Av  Ay  etc.,  which  we 
call  a  thing,  and  see  what  we  can  make  of  it.  The  causal- 
ity is  now  within  the  series,  not  beyond  it.  The  cause  pro- 
duces, and,  in  producing,  becomes  the  effect.  This  concep- 
tion is  often  illustrated  by  reference  to  the  transformations 
of  energy ;  in  which,  it  is  said,  one  phase  of  energy  pro- 
duces another  phase,  and  thus  passes  into  it,  so  that  the 
cause  vanishes  into  the  effect,  or  rather  reappears  in  the 
effect. 

We  are  certainly  standing  here,  if  we  do  stand,  in  slip- 
pery places.  It  is  only  by  the  help  of  the  formal  identi- 
ties of  thought  that  we  can  express  this  doctrine  at  all.  In 
order  to  think,  we  must  have  a  subject  and  a  predicate; 
but  in  the  case  supposed  the  real  subject  vanishes  as  the 
predicate  comes;  and  the  predicate  does  not  arrive  until 
the  subject  has  gone.  The  subject,  then,  is  the  subject  of  a 
not-yet-existing  predicate  ;  and  the  predicate  is  the  pred- 
icate of  a  no-longer-existing  subject.  We  overlook  this 
from  holding  the  subject  in  our  thought,  treating  of  it  as 
the  thing  or  the  series,  and  viewing  it  as  the  same  thing  or 


8G  METAPHYSICS 

series  throughout.  As  soon  as  we  guard  ourselves  against 
this  illusion,  it  becomes  evident  that  no  metaphysical  pred- 
ication whatever,  causal  or  otherwise,  is  possible  until  we 
bring  the  entire  metaphysical  movement  within  the  range 
of  thought  and  view  it  as  constituted  by  thought.  Logic 
shows  that  the  temporal  and  changing  can  be  grasped  only 
through  a  timeless  and  unchanging  idea.  If  the  changing 
be  vie\ved  as  the  temporal  realization  of  an  idea  by  a  fun- 
damental intelligence,  it  lies  within  the  range  of  thought 
and  is  constituted  by  thought.  Otherwise  all  positive  pred- 
ication is  absurd.  Epistemology  also  shows  that  thought 
can  never  recognize  anything  which  has  not  its  origin  in 
thought  somewhere,  and  that  the  conception  of  a  reality  ex- 
isting by  itself,  apart  from  thought,  independent  of  thought, 
and  having  separate  ontological  laws  of  its  own,  is  a  fiction 
of  the  first  magnitude ;  and  we  have  just  seen  that,  in  a 
world  of  change,  such  a  fiction  results  in  cancelling  predica- 
tion altogether. 

All  predication,  then,  must  take  place  within  the  sphere 
of  intellect,  and  with  reference  to  intellect.  Any  concep- 
tion of  reality,  which  is  at  once  intelligible  and  tenable,  runs 
back  to  intelligence  as  its  necessary  implication  and  presup- 
position. Every  other  conception  must  lose  itself  either  in 
mere  phenoraenality  or  in  the  vanishing  flux  of  Heraclitus. 
The  existence  of  things,  then,  has  no  meaning  except  with 
reference  to  intelligence ;  for  if  we  subtract  from  the  world 
of  real  things  those  constitutive  elements  which  thought  con- 
tributes, and  which  have  no  meaning  apart  from  thought, 
there  is  nothing  intelligible  left.  And  thus  we  see  that  the 
deepest  thing  in  existence  is  neither  being  nor  causation,  as 
abstract  categories,  but  intellect  as  the  concrete  realization 
and  source  of  both.  That  is,  intellect  cannot  be  construed 
from  the  categories  of  being  and  causation  as  something 
deeper  than  itself ;  on  the  contrary,  they  are  categories  of 


CAUSALITY  87 

intellect,  and  are  realized  only  in  and  through  the  activity 
of  the  intellect.  And  to  find  the  ontological  meaning  of 
these  categories,  we  must  have  recourse  to  our  experience 
of  intellect,  and  not  to  any  analysis  of  abstract  ideas.  Not 
until  we  raise  them  to  the  form  of  living  and  working  in- 
telligence do  we  reach  any  concrete  meaning  which  the 
dialectic  of  thought  will  not  dissolve  and  dissipate. 

Again  returning  to  our  series,  A,  Av  Av  etc.,  we  find  an 
additional  difficulty  as  follows :  The  A  which  is  to  become 
Av  etc.,  must  have  some  essential  relation  to  the  later  mem- 
bers of  the  series,  otherwise  we  lose  the  notion  of  ground 
altogether.  When  we  are  dealing  with  dependent  things 
the  easiest  solution  of  the  problem  is  to  view  the  series  as 
the  realization  in  temporal  form  of  an  idea  which  under- 
lies the  series.  When  we  are  dealing  with  the  fundamental 
reality  the  best  account  of  the  successive  stages  is  to  refer 
them  to  the  continuous  self-determinations  of  the  absolute 
intelligence,  according  to  an  abiding  plan.  But  spontane- 
ous thought  chooses  another  way.  It  has  not  learned  the 
dialectic  of  the  metaphysical  categories,  when  conceived  on 
the  impersonal  plane,  and  thinks  to  find  the  solution  of  the 
problem  in  the  notion  of  potentiality.  The  later  members 
of  the  series  were  potential  in  the  earlier. 

But  so  far  as  any  insight  is  concerned,  this  is  a  purely 
formal  solution.  It  is  simply  a  declaration  that  there  must 
be  a  determining  connection  somewhere,  and  a  resolve  to 
find  it  in  the  earlier  stages  of  the  thing.  But,  as  was  point- 
ed out  in  discussing  the  categories  in  the  Theory  of  Thought 
and  Knowledge,  this  notion  of  potentiality  is  exceedingly 
elusive  on  the  impersonal  and  necessary  plane,  and  gains 
a  positive  content  only  as  we  base  it  on  free  intelligence. 
The  impersonal  potentiality  must  be  an  existing  determina- 
tion of  being  of  some  sort,  and  what  it  is,  or  how  it  passes 
into  actuality,  is  beyond  us.  The  only  thing  we  can  say  is 


88  METAPHYSICS 

that  the  unpicturable  nature  of  a  thing  is  such  that,  under  a 
given  condition,  a?,  it  passes  into  a  new  state,  and  under  an- 
other condition,  y,  it  passes  into  another  state ;  and  these 
two  states  may  be  said  to  be  potential  in  the  thing,  but 
only  in  the  sense  that  they  will  be  developed  under  the 
conditions  x  and  y. 

At  first  sight  this  view  seems  to  help  the  matter,  but 
it  soon  appears  that  we  are  not  much  further  on.  It  is, 
first,  plain  that  it  does  not  escape  the  difficulties  concern- 
ing metaphysical  predication  in  a  changing  world  ;  indeed, 
these  remain  untouched,  and  even  unsuspected,  because  of 
the  formal  identity  involved  in  the  language.  But  apart 
from  these  we  also  need  to  know  what  and  where  these 
conditions  x  and  y  are  to  be  found.  If  they  lie  outside  of 
the  series  in  some  other  series,  then  we  have  the  problem 
of  interaction ;  and  the  potentialities  of  A  become  compli- 
cated with  the  question  of  its  dependence  on  the  fundamen- 
tal reality.  If  they  lie  within  A  itself,  vve  are  grievously 
puzzled  to  know  what  "  within  "  means,  or  how  within  the 
unity  of  A  there  can  be  these  antitheses  of  A  and  its  con- 
ditions. If  they  are  always  there,  their  consequences  must 
always  be  there;  and  if  they  arise  in  time  there  must  be 
some  further  condition  of  their  emergence.  Thus  we  start 
on  the  infinite  regress,  and  thought  collapses.  And  it  will 
stay  collapsed  until  we  reach  a  conception  of  causation 
which  provides  for  a  beginning ;  that  is,  until  we  rise  to 
the  conception  of  self-determining  intelligence  as  the  true 
and  only  type  of  proper  causality. 

Thus  it  appears  the  causality  which  manifests  itself  in 
the  form  of  antecedence  and  sequence  eludes  us  so  long  as 
we  regard  it  as  an  impersonal  activity  under  the  temporal 
form.  In  that  case  it  is  an  activity  without  a  subject,  for 
the  subject  disappears  in  the  flow.  Neither  is  it  activity, 
but  activities.  Both  the  "  it "  and  the  activity  vanish  into 


CAUSALITY  89 

indefinite  plurality,  and  thought  vanishes  along  with  them. 
Or,  if  thought  remains,  it  is  because  existence  is  not  thus 
constituted,  but  has  its  essential  root  and  bond  in  active 
intelligence. 

We  reach  the  same  conclusion  from  a  consideration  of  the 
category  of  unity.  We  have  frequently  referred  to  unity  as 
if  its  meaning  were  self-evident  and  admitted  of  no  ques- 
tion. In  particular  we  have  maintained  that  there  must 
be  a  fundamental  reality  which  is  ontologically,  and  in  the 
strictest  sense,  one  in  order  to  explain  the  fact  of  system 
and  the  reciprocity  of  things.  Unities  of  classification,  or 
formal  unities  which  arise  when  thought  calls  many  things 
one,  will  not  suffice.  A  true  substantive  unity  is  required, 
and  the  form  in  which  substantial"  or  metaphysical  unity 
must  be  thought  begins  to  be  a  problem. 

The  notion  of  real  unity  has  several  elements.  The  first 
and  lowest  is  negative  It  denies  composition  and  divisi- 
bility. A  compound  is  not  a  thing,  but  an  aggregate.  The 
reality  is  the  component  factors.  Hence  the  divisible  is 
never  a  proper  thing,  but  only  an  aggregate  or  sum.  The 
thought  of  a  compound  is  impossible  without  the  assump- 
tion of  component  units;  and  if  these  in  turn  are  com- 
pounds, we  must  assume  the  other  units ;  and  so  on,  until  we 
come  to  ultimate  and  uncompounded  units.  Hence  proper 
unity  and  proper  reality  can  be  found  only  in  the  uncom- 
pounded and  indivisible.  All  else  is  formal  or  phenomenal. 

But  this  result  forbids  us  to  find  proper  unity  in  anything 
spatial.  An  extended  body  exists  only  as  its  parts  exist. 
This  is  true,  whether  we  regard  the  body  as  atomic  or  as 
continuous.  If  the  body  have  an  atomic  constitution,  the 
truth  is  self-evident ;  for  then  the  body  is  but  the  aggregate 
of  the  parts,  and  exists  in  them  just  as  number  exists  only 
in  its  component  units.  But  if  the  body  be  viewed  as  con- 
tinuous and  not  compounded,  its  existence  in  space  allows 


90  METAPHYSICS 

us  to  divide  the  volume  into  different  parts,  each  of  \vhich 
exists  in  its  own  space,  and  is  distinct  from  all  the  other 
parts.  Thus  the  body,  though  continuous,  appears  as  the 
Integra]  of  its  parts,  and  exists  only  as  these  parts  exist. 
But  it  cannot  exist  as  the  sum  of  these  parts  without 
positing  an  interaction  among  the  parts.  That  the  part  B 
shall  maintain  itself  between  and  against  A  and  (7,  it  must 
be  able  to  prescribe  to  A  and  C  their  positions  relative  to 
itself.  The  same  is  true  for  all  other  parts ;  and  the  con- 
clusion is,  that  the  extended  body,  though  continuous,  is  yet 
a  complex  of  interacting  forces.  This  conclusion  remains 
valid  even  if  the  body  be  indivisible ;  for  such  indivisibility 
would  not  rest  upon  a  true  unity  of  the  thing,  but  only  upon 
the  greatness  of  the  cohesion  between  the  parts.  The  body 
would  still  be  a  system  of  interacting  forces.  Hence  no 
body  which  exists  extended  in  space  can  be  a  unit.  It  will 
always  be  possible  to  distinguish  separate  points  in  the  vol- 
ume of  the  thing ;  and  these  can  be  held  together  and  apart 
only  as  these  points  are  made  the  centres  of  cohesive  and 
repulsive  forces.  But  in  order  that  a  thing  shall  be  a  true 
unit,  it  must  allow  no  distinction  of  parts,  and  no  activities 
which  are  activities  of  parts  only.  But  this  distinction  of 
parts  will  always  be  possible  so  long  as  a  thing  is  regarded 
as  having  real  extension. 

And  now  it  begins  to  be  clear  that  there  can  be  no  real 
unity  on  the  impersonal  plane.  Logic  shows  that  on  this 
plane  we  reach  neither  the  one  from  the  many  nor  the 
many  from  the  one.  Thinking  on  the  plane  of  necessity, 
and  under  the  law  of  the  sufficient  reason,  we  can  never  log- 
ically escape  our  starting-point,  whatever  it  may  be.  If 
we  assume  unity  we  are  unable  to  take  one  step  towards 
plurality,  for  the  unitary  necessity  refuses  to  differentiate  or 
to  move  at  all.  Conversely,  if  we  start  with  plurality  we 
never  escape  it,  for  logic  compels  us  to  carry  the  many  into 


CAUSALITY  •  91 

their  antecedents.  If  we  trace  the  plurality  to  some  be- 
ing which  we  call  one,  we  are  forced  to  carry  the  plurality 
implicitly  into  the  unity  by  assuming  some  complexity  of 
nature,  and  some  complex  antithesis  and  mechanism  of  meta- 
physical states  in  the  one  being.  But  in  that  case,  though 
we  confidently  talk  about  unity,  \ve  are  quite  unable  to  tell 
in  what  the  unity  of  such  a  being  consists.  The  truth  is,  it 
has  no  unity  but  the  formal  unity  we  give  it  in  calling  it  one. 

This  puzzle  can  be  solved  only  as  \ve  leave  the  mechanical 
realm  for  that  of  free  intellect.  The  free  and  conscious  self 
is  the  only  real  unity  of  which  we  have  any  knowledge,  and 
reflection  shows  that  it  is  the  only  thing  which  can  be  a  true 
unity.  All  other  unities  are  formal,  and  have  only  a  mental 
existence.  But  formal  and  real  unities  alike  exist  only  for 
and  through  intelligence. 

And  here  we  come  again  upon  a  fact  which  we  have  be- 
fore d  welt  upon — namely,  that  active  intelligence  cannot  be 
understood  through  the  metaphysical  categories, 'but  these 
categories  must  be  understood  as  realized  in  active  intelli- 
gence. We  have  seen  this  illustrated  in  the  case  of  being 
and  causation,  and  now  it  finds  further  illustration  in  the 
case  of  unity.  "We  can  make  nothing  of  the  abstract  cate- 
gory of  unity.  Thought  is  not  possible  through  a  pre- 
existing unity,  but  unity  is  realized  through  thought  in 
action.  Just  as  little  can  we  abstractly  combine  unity 
with  the  complexity  and  variety  which  are  needed  to  save 
thought  from  the  deadlock  of  a  monotonous  simplicity. 
This  problem  is  solved  for  us  in  our  experience  of  free  in- 
telligence. Here  we  find  a  unity  which  produces  plurality 
without  destroying  itself.  Here  the  one  is  manifold  without 
being  many.  Here  the  identical  posits  an  order  of  change 
and  abides  unchanged  across  it.  But  this  perennial  wonder 
is  possible  only  on  the  plane  of  free  and  self-conscious  in- 
telligence. 


92  •  METAPHYSICS 

Interaction  between  the  many  must  be  replaced  by  im- 
manent action  in  the  one.  Impersonal  causality  vanishes 
hopelessly  in  the  Heraclitic  flux.  The  impersonal  itself  falls 
asunder  into  a  plurality  either  in  space  or  time,  and  we  seek 
in  vain  for  any  substantial  bond.  Living,  active  intelli- 
gence is  the  condition  both  of  conceptual  and  of  meta- 
physical unity.  Volitional  causality,  that  is,  intelligence 
itself  in  act,  is  the  only  conception  of  metaphysical  causality 
in  which  we  can  rest.  Science  may  study  the  laws  of  se- 
quence and  reciprocal  change  under  the  name  of  causation, 
and  there  is  no  objection,  so  long  as  we  understand  that 
this  is  not  causation  at  all.  But  when  we  come  to  proper 
efficiency,  it  is  either  volitional  causality  or  nothing.  And 
if  we  are  to  escape  the  abyss  of  the  infinite  regress,  and  are 
not  to  make  shipwreck  of  reason  on  the  problem  of  error, 
this  volitional  causality  must  be  viewed  as  self-determining 
or  free. 

Thus  we  get  an  insight  into  the  profound  speculative 
significance  of  free  intelligence.  Logic  shows  that  without 
freedom  we  can  never  solve  the  problem  of  error  or  satisfy 
any  of  our  rational  demands.  Explanation  is  possible  only 
through  free  intelligence.  Unity,  identity,  and  causality 
are  possible  only  through  free  intelligence.  Truth  itself 
is  possible  only  through  free  intelligence.  The  difficulty 
which  popular  thought  finds  in  this  conception  arises,  first, 
from  its  misinterpreted  sense-experience,  which  is  common- 
ly taken  to  be  law -giving  for  metaphysical  thought;  and, 
secondly,  from  a  superficial  conception  of  its  own  categories. 
Criticism  removes  much  of  the  paradox  from  our  result  by 
pointing  out  the  distinction  between  the  phenomenal  and 
the  metaphysical  points  of  view,  and  completes  the  work 
by  showing  that  the  metaphysical  categories  contradict 
themselves  until  they  are  realized  in  active  intelligence. 

What  we  call  the  interaction  of  the  many  is  possible  only 


CAUSALITY  93 

through  the  immanent  action  of  the  one  fundamental  reality. 
This  being,  as  fundamental  and  independent,  we  call  the 
infinite,  the  absolute,  the  world-ground.  In  calling  it  the 
infinite,  \ve  do  not  mean  that  it  excludes  the  co-existence 
of  the  finite,  but  only  that  it  is  the  self -sufficient  source  of 
the  finite.  In  calling  it  the  absolute,  we  do  not  exclude  it 
from  all  relation,  but  deny  only  external  restriction  and 
determination.  In  calling  it  the  world-ground,  we  do  not 
think  of  a  spatial  support,  and  still  less  of  a  raw  material 
out  of  which  things  are  made,  but  rather  of  that  basal 
causality  by  which  the  world  is  produced  and  maintained. 
Everything  else  has  its  cause  and  reason  in  this  being. 
Whatever  is  true,  or  rational,  or  real  in  the  world  must  be 
traced  to  this  being  as  its  source  and  determining  origin. 
But  this  point  we  reserve  for  the  next  chapter. 


CHAPTER  V 
THE  WORLD-GROUND 

IN  the  last  chapter  we  reached  the  conclusion  that  all 
things  depend  in  some  way  upon  one  basal  being  which 
alone  is  self -existent.  But  this  conclusion  raises  many 
questions  and  not  a  few  difficulties.  In  particular,  the  re- 
lation of  the  world  to  its  metaphysical  ground,  or  the  re- 
lation of  the  finite  to  the  infinite,  demands  further  spec- 
ification. Conversely,  we  need  to  determine  more  closely 
the  relation  of  the  world -ground  to  the  finite,  or  to  fix 
its  significance  for  the  system  by  virtue  of  its  position  as 
basal  and  infinite.  .  But,  instead  of  immediately  applying 
the  results  already  reached,  we  shall  find  our  advantage  in 
returning  to  some  extent  to  the  stand -point  of  popular 
thought.  Thus  we  shall  trace  the  dialectic  of  crude  think- 
ing, and  better  understand  its  confusions.  Meanwhile  we 
can  apply  the  results  of  criticism  as  a  corrective  upon  occa- 
sion. Logically,  there  is  a  shorter  way ;  but  pedagogically 
the  plan  proposed  seems  more  promising. 

The  discussions  of  the  first  chapter  have  freed  us  from 
the  superstition  of  passive  substance  or  pure  being.  We 
there  found  that  the  notion  of  substance  is  entirely  ex- 
hausted in  the  notion  of  cause,  and  that  agents  only  can 
lay  any  claim  to  existence.  The  infinite,  then,  is  not  to  be 
viewed  as  a  passive  substance,  but  as  a  unitary  and  indivis- 
ible agent.  Indeed,  the  misleading  connotations  of  the  no- 
tion of  substance  are  such  that  we  shall  do  better  to  drop 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  95 

it  altogether,  and  replace  it  by  cause,  or  agent.  We  are 
compelled  to  do  this  by  critical  reflection ;  and  the  advan- 
tages are  great.  The  notion  of  substance  carries  with  it 
many  implications  of  the  imagination  ;  and  these  are  peren- 
nial sources  of  error.  It  is  largely  conceived  as  a  plastic 
something,  or  as  a  kind  of  stuff  which  can  be  fashioned  into 
many  things.  These  implications,  rude  and  crude  as  they 
are,  have  modified  disastrously  most  pantheistic  speculation. 
The  infinite  has  been  viewed  almost  as  a  kind  of  raw  ma- 
terial out  of  which  the  finite  is  made,  and  hence  as  at  least 
partly  exhausted  in  the  finite.  Sometimes  the  representa- 
tion is  less  coarse;  and  the  infinite  appears  as  a  kind  of 
background  of  the  finite,  something  as  space  appears  as  the 
infinite  background  and  possibility  of  all  finite  figures  in  it. 
The  infinite  is  further  said  to  produce,  or  emit,  the  finite 
from  itself  ;  or,  by  a  process  of  self-direraption,  to  pass  from 
its  own  unity  into  the  plurality  of  finite  things.  It  is  the 
pure  being  which  appears  in  all  things  as  the  reality  of  their 
existence. 

The  finite,  on  the  other  hand,  is  spoken  of  as  parts  or 
modifications  of  the  infinite,  or  as  emanations  from  the  in- 
finite, or  as  partaking  of  the  infinite  substance.  Many  pan- 
theistic speculators  have  spoken  of  God  as  making  the  world 
out  of  himself.  Others,  again,  have  found  the  world  in  God 
prior  to  creation ;  and  creation  they  view  as  the  escape  of 
these  hidden  potentialities  into  realization.  Both  alike  have 
applied  the  notion  of  quantity  to  the  problem,  and  have 
greatly  exercised  themselves  \vith_  the  inquiry  whether  God 
before  creation  be  not  equal  to  God  plus  the  world  after 
creation.  This  entire  class  of  views  rests  mainly  upon  a 
false  and  uncritical  notion  of  substance  which  identifies  it 
with  pure  being  or  stuff;  and  they  appear  at  once  in  their 
crudity  and  untenability  when  the  stuff -idea  is  exploded. 
There  is  no  stuff  in  being.  The  infinite  substance  means 


96  METAPHYSICS 

the  infinite  agent,  one  and  indivisible.  To  explain  the  uni- 
verse,  we  need  not  a  substance  but  an  agent,  not  substantial- 
ity but  causality.  The  latter  notion  expresses  the  meaning 
of  the  former,  and  is,  besides,  free  from  sense-implications. 

This  necessity  of  viewing  all  true  existence  as  causal  and 
unitary  cancels  at  once  a  host  of  doctrines  which  have 
swarmed  in  pantheistic  speculation.  When  we  speak  of 
the  infinite  as  substance,  the  misleading  analogies  of  sense- 
experience  at  once  present  it  as  admitting  of  division,  ag- 
gregation, etc. ;  but  when  we  think  of  it  as  an  agent,  these 
fancies  disappear  of  themselves.  As  an  agent,  it  is  a  unit, 
and  not  a  sum  or  an  aggregate.  It  is,  then,  without  parts ; 
and  the  notions  of  divisibility  and  aggregation  do  not  ap- 
ply. Hence  we  cannot  view  the  finite  as  a  part  of  the  in- 
finite, or  as  an  emanation  from  the  infinite,  or  as  partaking 
of  the  infinite  substance;  for  all  these  expressions  imply 
the  divisibility  of  the  ^finite,  and  also  its  stuffy  nature. 
No  more  can  the  finitr  be  viewed  as  produced  by  any  self- 
diremption  of  the  infinite ;  for  this,  too,  would  be  incompat- 
ible with  its  necessary  unity.  All  of  these  views  really 
deny  the  infinite  and  replace  it  by  an  aggregate.  The  one 
divides  itself  into  the  many,  and  thereafter  is  only  the  sum 
of  the  many.  But  thereby  the  one  disappears  and  the 
many  alone  exist.  The  difficulty  is  double.  First,  the  notion 
of  division  has  no  application  to  true  being,  but  only  to 
aggregates ;  and,  second,  if  it  had  application,  the  result  of 
dividing  the  infinite  would  be  to  cancel  it,  and  replace  it  by 
the  sum  of  the  finite.  But  this  would  be  to  return  to  the 
impossible  pluralism  of  uncritical  speculation.  The  attempt 
to  divide  and  retain  the  unity  at  the  same  time  is  as  if  one 
should  speak  of  the  mathematical  unit  as  producing  num- 
ber by  self-direraption,  and  as  remaining  a  unit  after  divis- 
ion. The  necessary  unity  of  the  infinite  forbids  all  attempts 
to  identify  it  with  the  finite,  either  totally  or  partially.  If 


THE   WORLD  GROUND  97 

the  finite  be  anything  substantial,  it  must  be  viewed  as 
ontologically  distinct  from  the  infinite,  not  as  produced 
from  it,  but  as  created  by  it.  Only  creation  can  reconcile 
the  reality  of  the  finite  in  this  sense  with  the  unity  of  the 
infinite.  For  the  finite,  if  thus  real,  is  an  agent;  and  as 
such  cannot  be  made  out  of  anything,  but  is  posited  by  the 
infinite.  How  this  can  be  we  do  not  pretend  to  knc  T  ;  but 
any  other  view  is  wrecked  by  its  own  contradiction - 

Similar  objections  lie  against  all  views  which  speak  of 
the  finite  as  a  mode  of  the  infinite.  We  have  ourselves 
used  this  expression,  and  it  is  all  the  more  necessary  to  de- 
fine its  meaning.  In  its  ordinary  use  it  is  based  on  the 
notion  of  passive  substance,  or  pure  being.  Being  is  said 
to  be  one  in  essence,  but  various  in  mode  ;  as  the  same  raw 
material  may  be  built  into  many  forms.  Accordingly  all 
finite  things  are  called  modes,  or  modifications  of  the  in- 
finite. But  it  is  hard  to  interpret  this  language  so  as  to  es- 
cape the  absurdity  of  pure  being  and  remain  in  harmony 
with  the  necessary  unity  of  the  infinite.  The  notion  gen- 
erally joined  with  such  language  is  that  each  thing  is  a  par- 
ticular  and  separate  part  of  the  infinite ;  just  as  each  wave 
of  the  sea  is  not  a  phase  or  mode  of  the  entire  sea,  but  only 
of  that  part  comprised  in  the  wave  itself.  But  the  unity 
of  being  is  compatible  with  a  plurality  of  attributes  only 
as  each  attribute  is  an  attribute  of  the  entire  thing.  Any 
conception  of  diverse  states  which  are  states  of  only  a  part 
of  the  being  would  destroy  its  unity.  The  entire  being 
must  be  present  in  each  state;  and  this  cannot  be  so  long 
as  the  notion  of  quantity  is  applied  to  the  problem.  Hence, 
in  speaking  of  finite  things  as  modes  of  the  infinite,  we  must 
not  figure  the  relation  as  that  of  the  sea  to  its  waves,  or 
as  that  of  material  to  the  form  impressed  upon  it.  If,  then, 
finite  things  are  modes  of  the  infinite,  each  thing  must  be 
a  mode  of  the  entire  infinite;  and  the  infinite  must  be 
7 


98  METAPHYSICS 

present  in  its  unity  and  completeness  in  every  finite  thing, 
just  as  the  entire  soul  is  present  in  all  its  acts.  Any  other 
view  of  the  modes  would  cancel  the  unity  of  the  infinite 
and  leave  the  modes  as  things  in  interaction.  The  infinite, 
then,  cannot  be  viewed  as  a  sum  of  modes,  nor  as  parti}7  in 
one  mode  and  partly  in  another;  but  it  must  be  present 
alike  IL  each  and  every  mode.  Neither  can  the  modes  be 
viewed  ^.s  forms  or  moulds  into  which  the  infinite  substance 
is  poured.  Even  this  gross  conception  has  not  been  with- 
out influence  in  the  history  of  speculation ;  but  it  needs  no 
criticism.  In  general,  the  phrase,  modes  of  being,  is  mis- 
leading. It  is  allied  with  the  imagination ;  and  the  mind 
always  seeks  to  picture  it.  Just  as  we  tend  to  conceive 
substance  as  a  kind  of  raw  material  out  of  which  things  are 
made,  so  we  tend  to  think  of  a  mode  as  a  mould  into  which 
the  raw  material  is  cast.  Of  course,  the  attempt  to  picture 
instead  of  to  think  results  in  absurdity.  The  view  that  be- 
ing is  cause  cancels  these  misconceptions.  Indeed,  no  other 
view  can  meet  the  demands  made  on  the  modes.  The  only 
way  in  which  a  being  can  be  conceived  as  entire  in  every 
mode  is  by  dropping  all  quantitative  conceptions  and  view- 
ing the  being  as  an  agent,  and  the  modes  as  forms  of  its 
activity.  Hence  the  doctrine  that  things  are  modes  of  the 
infinite  can  only  mean  that  things  are  but  constant  forms 
of  activity  on  the  part  of  the  infinite,  and  that  their  thing- 
hood  is  purely  phenomenal.  Of  course,  it  is  impossible  to 
tell  how  the  one  can  act  in  various  ways  so  as  to  produce 
the  appearance  of  a  world  of  different  and  interacting 
things;  but  this  is  only  the  impossibility  of  telling  how 
there  can  be  unity  in  variety,  and,  conversely,  how  there 
can  be  variety  in  unity. 

"We  reach,  then,  the  following  conclusion  :  The  infinite 
is  not  a  passive  substance,  but  the  basal  cause  of  the  uni- 
verse. As  such,  it  is  one  and  indivisible,  and  is  "forever 


THE   WORLD-GROUND  99 

equal  to  itself.  Of  the  finite,  two  conceptions  are  logi- 
cally possible.  We  may  view  it  merely  as  a  form  of  ener- 
gizing on  the  part  of  the  infinite,  so  that  it  has  a  purely 
phenomenal  existence ;  or  we  may  view  it  as  a  substantial 
creation  by  the  infinite.  But  in  no  case  is  it  possible  to 
identify  the  infinite  with  the  finite,  either  totally  or  par- 
tially. 

The  decision  between  these  two  views  of  the  finite,  as 
already  pointed  out,  can  be  reached  only  by  studying  the 
facts  of  experience.  If  any  finite  thing  can  be  found  which  1 
is  capable  of  acting  from  itself  and  for  itself,  it  has  in  that 
fact  the  only  possible  test  of  reality,  as  distinguished  from? 
phenomenality.  But  this  possibility  can  be  found  only  in 
the  finite  spirit.  It  avails  nothing  against  this  conclusion 
to  say  that  the  world-ground  may  posit  impersonal  agents 
as  well  as  personal  ones ;  for  the  notion  of  the  impersonal 
finite  vanishes,  upon  analysis,  into  phenomenality.  In  seek- 
ing for  identity,  we  found  it  only  in  the  personal.  In  seeking 
for  causality,  we  found  it  only  in  the  personal.  In  study- 
ing interaction,  we  found  that  the  causality  of  the  finite 
cannot  properly  extend  beyond  its  own  subjectivity,  and 
the  impersonal  has  no  subjectivity.  On  all  these  accounts 
we  must  hold  the  impersonal  is  possible  only  as  dependent 
phenomenon,  or  process  of  an  energy  not  its  own.  Only 
selfhood  serves  to  mark  off  the  finite  as  substantial  reality, 
and  to  give  it  any  ontological  otherness  to  the  infinite. 
Apart  from  this,  there  is  essentially  nothing  but  the  in- 
finite and  its  manifold  activities.  The  impersonal  finite 
attains  onty  to  such  otherness  as  a  thought  or  act  has  to 
its  subject. 

But  the  personal  finite,  the  spirit,  must  be  viewed  as 
created.  It  is  not  made  out  of  pre- existent  stuff,  for  the 
stuff  notion  has  disappeared.  It  is  not  made  out  of  any- 


100  METAPHYSICS 

thing,  not  even  out  of  nothing ;  it  is  caused  to  be.  Crea- 
tion  has  a  positive  and  a  negative  meaning.  Positively,  it 
means  to  posit  in  existence  something  which  before  was 
)  not;  negatively,  it  denies  that  this  something  is  made  out 
of  pre-existent  material,  or  that  the  creator  is  less  after  the 
creative  act  than  before.  This  is  all  that  creation  means; 
and  to  this  we  are  shut  up  by  the  contradiction  of  any 
other  view.  Of  course,  no  one  can  hope  to  tell  how  crea^ 
tion  is  possible,  but  we  can  clearly  see  that  the  alternative 
views  are  impossible. 

Without  some  mental  steadiness  at  this  point  it  is  easy  to 
fall  into  some  species  of  pantheism.  In  spite  of  the  demon- 
strable inapplicability  of  the  category  of  quantity  to  the  re- 
lation of  the  finite  to  the  infinite,  a  swarm  of  metaphors  and 
imaginings  based  on  this  category  are  sure  to  spring  up  in 
uncritical  minds,  and  impose  on  them  their  fictitious  solu- 
tions. As  the  one  space  or  time  includes  all  finite  spaces 
or  times,  so  we  may  easily  fancy  that  the  infinite  includes 
the  finite  as  its  constituent  parts.  Logical  relations  also 
lend  themselves  to  the  illusion.  For,  as  all  particulars  are 
logically  but  accidents  or  specifications  of  the  universal, 
which  embraces  them  all,  we  may  readily  suppose  that  all 
particular  beings  are  but  specifications  of  the  universal 
being.  Critical  vigilance  is  the  price  of  liberty  in  the 
case  of  these  illusions.  We  must  see  that  quantity  is  a 
self-destructive  category  when  applied  beyond  phenomena. 
We  must  also  distinguish  between  logical  subordination  and 
ontological  implication.  The  universal,  which  applies  to  all 
the  particulars,  implies  none  of  them. 

A  more  subtle  source  of  error  concerning  this  matter  lies 
in  the  necessary  dependence  of  the  finite.  The  finite  is  de- 
pendent on  the  infinite,  and  is  also  a  member  of  a  system  to 
which  it  is  continually  subject.  The  result  is  that  the  finite 
spirit  has  only  a  limited  and  relative  existence  at  best.  As 


THE   WORLD-GROUND  101 

compared  with  the  infinite,  it  has  only  a  partial  and  incom- 
plete existence.  In  the  fullest  sense  of  the  word,  only  the 
infinite  exists;  all  else  is  relatively  phenomenal  and  non- 
existent. 

By  thinking  along  this  line  in  an  abstract  way  it  is  easy 
to  come  to  this  conclusion ;  and  every  reader  acquainted 
with  the  history  of  speculation  will  recall  how  often  men 
have  stumbled  into  pantheism  at  this  point.  Nor  is  it  easy 
to  escape  this  conclusion  so  long  as  we  dwell  on  the  abstract 
categories  of  finite  and  infinite,  dependent  and  independent, 
phenomenal  and  real,  existence  and  non-existence.  The 
truth  is  we  have  no  insight  into  these  categories  which  will 
enable  us  to  decide  what  is  concretely  possible  in  this  case. 
We  have  to  fall  back  on  experience,  and  interpret  the  cate- 
gories by  experience,  instead  of  determining  experience  by 
the  categories.  Any  other  method  is  illusory  and  the  pro- 
lific source  of  illusions. 

Adopting  this  method,  we  discover  that,  while  we  can- 
not tell  how  the  finite  can  be,  it  nevertheless  is.  The  finite 
may  not  exist  in  the  full  sense  of  the  infinite,  but  for  all 
that,  in  a  small  way,  it  is  able  to  act  and  is  acted  upon. 
In  the  sense  of  self-sufficiency  there  is  but  one  substance, 
as  Spinoza  said  ;  but  it  does  not  follow  that  all  other  things 
are  only  powerless  shadows,  for  there  are  a  great  many  sub- 
stances which  can  act  and  be  acted  upon.  It  matters  little 
what  we  call  these,  provided  we  bear  this  fact  in  mind. 
They  are  not  substances,  if  substance  means  self-sufficiency. 
They  are  substances,  if  substance  means  the  subject  of  ac- 
tion and  passion.  If,  then,  we  bear  our  meaning  careful \y  in 
mind,  we  may  say  that  only  the  infinite  exists  or  truly  is, 
that  the  finite  has  only  partial,  relative,  incomplete,  non- 
existent existence ;  and  there  would  be  a  sort  of  truth  in 
the  saying.  But  these  utterances  are  so  easily  misunder- 
stood that  they  should  be  reserved  for  esoteric  use.  and 


102  .       METAPHYSICS 

frugality  is  to  he  recommended  even  there.     In  these  oper- 
ations we  must  proceed  antiseptically,  and  sterilize  our  ver- 
bal instruments  by  careful  definition  before  we  begin. 
"Now  when  we  consider  life  at  all  reflective^  we  come 

i  upon  two  facts.  First,  we  have  thoughts  and  feelings  and 
volitions ;  and  these  are  our  own.  We  also  have  a  measure 
of  self-control  or  the  power  of  self-direction.  Here,  then, 
in  experience  we  find  a  certain  selfhood  and  a  relative  in- 
dependence. This  fact  constitutes  us  real  persons,  or  rather 
it  is  the  meaning  of  our  personality.  The  second  fact  is 

r  that  we  cannot  regard  this  life  as  self-sufficient  and  inde- 
pendent. How  the  life  is  possible  we  do  not  know ;  we 
only  know  that  it  is.  How  the  two  facts  are  put  together 
is  altogether  beyond  us.  We  only  know  that  we  cannot 
interpret  life  without  admitting  both,  and  that  to  deny 
either  lands  us  in  contradiction  and  nonsense.  It  is  no 
doubt  fine,  and  in  some  sense  it  is  correct,  to  say  that  God 
is  in  all  things;  but  when  it  comes  to  saying  that  God  is 
all  things  and  that  all  forms  of  thought  and  feeling  and 
conduct  are  his,  then  reason  simply  commits  suicide.  God 
thinks  and  feels  in  what  we  call  our  thinking  and  feeling; 
and  hence  he  blunders  in  our  blundering  and  is  stupid  in 
our  stupidity.  He  contradicts  himself  also  with  the  utmost 
freedom;  for  a  deal  of  his  thinking  does  not  hang  together 
from  one  person  to  another,  or  from  one  day  to  another  in 
the  same  person.  Error,  folly, -and  sin  are  all  made  divine; 
and  reason  and  conscience  as  having  authority  vanish.  The 
only  thing  that  is  not  divine  in  this  scheme  is  God  ;  and  he 
vanishes  into  a  congeries  of  contradictions  and  basenesses. 

For  note  the  purely  logical  difficulties  in  the  notion,  not 
to  press  the  problem   of  evil  and  error  just  referred  to. 

.  Suppose  the  difficulty  overcome  which  is  involved  in  the 
inalienability  of  personal  experience,  so  that  our  thoughts 
and  life  might  be  ascribed  to  God.  What  is  God's  relation 


THE   WORLD-GROUND  103 

as  thinking  our  thoughts  to  God  as  thinking  the  absolute 
thought  ?  Does  he  become  limited,  confused,  and  blind  in 
finite  experience,  and  does  he  at  the  same  time  have  abso- 
lute insight  in  his  infinite  life?  Does  he  lose  himself  in  the 
finite  so  as  not  to  know  what  and  who  he  is;  or  does  he 
perhaps  exhaust  himself  in  the  finite,  so  that  the  finite  is  all 
there  is  ?  But  if  all  the  while  he  has  perfect  knowledge  of 
himself  as  one  and  infinite,  how  does  this  illusion  of  the  finite 
arise  at  all  in  that  perfect  unity  and  perfect  light  ?  There 
is  no  answer  to  these  questions,  so  long  as  the  infinite  is 
supposed  to  play  both  sides  of  the  game.  We  have  a  series 
of  unaccountable  illusions  and  an  infinite  playing  hide-and- 
seek  with  itself  in  a  most  grotesque  metaphysical  fuddle- 
ment.  The  notion  of  creation  may  be  difficult,  but  it  saves 
us  from  such  dreary  stuff  as  this.  How  the  infinite  can 
posit  the  finite,  and  thus  make  the  possibility  of  a  moral 
order,  is  certainly  beyond  us ;  but  the  alternative  is  a  lapse 
into  hopeless  irrationality.  "We  can  make  nothing  of  either 
God  or  the  world  on  such  a  pantheistic  basis.  Accordingly, 
we  find  writers  who  incline  to  this  way  of  thinking  in  un- 
certain vacillation  between  some  "Eternal  Consciousness" 
and  our  human  consciousnesses  and  without  any  definite 
and  consistent  thought  concerning  their  mutual  relation, 
but  only  vague  and  showy  phrases. 

The  illusion  is  completed  by  taking  thought  abstractly 
and  forgetting  the  personal  and  volitional  form  of  concrete 
thinking.  The  infinite  thought  "as  conception  of  course 
embraces  all  things,  but  it  must  embrace  them  as  what  they 
are.  On  the  side  of  the  infinite  we  have  not  a  resting 
thought,  but  a  thinker  and  a  doer.  And  on  the  side  of 
the  finite  spirit  also  we  have  no  mere  conceptions  of  the 
divine  understanding,  but  thinkers  and  doers  also;  and  in 
that  fact  they  have  an  inalienable  individuality  and  person- 
ality. When  we  sweep  all  these  together  into  one  concep- 


104  METAPHYSICS 

tion,  "  Thought "  or  "  Consciousness,"  we  only  fall  a  prey 
to  the  fallacy  of  the  universal. 

Such  is  the  relation  of  the  finite  to  the  infinite.  We  next 
consider  the  relation  of  the  infinite  to  the  finite. 

By  virtue  of  its  position  as  world  -  ground,  the  infinite 
must  be  viewed  as  the  primal  source  of  all  finite  existence. 
Since  the  finite  has  no  ground  of  being  in  itself,  its  nature 
and  relations  must  be  originally  determined  by  the  infinite  ; 
and  hence  the  finite  can  be  properly  understood  or  compre- 
hended only  from  the  side  of  the  infinite.  The  finite  may 
be  viewed  as  the  outcome  or  expression  of  a  plan  or  purpose 
on  the  part  of  the  infinite ;  and  it  may  be  viewed  as  a  con- 
sequence of  the  infinite.  In  the  former  case,  the  basal  pur- 
pose will  contain  the  ground  or  reason  for  all  the  determina- 
tions of  the  system  ;  and  a  knowledge  of  the  system  will 
depend  upon  a  knowledge  of  the  purpose  for  whose  expres- 
sion and  realization  the  system  exists.  No  member  of  the 
system  will  have  any  ontological  or  other  rights,  except  such 
as  its  position  and  significance  in  the  system  secure  for  it. 
Freedom  apart,  every  finite  thing  is  what  it  is,  and  where  it 
is,  and  when  it  is,  solely  and  only  because  of  the  requirements 
of  the  fundamental  plan. 

And  even  if  we  should  conceive  the  infinite  as  unintelli- 
gent, we  must  still  view  the  finite  as  an  expression  of  the 
nature  of  the  infinite.  Atheism  and  theism  alike  must  re- 
gard the  finite  as  dependent  on  the  world-ground.  Theism 
finds  the  order  of  dependence  expressed  in  a  plan,  atheism 
would  found  it  in  the  nature  of  the  infinite.  This  nature 
then  becomes  the  determining  principle  of  all  finite  exist- 
ence. The  system  and  its  members  will  be  in  every  respect 
what  this  nature  may  demand  ;  and  a  knowledge  of  what 
can  be  or  cannot  be  will  depend  upon  a  knowledge  of  this 
nature.  The  meaning  or  significance  of  the  infinite  at  any 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  105 

particular  moment  will  be  the  sole  conditioning  ground  of 
all  things  and  events  in  the  system.  If  movement  takes 
place,  it  will  be  because  the  nature  of  the  infinite  calls  for 
it.  If  it  take  place  in  one  direction  rather  than  another,  it 
will  be  because  the  nature  of  the  infinite  would  not  be  satis- 
fied by  motion  in  any  other  direction.  Of  course,  it  is  im- 
possible to  get  any  exhaustive  formula  for  this  conditioning 
nature ;  but  the  conclusion  follows  not  from  any  insight  into 
the  nature,  but  solely  from  the  formal  position  of  the  infinite 
in  the  system. 

All  speculators  alike,  then,  must  pass  behind  the  finite  and 
find  the  conditioning  principle  of  the  finite  in  the  infinite. 
If,  for  example,  we  allow  the  physical  elements  to  be  as  real 
as  the  physicist  assumes,  we  have  still  to  allow  that  their 
number  and  nature  and  the  order  of  their  appearance  are 
not  determined  by  any  ontological  necessity  in  the  ele- 
ments themselves,  but  only  by  the  demands  which  the 
infinite  makes  upon  them.  If  the  system  exist  for  the 
realization  of  a  plan,  the  elements  will  be  in  all  respects 
what  the  plan  of  the  system  demands.  If  there  be  no  plan, 
and  the  infinite  be  only  a  blind  energizing,  still  this  energiz- 
ing will  be  such  as  the  nature  of  the  infinite  demands  for  its 
realization.  From  this  point,  also,  the  elements  will  be  pro- 
duced in  just  such  number,  order,  and  kind  as  the  significance 
of  the  infinite  demands.  Apart  from  a  knowledge  of  this 
nature,  we  cannot  know  anything  about  the  system.  "We 
cannot  say  that  the  present  order  has  alwa}Ts  existed ;  no 
more  can  we  deny  it.  We  cannot  say  that  the  members  of 
the  system  were  all  produced  at  once,  nor  that  they  were 
successively  originated.  No  more  can  we  know  anything 
about  the  future.  Whether  the  members  of  the  system 
will  alwa}Ts  continue,  or  whether  they  will  instantaneously 
or  successively  disappear,  are  questions  which  lie  beyond  all 
knowledge.  We  do  not  know  what  direction  the  future  will 


106  METAPHYSICS 

take  in  any  respect  whatever.  The  facts  in  all  of  these  cases 
depend  upon  the  plan  or  nature  of  the  infinite;  and  unless 
we  can  get  an  insight  into  this  plan  and  nature,  our  knowl- 
edge of  both  past  and  future  must  be  purely  hypothetical. 
No  natural  law,  in  and  of  itself,  can  give  any  hint  of  the 
time  and  circumstances  of  its  origin.  If  the  arch  of  being 
were  sprung  at  a  word,  the  laws  of  the  system  would  still 
have  a  virtual  focus  in  the  past,  just  as  the  rays  of  light 
from  a  convex  mirror  seem  to  meet  behind  the  mirror,  but 
do  not.  Or  if  any  new  order  should  arise  at  any  point  of 
cosmic  history,  this  new  order  would  also  have  a  virtual 
focus  in  an  imaginary  history.  Of  course,  "  demonstra- 
tions "  abound  concerning  what  has  been  and  what  will  be  ; 
but  the  fact  which  they  really  demonstrate  is  quite  other 
than  the  demonstrators  think.  If  we  assume  the  uniformity 
of  nature,  we  may  indeed  reach  a  certain  insight;  but  the 
result  is  purely  hypothetical.  This  uniformity  is  contin- 
gent ;  and,  so  far  as  we  know,  a  complete  reversal  of  all 
observed  methods  may  occur  at  any  moment.  The  reason 
is,  that  the  determining  principle  of  the  course  of  nature 
lies  beyond  all  observation  in  the  hidden  plan  or  nature  of 
the  infinite.  Every  system  which  denies  the  independence 
of  the  finite  must  allow  these  conclusions.  The  system  will 
be  at  all  times  and  in  all  respects  what  this  plan  or  nature 
demands.  The  finite  will  come  and  go,  change  and  become, 
in  accordance  with  the  same  rule.  The  result  is  that  an 
apriori  knowledge  of  the  system  must  be  declared  impos- 
sible; for  such  a  knowledge  demands  an  insight  which  no 
finite  being  possesses.  In  addition,  even  deductions  from 
experience  are  only  hypothetically  valid. 

Quite  a  swarm 'of  objections  spring  up  at  once.  To  begin 
with,  the  crude  speculator  of  popular  science  takes  umbrage 
at  the  suggestion  that  the  physical  elements  are  not  neces- 
sarily fixed  quantities.  Having  heard  frequently  of  the  in- 


destructibilitv  of  matter,  the  two  ideas  have  stuck  together 

v  CJ 

in  what  he  is  pleased  to  call  his  mind ;  and  now  he  professes 
himself  unable  to  separate  them.  But  this  mental  impotence 
need  not  delay  us.  The  indestructibility  of  matter,  in  the 
only  sense  in  which  it  is  proved,  is  compatible  with  the  com- 
plete phenomenal  ity  of  matter.  And  how  long  it  shall  re- 
main true,  even  in  this  sense,  depends  entirely  upon  the 
infinite. 

In  the  next  place,  the  crude  philosophical  dogmatist  will 
claim  that  the  necessity  which  rules  in  nature  excludes  a 
view  which  leaves  things  at  such  loose  ends.  Omitting  to 
inquire  whether  this  necessity  be  anything  more  than  a 
shadow  of  unclear  thinking,  we  point  out  that  in  any  case 
the  necessity  in  nature  can  only  mean  that. existing  laws, 
facts,  and  events  are  expressions  of  necessity,  but  there  is 
nothing  in  this  fact  to  assure  us  that  necessity  always  will 
express  itself  in  just  these  forms.  That  the  necessity  is 
compatible  with  change  we  know  from  experience ;  and 
what  future  changes  may  yet  become  necessary  no  one  can 
tell.  So  far  as  founding  the  order  and  fixity  of  nature  is 
concerned,  chance  itself  could  not  leave  us  more  in  the 
dark  than  necessity ;  unless  we  dogmatically  declare  the 
present  order  to  be  changelessly  necessary,  and  let  our  will 
stand  for  a  reason.  Critical  thought  can  find  no  rational 
security  for  uniformity  and  continuity  in  anything  but  ra- 
tional purpose ;  and  as  long  as  we  are  unable  to  read  the 
purpose  and  its  implications,  we  must  be  content  to  confine 
our  science  to  a  reasonable  degree  of  extension  to  adjacent 
cases ;  that  is,  to  cases  bearing  on  practice. 

A  weightier  objection  comes  from  the  side  of  the  intel- 
lectualist,  who  urges  that  our  view  is  a  relapse  into  vulgar 
empiricism.  If  this  objection  were  well  founded,  it  would 
be  a  serious  one ;  and  as  it  is,  it  makes  it  necessary  more 
clearly  to  define  our  meaning.  In  the  first  place,  intellect- 


108  METAPHYSICS 

ualism,  if  universally  valid,  is  purely  formal.  Suppose  we 
allow  that  all  phenomena  must  appear  in  space  and  be  sub- 
ject to  the  laws  of  space;  there  is  nothing  in  this  fact  to 
determine  which  of  many  possible  phenomena  shall  appear 
in  space.  The  most  diverse  phenomena  are  compatible  with 
the  laws  of  space ;  and  hence  these  laws  do  not  determine 
what  phenomena  shall  be  realized.  This  must  be  deter- 
mined by  something  beyond  space ;  and  to  know  the  out- 
come, we  must  know  more  than  the  formal  laws  of  space. 
Again,  allow  that  the  law  of  causation  is  universal,  there  is 
nothing  in  this  formal  law  to  decide  what  shall  be  caused. 
Here,  again,  we  must  go  outside  of  the  law  to  find  the  rea- 
son for  any  specific  event.  The  same  is  true  for  all  other 
intellectual  first  principles.  They  are  purely  formal  and 
determine  no  specific  content.  The  system  of  logical  cate- 
gories merely  outlines  a  knowledge  of  possibility  and  does 
not  give  any  insight  into  the  specific  nature  of  reality.  A 
multitude  of  real  systems  would  be  compatible  with  these 
categories;  and  hence  these  categories  do  not  explain  why 
one  of  these  possible  systems  should  be  real  rather  than 
another.  Within  each  of  these  possible  sj'stems,  also,  there 
is  a  deal  of  contingent  matter,  and  this  can  be.  learned  only 
from  experience.  If,  then,  we  were  justified  in  viewing 
first  principles  as  universally  valid,  we  should  still  have  only 
a  formal  knowledge,  and  not  a  knowledge  of  reality.  We 
should  have  to  consult  experience  to  learn  what  the  reality 
is  which  exists  within  these  formal  limits. 

Again,  those  first  principles  themselves  must  be  founded 
in  the  nature  of  the  infinite.  Just  as  what  is  real  is  founded 
in  the  infinite,  so  also  what  is  true  is  founded  in  it.  In  our 
finite  experience  we  find  ourselves  working  under  a  system 
of  laws  and  principles  which  condition  us,  and  which  all 
our  acts  must  obey.  And  these  laws  are  not  of  our  making, 
but  rule  us  even  against  our  will.  Under  this  experience 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  109 

there  grows  up  the  notion  of  a  realm  of  impalpable  and  in- 
visible laws,  to  which  all  reality  is  subject.  "We  think  of 
them  as  ruling  over  being,  and  not  as  founded  in  being. 
And  thus  first  principles  particularly  are  conceived  as  a 
kind  of  bottomless  necessity,  which  depend  on  nothing  for 
their  validity,  and  which  would  exist  if  all  reality  were 
away.  But  the  untenability  of  this  view  is  palpable.  Laws 
of  every  sort,  thought-laws  among  the  rest,  are  never  any- 
thing but  expressions  of  the  nature  of  being.  Eeality,  by 
being  what  it  is  and  not  something  else,  founds  all  ac- 
tivity and  all  law.  If  a  realm  of  law,  apart  from  being, 
were  anything  but  a  mere  abstraction,  it  could  not  rule  be- 
ing except  as  it  came  into  interaction  with  being.  To  rule 
rightly,  the  law  must  be  affected  by  the  changing  states 
of  being,  otherwise  it  might  command  one  thing  as  well 
as  another.  Nor  would  the  command  itself  be  enough ;  it 
must  enforce  the  command  by  its  action  upon  its  subjects. 
But  this  would  make  the  law  a  thing.  It  would  act  and 
be  acted  upon ,  and  this  is  precisely  the  definition  of  a 
thing. 

It  is,  then,  a  mere  delusion  when  we  fancy  that  there 
can  be  anything  deeper  than  being,  or  anything  outside  of 
being.  If  outside  of  being,  being  must  remain  indifferent 
to  it,  unless  this  outsider  be  able  to  act  upon  and  influence 
being.  But  this  brings  it  at  once  under  the  definition  of 
being.  Hence,  all  laws,  principles,  phenomena,  and  all  finite 
reality  must  be  viewed  as  consequences  or  manifestations 
of  the  basal  reality.  First  truths  also,  even  as  formal  truths, 
can  be  viewed  only  as  expressions  or  consequences  of  this 
reality,  and  never  as  its  antecedent,  or  as  independent.  It 
may  be  possible  for  us  to  perceive  truths  which  shall  be 
universally  valid  in  the  system,  true  alike  for  the  finite  and 
the  infinite ;  but  it  is  quite  absurd  to  ask  what  would  be 
true  apart  from  the  system.  When  we  ask  such  a  question, 


HO  METAPHYSICS 

we  are  always  present  with  our  thought-laws,  derived  from 
the  real  system ;  and  our  imaginary  system  is  always  con- 
structed on  the  basis  of  the  present  system,  and  this  we 
mistake  for  an  insight  into  the  nature  of  systems  quite  dis- 
tinct from  ours.  But  the  answer  to  such  questions  always 
consists  in  telling  what  is  now  true  for  us  as  determined  by 
the  actual  system  of  reality.  The  infinite  is,  and  being 
what  it  is,  the  system  of  law  and  truth  is  what  it  is ;  and 
the  thought  of  other  and  unrelated  systems  is  a  pure  ab- 
straction from  our  imaginary  constructions. 

Some  speculators  have  affected  to  find  a  limitation  of  the 
infinite  in  the  claim  that  it  is  subject  to  law  of  any  kind ; 
but  this  is  only  an  overstraining  of  the  notion  of  indepen- 
dence or  absoluteness  which  defeats  itself.  It  is  necessary 
to  the  thought  of  any  agent  that  it  have  some  definite  way 
of  working.  Without  this  the  thought  vanishes  and  the 
agent  is  nothing.  This  mode,  or  law.  of  action,  however, 
is  not  imposed  from  without ;  but  is  simply  an  expression 
of  what  the  being  is.  As  such  it  is  no  limitation.  The 
mind  is  not  limited  by  the  laws  of  thought;  but  realizes 
itself  in  and  through  those  laws.  Apart  from  them  it  is 
nothing;  and  they  apart  from  it  are  also  npthing.  The 
laws  are  simply  expressions  of  the  essential  nature  of  mind. 
In  the  same  way  the  laws  of  the  infinite,  instead  of  limiting, 
but  express  what  the  infinite  is.  They  are  not  antecedent 
to  it,  nor  separate  from  it,  nor  distinct  in  it.  The  only  re- 
ality is  the  being  in  a  definite  mode  of  activity ;  and  from 
this  fact  we  form  the  notion  of  law,  nature,  etc.  But  the 
fact  is  always  the  being  in  action. 

The  conclusion,  then,  is  that  there  is  one  basal  being  in 
action  as  the  source  of  the  system  and  of  all  its  laws,  prin- 
ciples, and  realities.  And  this  monism  extends  not  only  to 
things,  but  to  principles  also.  It  has  been  very  common  in 
English  speculation  to  assume  any  number  of  principles, 


THE   WORLD-GROUND  HI 

alike  independent  of  one  another  and  of  reality.  Space  and 
time,  especially,  have  been  posited  in  mutual  independence, 
and  also  as  independent  of  all  reality,  finite  and  infinite 
alike.  A  common  way  of  putting  it  is  that  space  and  time 
would  continue  to  exist  if  God  and  the  world  were  both 
away.  But  this  view  violates  the  necessary  unity  of  fun- 
damental being.  Whatever  space  and  time  may  be,  they 
cannot  be  independent  and  original  existences;  but  both 
alike  must  be  viewed  as  consequences  in  some  way  of  fun- 
damental being.  This  results  necessarily  from  the  unity  of 
the  basal  reality,  and  from  the  fact  that  the  nature  of  this 
reality  must  be  the  determining  principle  of  all  secondary 
existence  and  of  all  law  and  manifestation. 

That  the  world-ground  must  be  conceived  as  free  and  ac- 
tive intelligence  is  the  result  to  which  thought  continually 
comes,  whatever  the  line  of  investigation.  If  we  seek  a 
tenable  theory  of  knowledge  we  find  it  only  as  we  reach  a 
basal  intelligence.  If  we  seek  to  bind  the  many  together  in 
an  all-embracing  system,  it  is  possible  only  in  and  through 
intelligence.  If  we  seek  for  unity  in  being  itself  we  find  it 
only  in  intelligence.  If  we  seek  for  causality  and  identity 
in  being  we  find  them  only  in  intelligence.  If  we  would 
give  any  account  of  the  intelligible  order  and  purpose-like 
products  of  the  world,  again  intelligence  is  the  only  key. 
If,  finally,  we  ask  for  the  formal  conditions  of  reality  we 
find  them  in  intelligence.  The  attempt  to  define  reality 
itself  fails  until  intelligence  is  introduced  as  its  constitu- 
tive condition.  The  mind  can  save  its  own  categories  from 
disappearing,  can  realize  its  own  aims  and  tendencies,  can 
truly  comprehend  or  even  mean  anything,  only  as  it  relates 
everything  to  free  intelligence  as  the  source  and  adminis- 
trator of  the  system. 

Against  this  theistic  view  there  is  properly  no  competing 


112  METAPHYSICS 

view  whatever.  There  seem  to  be  such  views,  indeed,  but 
they  are  really  only  forms  of  words,  sonorous  and  swelling 
often,  but  without  any  rational  substance.  To  see  this,  we 
need  only  consider  the  atheistic  attempt  to  refer  the  world, 
its  order  and  products,  to  mechanical  necessity.  We  pass 
over  the  deeper  logical  difficulties  involved  in  this  notion 
of  impersonal  reality  and  mechanical  causation.  We  also 
pass  over  the  epistemological  difficulties  involved  in  the 
problem  of  error  on  such  a  scheme.  We  say  nothing  of 
the  puzzle  concerning  the  relation  of  the  human  personality 
to  its  mechanical  ground.  We  simply  point  out  the  empti- 
ness of  the  doctrine  itself  when  considered  as  an  account 
of  things. 

Logic  shows  how  extremely  dark  and  elusive  the  notion 
of  metaphysical  necessity  is ;  here  we  point  out,  in  addition, 
its  complete  barrenness.  For  necessity,  as  formal  category, 
contains  nothing  specific.  Nothing  can  be  deduced  from  it. 
It  gets  a  concrete  content,  therefore,  only  as  we  apply  it  to 
a  given  matter.  We  know  that  the  world  is  necessary,  not 
by  deducing  it  from  the  abstract  category  of  necessity,  but 
rather  by  applying  the  category  to  the  world.  Thus  the 
necessity  itself  is  hypothetical,  and  its  contents  are  learned 
from  experience.  That  is,  it  is  not  necessity  in  general 
which  explains  the  world,  but  the  necessity  of  the  world 
itself  which  explains  it.  We  know  by  hypothesis  that  the 
world  is  necessary ;  and  we  know  that  necessity  fully  ex- 
plains the  world,  because  that  necessity  is  just  the  necessity 
of  the  world.  We  simply  call  things  necessary ;  and,  so  far 
as  any  insight  is  concerned,  we  end  where  we  began. 

Logic  shows  that  any  explanation  which  does  not  root  in 
purpose  is  equally  empty.  The  antecedents  which  imply 
a  consequent  cannot  be  adequately  expressed  without  tak- 
ing into  account  the  consequent  which  they  imply.  The 
causes  must  be  defined  in  terms  of  their  effects,  and  the 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  113 

effects  must  be  made  potential  in  their  causes.  In  that 
case  explanation  consists  simply  in  affirming  or  assuming  a 
set  of  causes  such  and  in  such  relations  that  they  must  pro- 
duce the  effect  in  question,  to  the  exclusion  of  every  other. 
Certainly  with  such  causes  we  could  explain  the  effect ;  but 
it  must  be  plain  that  we  have  merely  postponed  the  prob- 
lem. Here  also,  so  far  as  any  insight  is  concerned,  we  end 
where  we  began. 

Some  problems  admit  of  competing  solutions.  Some 
solutions  may  be  better  than  others ;  but  all  may  have  some 
positive  value.  Non-theistic  solutions  of  world  problems, 
however,  are  not  of  this  sort.  They  have  no  value.  Criti- 
cally examined,  they  vanish  into  absolute  nothingness,  as 
bubbles  when  they  are  touched.  Nevertheless,  they  have 
been  thought  to  be  very  weighty.  They  have  caused  many 
a  theologian  great  heart-searching,  and  have  passed  for  the 
sura  of  wisdom  itself  with  herds  of  popular  speculators. 
This  makes  it  interesting  and  profitable  to  trace  the  source 
of  the  illusion. 

And  we  have  not  far  to  go  to  find  it.  The  crude  meta- 
physics of  sense-thinking  leads  to  the  fancy  that  we  see 
causes  in  immediate  perception,  and  see  them  to  be  material. 
Thus  the  substance  and  causality  of  the  world  are  provided. 
In  the  next  place  we  discover  an  order  of  law,  and  this  is 
viewed  as  necessary  as  a  matter  of  course.  Thus  the  order 
of  the  world  is  explained  as  due  to  the  reign  of  law ;  and  as 
this  is  necessary,  no  questions  may  be  asked  about  it.  The 
necessary  is  self-sufficient.  A  remark  or  two  about  the 
indestructibility  of  matter  and  the  conservation  of  energy 
make  it  plain  that  this  system  not  only  needs  no  supervision 
by  intelligence,  but  that  it  will  not  even  tolerate  it.  Thus 
the  system  of  law  and  nature  and  the  realm  of  mind  are  set 
in  mutually  exclusive  antithesis,  so  that  the  more  we  have 
of  the  former  the  less  we  must  have  of  the  latter.  By  this 


METAPHYSICS 

time  theistic  faith  is  in  a  most  forlorn  condition,  and  the 
finishing  stroke  is  given  by  the  fallacy  of  the  universal. 
By  calling  everything  necessary  we  make  it  clear  that  no 
questions  ought  to  be  raised ;  and  by  the  aid  of  the  fallacy 
mentioned  we  show  that  there  are  really  no  questions  to 
raise.  Existence  as  given  is,  indeed,  quite  complex,  but  we 
reduce  it  to  simplicity  with  the  utmost  ease.  Matter  and 
force  serve  our  purpose  handsomely,  matter  representing 
the  existential  aspect  of  reality,  and  force  representing  its 
causal  side.  Moreover,  both  of  these  are  scientific  terms ; 
and  thus  we  secure  the  prestige  of  science  for  our  view, 
which  is  no  small  gain.  But  in  these  terms,  matter  and 
force,  we  see  nothing  but  pure  simplicity,  and  hence  noth- 
ing that  needs  to  be  accounted  for;  nothing,  indeed — due 
account  being  taken  of  the  indestructibility  of  both  matter 
and  force — that  may  not  well  be  eternal.  Our  data,  then, 
raise  no  question  and  excite  no  surprise ;  and  that  they  are 
perfectly  adequate  to  the  administration  of  the  world  is 
plain,  for  by  virtue  of  the  great  principle  of  evolution  the 
like  becomes  unlike,  the  simple  becomes  complex,  the 
low  lifts  itself  to  the  high,  and,  in  fine,  the  indefinite,  in- 
coherent homogeneity  changes  to  a  definite,  coherent  hete- 
rogeneity, through  continuous  differentiations  and  integra- 
tions. This  is  the  great  fallacy-mill  which  has  ground  out 
most  of  our  showy  cosmological  speculation. 

The  fictitious  nature  of  this  performance  is  familiar  to  us. 
The  necessity  which  explains  all  is  the  necessity  which  con- 
tains all.  We  reach  the  necessity  from  the  all,  not  the  all 
from  the  necessity  ;  and  the  necessity  itself  is  hypothetical. 
The  simplifications  also  are  purely  verbal,  and  result  from 
mistaking  the  abstractions  of  logic  for  realities  of  existence. 
When  we  think  concretely  we  can  never  pass  from  the  com- 
plex to  the  simple  or  from  the  simple  to  the  complex  until 
we  rise  to  the  plane  of  free  and  active  intelligence.  On  the 

V— *s 


THE  WORLD  GROUND  115 

impersonal  and  mechanical  plane  we  must  always  in  princi- 
ple end  where  we  beginJJ 

"We  conclude  that  all  non-theistic  schemes  have  their  root 
in  unclear  thought,  or  in  the  verbal  illusions  thence  result- 
ing. What  they  call  for  is  not  positive  disproof,  but  rather 
to  clarify  thought  itself  and  bring  it  to  a  consciousness  of 
its  own  aims  and  implications.  When  this  is  done  they 
vanish  of  themselves,  and  leave  not  even  a  rack  behind. 

The  results  reached  in  the  previous  discussion  may  be 
held  with  all  conviction.  The  attempt  to  understand  or 
even  to  define  the  world  of  things  leads  to  the  insight  that 
it  is  nothing  except  with  reference  to  intelligence,  and  that 
it  must  be  viewed  as  existing  only  through  a  supreme  in- 
telligence which  is  its  constitutive  condition.  In  like  man- 
ner the  finite  spirit  can  make  nothing  of  itself  until  it 
reaches  the  thought  of  a  supreme  creative  spirit  in  which 
all  finite  existence  roots.  But  can  we  understand,  or  in 
any  way  represent  to  ourselves,  the  existence  of  that  su- 
preme being  ?  And  if  not,  if  thought  loses  itself  in  mystery, 
if  the  light  we  seem  to  have,  upon  examination,  turns  to 
darkness,  theism  shades  away  into  agnosticism,  and  we 
have  our  work  for  nothing.  That  this  is  the  last  result  of 
criticism  is  a  frequent  contention.  This  raises  the  question 
concerning  the  divine  personality  and  the  inner  thought- 
life  of  God. 

This  discussion  has  been  greatly  darkened  by  confusion  of 
ideas,  by  applying  to  God  the  limitations  of  the  finite,  and 
by  mistaken  expectations  and  demands.  In  popular  thought 
there  has  been  a  more  or  less  explicit  confusion  of  person- 
ality with  corporeality,  or  at  least  with  form  of  some  kind, 
combined  with  spatial  limitation  and  separation.  This  is 
helped  by  the  spatial  metaphors  in  which  religious  speech 
abounds,  and  by  the  fact  that  in  all  sense-thinking  spatial 


11C  METAPHYSICS 

separation  is  the  great  principle  of  individuation.  A  very 
superficial  criticism  serves  to  show  the  untenability  of  such 
a  view ;  and  the  conclusion  is  drawn  that  God  is  not  a  per- 
son or  individual  of  any  kind. 

But  this  conclusion  is  valid  only  for  persoualitj7  conceived 
as  implying  corporeity,  form,  and  spatial  separation.  It 
has  no  bearing  whatever  upon  personality  as  self-conscious- 
ness, self-knowledge,  and  self-control ;  and  this  is  the  es- 
sential meaning  of  personality.  In  affirming  that  God  is 
personal,  critical  thought  would  mean  only  to  affirm  that 
he  knows  and  determines  himself  and  his  activities.  This 
fact,  however  mysterious  in  its  possibility,  is  perfectly  clear 
in  its  meaning,  and  the  necessity  of  its  affirmation  is  obvious. 

That  God  is  not  a  person  or  individual  has  been  further 
maintained,  on  the  ground  that  then  he  would  be  one  of  a 
kind,  would  be  comprised  in  a  class,  and  so  would  lose  his 
infinitude  and  absoluteness.  If  we  rule  out  the  notion  of 
form  and  spatial  separation,  which  is  implicit  in  this  objec- 
tion, there  is  nothing  left  but  logical  confusion.  If  infinite 
meant  only,  and  absolute  meant  unrelated,  the  conclusion 
might  be  drawn ;  but  the  real  infinite  is  not  the  all,  and  the 
real  absolute  is  not  unrelated.  And  though  there  be  but 
one  infinite  and  absolute  being,  yet  is  it  one  of  a  kind  and 
stands  in  relations  posited  by  itself.  As  existing,  it  is  of 
the  being  kind.  As  active,  it  is  of  the  causal  kind.  As 
knowing,  it  is  of  the  knowing  kind.  To  the  objection  that 
the  first  cause  cannot  be  classed,  and  hence  cannot  be  known, 
since  there  can  be  only  one  first  cause,  the  answer  has  been 
very  properly  returned  that  the  first  wheelbarrow  is  in  the 
same  predicament,  and  is  unknowable  for  the  same  reason. 
Such  argument  is  throughout  a  play  on  the  etymology  of 
the  words,  in  complete  ignorance  of  their  philosophical 
meaning.  Mr.  Mill  said  it  was  hard  to  believe  it  seriously 
meant. 


THE   WORLD-GROUND  117 

It  is  further  maintained  that  we  cannot  view  the  infinite 
as  personal,  because  personality  implies  consciousness,  and 
consciousness  implies  the  antithesis  of  subject  and  object. 
Hence  the  infinite  as  one  and  only  has  no  object,  and  hence, 
again,  cannot  be  viewed  as  conscious.  Consciousness  then 
is  necessarily  a  contradiction  when  ascribed  to  the  infinite. 

Here  we  have  confusion  again.  The  antithesis  in  ques- 
tion is  purely  a  logical  or  psychological  form,  and  does  not 
involve  an  ontological  otherness.  Ps\Tchologically,  the  sub- 
ject is  subject  only  as  there  is  an  object ;  and  the  object  is 
object  only  as  there  is  a  subject.  But  this  denotes  only  the 
antithetical  form  of  consciousness  in  general,  and  is  as  valid 
for  self-consciousness  as  for  any  other.  But  subject  may 
also  denote  a  particular  knowing  subject,  and  object  may 
mean  some  independently  existing  object ;  and  in  unclear 
thought  it  is  easy  to  confuse  these  meanings  and  infer  a 
variety  of  things.  We  may  conclude  to  the  impossibility 
of  self -consciousness,  or  to  the  denial  of  the  infinite  person- 
ality^ Or,  by  short  and  easy  steps,  we  may  conclude  that 
God  and  the  world  mutually  imply  each  other.  For  is  not 
God  subject,  and  is  not  a  subject  a  contradiction  without 
an  object  ?  Likewise  is  not  the  world  very  much  of  an  ob- 
ject, and  must  it  not  have  a  fitting  subject?  Thus  by  duly 
considering  and  appropriately  manipulating  the  fundamental 
antithesis  of  subject  and  object  we  may  get  a  rich  variety 
of  important  speculative  truths.  JBut  that  the  infinite  should 
know  itself  and  thus  make  itseTT  its  own  object,  or  by  its 
activity  should  give  itself  objects,  is  a  conception  to  which 
this  profound  psychology  is  quite  irrelevant.^/ 

Further  difficulties  arise  from  transferring  to  the  infinite 
the  limitations  of  the  finite.  Our  intellect  is  limited  in 
range  and  in  methods.  Where  direct  insight  fails  we  have 
to  resort  to  roundabout  methods,  induction,  proof,  etc.  Our 
intellect  is  developed  also ;  and  some  speculators  have  been 


118  METAPHYSICS 

pleased  to  define  intelligence  in  such  a  way  as  to  make  de- 
velopment a  part  of  the  definition.  Our  consciousness  also 
begins  and  is  conditioned  by  a  great  variety  of  circum- 
stances beyond  our  control.  It  is  easy  to  see  that  these 
conditions  cannot  be  applied  to  the  infinite  being ;  and  then 
it  is  easy  to  say  that  conscious  intelligence  cannot  be  attrib- 
uted to  the  infinite. 

But  the  essential  meaning  of  intelligence  is  the  power  to 
know.  It  is  no  part  of  the  notion  that  it  must  begin,  or 
that  it  should  be  developed,  as  a  progressive  "adjustment 
of  inner  relations  to  outer  relations,"  or  that  it  should  use 
certain  methods.  The  only  thing  essential  to  intelligence 
is  that  it  should  be  able  to  know.  Likewise,  it  is  no  essen- 
tial factor  of  consciousness  that  it  should  begin  or  should  be 
externally  conditioned,  but  only  that  it  should  be  conscious. 
So  far  as  speculation  goes,  an  eternal  or  unbegun  conscious- 
ness is  at  least  as  thinkable  as  an  eternal  or  unbegun  any- 
thing; and  what  the  fact  in  the  case  may  be  is  certainly 
not  to  be  decided  by  representing  the  accidents  of  human 
thought  and  consciousness  as  essential  factors  of  all  thought 
and  consciousness. 

And  now  looking  away  from  this  bad  logic  and  psychol- 
ogy, and  recalling  the  essential  meaning  of  personality  as 
self -consciousness,  self-knowledge,  and  self-control,  it  is  clear 
that  the  traditional  dogma  of  superficial  criticism  on  this 
point  must  be  reversed.  Instead  of  saying  that  personality 
is  impossible  to  the  infinite,  we  must  rather  say  that  it  is 
possible  in  its  fullest  sense  only  to  the  infinite.  The  finite, 
because  of  its  necessary  dependence  and  subordination,  must 
alwaj^s  have  an  imperfect  and  incomplete  personality.  Com- 
plete self-knowledge  and  self-control  are  possible  only  to 
the  absolute  and  infinite  being ;  and  of  this  finite  personal- 
ity can  never  be  more  than  a  faint  and  feeble  image. 

We  come  now  to  the  mistaken  expectations  and  demands 


THE  WORLD  GROUND  119 

referred  to  as  sources  of  unsteady  thought  on  this  subject. 
To  begin  with,  we  must  not  attempt  to  construe  the  infinite 
spatially,  whether  in  itself  or  in  its  relation  to  the  world. 
In  the  next  chapter  we  shall  see  that  space  is  only  phenom- 
enal and  has  no  application  to  ontological  reality.  With 
this  result  it  follows  that  the  world  is  neither  in,  nor  out  of, 
God  in  a  spatial  sense;  and  that  God  is  neither  in,  nor 
apart  from,  the  world  in  a  spatial  sense.  The  world  de- 
pends unpicturably  upon  God,  as  our  thoughts  depend  un- 
picturably  upon  the  mind,  and  God  is  in  the  world  as  the 
mind  is  in  its  thoughts,  not  as  a  pervading  aura  or  spatial 
presence,  but  as  that  active  subject  by  which  all  things 
exist. 

Again,  we  may  not  seek  to  construe  the  infinite  mind,  but 
must  content  ourselves  with  recognizing  it.  We  have  al- 
ready seen  the  impossibility  of  construing  our  own  minds. 
The  attempt  to  understand  intelligence  as  the  result  of  its 
own  categories  has  revealed  itself  as  inverting  the  true  order. 
The  categories  are  the  forms  of  intelligence,  not  its  com- 
ponents ;  and  what  intelligence  is  can  be  known  only  in 
experience.  Particularly  do  we  need  to  bear  this  in  mind 
in  thinking  of  the  infinite.  Otherwise  we  shall  be  tempted 
to  pass  behind  the  absolute  consciousness  and  feign  a  set  of 
impersonal  metaphysical  abstractions  with  which  to  explain 
the  living  God.  Our  thought  must  content  itself  with  rec- 
ognition. Its  last  word  must  be  God.  As  it  was  in  the 
beginning,  is  now,  and  ever  shall  be,  God  is  that  with  which 
all  our  inquiry  must  end. 

And  even  the  recognition  is  full  of  mjTstery.  A  thought 
life  so  different  from  ours  eludes  any  but  the  vaguest  appre- 
hension on  our  part.  As  soon  as  we  ask  for  its  relation  to 
time  we  begin  to  grope.  If  we  eliminate  time  from  it  alto- 
gether the  conception  of  that  tideless  fulness  of  life  is  hard 
to  grasp.  If  we  admit  time  into  it,  the  thought  of  a  devel- 


120  METAPHYSICS 

oping  God  is  a  scandal  to  reason.  And  the  inner  life  of 
thought  and  feeling,  unchanging,  yet  without  monotony; 
the  structure  of  the  absolute  reason,  also,  which  determines 
the  eternal  contents  of  the  divine  thought — how  mysterious 
all  this  is,  how  impenetrable  to  our  profoundest  reflection ! 
Whatever  conception  we  form  in  this  field  is  of  the  nature 
of  a  limit  rather  than  of  a  veritable  apprehension.  "We  see 
that  certain  lines  of  thought  tend  to,  or  have  their  limit  in, 
certain  affirmations.  At  the  same  time  we  see  that,  how- 
ever necessary  they  may  be,  they  always  in  a  sense  lie  be- 
yond us.  The  asymptote  approaches  but  never  touches  the 
curve. 

"Whatever  more  is  to  be  said  on  this  subject  we  hand  over 
to  the  philosophy  of  religion.  We  content  ourselves  with 
discussing  the  general  metaphysical  principles  which  must 
underlie  that  philosophy. 


part  11 
COSMOLOGY 


CHAPTER  I 
SPACE 

WE  have  confined  our  attention  thus  far  to  the  notion  of 
being  in  itself;  and  the  results  reached  are  valid  for  any 
and  all  being.  We  leave  now  these  more  general  consider- 
ations and  pass  to  the  cosmic  forms  and  manifestations  of 
being.  Of  course  we  have  no  thought  of  deducing  these 
forms  as  necessary  logical  consequences  of  being.  Episte- 
raology  shows  that  there  is  no  apriori  road  from  ontology  to 
cosmology,  and  that  there  is  a  large  contingent  element  in 
experience.  The  attempt  to  reduce  this  contingent  factor  / 
to  logical  necessity  is,  first,  a  failure  so  far  as  any  insight 
we  have  is  concerned  ;  and,  secondly,  it  shatters  reason  it- 
self. We  must,  then,  wait  for  experience  to  reveal  the 
forms  of  cosmic  manifestation.  After  this  revelation,  how- 
ever, it  is  open  to  criticism  to  examine  these  forms  with  the 
aim  of  determining  more  accurately  their  nature  and  sig-  . 
nificance. 

Our  method,  then,  will  be  critical  as  usual.  We  take  the 
common-sense  theory  of  a  world  of  material  things  in  space 
and  time  as  the  text  for  a  critical  exegesis  with  the  aim  of 
seeing  what  changes  the  previous  discussion  and  further 
analysis  may  make  necessary.  But  in  this  theory  space  and 
time  constitute  a  kind  of  pre-condition  of  the  world,  and  of 
all  possible  worlds ;  or  they  appear  as  determining  princi- 
ples of  all  cosmological  manifestation.  The  things  in  space 
and  time  might  conceivablv  have  been  altogether  different. 


METAPHYSICS 

Many  widely  diverse  cosmic  systems  are  possible  in  thought; 
but  for  all  alike  space  and  time  would  be  conditioning  prin- 
ciples. This  is  the  position  which  they  hold  in  spontaneous 
thought ;  and  this  makes  it  necessary  to  consider  them  in 
the  beginning  of  our  cosmological  study. 
*i  The  present  chapter  deals  with  space,  and  the  question  is, 
What  is  the  metaphysical  nature  of  space,  and  how  is  it 
related  to  the  things  which  are  said  to  be  in  it?  We  exclude 
all  inquiry  into  the  psychological  genesis  of  the  idea  as  ir- 
relevant ;  for  the  history  of  a  notion  never  decides  its  mean- 
ing and  validity  when  it  appears.  Every  idea  has  a  psy- 
chological history  which  might  conceivably  be  written ;  but 
the  meaning  and  worth  of  an  idea  can  be  determined  only 
by  study  of  the  idea  itself  as  given  in  consciousness.  Neither 
the  geometrical  nor  the  metaphysical  properties  of  space 
can  be  discovered  by  either  physiological  or  psychological 
theorizing. 

In  the  Theory  of  Thought  and  Knowledge  it  has  been 
shown  that  space,  whatever  else  it  may  be,  is  primarily  a 
mental  principle  according  to  which  the  mind  projects  and 
relates  the  objects  of  external  experience.  However  real 
space  may  be,  it  becomes  real  for  us  only  as  the  space-law 
is  immanent  in  the  mental  activity  itself.  This  fact  makes 
it  unnecessary  to  have  a  real  space  in  order  that  we  may 
have  spatial  experience.  This  experience  is  primarily  a 
mental  product  according  to  mental  laws.  We  as  little 
need  a  real  space  to  see  things  in  as  we  need  a  real  space 
to  dream  things  in.  In  both  cases  the  spatial  form  is  pri 
marily  a  mental  imposition  from  wjthin,  and  not  a  passive 
reception  of  something  existing  without. 

But  to  conclude  from  this  fact  that  space  is  only  a  men- 
tal form  would  be  hasty.  The  study  o'f  perception  shows 
that  all  objective  knowledge  must  arise  in  the  same  wav. 


SPACE  125 

Knowledge  cannot_pass  ready-made  into  a  passively  recep- 
tive  mind,  but  must  arise  within  the  mind  itself  as  the 
result  of  its  own  activity.  All  perception  is  but  an  unfold- 
ing of  the  inner  mental  nature  upon  occasion  of  certain  ex- 
citations. It  is  the  reaction  of  the  mind  against  external 
action.  But  as  this  fact  does  not  warrant  us  in  denying 
the  object  perceived,  so  neither  does  the  necessity  of  space  as 
a  mental  principle  warrant  us  in  denying  that  space  may 
also  be  an  objectively  existing  fact.  For  this  conclusion  we 
need  to  show  that  space  is  a  mental  principle  and  that  it  is 
absurd  and  impossible  when  conceived  as  having  ontological 
existence.  The  decision  of  this  question  must  rest  upon  an 
analysis  of  space  conceived  as  something  existing.  If  re- 
flection upon  the  contents  of  the  space-idea  should  reveal 
it  to  be  incapable  of  proper  existence,  then,  and  only  then, 
would  its  subjectivity  be  established. 

The  one  thing  which  the  subjectivity  of  space,  as  a  prin- 
ciple  of  intuition  does  accomplish,  is  to  deprive  the  argu- 
inent  for  its  objectivity,  from  the  alleged  necessity  of  the 
intuition,  of  all  its  force.  If  space  be  such  a  principle,  of 
course  we  cannot  intuite  things  apart  from  it :  but  the  ne- 
cessity would  lie  in  the  nature  of  the  mental  subject,  and 
would  equally  exist  whatever  the  nature  of  the  object.  The 
nature  of  our  sensibility  determines  us  to  perceive  vibrating 
objects  as  colored,  and  we  cannot  perceive  them  otherwise ; 
but  the  necessity  is  in  ourselves.  On  this  account  the  argu- 
ment that  things  are  colored  because  we  must  perceive  them 
as  such,  loses  all  weight ;  and  on  the  same  account  the  argu- 
ment that  things  are  in  space  because  we  must  intuite  them 
spatially,  loses  all  its  weight.  The  result  is,  logically,  a 
drawn  battle  between  the  two  views,  even  if  the  doctrine 
of  the  objectivity  of  space  were  self -consistent.  The  ideal- 
ist could  show  that  there  is  no  need  to  assume  an  objective 
space  to  explain  our  intuition ;  and  the  realist  could  show 


126  METAPHYSICS 

that  the  subjectivity  of  space  does  not  exclude  its  objectivity, 
and  that  the  latter  view  is  far  more  in  harmony  with  spon- 
taneous thought.  To  overturn  this  balance  of  opinion  and 
reach  a  conclusion,  it  is  necessary  to  examine  the  contents 
of  the  space- idea. 

And  here,. for  the  sake  of  the  weak  brother,  and  also  in 
order  not  to  seem  to  be  manifestly  raving,  it  is  permissible 
to  refer  once  more  to  the  distinction  between  phenomenal 
and  ontological  reality.  There  can  be  no^  question  concern- 
ing  the  phenomenal  reality  of  space.  The  space  ancT  space 
relations  are  as  manifest  and  undeniable  parts  of  the  phe- 
nomenon as  the  things  themselves ;  and  if  the  former  were 
removed  the  latter  would  also  disappear.  The  question 
must  concern,  not  the  fact  of  reality,  but  the  kind  of  reality 
which  space  possesses.  Has  it  only  phenomenal  reality,  or 
has  it  in~  addition  ontological  reality  ?  The  idealist  would 
allow  the  phenomenal  reality,  but  would  deny  that  it  has 
any  other.  For  him  space,  objectively  considered,  is  simply 
tlie~7orm  of  external  experience.  It  is  not  something  in 
which  things  are,  but  only  the  form  of  experience  itself ; 
and  when  the  things  are  abstracted  a  real  space  is  left  be- 
hind as  little  as  a  real  space  is  left  behind  when  dream- 
objects. break  up  and  vanish.  For  the  realist,  on  the  other 
hand,  space  is  something  ajoart  Jfrqm.,j^hin^swhich  holds 
things,  or  in  which  things  exist.  But  for  both  speculators 
alike  the  spatial  order  of  experience  is  an  undeniable  datum ; 
and  for  both  alike  the  question  concerns  nothing  that  can 
be  given  in  experience,  but  rather,  and  only,  the  interpre- 
tation of  what  is  given  in  experience. 

What,  then,  is  space  objectively  considered  ?  Three  views 
are  possible.  First,  it  is  something  quite  sui  generis,  inde- 
pendent of  all  things,  and  of  all  that  we  understand  by  sub- 
stantial or  causal  reality.  Secondly,  it  is  a  peculiar  order 


SPACE  127 

of  relations  among  things,  which  order,  however,  exists 
objectively  and  independently  of  any  thinker.  Thirdly, 
space  is  the  form  of  objective  experience,  and  is  nothing  in 
abstraction  from  that  experience.  Which  of  these  views 
is  to  be  held? 

At  first  sight  the  first  of  the  three  views  mentioned  is 
the  true  one.  Space  is  not  a  thing,  but  the  place  of  things, 
and  as  such  is  a  necessary  condition  of  their  existence ;  for 
things  must  have  place  in  order  to  exist.  At  the  same 
time,  space  is  not  a  nothing,  but  a  peculiar  kind  of  existence, 
which  can  be  described  only  in  terms  of  itself.  Something 
and  nothing,  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the  terms,  do  not  form 
a  complete  disjunction ;  for,  besides  these,  a  third  concep- 
tion, space,  is  also  possible ;  and  this  cannot  be  defined  in 
terms  of  the  other  two.  This  is  the  view  of  common-sense ; 
and  it  seems  forced  upon  us  by  the  simplest  experience. 
This  view  finds  its  expression  in  the  oft-used  phrase,  that  if*"? 
fall  being  were  away,  space  would  still  remain  with  all  its  J 
(properties  unchanged.  Full  or  empty,  space  remains  the  ^^ 
same,  changeless  an  (internal-  For  though  space  conditions 
being,  being  does  not  condition  space.  When  the  intui- 
tion ist  is  looking  around  for  a  striking  illustration  of  the 
impossible  with  which  to  confound  the  empiricist,  he  often 
lights  upon  the  statement  that  God  himself  can  neither 
make  nor  unmake  space,  or  do  other  than  submit  to  its 
necessity.  The  proposition  frequently  recurs  in  philosophy 
to  regard  space  as  a  datum  objective  to  all  being,  and  with  J 

which  being  must  get  along  as  best  it  may.  Space  is  not  V^ 
a  system  of  relations,  for  relations  are  changing  while  space 
is  changeless.  It  is  not  a  property  of  things ;  for  it  is  inde- 
pendent of  things.  It  cannot  be  identified  with  any  actual 
form,  for  it  is  rather  the  formless  principle  of  all  form.  It 
is  "the  mysterious  background  of  forms  and  relations,  and 
is  identical  with  none.  In  this  view,  which  is  the  view  of 


128  METAPHYSICS 

common-sense,  space  appears  as  a  fathomless  and  indepen- 
dent necessity,  to  which  even  the  basal  reality  must  submit. 

At  first  sight,  this  view  is  sun-clear,  but  on  closer  inspec- 
tion it  is  seen  to  be  full  of  difficulty.  The  clearness  is  due 
entirely  to  confounding  the  phenomenal  and  the  ontological. 
The  space-law  is  the  same  for  all  phenomena,  and  remains 
unchanged  through  all  their  modifications.  Hence  it  is 
easy  to  abstract  it  from  phenomena  as  something  by  itself, 
independent,  all-embracing,  and  eternal.  And  as  the  phe- 
nomenal application  is  always  perfectly  clear,  we  fail  to 
notice  the  grievous  difficulties  in  which  this  notion  of  a 
real  and  independent  space  involves  us.  If  we  should  tell 
one  to  meet  us  at  such  a  time  and  place,  not  even  the  way- 
faring man  would  have  any  difficulty  in  understanding  us. 
This  is  the  phenomenal  side  of  the  matter.  But  if  we  ab- 
stract the  ideas  of  time  and  space  from  the  phenomena  of 
which  they  are  the  form,  and  consider  them  as  entities  by 
themselves,  then,  as  Berkeley  has  it,  we  are  "  lost  and  em- 
brangled in  inextricable  difficulties."  This  is  the  ontological 
aspect  of  the  case. 

To  begin  with  the  difficulties  in  the  case  of  a  real  space, 
the  conception  of  space  as  an  all-containing  form  is  an  in- 
consistent metaphor  borrowed  from  our  sense-experience. 
Forms  must  always  be  the  forms  of  something ;  and  when 
there  is  no  reality  to  produce  and  limit  the  form,  the  form 
exists  only  in  conception.  When  one  vessel  contains  an- 
other, it  is  not  the  form  which  contains,  but  the  vessel ;  and 
if  we  cancel  the  reality  of  the  latter  there  is  no  more  con- 
taining. To  the  conception  of  containing  there  is  necessarv 
the  thought  of  a  limit,  either  real  or  conceptual ;  and  with- 
out this  we  have  only  an  inconsistent  imagination.  The 
fancy  is  due  entirely  to  the  fact  that  the  spatial  synthesis 
applies  to  all  phenomena,  and  this  is  mistaken  for  a  form 
which  holds  them. 


SPACE  129 

Again,  the  asserted  reality  of  space  cannot  be  maintain- 
ed without  conflicting  with  the  space  intuition  itself.  For 
space  as  real  must  come  under  the  law  of  reality  in  general ; 
that  is,  it  must  be  able  in  some  way  to  assert  itself  as  a  de- 
termining factor  in  the  system  of  things.  No  matter  how- 
nameless  or  ineffable  a  substratum  we  may  assume  for  space, 
this  demand  cannot  be  escaped.  Unless  we  endow  space 
with  activity  and  regard  it  as  a  peculiar  something  in  inter- 
action with  other  things,  the  affirmation  of  its  existence 
becomes  absurd ;  and  its  existence  would  be  in  no  way  dis- 
tinguishable from  its  non-existence.  But  if  we  do  thus  en- 
dow it,  the  affirmation  becomes  equally  absurd  ;  for  to  view 
space  as  active  and  possessing  causal  efficiency  would  be  a 
grievous  affront  to  common-sense,  which  holds  that  space  is 
not  a  thing,  but  the  place  of  things. 

But  if  space  have  no  effect  upon  things,  and  if  there  be 
no  reciprocal  determination  between  space  and  things,  we 
are  quite  at  a  loss  to  know  in  what  its  alleged  reality  con- 
sists, and  what  the  relation  may  be  between  space  and 
things.  That  which  does  nothing,  determines  nothing,  nei- 
ther acting  nor  being  acted  upon,  most  certainly  is  noth- 
ing. If  we  set  out  to  define  or  give  the  marks  of  nothing 
we  could  find  no  others  than  just  those  mentioned  as  the 
marks  of  space. 

And  here,  very  possibly,  some  one  may  say  that  space  is 
nothing.  "Well,  then,  why  maintain  its  existence?  Does 
the  nothing,  the  non-existent,  nevertheless  exist,  and  have 
three  dimensions  and  divers  geometrical  properties?  The 
respondent  would  be  far  from  allowing  the  identity  of  the 
space -nothing  with  the  thing- nothing  or  the  mathemat- 
ical nothing ;  and  this  proves  that,  while  he  calls  space  noth- 
ing, he  still  has  some  indefinite  positive  existence  in  mind, 
which  is  distinct  from  pure  nothing,  and  which  has  peculiar 
properties  of  its  own.  For  if  we  view  space  as  pure  noth- 

9 


130  METAPHYSICS 

ing  it  is  plainly  absurd  to  affirm  its  existence,  to  endow  it 
with  properties,  and  distinguish  it  from  other  nothings. 
And  yet  if  space  does  nothing  and  determines  nothing,  in 
what  does  its  reality  consist  ? 

Now  to  this  question,  and  to  the  other  concerning  the 
relation  of  things  to  space,  common-sense  has  an  answer. 
The  reality  of  space  consists  in  its  being  just  what  it  is 
seen  to  be,  unbounded  room  for  things  ;  and  the  relation  of 
things  to  space  is  equally  simple ;  they  are  in  space.  Xoth- 
ing  could  be  more  manifest  or  less  mysterious. 

'  So  it  seems,  no  doubt,  so  long  as  we  fail  to  distinguish 
between  the  phenomenal  and  the  ontological  stand-point. 
Space  and  space  relations  are  perfectly  clear  as  phenom- 
enal; they  express  the  general  form  of  objective  experience 
and  the  relations  which  obtain  among  our  objects.  But  as 
phenomenal  they  have  only  mental  existence,  and  our  in- 
quiry concerns  a  supposed  ontological  space.  And  we  ask 
what  is  its  metaphysical  nature,  and  what  is  the  metaphys- 
ical relation  between  this  real  space  and  the  things  said 
to  be  in  it?  And  to  these  questions  there  is  no  answer 
which  does  not  either  conflict  with  the  space  intuition  itself 
or  else  deny  all  real  relation.  If  we  endow  space  with  effi- 
ciency we  outrage  common- sense ;  and  if  we  do  not  thus 
endow  it  we  deny  all  reality  to  space  itself  and  all  real  rela- 
tion between  it  and  things.  Thus  we  become  "lost  and  em- 
brangled in  inextricable  difficulties"  in  our  search  for  a  real 
space  in  distinction  from  the  apparent  order  of  experience. 

And  the  further  we  go  the  worse  we  fare ;  for  the  inner 
structure  of  this  supposed  real  space  teems  with  unman- 
ageable paradox.  It  is  easy  to  say  that  space  is  one,  but 
it  is  not  so  easy  to  say  in  what  its  unity  consists.  Onto- 
logical jmity,  we  have  seen,  is  possible  only  to  intelligence ; 
and~the  unity  of  space,  for  thought,  depends  on  the  pos- 
sibility of  comprehending  all  our  phenomena  in  a  single 


SPACE  131 

scheme,  and  of  uniting  all  diversities  of  position  in  a  re- 
lated whole.  But  this  unity  exists  for  thought  only,  and 
only  through  the  mental  synthesis  itself.  But  in  the  real 
space  apart  from  mind,  this  synthesis  is  lacking ;  in  what, 
then,  does  its  unity  consist?  The  fact  is,  it  has  none.  The 
law  of  space  is  the  mutual  externality  of  every  part  to 
every  other.  •  Space  exists  only  as  the  parts  exist.  They 
are  the  realities  and  it  is  their  sum.  ±*ut  what  binds  them 
together  into  a  whole?  What  determines  their  mutual 
positions  and  fixes  them  in  changeless  relations?  If  this 
were  done  by  thought  it  would  be  intelligible,  but  it  is  al- 
together unintelligible  when  supposed  to  be  done  apart 
from  thought.  To  posit  a  dynamic  relation  among  the  in- 
finite positions,  whereby  each  prescribes  its  place  to  every 
other,  would  be  monstrous ;  and  a  logical  relation  is  mean- 
ingless apart  from  thought. 

A  second  difficulty  with  the  doctrine  which  regards  space 
as  real,  apart  from  things,  is  that  it  leads  to  a  hopeless  dual- 
ismof  first  principles.  If  space  be  a  reality  aparTTrom 
things,  it  is  something  uncreated  and  eternal.  No  one 
would  be  hardy  enough  to  maintain  a  proper  creation  of 
space  conceived  of  as  an  infinite  void,  for  no  meaning  can 
be  attached  to  the  phrase ;  indeed,  the  idea  itself  negatives 
creation.  Those  speculators  who  have  taught  a  creation  of 
space  have  generally  abandoned  the  common  conception, 
and  regarded  space  as  a  system  of  relations,  or  as  a  prop- 
erty of  things.  In  such  a  case3  the  creation  of  the  things 
would  be  the  creation  of  space.  But  the  common  notion  of 
an  independent~space  is  repugnant  to  creation,  for  the  ne- 
cessity would  ever  pursue  us  of  positing  a  previous  space 
for  the  reception  of  the  created  one.  Accordingly,  spon- 
taneous thought  has  always  regarded  space  as  one  of  the 
eternal  and  self-existent  necessities  which  even  God  himself 
cannot  escape. 


132  METAPHYSICS 

But  this  view  is  contradicted  by  the  necessary  unity 
of  the  basal  reality.  English  and  American  thinkers,  in 
general,  have  paid  very  little  attention  to  the  general 
problem  of  knowledge ;  and  hence  they  have  had  little 
hesitation  in  allowing  any  number  of  independent  prin- 
ciples. Many  have  proposed  to  view  space  and  time  as 
mutually  independent,  and  as  equally  independent  of  God ; 
and  now  and  then  a  speculator  proposes  to  add  matter  to 
the  list.  Indeed,  the  materialists  general!}7  view  space, 
time,  and  matter  as  mutually  independent  and  self-sufficient 
existences.  But  we  have  seen,  in  discussing  the  relation  of 
the  infinite  to  the  system,  that  all  principles  and  all  mani- 
festation alike  must  flow  from  the  infinite,  and  that  the 
infinite  must  be  one.  If  we  should  posit  anything  aside 
from  the  infinite  as  alike  independent,  the  second  something 
could  not  manifest  itself  in  our  system  without  an  inter- 
action between  the  two.  But  this  would  make  them  both 
dependent,  and  would  force  us  to  assume  some  other  being, 
deeper  than  both,  as  their  common  source  or  foundation. 

e  cannot,  then,  view  space  and  being  as  mutually  inde- 
pendent ;  for  in  that  case  being  and  space  must  be  in  inter- 
action, if  space  is  to  affect  our  system."~jBut  this  would  de- 
stroy the  independence  of  both,  and  would  also  make  space 
an  active  thing,  and  not  space. 

It  is  conceivable  that  some  person  should  still  be  found 
who  might  think  it  enough  to  say  that  the  only  relation 
between  space  and  being  is,  that  being  is  in  space ;  but  if 
they  be  mutually  independent,  existence  in  space  can  have 
no  significance  for  being.  Both  being  and  space  would  go 
on  in  complete  indifference,  and  there  would  be  no  possi- 
bility of  communication  between  them.  In  that  case  no 
meaning  -whatever  could  be  attached  to  the  proposition 
that  being  is  in  space.  But  it  is  absurd  to  speak  of  being 
as  dependent  on  space,  and  hence  we  must  view  space 


SPACE  133 

as  dependent  on  being.  Further,  it  is  impossible  to  view 
space,  conceived  as  extended  emptiness,  as  created  or  de- 
pendent. Hence  space  cannot  be  viewed  as  such  emptiness, 
but  must  be  in  some  sense  a  principle  in  being  which  is  the 
root  of  spatial  manifestation.Tinstead  of  saying,  then,  that 
being  is  in  space,  we  must  rattier  say  that  space  is  in  being."*? 
It  is  strictly  impossible  to  regard  space  as  a  self-existent 
reality,  for  the  conclusions  reached  in  the  ontology  make  it 
impossible  to  posit  more  than  one  basal  and  independent 
existence.  All  else  is  a  consequence  of  this  one  reality, 
either  as  a  creation  or  as  a  principle  of  activity  and  mani- 
festation. But  space,  as  commonly  conceived,  admits  of  no 
creation.  If,  then,  the  popular  thought  has  rightly  grasped 
the  contents  of  the  space-idea,  we  can  view  space  only  as 
some  principle  in  being. 

The  above  conclusion  is  drawn  from  the  impossibility  of 
having  more  than  one  fundamental  existence.  It  results 
also  from  a  consideration  of  the  unity  of  being.  If  space 
be  a  real  objective  existence,  then  the  infinite,  or  rather 
God,  is  in  space,  and  possesses  bulk  and  diameter.  For 
whatever  exists  in  space  must  exist  either  as  a  point  or  as 
a  volume ;  and  as  no  one  would  think  of  ascribing  a  punc- 
tual existence  to  God,  there  is  nothing  to  do  but  to  ascribe 
volume.  But  nothing  possessing  volume  in  space  can  be 
a  unit.  Points  and  component  volumes  can  always  be  dis- 
tinguished in  the  volume  of  such  a  thing,  and  thus  the  thing 
appears  as  made  up  of  parts.  But  such  a  conception  applied 
to  the  infinite  cancels  both  its  unity  and  its  omnipresence. 
That  which  is  omnipresent  in  space  cannot  be  extended  in 
space,  for  such  extension  would  imply  merely  the  presence 
of  the  being  part  for  part,  or  volume  for  volume,  in  the  oc- 
cupied space.  Philosophy  cannot  reconcile  the  necessary 
unity  of  the  infinite  with  existence  in  space,  and  theology 
cannot  reconcile  its  conception  of  the  non-spatial  mode  of 


134  METAPHYSICS 

the  divine  existence  with  existence  in  space.  But  if  space 
be  real  it  must  be  infinite,  and  God  must  exist  in  space,  and 
the  indicated  conclusions  must  follow.  These  conclusions 
apply  especially  to  Newton's  and  Clarke's  conception  of 
space.  They,  in  effect,  made  it  an  attribute  of  God  ;  and 
Clarke  framed  a  theistic  argument  on  this  conception.  But 
this  view  simply  affirms  extension  of  God,  and  leads  to  the 
difficulties  mentioned. 

On  all  these  accounts,  therefore,  we  hold  that  space  can- 
not be  viewed  as  a  real  existence.  Its  reality  is  incompati- 
ble with  the  unity  of  being,  and  with  the  unity  of  all  prin 
ciples  in  one  fundamental  being.  To  maintain  its  reality, 
we  must  despatialize  it,  and  make  it  an  active  thing;  and 
thus  we  conflict  with  our  space-intuition,  which  at  once  de- 
mands a  second  space  to  contain  the  first.  Finally,  we  can- 
not bring  space,  and  the  things  which  are  said  to  be  in  it, 
into  any  articulate  relation  without  positing  an  interaction 
between  them.  Thus  we  fall  back  into  the  previous  diffi- 
culty, and  despatialize  space.  The  declaration  that  space  is 
real,  and  that  things  are  in  it,  which  seemed  so  sun-clear, 
turns  out,  upon  inquiry,  to  be  in  the  highest  degree  unclear 
and  untenable. 

These  difficulties  have  led  many  thinkers  to  abandon  the 
common  notion  of  space  for  the  second  view  mentioned — 
that  space  is  a  certain  order  of  relations  among  realities. 
They  allow  that  space  apart  from  things  is  nothing,  and 
hence  that,  if  things  were  away,  there  would  be  strictly 
nothing  remaining.  But  things,  when  they  exist,  exist  in 
certain  relations,  and  the  sum,  or  system,  of  these  relations 
constitutes  space.  Things,  then,  do  not  exist  in  space ;  but 
they  exist  in  space -relations,  and  with  space  -  properties. 
These  relations  and  properties  are  the  constituents  of  the 
space-idea,  and  by  abstraction  from  them  we  come  to  the 


SPACE  135 

notion  of  a  single  unitary  space.  But  while  space  is  thus 
dependent  upon  things,  these  relations  and  properties  of 
things  are  quite  independent  of  our  thinking.  This  view, 
then,  agrees  with  the  preceding  one  in  regarding  these  rela- 
tions as  independent  of  the  mind  and  as  objectively  exist- 
ing among  things. 

If  this  view  were  correct  we  should  have  no  unity  what- 
ever in  space ;  for  the  space  relations  of  things  are  perpet- 
ually changing,  and  thus  space  itself  is  perpetually  becom- 
ing something  else.  It  also  makes  no  provision  for  the 
myriad  ideal  and  possible  space  relations  which  are  implicit 
in  the  space  intuition,  but  are  not  realized.  All  of  these 
would  have  to  be  handed  over  to  subjectivity  as  having 
only  mental  existence;  while  the  real  space  would  become 
a  variable  thing  without  any  unity  or  continuity  whatever. 
Moreover,  the  view  has  some  very  curious  implications.  A 
single  thing  could  not  be  in  space  at  all ;  and  any  system  of 
things  which  always  maintained  the  same  relations  would 
be  in  the  same  space.  Our  solar  system,  conceived  by  it- 
self, would  always  be  in  the  same  space,  so  long  as  the 
same  relations  of  its  members  were  maintained.  Either, 
then,  the  whole  system  could  not  move,  or,  if  it  did  move, 
it  would  still  be  in  the  same  space.  Following  out  this  line 
of  thought,  we  should  come  upon  some  unusually  hard  and 
dark  sayings. 

But  the  view  is  untenable  in  any  case ;  for  formal  rela- 
tions are  incapable  of  real  existence.  It  might  conceivabty 
be  contended  that  relations  of  interaction  may  exist  apart 
from  thought ;  but  formal  relations  exist  only  in  and  through 
thought.  And  as  it  would  hardly  occur  to  any  one  to  at- 
tribute causal  efficiency  to  space  relations,  we  can  only 
conclude  that  they  are  formal  relations,  and  as  such  are 
necessarily  subjective.  Hence,  if  space  be  only  a  system  of 
relations,  it  is  purely  subjective ;  and  thus  the  view  passes 


136  METAPHYSICS 

over  into  the  third  one,  which  makes  space  only  phe- 
nomenal. 

This  subjectivity  of  formal  relations  is  easily  misunder- 
stood through  a  pardonable  oversight.  There  are  many  re- 
lations among  the  objects  of  thought  which  are  seen  to 
be  universal;  and  because  they  do  not  exist  for  one  more 
than  for  another,  we  say  that  they  exist  independently  of 
the  mind.  Thought  or  unthought,  the  relations  exist  among 
the  realities ;  and  the  realities  are  really  related.  This  fact 
we  seek  to  express  by  saying  that  the  relations  themselves 
are  independent  of  all  thought.  But  all  that  we  can  mean 
here  is  to  affirm  the  universality  of  the  relation.  There  is 
a  great  difference  between  being-independent  of  our  thought 
and  being  independent  of  all  thought.  And  when  we  ask 
what  the  ontological  fact  is  underlying  a  formal  relation 
when  abstracted  from  all  reference  to  a  constitutive  in- 
telligence, there  is  strictly  nothing  to  be  found.  However 
relatable  things  may  be  in  themselves,  they  are  related  only 
in  the  relating  act  of  thought;  and  that  relatability  also,  if 
pursued,  would  be  found  to  refer  back  to  thought  some- 
where for  its  origin  and  meaning. 

This  subjectivity  of  relations,  however,  must  be  carefully 
distinguished  from  any  doctrine  which  makes  them  individ- 
ual or  arbitrary.  It  allows  the  possibility  that  objects  of 
thought  may  be  so  constituted  that  in  clear  thought  only 
certain  relations  can  be  instituted,  as  in  the  case  of  number 
and  geometrical  figures.  The  relations,  while  subjective, 
may  be  also  necessary.  It  is  equally  possible  that  the 
objects  of  thought  may  be  such  that  whenever  they  are 
conceived  by  any  intelligence  anywhere  the  same  relations 
shall  be  instituted.  The  relations,  while  subjective,  may 
also  be  universal.  It  follows  only  from  this  subjectivity 
that  it  is  absurd  to  speak  of  relations  as  objectively  existing. 
And  what  is  thus  true  of  relations  in  general  must  be  true 


SPACE  137 

also  of  space  -  relations.  In  so  far  as  space  is  a  system  of 
relations,  in  so  far  it  has  only  a  subjective  existence.  If 
space-relations  are  to  have  objective  existence,  they  must  be 
more  than  relations ;  they  must  be  a  series  of  interactions 
among  things.  But  in  that  case  we  should  deny  the  in- 
difference of  things  to  space,  and  fall  back  again  into  the 
view  which  makes  space  active.  We  must  then  dismiss 
the  doctrine  that  space  is  a  series  of  objective  relations 
among  things  which  exist  independently  of  thought.  Space 
is  neither  a  real  thing  nor  an  ontological  predicate. 

The  two  first  views  of  the  nature  of  space  proving  unten- 
able, we  seem  shut  up  to  the  third,  which  makes  space  a 
form  of  intuition,  and  not  a  mode  of  existence.  According 
to  this  view,  things  are  not  in  space  and  space-relations, 
but  appear  to  be.  In  themselves  they  are  essentially  non- 
spatial ;  but  by  their  interactions  with  one  another,  and 
with  the  mind,  they  give  rise  to  the  appearance  of  a  world 
of  extended  things  in  a  common  space.  Space-predicates, 
then,  belong  to  phenomena  only,  and  not  to  things  in  them- 
selves. But  while  shut  up  to  this  view  by  the  failure  of 
the  others,  we  seem  shut  out  from  it  by  its  own  overwhelm- 
ing absurdity.  Certainly,  before  the  doctrine  can  be  made 
to  seem  anything  but  the  most  grievous  outrage  on  com- 
mon-sense, the  paradox  must  be  explained  away,  or  at  least 
relieved ;  and  this  we  now  hope  to  do.  The  chief  difficulties 
are  due  to  a  swarm  of  misconceptions,  which  have  clustered 
around  the  doctrine;  and  a  large  part  of  the  argument  for  its 
validity  must  consist  in  removing  these  misunderstandings. 

In  the  first  place,  the  doctrine  is  commonly  made  to  mean 
that  our  space-intuition  is  something  arbitrary,  and  with- 
out any  determining  factor  in  the  world  of  causality.  The 
mind  is  conceived  as  standing  with  its  space-forms  waiting 
to  impose  them  upon  reality  without  any  regard  whatever 


138  METAPHYSICS 

for  the  peculiar  nature  or  circumstances  of  reality.  These 
forms  are  purely  external  impositions,  and  might  as  well 
have  been  anything  else  whatever.  They  are  the  mental 
spectacles  through  which  the  mind  looks,  and,  for  all  we 
.know,  other  beings  may  have  altogether  different  spectacles. 
This  doctrine  of  the  spectacles  implies  absolute  nescience 
and  universal  relativity  of  knowledge ;  for,  of  course,  we 
cannot  tell  how  things  would  look  if  the  spectacles  were 
off;  nor  how  things  may  look  to  other  beings  who  may 
have  different  spectacles. 

But  the  obnoxious  feature  of  the  doctrine  is  that  the 
spectacles  are  viewed  as  having  only  an  arbitrary  relation 
to  reality,  and  hence  one  which  might  as  well  be  changed 
as  not.  Even  Kant,  the  first  pronounced  teacher  of  the 
ideality  of  space,  is  chargeable  with  this  misunderstand- 
ing and  extravagance.  Doubtless  many  passages  could  be 
adduced  which  would  show  that  he  viewed  the  order  and 
sequence  of  phenomena  as  objectively  determined ;  but  in 
so  doing  he  was  inconsistent  with  his  own  doctrine  of 
causation,  which  denies  determination  to  things  in  them- 
selves ;  and,  besides,  the  conception  of  the  mind,  as  arbitra- 
rily related  to  things,  incessantly  reappears.  The  result  is 
that  his  theory  of  perception  breaks  down  in  the  attempt 
to  bring  the  mental  form  into  use.  The  mental  form  is 
compatible  with  the  most  varied  applications.  In  itself  it 
does  not  determine  whether  a  given  object  shall  appear 
as  a  cube  or  as  some  other  figure ;  and  there  is  nothing  in 
Kant's  exposition  which  supplies  a  principle  of  discrimina- 
tion, or  makes  the  choice  between  the  various  forms  other 
than  arbitrary.  The  disciples  of  Kant  were  more  obliv- 
ious of  this  difficulty  than  Kant  himself,  and  in  general 
they  left  the  application  of  the  mental  form  to  pure  chance. 
It  was  necessary,  therefore,  that  the  system  should  pass 
into  the  subjective  idealism  of  Fichte. 


SPACE  139 

But  the  human  mind  has  no  such  liberty  in  the  use  of  its. 
subjective  forms.  The  positions  and  relations  of  things  in 
our  subjective  space  are  independent  of  our  volition ;  and 
their  spatial  changes  take  place  without  any  consent  of  ours. 
The  source  of  their  movement  and  the  ground  of  their  rela- 
tive arrangement  are  not  in  us  alone.  The  subjective  image 
of  things  in  space  at  any  point  and  time  is  a  fixed  one.  We 
cannot  exchange  the  right  for  the  left,  the  up  for  the  down, 
the  far  for  the  near.  Least  of  all  can  we  eliminate  the  idea 
of  distance  from  our  subjective  space,  and  think  of  things 
as  equidistant  from  ourselves  or  from  one  another.  The 
same  thing  has  happened  with  the  subjectivity  of  space  as 
with  the  subjectivity  of  sense-qualities.  It  is  very  common, 
when  the  beginner  in  psychology  has  learned  rather  than 
mastered  the  latter  doctrine,  to  hear  him  affirming  that  they 
are  nothing  but  mental  affections,  in  complete  ignorance  of 
the  fact  that,  while  subjective  effects,  they  still  have  an  ob- 
jective cause,  which,  though  not  like  them,  nevertheless  de- 
termines them.  In  affirming  the  subjectivity  of  space  we 
have  equally  to  admit  something  beyond  ourselves  which  is 
a  determining  factor  in  our  spatial  experience. 

This  objective  factor  may  be  conceived  in  two  ways. 
We  may  regard  it  as  a  non-spatial  system  with  which  we 
are  in  interaction  ;  or  we  may  regard  it  as  God  himself,  who 
is  reproducing  in  finite  thought  the  order  which  exists  in 
his  infinite  thought.  In  the  former  case  we  can  affirm  the 
subjectivity  of  space  only  in  the  following  form.  The  re- 
lation of  things  to  us  is  such  that  when  they  strike  upon 
our  senses  they  produce  certain  sensations  of  light,  heat, 
and  sound.  These  sensations,  however,  are  not  copies  of 
anything  objective,  but  are  the  subjective  symbol,  or  trans- 
lation, of  certain  phases  of  the  object.  Now  in  the  same 
way  things  and  their  unpicturable  interactions  are  such 
that  they  produce  in  perceptive  beings  an  intuition  of  space, 


140  METAPHYSICS 

which  intuition,  again,  is  not  a  copy  of  anything  objective, 
but  only  the  subjective  symbol  or  translation  into  the  forms 
of  sense -intuition  of  unpicturable  realities  beyond  them. 
The  intuition,  however,  is  not  independent  of  the  realities, 
but  for  each  change  in  the  latter  there  is  a  definite  change 
in  the  former.  Just  as  a  rise  or  fall  in  the  rate  of  vibra- 
tion is  attended  by  a  rise  or  fall  of  the  tone  heard,  or  the 
color  seen,  so  any  change  in  the  metaphysical  interactions  of 
things  is  attended  b}T  a  corresponding  change  in  the  appar- 
ent space-relations.  Or  as  the  dark  ether  tides  flash  into  a 
sphere  of  light  when  they  strike  upon  an  eye,  so  the  ineffa- 
ble tides  of  cosmic  causality,  when  they  strike  the  soul, 
appear  ;:s  a  world  of  things  in  space  and  space-relations. 
The  subjective  intuition  has  its  objective  ground  ;  but  that 
ground,  though  unlike  its  mental  translation,  yet  stands  in 
certain  definite  relations  to  it,  so  that  a  given  state  of  the 
object  allows  only  one  space-translation,  just  as  a  given  rate 
of  vibration  can  be  heard  only  as  one  tone.  This  fixed  con- 
nection between  reality  and  its  spatial  phenomena  allows 
us  to  deal  with  the  latter  as  if  they  were  real  objects,  and 
to  predict  their  course  with  as  much  certainty  as  if  they 
were  things  in  themselves.  It  produces  the  same  reign  of 
law  among  phenomena  and  the  same  possibility  of  prevision 
which  would  exist  if  phenomena  were  things.  Mechanics 
and  astronomy  run  no  risk  of  being  falsified  or  displaced 
by  the  subjectivity  of  space. 

This  is  a  possible  view  of  the  subjectivity  of  space,  but 
it  cannot  be  regarded  as  adequate  in  this  form.  There  is 
in  it  an  assumption  of  impersonal  finite  agents,  and  this  we 
have  come  to  regard  as  a  great  heresy.  The  view  arises 
from  approaching  the  subject  from  the  side  of  causality 
before  we  have  raised  causality  to  the  volitional  and  intel- 
lectual form.  For  us,  apart  from  the  finite  spirit,  there  is 
nothing  but  the  infinite  mind  and  its  activities;  and  the 


SPACE  1-tl 

objective  determining  ground  of  our  space  order  must  be 
sought  here  rather  than  in  any  unpicturable  finite  exist- 
ence. In  this  view  the  impersonal  and  non- spatial  finite 
falls  away  entirely  as  a  reality  by  itself,  and  leaves  only 
the  infinite  agency  and  the  phenomena  it  produces.  This 
gives  an  entirely  different  aspect  to  the  whole  question,  as 
will  appear  in  the  discussion  of  the  next  objection. 

A  second  misconception  is  that  this  view  makes  space  a 
delusion,  and  thus  destroys  all  confidence  in  the  mind.  This 
error  has  several  roots.  The  first  is  the  failure  to  distin- 
guish between  phenomenal  and  ontological  reality ;  and  a 
second  is  the  confounding  of  subjectivity  with  delusion. 
The  first  point  has  been  sufficiently  referred  to  already. 
No  one  proposes  to  deny  the  phenomenal  reality  of  space 
or  its  universal  validity  in  our  experience.  Doubt  attaches 
only  to  that  ontological  space  of  traditional  dogmatism ; 
and  on  this  point  experience  can  decide  nothing. 

The  second  confusion  rests  upon  an  easy  oversight  of 
spontaneous  thought  concerning  the  relation  of  mind  to 
reality.  In  all  of  our  objective  knowing  we  seem  to  be 
dealing  with  a  reality  which  was  there  before  we  thought 
about  it,  and  which  is  quite  independent  of  our  thought. 
Thus  we  are  easily  led  to  think  of  mind  as  non-essential  to 
reality,  as  adding  and  constituting  nothing,  and  as  at  best 
only  copying  a  reality  which  would  exist  just  the  same,  if 
all  mind  were  away.  The  theistic  realist  would  of  course 
admit  that  the  reality  had  its  origin  in  the  divine  thought, 
but  he  would  find  no  present  function  for  that  thought  be- 
yond knowing  things  existing  in  their  own  right  beyond  it. 

But  while  the  origin  of  this  notion  is  obvious,  and  while 
spontaneous  thought  should  not  be  blamed  for  resting  in  it, 
it  becomes  an  uncritical  prejudice  when  advanced  as  a  spec- 
ulative dogma.  It  has  long  been  one  of  the  great  questions 
of  philosophy  whether  mind  can  be  viewed  as  thus  super- 


142  METAPHYSICS 

fluous,  or  whether,  on  the  contrary,  reality  can  have  its 
full  existence  anywhere  but  in  mind.  Episteraology  shows 
that  nothing  can  exist  for  mind  which  does  not  have  its 
root  in  mind.  And  logic  shows  that  reality  is  unintelligible 
and  impossible  except  with  reference  to  mind.  Every  def- 
inition of  reality  which  is  not  reality  for  mind  either  shat- 
ters on  the  rocks  of  the  Eleatic  Scylla  or  is  ingulfed  in  the 
whirlpools  of  the  Heraclitic  Charybdis.  The  conception 
of  extra-mental  existence  is  simply  a  shadow  of  our  convic- 
tion that  our  objects  are  not  created  by  us ;  and  this  inde- 
pendence of  our  mind  is  mistaken  for  an  independence 
of  all  mind — a  notion  which  destroys  itself.  We  conclude, 
then,  that  subjectivity,  in  the  sense  of  dependence  on 
mind,  is  universal;  and  that  objectivity,  in  the  sense  of 
non-dependence  on  mind,  is  a  fiction,  a  shadow  of  crude 
thinking. 

Now  from  this  point  of  view  the  subjectivity  of  space  is 
far  enough  from  making  space  a  delusion.  For  sponta- 
neous thought  all  our  objects  are  real  in  an  extra- mental 
sense.  The  confused  synthesis  of  experiences  which  makes 
up  the  world- view  of  common-sense  is  regarded  as  alike 
real  and  as  real  in  the  same  sense.  And  when  criticism  be- 
gins, the  true  question  is  not  whether  this  mass  of  raw 
material  be  real,  but  what  kind  of  reality  it  possesses,  and 
whether  different  parts  have  not  different  kinds  of  reality. 
And  the  inquiry  once  started,  we  soon  find  ourselves  com- 
pelled to  disturb  the  uncritical  rest  of  common-sense.  The 
entire  world  of  sense-qualities  is  first  discovered  to  have  no 
extra-mental  and  ontological  existence,  but  only  a  phenom- 
enal reality.  They  do  not  thereby  become  unreal  and  de- 
lusive ;  for  all  that  was  ever  true  of  them  remains  true  of 
them  still.  Their  nature  and  relations  are  undisturbed ; 
and  their  immense  significance  for  our  practical  life  is  as 
undeniable  as  ever.  We  have  learned  not  that  they  are  un- 


SPACE  143 

real,  but  that  they  have  their  reality  only  in  and  for  mind. 
And  this  reality  for  mind  is  not  only  a  very  important  kind 
of  reality,  but  when  we  look  closely  into  the  matter  we  find 
ourselves  somewhat  at  a  loss  to  discover  anything  more 
real  this  side  of  the  spiritual  causality  on  which  all  finite 
reality  depends. 

In  the  same  manner,  when  we  come  to  consider  the  spatial 
order  of  things,  we  discover  not  that  it  is  unreal,  but  that 
it  is  real  only  for  mind.  But  it  does  not  therefore  become 
a  delusion.  Space  is  still  the  form  of  our  objective  experi- 
ence, and  is  as  law-giving  for  that  experience  as  ever.  It  is 
not  then  a  delusion ;  for  all  that  was  ever  true  of  space  and 
space  -  relations,  and  of  objects  in  space -relations,  remains 
true  still.  We  have  merely  discovered  that  there  is  some- 
thing deeper  than  space,  and  that  spatial  phenomena  are 
nothing  in  which  we  can  rest  as  ontologically  ultimate,  or 
as  existing  apart  from  mind.  Apparent  reality  exists  spa- 
tially ;  but  proper  ontological  reality  exists  spacelessly  and 
without  spatial  predicates.  And  this  conclusion  is  not 
forced  upon  us  against  reason,  but  by  reason  itself.  We 
do  not  deny  the  truth  of  appearances  as  appearing.  They 
furnish  the  starting-point  but  not  the  stopping-point ;  for 
we  find  in  the  appearances  themselves  the  necessity  of  go- 
ing behind  them  to  something  which,  though  their  ground, 
is  still  without  the  predicates  of  the  appearances.  Whoever 
will  bear  in  mind  that  reality  as  it  exists  for  reason  does 
not  contradict  reality  as  it  appears  will  see  that  there  is 
nothing  sceptical  in  the  conclusion,  provided  it  be  solidly 
deduced.  On  the  contrary,  the  refusal  to  go  where  thought 
points  is  the  true  and  only  scepticism. 

Well,  then,  is  the  real  world  spatial  or  non-spatial?  That 
depends  altogether  on  what  we  mean  by  the  real  world.  If 
we  mean  the  world  of  experience,  it  most  certainly  is  spatial. 
If  we  mean  a  world  of  ontological  substances  other  than 


144  METAPHYSICS 

spiritual  existences,  it  certainly  is  not  spatial.  But  it  is  per- 
mitted to  doubt  whether  such  a  world  exists.  Experience 
reveals  the  apparent  world,  and  reflection  shows  its  phe- 
nomenal character ;  but  reflection  also  shows  that  for  the 
explanation  of  this  world  we  do  not  need  a  noumenal  world, 
but  rather  the  infinite  and  its  unpicturable  causality.  The 
noumenal  world  behind  the  apparent  world,  trying  to  peer 
through  it  but  hopelessly  masked  by  it,  is  something  for 
which  speculation  has  no  longer  any  use.  Nor  may  we  call 
the  causality  on  which  the  apparent  world  depends  the  real 
world ;  for  that  causality  finds  its  meaning  only  in  the  ap- 
parent world  which  it  founds.  In  abstraction  from  this 
effect  which  it  realizes,  we  can  make  nothing  of  it  whatever. 
And  thus,  in  a  very  important  sense,  it  appears  that  the 
apparent  is  the  reality  of  the  non-apparent. 

The  source  of  these  paradoxes,  which  we  seem  to  have 
been  heaping  up  without  conscience  or  remorse,  lies  in  the 
attempt  to  define  reality  without  reference  to  intelligence. 
The  real  world,  we  fancy,  is  not  the  apparent  world,  for 
that  is  phenomenal  and  exists  only  for  intelligence.  The 
real  world,  then,  is  the  noumenal  world  of  impersonal  things 
in  unpicturable  relations  of  interaction.  Into  this  world  we 
cannot  enter  by  any  spatial  intuition ;  only  the  pure  reason 
can  gain  admission  here.  Luckily,  the  pure  reason,  before 
seeking  admission,  bethinks  itself  to  examine  the  notion  of 
this  world ;  and  then  it  turns  out  that  this  world,  if  it  ex- 
ists, does  so  only  in  and  for  intelligence.  All  such  reality 
is  constituted  by  intelligence,  and  has  no  meaning  apart 
from  intelligence.  In  this  sense  this  noumenal  world  is 
phenomenal,  and  yet,  unfortunately,  it  is  not  phenomenal 
to  any  assignable  percipients.  From  this  stand-point  the 
so-called  noumenal  world  begins  to  take  on  a  fictitious  look, 
while  the  phenomenal  world  is  as  undeniable  as  ever.  And, 


SPACE  145 

indeed,  as  soon  as  we  see  the  impossibility  of  defining  the 
reality  of  things  except  with  relation  to  a  constituent  idea 
and  a  constituting  intelligence,  phenomenal  reality  is  all  we 
are  permitted  to  look  for  in  the  world  of  things.  Thus  the 
apparent  world  becomes  the  only  world  there  is,  and  is  just 
as  real  as  it  proves  itself  to  be.  To  be  sure,  it  has  not  onto- 
logical  existence,  but  it  is  the  seat  and  substance  of  prac- 
tical experience.  And  when  we  aim  to  explain  it  we  are 
not  to  look  for  a  fictitious  noumenal  world,  but  rather  for 
its  substantial  cause  and  ground ;  and  this  cause  must  be 
non-spatial. 

These  considerations  go  a  long  way  towards  saving  the 
truth  of  appearances.  We  are  not  in  a  world  of  illusions 
and  fictions ;  we  are  rather  in  the  world  of  mind.  And  in 
this  world  the  space  order  has  its  place  and  value.  More- 
over, the  demand  to  think  of  ontological  reality  as  without 
relation  to  space  is,  after  all,  not  so  foreign  to  our  thought. 
We  have  only  to  reflect  upon  our  own  existence  to  see  that 
in  any  case  space  applies  only  to  the  objects  of  sense-in- 
tuition. It  never  occurs  to  us,  at  least  when  thought  is 
fairly  critical,  to  give  the  inner  life  spatial  predicates.  We 
think  of  our  thoughts  as  neither  in  the  soul  nor  out  of  it, 
but  only  as  dependent  upon  it.  We  do  not  think  of  them 
as  to  the  right  or  the  left,  above  or  below  one  another,  but 
only  as  co-existent  and  sequent  in  logical  relations.  In  the 
same  way  we  think  of  the  fundamental  being  which  we 
have  been  forced  to  posit,  as  without  form  of  any  kind  ;  and 
we  think  of  the  finite,  spatial  and  non-spatial  alike,  as  ex- 
isting in  it  as  non-spatially  as  our  thoughts  and  feeling  ex- 
ist in  the  mind.  And  as  the  soul  and  its  products  cannot 
be  pictured  in  their  proper  existence,  so  the  infinite  and  its 
products  cannot  be  pictured  in  their  proper  existence.  In 
thinking  in  this  field  we  must  use  concepts  and  not  images. 
We  also  point  out  once  more  that  if  we  do  view  space  as 
10 


146  METAPHYSICS 

ontologically  real,  the  infinite  itself  must  be  viewed  as  spa- 
tial, and  thus  would  disappear  altogether.  There  is  no  way 
of  maintaining  the  unity  and  reality  of  the  infinite  apart 
from  the  essential  phenomenality  of  space.  On  this  point 
popular  thought  has  attained  to  no  consistent  conception. 
Once  in  a  while  a  speculator  can  be  found  who  maintains 
that  all  things,  finite  and  infinite,  material  and  spiritual, 
are  in  space ;  but  in  general  the  tendency  has  been  to  limit 
space  to  material  things  only.  But  there  has  been  little 
effort  to  reconcile  the  non-spatiality  of  spiritual  existence 
with  the  ontological  reality  of  space.  Indeed,  their  incom- 
patibility is  the  unsuspected  source  of  most  of  our  material- 
istic speculation. 

Shall  we  say,  then,  that  space  is  the  form  under  which 
we  intuite  objects  ?  There  is  no  objection,  provided  we  do 
not  conceive  the  objects  as  something  apart  from  the  intui- 
tion and  as  warped  by  the  intuition  into  forms  foreign  to 
their  true  nature.  These  "  things  in  themselves  "  are  myths 
engendered  by  the  Kantian  epistemology,  which  still  held 
the  fancy  that  there  can  be  reality  which  is  not  reality  for 
intelligence.  This  fancy,  combined  with  the  phenomenality 
of  space,  gave  the  unknowable  noumena  as  a  matter  of 
course.  The  phrase  proposed  becomes  less  misleading  if  we 
change  it  to  read  that  space  is  the  form  of  objective  intui- 
tion, or  the  form  of  objective  experience.  At  the  same  time 
we  maintain  its  strict  phenomenality.  Neither  the  mind 
nor  things  are  in  space ;  we  have  experience  under  the 
spatial  form.  And  this  spatial  experience,  considered  as  a 
mental  event  or  form  of  psychical  activity,  is  non-spatial. 
To  ascribe  spatial  properties  to  it  would  be  as  absurd  as  to 
say  that  the  thought  of  length  must  itself  be  long  or  the 
thought  of  fire  must  be  hot. 

When  we  are  considering  the  space  world  as  object  we 
are  not  to  view  it  as  a  translation  of  reality  into  forms  of 


SPACE  147 

appearance.  It  is  simply  what  \ve  find  it  to  be.  But  when 
we  consider  it  from  the  epistemological  stand-point,  then  it 
is  permitted  to  use  this  metaphor  of  translation.  For  the 
knowledge  of  space  arises  in  the  mind  through  a  spaceless 
reaction  against  spaceless  affections  of  the  sensibi]it\T.  More- 
over, the  world  itself  as  product  rests  continually  upon  the 
producing  energy  of  the  infinite.  In  this  system  of  activity 
we  have  our  place ;  and  in  the  inductive  sense  we  are  in 
interaction  with  it.  And  out  of  this  unpicturable  dynamic 
relation  arises  the  stimulus  to  all  objective  knowing.  Space 
itself  is  not  a  translation,  but  our  knowledge  of  space  is  not 
improperly  called  a  translation  of  dynamic  relations  into 
forms  of  appearance. 

Some  final  misconceptions  may  soon  be  warded  off.  It 
is  not  to  be  expected  that  daily  language  should  be  modified 
to  suit  this  view;  indeed,  if  it  were,  it  would  almost  cer- 
tainly be  false ;  for  daily  life  deals  only  with  things  in  in- 
tuition, and  space  is  a  form  of  intuition.  It  is  only  when 
we  pass  into  the  ontological  realm  that  we  must  drop  our 
space-conceptions.  It  would  be  absurd  pedantry  to  refuse 
to  say  that  the  sun  rises  and  sets,  and  yet  when  it  comes  to 
an  ultimate  explanation  we  must  forsake  the  phenomenal 
stand-point  and  put  ourselves  at  the  centre.  It  would  be 
excessively  tedious  and  stupid  if,  instead  of  calling  a  thing 
red  or  green,  we  should  say  that  it  emits  vibrations  of  a 
certain  length.  "When  dealing  with  phenomena,  phenome- 
nal language  only  is  in  place.  Yet  even  here  it  is  at  times 
necessary  to  drop  our  phenomenal  expressions  and  deal  with 
the  fact  in  thought-terms.  So  also  in  metaphysics  we  use 
and  must  use  the  language  of  space  in  dealing  with  phenom- 
ena ;  but  when  we  seek  for  an  ultimate  explanation  we  are 
forced  to  abandon  this  language  as  having  only  phenomenal 
application. 

Yet,  after  all,  it  will  be  urged,  this  view  is  totally  foreign 


148  METAPHYSICS 

to  the  appearance.  Of  course  it  is,  and  no  one  denies  it. 
Space  as  the  form  of  appearance  can  never  be  emptied  out 
of  appearance.  It  is  a  complete  misconception  of  our  aim 
to  suppose  that  we  are  trying  to  intuite  things  out  of  space. 
Any  attempt  to  construe  the  doctrine  to  the  imagination 
must  necessarily  fail ;  for  space  is  the  form  of  the  imagina- 
tion. All  such  attempts  are  excluded  by  the  terms  of  the 
doctrine,  and  hence  involve  a  misunderstanding  of  it.  We 
cannot,  therefore,  pierce  behind  space  by  the  imagination 
which  is  limited  to  the  forms  of  space,  and  tell  how  the  non- 
spatial  realities  look  in  their  non-spatial  existence.  They 
do  not  look  at  all.  Pure  thought  only  can  enter  that  un- 
imaginable realm,  and  with  its  non-spatial  categories  deter- 
mine how  we  shall  think  of  the  unpicturable  reality  which 
founds  all  relations  and  all  appearances.  When,  then,  one 
asks,  Are  all  things  together  in  space?  or  when  I  seem  to 
be  moving  am  I  really  sitting  still  ?  he  shows  thereby  that 
he  has  not  grasped  the  doctrine,  and  he  even  awakens  the 
suspicion  that  he  may  not  be  entitled  to  any  opinion  in  this 
matter. 

It  will  be  further  urged  that  this  is  not  the  impression 
which  experience  makes  on  spontaneous  thought.  But  what 
of  that?  Spontaneous  thought  is  busied  only  with  things 
as  they  appear;  and  space  is  real  in  appearance.  More- 
over, there  is  scarcely  a  single  doctrine  of  science,  from 
the  theory  of  matter  to  the  theory  of  astronomy,  which 
agrees  with  the  impressions  of  spontaneous  thought.  If  our 
senses  rightly  report  to  us  the  phenomenal  world,  and  make 
a  platform  on  which  life  can  go  on,  we  can  excuse  them 
if  they  do  not  give  us  the  ultimate  metaphysical  truth.  For 
practical  purposes  they  give  us  something  a  great  deal  bet- 
ter; and  sane  metaphysics  when  it  comes  does  not  dis- 
credit the  senses,  but  only  the  hast}7  inferences  based  upon 
them.  In  truth,  it  is  not  a  case  of  sense  against  reason,  but 


SPACE 

of  one  system  of  metaphysics  against  another;  both  of 
which  must  find  their  raw  material  in  sense  itself. 

A  final  objection  is  drawn  from  epistemology.  Subject 
and  object,  it  may  be  said,  form  a  necessary  antithesis  in 
thought ;  and  the  object  is  external  to  the  subject.  And 
what  do  we  mean  by  the  external  world,  a  phrase  which 
the  idealist  himself  is  compelled  to  use,  but  a  world  out- 
side of  the  subject  ?  The  subject  is  here,  the  world  is  there, 
yonder,  all  about  us.  No  amount  of  speculative  hasheesh 
can  long  blind  us  to  this  fact;  and  so  long  as  this  fact  re- 
mains, the  subjectivity  of  space  can  never  be  more  than 
an  idol  of  the  speculative  den. 

The  objector  is  earnest,  but,  however  full  of  sweetness,  is 
somewhat  lacking  in  light.  To  begin  with,  he  seems  to 
confuse  his  body  with  himself;  and  as  he  finds  the  body 
to  exist  in  spatial  relations  to  other  bodies,  all  of  which  as 
spatial  are  mutually  external,  he  apparently  fancies  that 
objects  are  spatially  outside  of  the  subject.  This  concep- 
tion, if  it  were  valid,  would  make  knowledge  altogether 
impossible.  The  truth  is,  the  relation  of  subject  and  object 
is  absolutely  unique  and  can  only  be  experienced.  .  It  ad- 
mits of  no  spatial  representation. 

As  to  what  we  mean  by  the  external  world,  the  ideal- 
ist has  an  easy  answer.  It  may  mean  the  order  which  is 
independent  of  our  thought.  It  is  the  not -self,  not  in  the 
sense  of  existing  apart  from  all  mind,  but  in  the  sense  of 
being  independent  of  us.  Or  it  may  mean,  and  in  this  con- 
nection it  would  mean,  those  factors  of  our  experience  to 
which  we  give  space  relations.  Some  elements  of  experi- 
ence have  the  spatial  form,  and  some  have  only  the  tem- 
poral form.  It  is  this  fact  which  underlies  the  distinction 
of  internal  and  external  in  psychology ;  but  we  reach  noth- 
ing extra-mental  in  this  way. 

There  is  a  deep -lying  mystery  here  whose  implicit  but 


150  METAPHYSICS 

unconscious  presence  is  the  source  of  much  of  our  uneasi- 
ness in  this  matter.  Without  a  common-to-all,  knowledge 
breaks  up  into  self-destructive  individualism ;  and  to  found 
this  common -to-all,  we  seem  to  need  a  common  object.  And 
then,  in  order  to  secure  its  identity  in  itself  and  its  exist- 
ence for  all,  nothing  seems  so  promising  as  to  plant  it  in 
one  space  where  everybody  may  have  free  access  to  it. 
Thus  the  identity  and  community  of  the  object  are  secured 
and  insured,  and  knowledge  is  made  possible. 

This  view  is  clear  because  it  admits  of  being  pictured ; 
and  its  hopeless  absurdity  is  revealed  only  to  critical  reflec- 
tion. And  reflection  has  nothing  to  put  into  its  place  which 
will  compare  with  it  for  easy  understanding.  The  world  is 
one  only  for  and  in  the  divine  thought ;  and  the  world  has 
its  place,  not  in  space,  but  in  the  divine  mind.  And  our 
theory  of  knowledge  must  ultimately  run  back  to  the  di- 
vine thought  and  will  for  its  definition  of  reality,  for  the 
unity  and  identity  of  the  object,  and  for  the  possibility  of 
knowledge  in  general.  Thus  we  are  introduced  to  a  world 
of  unpicturable  relations  and  of  impenetrable  mystery,  in 
comparison  with  which  the  sense-view  is  sun-clear  and  self- 
evident  ;  that  is,  in  advance  of  reflection.  And  yet,  after 
all,  this  difficult  view  turns  out  to  represent  the  line  of  log- 
ical least  resistance,  when  thought  becomes  critical  and  re- 
flective. And  if  it  seems  to  suggest  Malebranche  and  the 
vision  of  all  things  in  God,  it  is  none  the  worse  for  that. 

And  now  that  the  question  is  raised,  it  seems  well  to 
come  to  some  definite  understanding  on  this  matter  of  phe- 
nomenal knowledge.  From  the  stand-point  of  the  sense- 
bound  philosopher,  phenomenal  knowledge  can  hardly  seem 
to  be  knowledge  at  all,  but  only  a  recitation  of  individual 
experiences.  Phenomena  as  such  are  only  in  the  mind ; 
and  when  many  persons  perceive  the  same  phenomena  there 
is  no  more  objectivity  than  when  many  persons  dream  the 


SPACE  151 

• 

Same  dream.  We  might  possibly  get  on  with  the  phenom- 
enality  of  sense-qualities,  because,  though  subjective,  they 
may  be  related  to  real  and  common  objects  in  space.  But 
when  these  objects  are  also  made  phenomenal,  then  all  re- 
ality, community,  and  identity  of  the  object  disappear;  and 
nothing  is  left  but  a  multitude  of  individual  dreams,  more 
or  less  overlapping  and  coincident  perhaps,  but  having  no 
other  connection.  To  this  failure  and  overthrow  of  real 
knowledge  the  phenomenal  doctrine  must  come. 

We  touch  here  upon  a  real  difficulty  and  a  profound  mys- 
tery. At  first  sight  the  objections  urged  seem  conclu- 
sive ;  and  there  appears  to  be  no  way  out,  except  to  put  the 
real  objects  back  into  real  space,  and  let  every  one  come 
forward  and  know  them  as  they  are.  Only  thus  can  the 
reality  and  identity  of  the  object  be  secured. 

So  it  undoubtedly  seems,  but  the  matter  grows  obscure 
upon  reflection.  In  the  first  place,  the  phenomenality  of 
sense-qualities  is  not  so  easily  conceived,  and  yet  it  must  be. 
admitted.  The  notion  that,  apart  from  eyes  and  ears,  the 
world  is  neither  dark  nor  light,  neither  sounding  nor  silent, 
is  fairly  hard  to  realize.  And  we  are  not  much  helped  in 
the  realization  by  being  told  that  the  things  are  really  there, 
only  they  are  altogether  different  from  what  they  appear. 
"Transfigured  realism"  is  a  broken  reed.  The  distinction 
of  primary  and  secondary  qualities  will  not  work.  But  if 
we  can  have  an  experience  of  a  common-to-all  in  sense,  even 
when  there  is  no  extra-mentality  in  the  object,  we  might 
equally  have  it  in  connection  with  spatial  phenomena  in 
general. 

The  real  problem  here  divides  into  two.  First,  can  we 
have  an  experience  of  an  order,  or  of  thought  contents  and 
relations,  which  shall  be  valid  for  all  ?  Secondl}*,  how  can 
we  have  such  experience?  The  first  is  simply  a  question  of 
fact;  and  the  answer  must  be  in. the  affirmative.  To  the 


152  METAPHYSICS 

second  question  no  answer  can  be  given.  We  do  not  know 
how  we  reach  the  common-to-all ;  we  only  know  that  we 
reach  it.  This  is  the  deep  mystery  which  is  involved  in  the 
community  of  finite  minds ;  and  its  solution  must  finally  be 
sought  in  the  realm  of  the  infinite. 

But  to  the  second  question  common-sense  thinks  it  gives 
an  answer.  This  illusion  is  due  to  picturing  the  object  in 
space  with  other  bodies  about  it  which  represent  the  know- 
ing subjects.  With  this  image  well  in  mind,  it  is  easy  to 
see  how  they  all  have  the  same  object ;  for  they  are  all  gath- 
ered round  the  object  and  everybody  sees  it  to  be  one  and 
the  same.  But  this  delusive  clearness  disappears  when 
we  remember  the  process  of  perception.  We  never  can  get 
nearer  the  object  than  our  thought  will  carry  us ;  and  the 
object  exists  for  us  as  anything  independent  of  our  thought 
only  through  the  rational  necessity  we  find  of  positing  the 
object  as  an  independent  and  universal  content.  This  ne- 
cessity is  the  bottom  fact  in  the  case ;  and  it  can  be  referred 
to  nothing  else.  But  this  is  quite  as  possible  with  the  ex- 
perience of  phenomena  as  with  any  other.  The  identity  of 
the  object  is  not  secured  by  having  a  real  thing  in  a  real 
space,  but  only  by  its  being  a  factor  of  that  rational  world 
which  is  the  meaning  and  substance  of  the  phenomenal 
world,  and  which  is  the  presupposition  of  every  theory  of 
knowledge  which  understands  itself  and  its  problem. 

We  have  now  to  decide  between  the  views  of  space.  In 
any  case,  space  must  be  a  principle  of  intuition.  One  fact, 
which  makes  the  objectivity  of  space  so  unquestionable  to 
unreflective  thought,  is  that  we  have  apparently  an  imme- 
diate perception  of  its  existence,  so  that  our  perception  of 
space  is  as  direct  and  immediate  as  our  perception  of  things. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  is  made  an  objection  to  the  subjective 
theory  that  it  implies  a  deal  of  mental  mechanism  and  men- 


SPACE  153 

tal  activity  of  which  we  are  totally  unconscious.  Both  po- 
sitions are  worthless  as  arguments.  The  apparently  imme- 
diate perception  of  space  is,  in  any  case,  the  result  of  non- 
spatial  activities.  The  existence  of  space  would  not  account 
for  its  perception.  We  must  in  some  way  be  affected  b}T  it. 
But  space  itself  does  not  act  upon  the  mind  ;  only  things  do 
that.  Hence  our  knowledge  of  space  is  a  mental  interpre- 
tation of  the  action  of  things  upon  the  mind.  In  this  ac- 
tion, spatial  properties  are  displaced  by  varying  intensities 
of  activity,  and  these  variations  are  translated  by  the  mind 
into  space-terms.  These  considerations  show  that  our  space 
intuition  must  in  any  case  arise  within,  and  that  the  objec- 
tive space  is  no  factor  of  sense  perception  whatever.  There 
is  no  need  of  the  real  space  to  explain  our  experience. 

But  we  have  further  seen  that  the  realistic  view  is  in- 
consistent, and  upon  analysis  even  unintelligible.  It  hovers 
between  making  space  something  and  nothing,  and  both 
views  are  absurd.  It  also  conflicts  with  the  unity  of  being, 
and  forces  us  to  regard  the  infinite  as  composed  of  parts. 
Finally,  it  implies  a  hopeless  dualism  of  first  principles,  in 
that  it  implies  the  coexistence  of  two  necessary  and  mutual- 
ly independent  principles.  But  this  view  is  strictly  impos- 
sible, and  any  doctrine  which  leads  to  it  must  be  rejected. 
The  attempt  to  regard  space  as  a  system  of  relations  be- 
tween things  we  found  to  be  an  impossible  compromise  be- 
tween the  subjective  and  the  objective  view.  The  objective 
existence  of  space,  then,  is  not  only  not  proven,  but  it  is  in 
itself  unclear,  inconsistent,  and  impossible.  "We  reject  it, 
therefore,  for  the  view  that  space  is  ultimately  a  principle 
of  intuition,  and,  secondarily,  a  mode  of  appearance.  But 
though  subjective,  it  is  not  arbitrary  or  individual.  A  given 
state  of  being  may  allow  of  only  one  space-translation,  and 
this  translation  may  be  universal  and  changeless  in  all  intui- 
tion, whether  divine  or  human.  However  that  may  be,  the 


154  METAPHYSICS 

universe  can  have  its  spatial  properties  and  relations  only  in 
the  mind,  which  not  only  belongs  to  the  system,  but  is  both 
its  foundation  and  its  crown. 

So,  then,  space  is  phenomenal.  It  is  not  a  boundless  void 
in  which  things  exist,  but  only  the  general  form  of  objective 
experience.  But  all  that  was  ever  true  of  it  is  true  still ; 
and  the  laws  of  space  are  as  binding  upon  us  as  ever.  We 
cannot  slip  into  the  non-spatial  and  get  about  without  mov- 
ing. We  may  still  go  on  making  appointments  to  meet  at 
any  given  place,  and  there  will  be  no  obscurity  about  our 
meaning.  Within  the  phenomenal,  space  relations  have  the 
clearest  possible  meaning.  But  when  we  abstract  them  from 
things  and  set  them  up  as  realities  by  themselves,  we  are 
"lost  and  embrangled  in  inextricable  difficulties." 

The  relation  of  the  infinite  to  space  calls  for  brief  men- 
tion. We  have  affirmed  that  space,  as  the  form  of  intuition, 
may  exist  for  the  infinite  as  well  as  for  the  finite;  and  this 
may  easily  be  mistaken  for  a  limitation  of  the  infinite.  But 
this  would  be  to  confound  space  as  principle  with  space  as 
limitation.  For  human  beings  space  has  a  double  aspect. 
It  represents  not  only  a  principle  of  intuition,  but  also  a 
limitation  of  our  agency.  The  organism  which  conditions 
our  mental  activity  has  space  relations,  and  thus  we  natu- 
rally appear  to  be  located  and  limited  in  space.  But  this 
location  is  of  the  organism  only,  and  this  limitation  is  only 
the  result  of  our  dynamic  limitations.  It  consists  solely  in 
the  fact  that  our  immediate  action  upon  reality  is  limited. 
Far  and  near  are  terms  which  depend  entirely  upon  the 
amount  of  mediation  necessary  to  affect  any  given  reality. 
Wherever  we  act  immediately,  there  we  are ;  so  that,  instead 
of  saying  we  can  act  only  where  we  are,  we  ought  rather  to 
say  we  are  wherever  we  act.  But  our  immediate  action  ex- 
tends to  only  a  few  things,  and  this  fact  appears  as  spatial 
limitation.  In  this  sense  of  limitation,  space  cannot  be  af- 


SPACE  155 

firmed  of  the  infinite.  It  comprises  all  reality  in  the  unity 
of  its  immediate  activity,  and  hence  is  everywhere.  For  by 
omnipresence  we  can  mean  nothing  more  than  this  immedi- 
ate action  upon  all  reality.  The  conception  of  omnipresence 
as  a  boundless  space-filling  bulk  is  a  contradiction,  for  that 
which  is  in  space  and  fills  space  cannot  be  omnipresent  in 
space,  but  different  parts  must  be  in  different  places.  Each 
part,  then,  would  be  in  its  own  place  and  nowhere  else. 
Thus  the  unity  and  omnipresence  of  the  infinite  would  dis- 
i\  ppear. 

This  modification  of  the  spatial  judgment  by  our  organic 
experience  introduces  a  large  element  of  relativity  into  it. 
It  is  only  the  pure  spatial  judgment,  as  in  geometry,  which 
can  be  regarded  as  universal.  All  beyond  that  is  affected 
by  the  general  limitation  of  the  finite  and  by  our  organic 
connections. 

Our  general  view  of  space  can  hardly  fail  to  suggest  the 
much-debated  question  concerning  the  dimensions  of  space. 
Of  late  years  the  claim  has  often  been  made  by  mathema- 
ticians that  space  may  not  be  restricted  to  three  dimensions, 
and  elaborate  discussions  have  been  made  of  the  properties 
of  non-Euclidian  space.  The  most  curious  conclusions  have 
been  drawn  as  to  what  would  be  true  in  such  spaces,  and 
the  impression  has  become  very  general  that  the  conception 
of  space  as  having  only  three  dimensions  is  mistaken.  We 
have  now  to  inquire  whether  the  principle  of  space  is  such 
as  necessarily  to  restrict  it  to  three  dimensions. 

The  principle  of  space  has  no  such  universality  as  the 
laws  of  formal  thought.  These  condition  all  our  thinking, 
but  the  principle  of  space  conditions  only  our  intuition  of 
objects.  We  must  further  allow  that  all  forms  of  external 
experience  are  not  alike  calculated  to  awaken  the  mind  to 
react  with  a  spatialization  of  its  objects.  We  must  also  ad- 


156  METAPHYSICS 

mit  that  our  nature  may  contain  mysterious  possibilities 
Avhich  are  at  present  entirely  hidden.  It  is,  then,  possible 
that,  under  certain  forms  of  experience,  the  mind  would 
never  come  to  the  space  intuition.  It  is  equally  possible 
that,  under  other  forms  of  sense-experience,  the  mind  should 
arrange  its  objects  according  to  some  altogether  different 
principle,  so  as  to  have  a  new  form  of  intuition.  This  new 
form,  however,  would  not  be  space,  but  something  quite 
peculiar.  As  such,  it  would  be  related  to  the  space-intui- 
tion, as  our  sense  of  color  is  to  that  of  sound.  This,  of 
course,  is  a  mere  logical  possibility,  but  there  is  certainly 
no  ground  for  saying  that  the  space-intuition  is  the  only  one 
possible  in  the  nature  of  being.  If  there  were  any  ground 
for  affirming  the  existence  of  such  a  new  form,  there  would 
be  nothing  apriori  incredible  in  it.  It  is  entirely  possible, 
however,  to  hold,  along  with  this  admission,  that  the  space- 
intuition  cannot  be  changed  in  its  essential  laws  and  nature. 

In  affirming  that  the  dimensions  of  space  are  necessarily 
three,  and  only  three,  it  is  important  to  premise  that  the 
planes  of  reference  are  perpendicular  each  to  the  other  two. 
Without  this  assumption,  the  dimensions  of  space  may  be 
as  many  as  we  please.  But,  with  this  assumption,  the  claim 
is  that  the  position  of  any  point  in  space  can  be  defined  by 
straight  lines  drawn  to  each  of  these  planes  of  reference. 
These  straight  lines  are  called  the  co-ordinates  of  the  point, 
and  they  tell  us  ho\v  far  the  point  is  from  each  of  the  planes. 
The  three  planes  represent  the  dimensions  of  space.  '  Thus 
far  nothing  has  appeared  in  the  affirmative  which  is  not 
purely  hypothetical,  or  which  does  not  confound  the  dimen- 
sions of  things  in  space  with  the  dimensions  of  space  itself. 

The  first  class  of  arguments  consists  entirely  of  illustra- 
tions drawn  from  analytic  formulas.  It  is  well  known  that 
the  formulas  of  analytics  are  independent  of  geometrical  rep- 
resentation. So  far  as  the  analytic  reasoning  goes,  we  are 


SPACE  157 

free  to  choose  n  planes  of  reference,  if  \ve  make  no  attempt 
at  spatial  representation.  These  formulas,  however,  admit 
of  such  representation  when  there  are  only  three  perpendic- 
ular planes  of  reference  ;  and  if  n  such  planes  were  possible, 
then  a  formula  involving  n  planes  would  also  be  represent- 
able.  But  this  is  far  enough  from  proving  that  n  planes 
are  possible;  it  only  deduces  a  consequence  from  an  as- 
sumption. 

But  there  is  no  need  to  have  recourse  to  elaborate 
formulas  to  deduce  this  small  conclusion.  There  is  to  the 
uninitiated  a  certain  air  of  mystery  in  an  involved  and 
transcendental  formula,  and  especially  in  a  formula  for  a 
"  pseudo-spherical "  surface,  which  may  serve  to  impose  on 
the  illogical  mind,  but  the  argument  from  such  a  formula 
is  in  nothing  better  than  the  following:  In  algebra,  a  can 
be  represented  by  a  line  in  space,  a"  by  a  plane  surface,  and 
a'  by  a  cube ;  a4  and  all  higher  powers  are  unrepresentable. 
So  far  as  algebra  is  concerned,  it  is  a  mere  coincidence  that 
#,  a3,  and  a3  are  spatially  representable,  and  the  algebraic 
analysis  goes  on  in  complete  independence  of  space.  It 
deals  with  numbers  and  their  relations,  and  these  are  log- 
ical, and  not  spatial.  But  it  would  be  quite  easy  to  say 
that,  if  space  had  n  dimensions,  then  au  could  be  spatially 
represented  as  well  as  a  or  a?  or  a3,  and  the  argument  would 
be  just  as  forcible  as  the  mass  of  what  is  uttered  on  this 
subject.  In  fact,  mathematicians  have  fallen  a  prey  to  their 
own  terminolog}7  in  this  matter.  Through  desiring  to  give 
the  utmost  generality  to  their  analytic  formulas,  they  have 
constructed  them  without  any  regard  to  actual  space.  Then 
they  have  discovered  that,  to  make  them  representable,  cer- 
tain limitations  must  be  made.  Thus  actual  space  is  made 
to  appear  as  a  special  case;  and  this  is  called  flat  space, 
Euclidian  space,  etc.  But,  by  applying  an  adjective  to 
space,  they  have  suggested  to  themselves  the  possibility  of 


158  METAPHYSICS 

other  spaces,  and  forthwith  any  given  set  of  analytic  as- 
sumptions passes  for  a  space  of  the  nth  order.  By  this  time 
the  illusion  is  complete,  and  the  request  for  a  proof  that 
those  spaces  of  the  nth  order  represent  anything  but  ana- 
lytic assumptions  is  resented  as  unkind. 

The  other  class  of  arguments  confounds  the  dimensions 
of  things  in  space  with  the  dimensions  of  space  itself.  If 
we  omit  reference  to  the  three  perpendicular  planes  of  ref- 
erence, a  thing  may  have  any  number  of  dimensions.  The 
various  utterances  concerning  a  curvature  of  space  are  all 
instances  of  this  confusion.  What  is  meant  by  a  curvature 
of  space  itself  is  something  which  defies  all  comprehen- 
sion, as  much  so  as  a  curvature  of  number.  It  is  assumed 
that,  in  case  of  such  curvature,  straight  lines  would  at  last 
return  into  themselves;  but  the  simple  fact  would  be,  not 
that  space  is  curved,  but  that  the  line  is  not  straight,  but 
curved.  This  would  be  quite  intelligible,  while  the  doctrine 
of  a  curved  space  is  quite  unintelligible.  If  it  be  said  that 
straight  lines  never  occur  in  reality,  we  have  no  objection, 
provided  the  claim  be  proved ;  but  this  is  different  from 
affirming  that  truly  straight  lines  are  not  straight,  but 
curved.  The  geometer  does  not  assume  anything  about 
the  reality  of  lines,  but  contents  himself  with  showing  what 
would  be  true  of  such  lines,  if  they  did  exist.  To  determine 
the  content  and  implications  of  our  space-intuitions  is  his 
only  aim  ;  and,  knowing  that  these  intuitions  are  purely 
mental  products,  he  is  entirely  free  from  doubts  whether, 
in  some  outlying  regions  of  space,  these  principles  may  not 
be  invalid.  Space  being  in  the  mind,  and  space-figures  be- 
ing mental  constructions,  they  will  always  have  the  mean- 
ing which  the  mind  assigns  to  them,  and  hence  can  never 
be  twisted  out  of  their  proper  significance. 

This  principle  of  a  curvature  of  space  has  been  invoked  to 
save  the  universe  from  finally  running  down.  If  space  be 


SPACE  159 

curved,  then  the  outgoing  energy  will  at  last  be  restored, 
and  the  system  may  keep  agoing.  But  there  is  no  need  of 
the  unintelligible  assumption  of  a  curvature  of  space  to  ex- 
press this  result.  We  can  simply  say  that,  if  the  nature  of 
reality  be  such  that  radiant  energy  moves  in  curved  lines, 
then  it  will  at  last  come  back  to  the  point  of  departure.  Of 
course,  to  make  this  assumption  of  any  use,  we  should  have 
to  make  many  others,  but,  such  as  it  is,  it  is  an  attack,  not  on 
our  space-intuition,  but  on  the  first  law  of  motion.  In  short, 
all  the  illustrations  of  a  space  of  n  dimensions  can  be  brought 
into  entire  harmony  with  our  space-intuition  by  substitut- 
ing for  a  curvature  of  space  a  curvature  in  space,  and  for  n 
dimensions  of  space  n  dimensions  of  things  in  space.  This 
part  of  the  doctrine  seems  to  be  largely  due  to  the  pestilent 
practice  of  viewing  straight  lines  as  segments  of  circles 
with  an  infinite  radius.  This  custom,  together  with  the 
allied  one  of  viewing  parallel  lines  as  meeting  at  an  infinite 
distance,  has  its  practical  advantage,  but  when  it  results  in 
confounding  all  definitions  and  in  uttering  complete  non- 
sense, it  is  high  time  to  inquire  whether  the  advantage  be 
not  too  dearly  purchased. 

A  poor  argument,  however,  though  a  suspicious  circum- 
stance, is  not  a  disproof  of  the  thing  to  be  proved.  The 
doctrine  of  n  dimensions  can  be  tested  only  by  a  direct  at- 
tempt to  realize  its  assumptions.  Where,  then,  is  the  nth 
dimension  to  be  found  ?  One  writer,  in  his  explanation  of 
the  disappearance  of  material  bodies  in  spiritistic  perform- 
ances, assumes  a  fourth  dimension  of  space,  into  which  the 
bodies  are  drawn  by  the  spirits.  If  there  were  beings  who 
could  observe  only  two  dimensions  of  space,  then  a  body 
which  moved  in  the  third  dimension  would  disappear  from 
their  vision.  If,  now,  there  be  a  fourth  dimension,  then  the 
spirits  have  only  to  draw  the  body  into  the  fourth  dimen- 
sion to  render  it  invisible.  It  would  seem,  then,  that  the 


160  METAPHYSICS 

fourth  dimension  interpenetrates  the  three  dimensions.  The 
solid  body  which  disappeared  was  not  out  of  the  room,  hut 
out  of  its  three  dimensions.  And  yet  there  was  no  point  in 
the  room  which  could  not  be  defined  in  a  space  of  three 
dimensions.  The  fourth  dimension,  therefore,  is  not  some- 
thing added  to  the  three  dimensions,  but  is  something  co- 
incident with  them  ;  that  is,  it  is  not  a  space-dimension  at  all, 
but,  if  anything,  it  would  be  a  state  of  matter  in  which  it 
would  not  appear  in  any  way.  The  necessity  of  putting  the 
fourth  dimension  within  the  three  dimensions  deprives  it  of 
all  right  to  be  called  a  dimension  of  space.  Upon  the  whole, 
it  is  not  likely  that  the  performances  of  sleight-of-hand 
tricksters  will  contribute  much  to  philosophic  discovery. 

The  relation  of  the  doctrine  to  geometry  is  not  clearly 
settled  in  the  minds  of  its  holders  Some  would  view  it 
simply  'as  an  extension  of  our  present  geometry,  while 
others  would  view  it  as  an  attack  upon  it  If  we  conceive 
of  beings  dwelling  in  a  plane  and  limited  to  conceptions  of 
lines  in  a  plane,  it  is  possible  that  such  beings  should  form 
a  valid  plane  geometry ;  and  if  afterwards  they  should  ad- 
vance to  a  conception  of  the  third  dimension  of  space,  their 
early  geometry  would  be  extended  nerely,  and  would  be 
as  valid  as  ever.  Now,  in  the  same  way,  it  may  be  claim- 
ed that  a  new  dimension  of  space  would  only  extend  our 
present  geometry  without  in  any  way  discrediting  it.  In 
that  case  the  doctrine  could  be  tested  only  by  inquiring 
whether  the  notion  of  a  new  dimension  represents  any- 
thing more  than  a  gratuitous  assumption  which  defies  all 
construction  and  comprehension.  But  many  holders  of  the 
view  regard  it  as  conflicting  with  received  geometry,  and 
this  position  makes  it  possible  to  test  the  view  by  reflecting 
upon  the  character  of  geometrical  truth.  If  that  truth  be 
strictly  true,  then  any  doctrine  which  conflicts  with  it  is 
false.  The  believer  in  n  dimensions  will  have  to  disprove 


SPACE  161 

geometry  before  he  can  maintain  his  theory.  If  he  insist 
that  straight  lines  return  into  themselves,  that  only  shows 
that  he  means  by  straight  lines  what  others  mean  by  curves. 
If  he  claim  that  parallel  lines  may  meet,  it  only  shows  that 
he  means  by  parallel  lines  what  others  mean  by  converging 
lines.  Xor  must  he  be  allowed  to  make  irrelevant  appeals 
to  the  nature  of  things,  for  geometry  does  not  concern  itself 
with  the  nature  of  things,  but  with  the  nature  and  implica- 
tions of  our  space-intuition. 

A  final  word  must  be  said  concerning  the  unity  of  our 
space-intuition.  It  is  often  assumed  that  there  may  be  be- 
ings which  see  things  in  only  one  or  two  dimensions,  and 
they  would,  of  course,  be  as  positive  about  the  impossibility 
of  a  third  dimension  as  we  are  about  a  fourth.  We  know, 
however,  that  they  would  be  mistaken,  and  what  better  right 
have  we  to  insist  on  our  view.  If  the  fourth  dimension  be 
assumed  to  contradict  what  we  know  of  the  three  dimen- 
sions, we  should  have  the  best  right  for  rejecting  it :  and 
even  if  it  were  assumed  only  to  extend  our  view,  we  should 
have  a  right  based  on  the  unity  of  our  space-intuition.  For 
these  beings  who  see  things  only  in  one  or  two  dimensions 
are  pure  myths,  and  their  possibility  is  far  from  apparent. 
To  begin  with,  the  assumption  that  reality  admits  of  any 
number  of  space-intuitions  falls  back  into  the  popular  form 
of  Kantianism,  according  to  which  reality  itself  is  quite  in- 
different to  the  forms  of  thought.  But  this  is  to  divorce 
thought  and  reality  entirely,  and  to  leave  the  thought  with- 
out any  ground  or  explanation.  But  if  reality  is  to  explain 
thought,  then  a  given  phase  of  reality  admits  only  of  a  given 
representation  in  thought.  This  notion  that  thought  can 
shift  about  and  view  reality  in  any  and  every  way  betrays 
a  total  lack  of  appreciation  of  causation  ;  it  is  the  supersti- 
tion of  a  time  which  had  no  conception  of  law  whatever. 

Further,  our  intuition  of  space  is  not  built  up  by  adding 
11 


162  METAPHYSICS 

one  dimension  after  another;  but  the  first  and  second  dimen- 
sions are  reached  by  abstracting  from  the  unitary  intuition 
of  a  space  of  three  dimensions.  Given  this  intuition,  it  is 
easy  to  attend  to  one  dimension  to  the  exclusion  of  the  other 
two ;  but  they  could  not  be  directly  reached  for  the  follow- 
ing reasons :  Suppose  a  being  with  an  intuition  of  only  one 
dimension  of  space.  At  first  we  are  tempted  to  think  of 
that  one  dimension  as  a  line ;  but  this  it  could  not  be,  because 
to  see  it  as  a  line,  the  being  must  be  outside  of  the  line,  and 
the  line  must  be  across  the  direction  of  vision.  But  this 
would  imply  two  dimensions  of  space — the  direction  of  the 
line  of  vision  and  that  of  the  line  perceived.  If  we  confine 
him  strictly  to  one  dimension,  the  line  must  take  the  direc- 
tion of  the  line  of  vision,  and  this  would  become  a  point. 
But  this  point  again  could  never  be  known  as  such,  except 
in  relation  to  other  points  outside  of  the  line,  and  as  this  is 
contrary  to  the  hypothesis,  it  could  never  be  known  as  a 
point  at  all.  The  line  itself  is  without  breadth  or  thickness, 
and  the  being,  if  it  knew  itself  as  related  to  the  line,  must 
know  itself  as  in  the  line ;  and  all  its  other  objects  must  be 
in  the  line,  and  hence  all  alike  must  be  known  as  without 
breadth  or  thickness.  For  us  who  have  the  full  space- 
intuition,  it  is  easy  to  abstract  from  two  dimensions  and 
consider  only  the  line,  but  for  the  being  who  has  only  the 
one  dimension  the  space-intuition  would  be  impossible. 

The  same  is  true  for  the  two  dimensions.  In  this  case 
the  being  would  be  in  a  plane,  but  without  any  thickness. 
He  cannot  rise  above  the  plane  to  look  at  it,  for  this  would 
be  to  invoke  the  third  dimension.  He  must  stay  then  in 
the  surface,  and  must  find  all  his  objects  in  that  surface. 
But  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  we  are  led  to  the  conception 
of  a  surface  only  by  our  experience  with  solids;  we  reach  it 
by  abstraction  of  the  third  dimension.  If  there  were  no 
third  dimension,  we  should  certainly  never  have  to  come  to 


SPACE  163 

the  notion  of  either  line  or  surface.  This  being,  however, 
who  is  in  the  surface,  and  who  knows  nothing  of  any  points 
outside  of  the  surface,  would  never  know  the  surface  at  all. 
The  surface  is  conceivable  only  as  a  limit  between  different 
parts  of  space,  and,  as  these  are  impossible,  the  limit  between 
them  is  also  impossible.  We  view  our  space -intuition  as 
properly  a  unit,  and  not  as  compounded  of  separate  factors, 
and  these  factors  which  we  separate  in  thought  are  abstrac- 
tions, which  are  possible  only  through  the  unity  of  space  as 
a  form  of  three  dimensions.  All  our  dealing  with  the  first 
and  second  dimensions  of  space  implies  the  three  dimensions. 
For  the  present,  those  who  affirm  that  space  may  have  n 
dimensions  must  be  judged  either  to  be  calling  a  series  of 
analytic  assumptions  by  the  misleading  name  of  space  or 
eise  simply  to  be  making  a  noise. 


CHAPTER  H 

TIME 

ACCORDING  to  the  popular  view,  the  world  is  in  space  and 
has  its  history  in  time.  We  have  found  ourselves  compelled 
to  deny  that  the  world  is  in  space,  for  spatiality  is  only  phe- 
nomenal. We  have  next  to  inquire  whether  the  world's 
history  in  time  is  an  ontological  or  only  a  phenomenal  fact. 
Kant  made  the  same  argument  do  for  both  space  and  time ; 
but  there  are  many  difficulties  in  the  case  of  time  which  do 
not  exist  in  that  of  space,  and  which  compel  a  separate  dis- 
cussion. The  subjectivity  of  time  is  by  no  means  involved 
in  that  of  space.  At  the  same  time  much  that  was  said  in 
the  previous  chapter  will  apply  here. 

As  in  the  case  of  space,  we  distinguish  between  the  onto- 
logical and  the  psychological  question.  We  do  not  ask  how 
we  come  to  the  notion  of  time,  but  what  it  stands  for  after 
we  get  it.  Is  it  an  existence,  or  a  mode  of  existence,  or  only 
a  mode  of  our  thinking? 

Kant  set  the  example  of  calling  space  and  time  forms 
of  intuition,  and  this  has  led  to  a  very  general  assumption 
among  philosophers  that  we  have  a  proper  intuition  of  time, 
such  as  we  have  of  space.  It  is,  therefore,  a  matter  of  great 
surprise,  on  looking  around  for  this  intuition,  to  find  it  want- 
ing. We  grasp  coexistences  in  a  single  space-image  which 
is  sui  generis'  and  when  we  think  the  things  away,  we  are 
still  able  to  outline  the  space  as  such.  With  time  this 
is  impossible.  We  cannot  comprehend  events  in  a  single 


TIME  165 

temporal  image,  and  when  the  events  are  thought  away 
there  is  nothing  remaining,  even  in  imagination,  which  has 
a  temporal  character.  As  has  often  been  pointed  out,  all 
our  representations  of  time  are  images  borrowed  from 
space,  and  all  alike  contain  contradictions  of  the  time-idea. 
We  think  of  it  as  an  endless  straight  line,  but  the  concep- 
tion fails  to  fit ;  for  the  points  of  such  a  line  coexist,  while 
of  the  time-line  only  the  present  point  exists.  We  think  of 
it  also  as  a  flowing  point  which  describes  a  straight  line,  but 
here  also  we  implicitly  assume  a  space  through  which  the 
point  moves ;  and  without  this  assumption  the  illustration 
loses  all  meaning.  Or  if  we  wish  to  form  a  conception  of 
earlier  and  later,  we  do  it  by  positing  a  line  over  which  we 
are  to  move  in  thought;  and  we  measure  the  time  by  the 
motion  and  its  direction.  The  temporal  before-and-after  is 
represented  only  by  the  spatial  before-and-after.  Xor  are 
we  content  to  borrow  figures  from  the  one  dimension  of 
space;  in  dealing  with  the  system  we  generally  have  two 
dimensions,  and  sometimes  three.  Since  space  is  filled  with 
coexistences,  all  of  which  are  alike  in  the  same  time,  the 
time-line  is  extended  to  all  these.  Thus  the  line  becomes  a 
cylinder  and  the  point  becomes  a  plane;  while  the  time 
passed  over  by  the  moving  plane  remains  behind  as  a  kind 
of  third  dimension.  But  in  all  these  cases  we  have  only 
space-images,  which  are  applied  to  time  only  by  metaphor. 
We  cannot,  then,  properly  call  time  a  form  of  intuition,  as 
we  have  properly  no  special  presentation  corresponding  to  it. 
In  itself  it  is  rather  a  certain  unpicturable  order  of  events. 
Whenever  we  attempt  to  picture  it  we  replace  temporal  se- 
quence by  spatial  sequence. 

What,  then,  is  time?  The  popular  view  of  time  closely 
resembles  that  of  space.  Time  is  conceived  as  an  existence 
sui  generis,  which  exists  apart  from  things,  losing  nothing 
by  their  absence  and  gaining  nothing  by  their  presence.  It 


166  METAPHYSICS 

is  independent,  and  hence  without  any  essential  relation  to 
being,  but  moves  on  in  ceaseless  and  steady  flow  forever. 
Like  space,  it  is  one  of  the  necessities  which  being  can  nei- 
ther create  nor  annihilate,  and  to  which  it  must  submit. 

This  view  seems  self-evident  in  its  clearness  at  first  glance, 
and  it  would  not  be  surprising  if  some  speculator  should 
order  up  an  intuition  in  support  of  it.  But,  in  spite  of  the 
intuition  and  the  apparent  self -evidence,  the  clearness  of 
this  view  turns  out,  upon  inquiry,  to  be  delusive.  It  is  un- 
tenable on  two  accounts :  (1)  By  making  time  independent 
of  being  it  sins  against  the  law  of  reason,  which  forbids  all 
plurality  of  independent  principles.  This  fact,  which  we 
have  sufficiently  illustrated  in  previous  chapters,  is  conclu- 
sive against  the  independence  of  time.  Whatever  time  may 
be,  it  is  no  independent  reality  apart  from  being.  (2)  The 
view  which  regards  time  as  a  real  existence  is  hopelessly 
unclear  and  inconsistent  in  its  assumptions  and  implications. 
Many  qualities  and  functions  are  attributed  to  time  in  spon- 
taneous thinking,  which  have  only  to  be  pointed  out  to  be 
rejected,  because  they  are  inconsistent  with  the  time-idea. 
This  fact  we  proceed  now  to  illustrate. 

But  before  beginning  it  seems  necessary  to  refer  again  to 
the  ever-recurring  distinction  between  the  phenomenal  and 
the  ontological  fact.  Time  as  the  form  of  experience  or  as 
the  form  of  change  is  a  perfectly  clear  and  self-sufficing  no- 
tion. In  this  sense  our  experience  is  in  time,  and  there  can 
be  no  question  of  having  a  timeless  experience,  or  of  describ- 
ing experience  apart  from  temporal  relations.  The  question 
concerns  that  abstract  and  independent  time  which  is  more 
than  the  form  of  experience,  which  is  rather  a  something  in 
which  events  occur ;  and  the  claim  is  that  this  time  is  a  fic- 
tion arising  from  separating  the  form  of  experience  from 
experience  itself.  When  we  are  dealing  with  time  as  the 
form  of  experience  all  is  perfectly  clear,  and  every  one  under- 


TIME  167 

stands  what  is  meant.  An  engagement  to  meet  at  a  certain 
time  and  place  has  no  mystery  for  the  understanding  of  any 
one;  but  when  we  abstract  from  the  particular  concrete 
things  and  relations,  and  attempt  to  conceive  time  by  itself, 
then  once  more  we  are  "  lost  and  embrangled  in  inextrica- 
ble difficulties,''  and  are  "  miserably  bantered  "  and  buffeted 
by  the  absurdities  which  emerge. 

In  illustration  of  the  unclearness  of  popular  thought  on 
this  subject,  it  is  not  plain  whether  time  be  regarded  as 
standing  or  flowing.  Sometimes  it  is  said  to  comprehend 
in  its  unity  past,  present,  and  future  alike ;  and  in  its  to- 
tality it  is  identical  with  eternity.  There  is  but  one  time, 
as  there  is  but  one  space ;  and  all  particular  times  are  but 
parts  of  the  one  time.  Sometimes  it  is  said  to  flow,  and 
sometimes  it  is  mentioned  as  the  standing  condition  of  all 
flow.  In  one  view  time  itself  flows,  and  events  flow  with 
it;  and  in  another  view  time  stands,  and  events  flow  in  it 
as  a  space  or  through  it  as  a  channel,  or  move  across  it  as 
a  background.  All  of  these  conceptions  appear  in  the  pop- 
ular thought  of  time,  and  all  are  attended  with  great  diffi- 
culties. If  we  regard  time  as  a  whole  as  existing,  and  thus 
embracing  past,  present,  and  future,  then  time  as  a  whole 
stands,  and  the  flow  is  put  in  things  and  not  in  time.  In 
that  case  the  distinction  between  past  and  future  would 
not  be  in  time  itself,  but  in  things,  and  especially  in  the 
observer's  stand-point.  The  past  would  not  be  the  non- 
existing,  but  that  which  has  been  experienced.  The  future 
also  would  not  be  the  non-existing,  but  simply  that  which 
we  have  not  yet  experienced.  There  would  be  nothing  in 
this  view  to  forbid  the  thought  that  things  might  coexist 
at  different  points  of  the  temporal  sequence.  There  would 
also  be  nothing  in  it  to  forbid  the  conception  of  a  being 
which  should  fill  out  the  totality  of  time,  as  the  omnipres- 
ent fills  out  space,  and  for  whose  thought  the  past  and  the 


METAPHYSICS 

future  should  alike  coexist.  Thus  quite  unexpectedly  we 
come  down  to  the  notion  of  the  eternal  now.  But  this  is 
just  the  opposite  of  what  the  popular  view  means  to  say. 
Common-sense  insists  that  time  itself  flows  as  well  as  the 
events  within  it.  In  truth,  this  notion  of  an  empty  time, 
with  things  flowing  through  it,  is  simply  the  image  of  empty 
space  which  has  been  mistaken  for  that  of  time. 

But,  on  the  other  hand,  if  we  do  not  regard  time  as  ex- 
isting as  a  whole,  then  we  are  shut  up  to  the  affirmation 
that  only  the  present  exists.  This  view  also  is  held  by 
spontaneous  thought ;  and  upon  occasion  it  is  stoutly  af- 
firmed that  all  existence  is  contained  in  the  narrow  plane 
of  the  present.  But  the  present  has  no  duration,  and  is  not 
time  at  all.  It  is  but  the  plane  which,  without  thickness, 
divides  past  and  future.  Time,  then,  is  not  made  up  of 
past,  present,  and  future,  but  of  past  and  future  only ;  and, 
as  these  do  not  exist,  time  itself  cannot  exist.  It  avails 
nothing  against  this*  conclusion  to  call  the  present  the  pas- 
sage of  the  future  into  the  past ;  for  this  passage  must  re- 
quire time,  or  it  must  not.  If  it  require  time,  then  it  is 
itself  susceptible  of  division  into  past  and  future.  If  it  be 
timeless,  then  time  once  more  falls  into  past  and  future,  and 
has  no  existence  whatever.  Besides,  it  is  not  easy  to  see 
how  we  can  speak  of  the  passage  of  the  future  into  the  past 
when  both  alike  are  non-existent.  Such  a  passage  can  be 
represented  only  by  a  reality  moving  across  a  certain  line, 
but  which  is  equally  real  on  both  sides  of  the  line ;  and  this 
notion  is  inapplicable  to  time.  When  the  moving  reality  is 
real  only  on  the  line,  it  cannot  cross  it. 

It  is  equally  hard  to  see  how,  on  this  view,  time  can  have 
any  duration.  The  past  was  once  present,  so  that  past  time 
is  made  up  of  moments  which  once  were  present.  But  if 
the  present  have  no  duration,  no  sum  of  present  moments 
can  have  any  duration.  Nor  does  it  relieve  the  matter  to 


TIME  169 

say  that  time,  like  space,  is  continuous,  and  that  units  of 
both  are  but  arbitrary  sections  of  the  indivisible.  Space 
can,  indeed,  be  divided  by  a  plane  into  right  and  left,  so 
that  the  space  to  the  right  and  that  to  the  left  shall  make 
up  all  space ;  but  this  does  not  represent  the  relation  of  past 
and  future,  for  the  two  divisions  exist  as  real  in  the  case  of 
space,  while  in  time  they  are  non-existent.  If  the  space  oc- 
cupied by  the  plane  were  alone  real,  then  space  also  could 
not  exist,  for  the  plane  is  only  a  limit,  and  occupies  no 
space.  And  if  the  plane  should  move  under  such  circum- 
stances, it  would  not  pass  over  any  space  or  generate  any 
volume,  for  each  integral  of  volume  would  perish  as  fast  as 
born.  The  plane  would  continue  to  be  all,  and  space  would 
be  nothing.  This  is  the  case  with  time.  The  plane  is  all, 
and  duration  is  never  reached.  When  we  attempt  to  con- 
ceive duration,  we  must  have  recourse  to  space-illustrations, 
which  are  implicit  contradictions  of  the  time-idea.  Time 
cannot  exist,  and  things  cannot  exist  in  time.  But  if,  to 
escape  these  difficulties,  we  allow  that  the  present  is  a  mo- 
ment with  proper  duration,  it  is  plain  that  this  moment 
must  lie  partly  in  the  past  and  partly  in  the  future,  or  else 
that  duration  is  not  indefinitely  divisible.  Either  assump- 
tion would  swamp  us  by  bringing  the  time-idea  into  con- 
tradiction with  itself. 

If  we  say  that  time  as  a  whole  stands  we  deny  the  time- 
idea.  Past,  present,  and  future  coexist ;  and  there  is  no 
assignable  reason  for  the  change  from  the  future  to  the 
past.  It  is  equally  impossible  to  find  in  a  standing  time  any 
ground  for  change.  But  we  fare  no  better  with  the  notion 
of  a  flowing  time.  If  we  say  that  time  flows  we  must  ask 
whence  and  whither.  From  the  future  to  the  past,  or  from 
the  past  to  the  future  ?  But  both  past  and  future  are  di- 
mensions of  time ;  and  it  seems  absurd  to  speak  of  time  as 
flowing  into  or  out  of  itself.  Such  a  view  is  as  impossible 


170  METAPHYSICS 

as  the  thought  of  a  moving  space.  A  space  which  should 
start  sideways,  so  as  to  leave  spacelessness  on  one  side  and 
penetrate  or  telescope  itself  on  the  other,  would  not  be  a 
more  absurd  notion  than  this  of  a  moving  time.  And,  final- 
ly, when  we  say  that  time  as  a  whole  flows  we  need  another 
time  for  it  to  flow  in.  Otherwise,  the  flow  of  time  is  time- 
less ;  and  there  is  no  good  reason  why  the  flow  of  things 
may  not  be  timeless  also. 

Perhaps  we  may  say  that  the  moments  of  time  flow,  and 
not  time  as  a  whole  ;  but  then  we  have  a  puzzle  in  deciding 
what  the  relation  may  be  between  the  standing  time  and  its 
flowing  moments.  A  time  which  is  not  the  sum,  or  integral, 
of  its  moments  is  a  difficult  conception,  and,  allowing  it,  we 
see  no  reason  in  the  standing  time  for  the  flowing  moments. 
We  should  also  need  to  know  the  whence  and  whither  of 
the  flowing  moments  and  in  what  their  flow  in  pure  time 
would  be  distinguishable  from  their  non-flow.  We  should 
have  a  movement  in  which  there  is  neither  moved  nor  mover, 
a  movement  without  whence  or  whither,  a  movement  which 
stops  as  soon  as  we  attempt  to  conceive  it  as  moving,  and  a 
rest  which  moves  as  soon  as  we  attempt  to  conceive  it  as 
resting.  The  notion  of  a  standing  time  contradicts  the  time- 
idea  ;  and  the  notion  of  a  flowing  time  results  in  a  mental 
vacuum.  Both  views  involve  not  merely  mystery,  but  in- 
consistency and  contradiction.  Their  exceeding  clearness 
and  self-evidence  are  due  to  the  space-metaphors  in  which 
the  doctrines  are  expressed  ;  and  these  metaphors,  upon  ex- 
amination, turn  out  to  be  inconsistent  and  inapplicable. 

Plainly  we  are  "  embrangled  "  and  most  "  miserably  ban- 
tered" in  our  attempt  to  conceive  time  as  independently 
existing;  but  the  embranglement  and  bantering  become 
still  worse  when  we  seek  to  determine  the  relation  of  this 
independent  time  to  the  things  and  events  said  to  be  in  it. 
To  begin  with,  it  is  impossible  to  see  how  anything  articu- 


TIME  171 

late  can  exist  at  all  in  a  real  time.  Things  cannot  exist  in 
the  past,  or  in  the  future ;  but  in  such  a  time  the  present  is 
nothing ;  and  hence  they  cannot  exist  at  all.  In  discussing 
causality  we  found  that  no  metaphysical  predication  what- 
ever is  possible  until  we  bring  the  entire  metaphysical  move- 
ment within  the  range  of  thought,  and  view  it  as  consti- 
tuted by  thought.  Existence  in  time  is  a  vanishing  and 
perishing  shadow  which  eludes  all  apprehension  and  all  sig- 
nificance. Rightly  enough,  then,  did  Berkeley  say  of  this 
abstract  time,  that  it  led  him  "  to  harbour  odd  thoughts  " 
of  his  own  existence  ;  and  he  might  have  added,  of  all  other 
existence  as  well. 

Again,  what  is  the  relation  of  the  independent  time  to 
events  ?  The  movement  of  time  is  not  supposed  to  be  the 
movement  of  events,  and  the  movement  of  events,  though 
in  time,  is  not  supposed  to  be  due  to  the  movement  of  time, 
but  to  the  causes  at  work.  In  what  relation  are  these  two 
orders  of  movement  ?  If  one  might  go  faster  than  the  other, 
then  our  time,  which  is  taken  entirely  from  the  order  of 
events,  would  be  no  measure  of  that  absolute  time  back  of 
events.  To  explain  the  connection,  a  number  of  vague  fan- 
cies, borrowed  from  space,  arise  in  the  mind,  as  that  the 
stream  of  time  floats  events  along  with  it ;  and  these  no- 
tions often  impose  upon  us  their  imaginary  solutions.  But 
the  more  we  reflect  upon  the  matter  the  more  difficulty  we 
have  in  finding  any  connection  between  time  and  the  events 
said  to  be  in  it. 

But  here  it  may  occur  to  us  that  the  relation  between 
time  and  events  is  that  the  former  conditions  the  latter; 
and  this  will  certainly  seem  to  many  minds  a  sufficient  and 
final  answer.  But  one  must  confess  inability  to  get  any 
notion  of  what  this  conditioning  may  be,  unless  it  is  of  a 
dynamic  character,  and  such  a  conditioning  cannot  be  recon- 
ciled with  the  notion  of  time.  That  time  is  causal  and  does 


172  METAPHYSICS 

anything  is  as  great  a  scandal  to  common -sense  as  could 
well  be  conceived  ;  and  when  the  notion  of  doing  something 
is  left  out,  one  is  quite  at  a  loss  to  know  what  the  condition- 
ing is.  But  here  it  will  certainly  be  asked  if  we  are  not 
aware  of  the  distinction  between  a  cause  and  a  condition ; 
and  we  reply  that  the  distinction  is  a  familiar  one,  but  that 
it  helps  us  here  is  the  point  which  seems  doubtful.  That 
a  thing  should  be  conditioned  by  its  own  nature,  or  law,  is 
a  conception  which  involves  no  causal  determination ;  but 
that  a  thing  should  be  conditioned  or  in  any  way  deter- 
mined by  another  thing  without  dynamic  influence  seems 
to  be  an  utterly  vacuous  conception.  Hence  if  we  deny  to 
this  real  time  all  influence  upon  events,  no  one  can  tell  what 
he  means  by  events  being  in  that  time;  and  if  we  attribute 
an  influence  to  time  we  contradict  the  notion  of  time  and 
shut  ourselves  up  to  an  endless  regress,  unless  we  suppose 
that  time  can  act  timelessly,  or  without  time  to  act  in. 

And  now,  to  complete  the  confusion,  we  point  out  that  if 
time  be  real  and  without  causal  influence,  the  whole  series 
of  events  runs  off  instantaneously ;  for  on  this  view  the  con- 
ditions of  change  are  not  to  be  found  in  time,  but  in  the  in- 
teractions of  things ;  and  when  the  dynamic  conditions  of 
change  are  fulfilled-  there  is  no  reason  why  the  change 
should  delay.  If  we  suppose  that  time  does  something 
which  was  lacking,  or  breaks  down  some  hinderance  to  the 
change,  or  exercises  some  repressive  action,  we  make  time 
a  thing  with  active  powers;  and  this  view  is  contrary  to  the 
supposition.  But  if  we  do  not  do  this  there  is  no  escape 
from  admitting  that  the  fulfilment  of  the  conditions  and 
the  entrance  of  the  change  are  absolutely  coexistent.  For 
empty  time  can  do  nothing;  and  one  cannot  see  why,  in 
such  a  case,  a  greater  flow  of  time,  provided  the  phrase  in 
general  meant  anything,  should  be  more  effective  than  a 
lesser  flow-.  Certainly  n  minutes  could  do  no  more  than 


TIME  173 

any  fraction  of  a  minute;  and  infinite  time  would  furnish 
nothing  not  contained  in  infinitesimal  time..  The  integral 
of  emptiness  is  always  emptiness,  and  no  addition  of  zeros 
can  produce  a  sum.  We  must,  then,  regard  the  event  as 
coincident  with  the  fulfilment  of  its  conditions.  Hence 
the  beginning  and  the  end  must  coincide  in  time.  Every 
effect  is  given  simultaneously  with  its  conditions,  and  each 
effect  in  turn  becomes  the  cause  of  new  effects,  and  these 
are  likewise  simultaneously  given ;  and  thus  the  whole  se- 
ries exists  in  a  point  of  time  without  any  real  before  and 
after  in  it. 

If,  then,  we  conceive  inactive  time  as  either  resting  or 
flowing,  it  is  quite  impossible  to  assign  any  articulate  rela- 
tion in  which  it  can  stand  to  things  or  events.  It  neither 
acts  nor  is  acted  upon,  but  remains  a  mere  ghost  outside  of 
being,  contributing  nothing  and  determining  nothing.  It 
does  not  even  measure  anything,  for  our  units  of  time  are 
not  taken  from  time,  but  from  some  change  in  things — a 
revolution  of  the  earth,  the  swing  of  a  pendulum,  etc.  If, 
on  the  other  hand,  we  conceive  time  as  active  we  contra- 
dict the  time-idea. 

Finally,  the  believer  in  a  real  time  will  affirm  with  great 
positiveness  that  our  mental  life  itself  bears  witness  to  the 
reality  of  time.  However  we  may  confuse  ourselves  about 
the  world-process,  we  know  that  we  have  lived  through  a 
real  pastr  and  that  we  are  now  able  to  compare  it  with  a 
real  present.  Any  attempt  to  deny  time,  it  is  said,  must 
shatter  on  this  fact.  But  this  objection  largely  depends  on 
overlooking  the  distinction  between  the  phenomenal  and  the 
ontological.  No  one  can  think  of  denying  the  relations  of 
time  in  experience.  But  these  relations  are  established  by 
the  mind  itself,  and  if  there  were  not  something  non-tempo- 
ral in  the  mind  they  could  not  exist  for  us  at  all.  The  suc- 
cession in  consciousness  to  which  the  realist  appeals  so  confi- 


174  METAPHYSICS 

dently  is  the  very  thing  the  knowledge  of  which  makes  his 
realistic  view  impossible.  If  there  were  nothing  unchanging 
and  timeless  in  the  mind,  the  knowledge  of  succession  could 
never  arise.  The  mind  must  gather  up  its  experiences  in  a 
single  timeless  act  in  order  to  become  aware  of  succession. 
The  conceptions  which  are  arranged  in  a  temporal  order 
must  coexist  in  the  timeless  act  which  grasps  and  arranges 
them.  The  conception  of  sequence  not  only  does  not  involve 
a  sequence  of  conceptions,  but  it  would  be  impossible  if  it 
did.  The  perception  of  time,  then,  is  as  timeless  as  the 
perception  of  space  is  spaceless.  The  things  which  are  per- 
ceived in  time  must  yet  coexist  in  timeless  thought  in  order 
to  be  so  perceived.  The  admission  of  ontological  temporal 
differences  in  thought  would  make  thought  impossible.  It 
only  remains  that  time  be  restricted  to  phenomenal  exist- 
ence, and  that  thought  instead  of  being  in  time  be  regarded 
as  the  source  and  founder  of  temporal  relations,  which  are 
the  onlv  time  there  is.  And  the  supposed  ontological  time 
is  merely  a  shadow  of  experience,  and  its  necessit}'  is  merely 
a  consequence  of  the  temporal  law  as  a  rule  of  mental  pro- 
cedure. 

Thus  the  notion  of  time  as  a  separate  ontological  exist- 
ence shows  itself  on  every  hand  as  a  congeries  of  contradic- 
tions, and  must  be  given  up.  The  impossibility  of  more 
than  one  independent  principle  forbids  us  to  admit  the  in- 
dependent existence  of  time.  Whatever  it  may  be,  it  de- 
pends on  being  as  a  consequence  or  creation.  But  the  at- 
tempt to  think  of  time  as  a  substantive  fact  breaks  down 
from  its  inherent  unclearness  and  contradiction.  This  view 
of  time,  when  analyzed,  is  always  found  to  deny  itself. 
Conceived  as  resting  or  flowing,  time  is  absurd.  Con- 
ceived as  ontological,  it  cannot  be  brought  into  any  re- 
lations to  things  without  positing  an  interaction  between 
them ;  and  then  we  need  a  new  time  as  the  condition  of 


TIME  1 75 

this  interaction,  and  this  would  lead  to  an  endless  regress. 
Time,  then,  cannot  be  viewed  as  a  substantive  fact  created 
or  uncreated.  As  a  whole,  time  does  not  exist,,  and  sub- 
stantive reality  is  not  in  time  any  more  than  it  is  in  space. 

This  result  we  may  hold  with  clear  conviction,  but  it 
would  be  very  easy  to  misinterpret  it.  We  are  by  no 
means  out  of  the  woods  yet.  Reality  certainly  is  not  in 
time  as  something  independent;  but  for  all  that  yet  appears 
time  might  be  in  reality  as  a  law  of  existence.  If  there 
were  a  being  which  had  its  existence  in  succession,  such 
being  would  not  be  in  time,  but  its  existence  would  be  tem- 
poral. Moreover,  when  we  say  that  reality  is  not  in  time, 
reality  is  a  word  of  uncertain  meaning.  It  might  mean  all 
reality,  finite  and  infinite  alike;  or  it  might  mean  finite  re- 
ality; or,  finally,  it  might  mean  the  objective  cosmic  order. 
In  the  last  case  we  run  a  very  serious  risk  of  confounding 
the  apparent  order,  which  is  temporal,  with  an  assumed 
noumenal  order  which'is  very  possibly  fictitious.  We  shall 
need,  then,  to  look  well  to  our  goings,  or  we  shall  fall  a  prey 
to  some  verbal  illusion. 

The  common  conclusion  from  these  facts  is  that  time, 
like  space,  is  only  the  subjective  aspect  of  things  and  proc- 
esses which  are  essentially  non-temporal.  In  this  putting 
there  is  an  implicit  reference  to  the  Kantian  noumena  which 
lie  as  realities  beyond  the  "subjective  aspect";  and  this  as- 
pect is  supposed  to  belong  to  us,  constituting  a  veil  rather 
than  a  revelation  of  existence.  For  the  present  we  will  not 
insist  on  the  doubtful  character  of  these  noumena,  but  sim- 
ply consider  the  attempts  to  make  the  subjectivity  of  time 
acceptable.  This  will  finally  lead  us  to  a  better  under- 
standing of  the  form  which  the  doctrine  must  assume  in 
order  to  be  tenable.  The  traditional  idealistic  view  is  almost 
as  obnoxious  to  criticism  as  the  traditional  realistic  view. 


176  METAPHYSICS 

Since  the  time  of  Kant  the  ideality  of  time  has  been  held 
as  being  as  well  established  as  the  ideality  of  space ;  but  in 
fact  it  is  a  much  more  difficult  doctrine.  We  have  a  clear 
experience  of  the  possibility  of  thinking  and  feeling  apart 
from  space.  We  do  not  regard  our  souls  as  spatial ;  and 
space-relations  do  not  enter  into  our  internal  experience  in 
any  way.  That  there  should  be  existence  apart  from  space 
is  not,  therefore,  so  difficult  a  conception.  With  time  the 
case  is  different.  It  enters  into  our  entire  mental  life,  and 
cannot  by  any  means  be  escaped.  Hence  we  cannot  appeal 
to  any  non-temporal  experiences  to  aid  our  thought ;  and 
nothing  remains  but  to  analyze  the  notion,  and  see  if  we 
cannot  reach  a  stand-point  from  which  the  difficulties  may, 
at  least  to  some  extent,  disappear.  The  holders  of  the  doc- 
trine have*  taken  it  all  too  easy  in  this  respect.  They  have 
contented  themselves  with  arguments  which  show  the  ideal- 
ity of  space,  and  have  not  bestowed  upon  time  the  attention 
which  the  peculiar  difficulties  of  the  problem  demand.  We 
proceed  to  examine  the  attempts  to  make  the  subjectivity 
of  time  credible. 

And  first  we  mention  a  rhetorical  device.  Long  and 
short,  it  is  said,  are  relative  terms,  and  our  estimate  of  dura- 
tion is  purely  subjective.  The  time  which  is  long  to  one  is 
short  to  another,  according  to  the  state  of  mind.  With  God 
a  thousand  years  are  as  one  day ;  and  even  to  the  old  man 
a  long  life  is  as  a  tale  that  is  told,  or  as  a  watch  in  the 
night.  The  whole  of  human  history  is  nothing  to  the  peri- 
ods of  geology ;  and  these,  again,  shrink  to  insignificance 
when  we  ascend  to  the  cycles  of  astronomy.  What,  then, 
it  is  said,  are  all  finite  periods  to  Him  who  inhabits  eternity  \ 
Remarks  of  this  kind  have  a  certain  value  in  arousing  the 
feeling  of  wonder ;  but  they  are  valueless  in  philosopical 
speculation.  No  doubt  our  estimate  of  the  length  of  time 
is  purely  relative  and  subjective;  indeed,  if  the  world-proc- 


TIME  177 

ess  did  not  exist  as  a  common  time-keeper,  every  man  would 
have  his  own  time.  Time  is  one  only  because  we  measure 
it  by  reference  to  the  same  objective  process,  or  to  the  same 
consciousness.  But  the  before-and-after  of  things  is  not  a 
matter  of  feeling.  Kelatively,  the  whole  measure  of  finite 
existence  may  shrink  to  a  span,  but  the  time-order  remains 
unchanged.  Something  more  powerful,  therefore,  must  be 
found,  if  we  are  to  succeed  in  reducing  time  to  a  purely 
subjective  existence. 

If  reality  were  a  changeless  system  of  things  in  change- 
less relations,  like  the  members  of  a  thought-system,  or  like 
the  ideas  of  Plato's  philosophy,  it  would  be  easy  to  view 
the  sequence  of  things  in  our  experience  as  only  a  sequence 
of  knowledge,  and  as  due  entirely  to  our  finiteness.  Thus, 
mathematical  truths  coexist ;  but  we  grasp  them  successive- 
ly, not  because  they  really  succeed  in  time,  but  because  our 
finite  minds  are  unable  to  grasp  them  all  at  once.  Hence 
we  are  often  tempted  to  think  that  the  earlier  propositions 
in  geometry  precede  and  found  the  later.  But  a  moment's 
reflection  convinces  us  that  the  only  relation  in  this  case 
is  that  of  logical  sequence,  and  that  the  apparent  temporal 
sequence  is  merely  the  reflection  of  our  own  finiteness, 
which  compels  us  to  grasp  successively  what  exists  simulta- 
neously. A  perfect  insight  into  truth  would  grasp  it  in  one 
changeless  intuition,  and  the  illusion  would  not  exist.  If 
now  the  world  were  such  a  system  of  logical  relations,  it 
would  be  entirely  credible  that  time  is  not  only  subjective, 
but  exists  only  for  the  finite,  being  in  every  case  but  a  re- 
flex of  limited  power.  It  might  be  said  that  even  in  this 
case  we  could  not  dispute  the  reality  of  time,  for  time  is 
given  not  merely  in  the  movement  of  the  outer  world,  but 
also  and  pre-eminently  in  the  movement  of  thought.  But 
this  objection  would  be  invalid,  for  this  psychologic  time 
would  be  nothing  but  a  subjective  fact,  and  would  have  no 

12 


178  METAPHYSICS 

significance  for  the  changeless  reality,  or  for  the  omniscient 
mind  which  should  grasp  it  in  its  changeless  intuition.  Time 
would  be  simply  a  movement  in  the  finite  mind,  while  for 
the  infinite  there  would  be  an  eternal  now. 

Unfortunately,  this  illustration  is  not  entirely  applicable 
to  the  case  in  hand,  at  least  unless  we  adopt  the  Eleatic  no- 
tion of  being.  For  the  Eleatics  there  is  no  need  of  time. 
Action  and  change  do  not  exist,  and  things  are  but  the 
eternal  consequences  of  being,  just  as  all  mathematics  is 
eternally  existent  in  the  basal  axioms  and  intuitions.  In 
such  a  scheme  time  cannot  be  anything  but  an  unaccount- 
able illusion  in  finite  thought.  But  we  are  already  com- 
mitted to  the  Heraclitic  view  of  being  so  far  as  change  is 
concerned.  For  us,  things  are  not  resting  in  changeless 
logical  relations,  but  are  active  and  changing ;  and  hence  it 
is  impossible  to  reach  the  ideality  of  time  by  eliminating 
change  from  being.  "We  must  have  motion  in  things  as 
well  as  in  the  observer.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  notion 
of  time  seems  the  great  dividing-wall  between  Heraclitus 
and  the  Eleatics.  When  we  exclude  time,  cause  and  effect 
must  coexist;  and  then  the  effect  is  not  produced  by  the 
cause,  but  is  only  its  logical  implication.  Without  a  real 
before-and-after  it  seems  impossible  to  prevent  the  dynamic 
relations  of  reality  from  vanishing  into  purely  logical  rela- 
tions; and  this  would  be  to  abandon  Heraclitus  and  return 
to  Spinoza  and  the  Eleatics.  The  alternative  can  be  escaped 
only  by  showing  that  change  does  not  imply  time  as  an 
actual  existence,  but  that  time  is  only  the  subjective  appear- 
ance of  change.  If  this  can  be  made  out,  there  will  be  no 
difficulty  in  accepting  the  ideal  theory. 

But  before  passing  to  this  question  we  must  consider  an 
objection  springing  out  of  the  illustration  from  a  changeless 
system.  It  may  be  said  that  we  confound  time  with  dura- 
tion. Time  itself  may  be  viewed  as  a  correlate  of  change ; 


TIME  179 

but  if  there  were  no  change  the  changeless  would  still  en- 
dure. If,  then,  \ve  should  adopt  the  Eleatic  conception  of 
changeless  being,  so  that  all  the  consequences  of  being  should 
changelessly  coexist  with  it,  being  as  a  whole  would  still 
have  duration.  There  would  be  no  sequence,  but  there 
would  be  duration.  This  distinction  between  time  and  du- 
ration, though  it  has  often  appeared,  especially  in  theology, 
we  cannot  view  as  tenable.  For  duration  can  only  mean 
continuous  existence  through  time,  and  without  the  notion 
of  time  duration  loses  all  significance.  The  only  reason  for 
distinguishing  separate  times  in  the  changeless  would  be  the 
sequence  of  mental  states  in  ourselves ;  and  this  sequence 
itself  is  change,  and  hence  contrary  to  the  hypothesis.  We 
can  give  duration  significance,  as  applied  to  the  changeless, 
only  on  the  assumption  of  an  independent  flowing  time, 
which  moves  on  ceaselessly  and  carries  being  with  it.  But 
this  view  we  have  found  empty  and  impossible,  and  hence 
we  do  not  allow  that  duration  has  any  application  to  change- 
less existence.  Such  being  simply  is,  and  the  distinction  of 
past  and  future  does  not  exist.  Even  the  "  is  "  we  view  as 
an  affirmation  of  being,  and  not  as  a  present  tense.  The 
difficulty  in  accepting  this  view  is  due  partly  to  an  implicit 
return  to  the  notion  of  an  independent  time,  and  partly  to 
the  fact  that  even  in  such  a  fixed  state  we  assume  ourselves 
as  present  with  all  our  mental  changes. 

Time,  then,  depends  on  change.  In  a  changeless  world 
time  would  have  no  meaning.  But  the  actual  world  is  not 
changeless,  and  thus  the  question  arises  concerning  the  rela- 
tion of  change  to  time.  That  it  cannot  be  in  time,  as  some- 
thing independent  of  itself,  we  have  already  seen.  In  that 
case  the  whole  temporal  series  would  exist  at  once  without 
any  temporal  sequence,  and  thus  the  assumed  reality  of 
time  would  give  us  a  curious  form  of  the  ideality  of  time,  in 
that  it  would  find  the  succession  of  things  entirely  in  our 


180  METAPHYSICS 

minds  and  not  in  things  themselves.  But  while  change  is 
not  in  time,  its  factors  are  successive,  and  thus  change  has 
the  temporal  form.  Its  members  cannot  be  brought  to- 
gether in  temporal  coexistence,  and  the  attempt  to  do  so 
involves  a  tacit  affirmation  of  the  time  which  is  denied. 
Time,  then,  cannot  relate  to  any  independent  flow  outside  of 
things,  but  it  does  relate  to  these  phases  of  change.  These 
cannot  be  related  as  coexistences,  but  only  as  sequences ; 
and  time  expresses  these  relations.  The  date  of  an  occur- 
rence is  not  a  moment  of  absolute  time,  but  expresses  a  rela- 
tion within  the  changing  series.  How  shall  we  conceive 
this  relation  ? 

The  problem  now  takes  on  the  following  form.  As  long 
as  we  apply  the  law  of  the  sufficient  reason  on  the  imper- 
sonal plane,  change  in  appearance  is  impossible  without 
change  in  reality.  There  is  then  an  order  of  real  change, 
and  the  idealist  has  to  show  that  time  is  but  the  subjective 
aspect  of  that  order,  or  the  form  under  which  we  conceive 
change. 

The  idealist  now  has  the  floor  and  offers  the  following 
exposition.  As  the  dynamic  relations  of  things  are  space- 
less, yet  demand  that  things  should  appear  in  space,  so  the 
dynamic  relations  of  things  are  timeless,  but  demand  that 
they  shall  appear  under  the  form  of  time.  The  notion  may 
be  presented  as  follows :  "We  have  before  pointed  out  that 
change  does  not  occur  in  an  independent  time,  and  that 
in  the  series  A,  Ar  Av  .  .  .  An,  by  which  we  represent  the 
world-process,  only  dynamic  relations  are  concerned.  We 
have  simply  a  relation  of  cause  and  effect  without  any  ad 
mixture  of  time-elements ;  and  the  notion  of  time  can  only 
be  the  translation  of  this  causal  connection  into  terms  of 
sequence.  If,  now,  we  suppose  some  perceptive  being  in  the 
midst  of  this  process,  say  at  Am,  who  could  discern  the  order 


TIME  181 

of  dependence  among  the  members  of  the  series,  he  would 
perceive  that  each  member  is  conditioned  by  the  preceding 
one,  and  conditions  the  succeeding  one.  Am  is  conditioned 
by  -4m-i-  and  conditions  Am+i.  The  attempt  to  represent 
this  relation  in  thought  results  in  their  arrangement  in  a 
temporal  scheme,  in  which  the  cause  is  made  the  antecedent 
and  the  effect  the  consequent.  Antecedence  and  sequence 
is  the  universal  form  under  which  the  mind  represents  to 
itself  causation  ;  but,  when  we  reflect  upon  the  matter,  we 
find  that  time  does  not  enter  into  the  reality,  but  only  into 
the  appearance.  To  return,  now,  to  our  being  at  Am<  his  own 
position  will  constitute  for  him  the  present.  He  will  per- 
ceive, too,  that  Am  conditions  all  the  higher  members  of  the 
series,  and  hence  he  will  locate  them  in  the  future,  and  he 
will  make  them  far  or  near,  according  to  the  complexity  of 
their  conditionedness.  Am+\  will  be  conditioned  only  by 
Am,  while  J.m+2  will  be  conditioned  by  both  Am  and  Am+\', 
hence  it  will  be  put  further  on  in  the  series.  This  being 
will  further  perceive  that  all  the  lower  members  of  the 
series  condition  Am,  or  his  present,  and  hence  he  will  put 
them  in  the  past  and  at  greater  or  less  distances,  according 
to  their  relations  to  Am.  If,  in  the  series,  this  being  should 
discover  an  unconditioned  member,  the  regress  would  stop 
at  that  point,  and  that  member  would  appear  as  eternal. 
Thus  a  tendency  to  represent  dependence  b}T  temporal  ante- 
cedence and  sequence  would  produce  in  such  a  being  the 
perception  of  a  temporal  order,  even  in  a  perfectly  timeless 
system.  That  there  is  such  a  tendency  in  the  human  mind 
cannot  be  denied,  for  it  is  so  strong  that  we  are  always 
tempted  to  resolve  logical  and  dynamic  sequence  into  tem- 
poral sequence.  But  we  have  seen  that  the  dynamic  se- 
quence bears  no  marks  of  time,  and  hence  we  must  con- 
clude that  the  temporal  order  of  things  exists  only  in 
thought,  and  is  purely  a  product  of  the  observing  mind. 


182  METAPHYSICS 

There  may  be  some  truth  in  this  view,  but  it  does  no*; 
seem  to  be  well  put ;  or  rather  the  exposition  is  not  without 
ambiguity.  The  result  is  to  show  how,  in  a  timeless  system 
of  conditioning  and  conditioned  members,  the  appearance 
of  time  might  arise  as  the  way  in  which  we  represent  de- 
pendence. But  we  set  out  to  discover  the  relation  of  time 
to  change,  and  that  is  not  clearly  the  same  matter.  There 
is  one  fact  in  our  temporal  experience  which  is  fatal  to 
the  attempt  to  make  dependence  take  the  place  of  change. 
It  is,  indeed,  conceivable  that  in  a  changeless  system  the 
relation  of  dependence  should  be  represented  as  that  of 
before-and-af ter ;  so  that  for  every  being  at  different  points 
in  the  system,  all  the  lower  members  should  seem  to  be  in 
the  past,  and  all  the  higher  members  should  seem  to  be  in 
the  future.  But  in  such  a  case  every  being  would  have  a 
fixed  present.  The  being  at  Am  would  always  have  his 
present  at  Am,  and  past  and  future  would  be  fixed  quanti- 
ties in  experience.  But  this  is  not  the  case.  Am  does  not 
remain  the  present,  but  forthwith  gives  place  to  Am+l ;  and 
this  in  turn  is  displaced  by  Am+2.  Thus  the  future  is  ever 
becoming  present  and  vanishing  into  the  past.  But  this 
fact  is  impossible  so  long  as  there  is  no  change  in  reality. 
Hence  change  can  never  be  made  phenomenal  only,  but  is 
a  fact  of  reality  itself. 

We  are  certainly  not  getting  on  very  fast,  but  we  are 
making  some  progress,  though  it  may  not  be  apparent.  The 
net  result  thus  far  is  about  as  follows :  There  is  no  inde- 
pendent time  in  which  change  occurs  and  by  which  change 
is  measured ;  but  change  is  nevertheless  real,  and  time  as 
the  form  of  change  is  also  real.  Time  dates  and  measures 
do  not  refer  to  an  independent  time,  but  they  express  real 
facts  and  relations  within  the  changing  series.  The  series 
-4,  Av  Az,  Ay  .  .  .  An  is  not  in  time  ;  and  between  A  and 
4n  there  is  no  time.  Neither  is  A  earlier  than  An  in  anv 


TIME  183 

absolute  time,  for  that  which  makes  a  thing  earlier  or  later 
is  its  position  in  the  series.  But  A  and  An,  though  not  sepa- 
rate in  any  absolute  time,  are  nevertheless  not  coexistent, 
for  their  relations  are  such  that  the  existence  of  either  ex- 
cludes that  of  the  other.  The  objective  fact  is  being  passing 
from  state  to  state,  and  these  states  are  mutually  exclusive. 
Change  does  not,  indeed,  require  time ;  but  it  results  in  a 
new  state  which  excludes,  and  hence  succeeds,  its  prede- 
cessor. This  fact  of  change  is  basal.  It  is  not  in  time, 
and  it  does  not  require  time ;  but  it  founds  time ;  and  time 
is  but  the  form  of  change.  In  the  common  thought  time 
exists  as  a  precondition  of  change ;  in  our  view  change  is 
first,  and  time  is  but  its  form.  It  has  no  other  reality. 

The  view  thus  reached  is  a  compromise  between  the  ideal 
and  the  current  view.  Absolute  time,  or  time  as  an  in- 
dependent reality,  is  purely  a  product  of  our  thinking.  In 
this  sense,  then,  the  world  is  not  in  time.  But  change  is 
real,  and  change  cannot  be  conceived  without  succession. 
In  this  sense,  the  world-process  is  in  time.  But  distinctions 
of  time  do  not  depend  on  any  flow  of  absolute  time,  but 
on  the  flow  of  reality,  and  on  the  position  of  things  in  this 
flow.  To  say  that  there  is  time  between  distant  members 
of  the  series,  means  only  that  reality  changes  in  passing 
from  one  state  to  another ;  and  the  amount  of  time  is  not 
simply  measured  by  the  amount  of  change,  but  is  nothing 
but  the  amount  of  change.  The  rate  of  change  is  the  rate 
cf  time ;  and  the  cessation  of  change  would  be  the  cessa- 
tion of  time. 

This,  we  have  said,  is  about  the  net  result  of  the  previous 
discussion ;  but  that  we  have  not  yet  reached  any  final 
resting-place  appears  on  a  little  reflection.  Thought  itself 
disappears,  if  we  do  not  allow  some  sort  of  changeless- 
ness  or  timelessness  across  all  change  or  temporality.  The 


184  METAPHYSICS 

changing  world  must  in  some  way  be  paced  to  the  change- 
less, or  thought  collapses.  In  treating  of  change  and  iden- 
tity we  found  that  the  two  can  never  be  reconciled  on  the 
impersonal  plane.  The  Eleatic  was  able  to  refute  the  Her- 
aclitic;  and  the  Heraclitic  was  equally  able  to  refute  the 
Eleatic.  Meanwhile  thought  was  seen  to  demand  both  ele- 
ments, but  the  discovery  was  also  made  that  their  union 
could  be  effected  only  as  we  abandoned  the  abstract  cate- 
gories of  the  impersonal  understanding,  and  rose  to  the  con- 
ception of  active  intelligence  as  furnishing  the  only  possible 
concrete  union  of  the  categories  in  question,  and  as  being 
indeed  the  only  true  reality  and  the  place  of  all  subordinate 
realities. 

These  results  must  be  recalled  here.  The  truth  is  that 
the  common  notion  of  an  extra-mental  reality  of  some  sort, 
which  we  have  already  exorcised  and  cast  out,  has  unwit- 
tingly come  back  into  our  thought  and  darkened  the  dis- 
cussion. This  reality,  which  is  supposed  to  be  changing 
apart  from  thought,  we  have  sought  to  reduce  to  timeless- 
ness,  and,  as  might  have  been  expected,  with  very  imper- 
fect success.  And  we  have  tacitly  assumed  that  this  chang- 
ing reality  is  something  possible  on  its  own  account,  and 
that  its  temporal  relations  can  be  determined  within  the 
changing  series  itself  and  without  any  reference  to  intelli- 
gence. In  all  this  we  have  forgotten  our  earlier  studies, 
and  by  consequence  have  erred  and  strayed  from  the  way. 
But  in  fact  change  is  nothing  except  with  reference  to  an 
abiding  intelligence.  As  an  idea  it  eludes  us  until  it  is 
contrasted  with  the  unchanging ;  and  as  a  reality  it  is  noth- 
ing until  it  is  subordinated  to  active  intelligence,  which  is 
the  only  causal  reality  and  which  can  recognize  nothing  but 
itself  and  its  own  products.  The  attempt  to  find  a  present 
in  the  changing  series  apart  from  reference  to  intelligence 
is  equally  a  failure.  Considered  as  temporal  and  extra- 


TIME  185 

mental,  the  series  falls  asunder  into  past  and  future,  leaving 
the  present  only  as  the  plane  of  division  between  them. 
With  this  result,  the  extra-mental  time  vanishes  altogether. 
Hence  the  doctrine  of  time  must  be  construed  not  with  ref- 
erence to  an  extra -mental  existence,  but  from  the  stand- 
point of  self-conscious  intelligence.  Only  thus  can  we 
escape  the  intellectual  scandals  and  contradictions  and  im- 
possibilities which  haunt  both  the  traditional  and  the  ideal- 
istic view  of  time,  so  long  as  any  extra-mental  existence  is 
allowed. 

Now  from  this  point  of  view  the  question  assumes  a  very 
different  aspect.  Time,  as  the  form  of  our  subjective  ex- 
perience, takes  its  origin  from  the  stand-point  of  conscious 
intelligence,  which  constitutes  its  own  present.  This  pres- 
ent is  not  in  time  as  anything  independent  of  itself;  it  is 
simply  a  relation  in  consciousness.  The  mind  relates  its 
actual  experience  to  itself,  and  thus  constitutes  the  only 
present  there  is.  When  we  attempt  to  have  experience  in 
the  present,  considered  as  a  point  or  section  of  a  real  time, 
we  fall  into  contradiction.  We  escape  this  by  the  insight 
that  the  present  can  only  mean  the  actual  in  experience ; 
and  past  and  future  get  all  their  meaning  by  being  related 
to  this  actual.  Experience,  then,  is  not  in  the  present,  but 
the  present  is  in  experience.  If  we  would  know  what  the 
present  means  we  must  not  look  for  a  point  in  abstract  time 
by  which  to  define  it ;  we  must  rather  look  into  experience 
itself  for  the  meaning  of  the  relation. 

And  this  which  is  true  for  our  subjective  time  is  equally 
true  for  objective  or  cosmic  time.  This  time  also  can  be 
understood  and  defined  only  from  the  stand-point  of  con- 
scious intelligence.  Taken  abstractly,  or  by  itself,  it  makes 
both  the  world  and  thought  impossible.  And  they  remain 
impossible  until  it  is  seen  that  time  is  neither  an  ontologi- 
cal  reality  nor  an  cntological  process,  but  rather  and  only  a 


186  METAPHYSICS 

thought-relation  which  has  neither  existence  nor  meaning 
apart  from  thought. 

And  thus  we  come  again  upon  the  fact,  often  referred  to 
in  previous  chapters,  that  thought  cannot  be  understood 
through  its  own  categories.  That  is,  the  categories  are 
nothing  which  precede  intelligence  and  make  it  possible; 
they  are  rather  the  categories  of  intelligence,  and  for  their 
concrete  meaning  we  are  referred,  not  to  a  formal  analysis 
of  abstract  ideas,  but  to  our  experience  of  living  intelligence. 
We  have  seen  this  to  be  the  case  with  the  categories  of  be- 
ing, identity,  unity,  and  causality ;  and  now  we  find  the 
same  fact  in  the  case  of  time.  Thought  is  the  source  of 
temporal  relations;  and  for  their  meaning  we  must  fall, 
back  upon  experience,  rather  than  any  reflection  on  the  ab- 
stract temporal  category. 

Time,  then,  is  not  an  ontological  fact  but  is  essentially  a 
function  of  self-conscious- intelligence.  Shall  we  say,  then, 
that  intelligence  itself  is  timeless ;  and,  if  we  do  say  so, 
have  we  not  fallen  into  absolute  unintelligibility,  if  not 
into  downright  raving?  Surely,  considering  the  nature  of 
our  experience,  the  brevity  and  changefulness  of  our  exist- 
ence, it  would  seem  that  no  one  can  be  serious  who  denies 
our  temporality.  A  little  paradox  is  permissible;  but  it 
becomes  an  insufferable  affront  to  good  sense  when  it  is 
carried  to  such  shocking  extremes. 

This  remonstrance  has  something  in  it ;  but  for  the  most 
part  it  rests  on  overlooking  the  distinction  between  the 
phenomenal  and  the  ontological  reality.  We  have  repeat- 
edly declared  that  no  one  can  deny  time  as  a  form  of  our 
experience,  and,  in  this  sense,  as  a  fact  of  reality.  But 
this  time  exists  only  in  the  experience  of  a  self-conscious  in- 
telligence ;  and  it  is  permitted  to  inquire  whether  it  has  exist- 
ence or  meaning  apart  from  that  relation.  It  never  occurs  to 
the  idealist  to  have  experiences  without  temporal  relations 


TIME  187 

among  their  elements,  but  these  exist  only  in  and  for 
thought. 

There  is  a  somewhat  complicated  thought  underlying  the 
remainder  of  the  remonstrance.  The  purely  temporal  form 
and  relation  are  complicated  with  the  limitations  of  the 
finite;  and  thus  two  questions  quite  distinct  are  confused. 
There  is  also  an  implicit  effort  to  conceive  the  non-temporal 
temporally,  or  to  make  temporal  coexistence  the  antithesis 
of  temporality.  For  the  sake  of  untangling  the  matter, 
we  must  divide  the  questions,  and  consider  the  relation  of 
time,  first,  to  the  finite  intellect ;  secondly,  to  the  finite 
spirit  as  existing ;  and,  thirdly,  to  the  infinite  and  absolute 
being. 

And,  first  of  all,  the  finite  intelligence,  in  so  far  as  it  is 
intelligence,  is  timeless ;  that  is,  it  has  no  real  before-and- 
after  in  it,  but  it  establishes  temporal  relations.  If  we  say 
that  such  a  being  is  unthinkable  m  abstraction  from  tem- 
poral relations,  that  can  only  mean  that  an  abstract  sub- 
ject which  did  nothing,  and  hence  did  not  manifest  itself  as 
mind,  would  be  nothing  for  thought.  But  if  we  mean  that 
this  mind  which  establishes  temporal  and  other  relations, 
and  thus  produces  an  articulate  thought-life,  is  itself  com- 
prised in  those  temporal  relations,  as  something  apart  from 
and  antecedent  to  thought,  we  must  say  that  this  view  is 
truly  unthinkable  and  leads  to  the  destruction  of  thought. 
What  is  this  being?  It  is  the  subject  of  the  thought-life, 
and  it  knows  and  reveals  itself  in  this  life.  If  we  ask  how 
it  can  be  a  self-conscious  subject  and  manifest  itself  in  the 
establishment  of  the  forms  and  relations  of  thought,  the 

answer  must  be  that  there  is  no  answer.     Realitv  cannot 

•  •/ 

be"  deduced ;  it  is ;  and  the  only  work  of  speculation  must 
be  to  discover  what  the  reality  is  which  is.  To  recognize 
and  describe,  not  to  deduce  or  comprehend,  must  be  our 
aim. 


188  METAPHYSICS 

The  pure  temporal  form  does  not  involve  the  knowing 
subject,  whether  finite  or  infinite.  When  in  a  dream  the 
mind  gives  the  spatial  form  to  its  objects,  the  mind  is  the 
source  of  the  form,  but  it  is  not  included  in  it.  Through 
our  connection  with  an  organism,  however,  we  acquire  a 
new  relation  to  space.  The  organism  exists  in  spatial  re- 
lations, and  thus  we  seem  to  have  a  location.  This,  as  we 
have  said  in  the  previous  chapter,  is  only  an  expression  of 
our  finitude,  and  is  no  essential  part  of  the  space  intuition. 
The  same  fact  appears  in  the  case  of  time.  The  purely 
temporal  form  alone  does  not  involve  the  subject.  But  we 
are  also  members  of  a  system  which  is  independent  of  us, 
and  we  are  to  a  very  great  extent  subordinated  to  that  sys- 
tem. This  relation  manifests  itself  in  a  certain  temporal 
character  of  our  experience.  The  self  is  limited  ;  it  comes 
and  goes,  has  beginnings  and  endings,  and  unpicturable 
pauses  and  variations  which  are  imposed  upon  it  from  with- 
out. In  this  sense  our  life  is  temporal ;  and  in  this  sense 
temporality  is  only  the  shadow  of  our  finitude  and  limita- 
tion, and  our  subordination  to  the  total  system  and  order 
of  finite  existence.  And  this  temporality  is  not  in  time; 
it  is  simply  an  aspect  of  our  experience. 

From  this  point  of  view  time  is  seen  to  be  largely  rela- 
tive in  any  case.  Time  is  primarily  the  form  of  individual 
experience,  and  would  remain  relative  to  the  individual 
were  it  not  for  the  existence  of  the  cosmic  order  which 
marks  the  cosmic  time,  and  furnishes  the  common  time- 
piece by  which  our  individual  times  are  regulated.  But 
even  this  does  not  remove  the  relativity  of  time.  We  have 
seen  that  this  process  gives  no  time  order  until  it  is  related 
to  conscious  intelligence ;  and  the  temporal  judgment  will 
vary  with  the  powers  of  the  one  judging. 

First  of  all,  the  present  is  relative.  "We  have  seen  that 
we  cannot  have  experience  in  the  present,  but  we  consti- 


TIME  189 

tute  the  present  by  the  actual  in  experience  But  the  range 
of  this  experience  varies  with  the  range  of  our  powers. 
One  able  to  comprehend  a  large  body  of  objects  or  events 
within  the  field  of  consciousness  would  have  a  more  exten- 
sive present  than  another  who  could  grasp  but  a  few.  If 
\ve  could  retain  all  the  objects  of  experience  in  equal  vivid- 
ness and  immediacy  they  would  be  alike  present.  A  mind 
which  could  do  this  would  have  no  past.  Again,  a  mind 
in  full  possession  of  itself,  so  that  it  does  not  come  to  itself 
successively  would  have  no  future.  Such  a  being  would 
have  a  changeless  knowledge  and  a  changeless  life.  It 
would  be  without  memory  or  expectation,  so  far  as  itself 
was  concerned,  yet  it  would  also  be  in  the  absolute  enjoy- 
ment of  itself.  For  such  a  being  the  present  alone  would 
exist,  and  its  now  would  be  eternal. 

The  present,  then,  is  no  point  in  absolute  time,  but  a  re- 
lation in  conscious  experience;  and  its  measure  and  con- 
tents depend  on  the  range  of  our  powers.  Every  intellect 
transcends  time  as  mental  form ;  but  the  finite  mind  re- 
mains under  the  law  of  time  as  limitation,  by  virtue  of  its 
finitude.  When  we  speak  of  transcending  time  this  double 
aspect  of  the  question  must  be  borne  in  mind.  The  com- 
plete transcendence  of  time  in  both  senses  is  possible  only 
to  the  absolute  person.  Here  only  do  we  find  the  absolute 
independence  and  changeless  self-possession  which  are  need- 
ed to  constitute  the  timeless  life.  Finite  minds,  on  the 
other  hand,  are  in  time  in  a  sense.  Change  penetrates  into 
their  life.  But  this  time  is  not  something  which  contains 
them,  or  which  precedes  and  conditions  the  change;  and 
the  changing  life  is  only  an  expression  of  our  subordination 
and  finitude. 

What  we  have  said  of  the  timelessness  of  the  absolute 
being  might  possibly  be  allowed  so  far  as  its  own  self- 
knowledge  and  self-possession  are  concerned ;  but  what  of 


190  METAPHYSICS 

the  will  whereby  the  cosmic  process  is  realized  and  carried 
on  ?  This  process,  we  may  say,  is  essentially  changing  and 
progressive,  and  hence  essentially  temporal  There  is  suc- 
cession in  the  process,  and  there  must  be  succession  in  the 
realizing  will. 

This  seems  perfectly  clear  at  first  sight,  but  grows  cloudy 
on  reflection.  If  the  world-process  is  to  be  in  time  in  any 
sense,  it  must  be  in  time  for  some  one.  Its  temporality  has 
no  meaning  in  itself.  Without  doubt  the  cosmic  process 
has  the  temporal  form  for  us ;  and  very  possibly  it  has  the 
temporal  form  for  the  Creator.  Temporally  considered,  it 
is  successive.  Temporally  considered,  it  is  impossible  to 
reduce  it  to  coexistence.  But  the  temporal  form  as  little 
requires  temporal  succession  in  the  realizing  activity  as 
the  spatial  form  requires  spatial  extension  in  the  realiz- 
ing activity.  In  both  cases  we  come  upon  an  unpicturable 
ground  of  the  order,  but  we  are  not  permitted  to  carry 
the  factors  of  the  phenomenal  order  into  its  ontological 
ground.  Unless  we  are  to  lose  ourselves  in  the  infinite 
regress,  all  change  must  at  last  be  referred  to  the  change- 
less, the  unchanging  source  of  change.  The  change  must 
be  found  in  the  effects,  and  not  in  the  cause.  When  we 
come  to  the  unconditioned  cause,  further  regress  becomes 
absurd.  But  such  a  changeless  cause  is  a  contradiction  on 
the  plane  of  impersonal  necessity.  Nothing  will  meet  the 
case  except  the  conception  of  the  absolute  person,  which 
freely  posits  a  changing  world-order  without  being  himself 
involved  in  the  change. 

If,  however,  we  persist,  and  insist  that  even  this  absolute 
cause  may  still  change  himself  and  would  change  himself 
in  the  case  mentioned,  we  find  ourselves  unable  to  make  out 
our  own  meaning.  From  what  to  what  would  the  change 
be?  There  is  no  developing  life  within  the  infinite  by 
which  to  measure  it.  If  we  say  it  is  at  least  from  inactivity 


TIME  191 

to  actir:ty,  or  from  one  phase  of  activity  to  another  phase 
of  activity,  we  can  make  nothing  of  this  except  by  referring 
to  the  products.  We  would  hardly  feign  a  sub-conscious 
substance  with  divers  modifications  in  it;  and  if  we  dismiss 
this  fiction,  then  the  only  assignable  change  falls  among  the 
effects ;  that  is,  within  the  temporal  order.  We  conclude, 
then,  that  the  activity  whereby  the  temporal  order  is  real- 
ized has  no  temporality  in  itself.  Such  temporality  as  the 
world  may  have  other  than  the  thought  order  would  exist 
not  for  the  creator,  but  only  for  the  finite  spirits  which  are 
comprehended  in  the  cosmic  process. 

And  now  it  will  doubtless  occur  to  the  dealer  in  abstrac- 
tions that  all  this  is  hopelessly  contradictory.  The  tracing 
of  change  to  the  changeless,  and  the  deduction  of  change 
from  the  changeless,  what  is  this  but  contradiction  ?  That 
is  indeed  what  it  is  on  the  plane  of  impersonal  abstractions. 
Change  and  changelessness  are  contradictory  ideas,  and 
neither  can  be  viewed  as  the  source  of  the  other;  for  no 
reflection  on  either  will  reveal  the  other  except  as  its  con- 
tradictory opposite.  And  thus  we  find  ourselves  in  a  great 
embarrassment.  On  the  one  hand,  reflection  shows  that 
the  admission  of  ontological  change  into  intelligence  would 
destroy  it,  and  on  the  other,  logic  refuses  to  accept  the 
changeless  as  the  explanation  of  change.  There  is  no  way 
out  of  this  deadlock  on  the  impersonal  plane.  On  this 
plane,  by  the  law  of  the  sufficient  reason,  we  can  only  come 
to  the  Heraclitic  flux  and  the  destruction  of  thought.  The 
solution  of  the  puzzle  is  found  in  leaving  the  impersonal 
abstractions,  and  rising  to  the  plane  of  free  personality. 
Change  does  not  arise  from  abstract  changelessness,  but  the 
free  mind  initiates  change  without  being  itself  involved  in 
it.  Thus  the  contradiction  disappears.  How  this  is  possi- 
ble is  quite  beyond  us;  but  it  is  something  to  see  that  it  is 
nevertheless  aciual,  and  that  thought  is  hopelessly  stalled 


192  METAPHYSICS 

on  any  other  view.  And  when,  instead  of  taking  change 
and  changelessness  abstractly  and  verbally  manipulating 
them,  we  take  them  as  they  are  given  in  the  mind's  living 
experience  of  itself,  the  problem  solves  itself.  The  solution 
by  walking  is  the  great  practical  solution  ;  and  the  abstract 
thinker  who  wants  something  deeper  only  mistakes  his 
fictitious  abstractions  for  reality. 

•  It  is  something  of  a  relief  to  remember  again  that  these 
difficult  questions  refer  in  no  way  to  experience,  but  only 
to  its  ontological  ground.  And  however  sure  we  may  be 
that  the  essential  ground  of  experience  is  neither  spatial 
nor  temporal,  but  founds  both  spatial  and  temporal  rela- 
tions, we  are  under  no  obligation  to  tell  how  it  is  done,  and 
we  may  go  on  making  engagements  to  meet  at  times  and 
places  with  as  much  certainty  of  our  meaning  and  security 
as  to  the  fulfilment  as  if  the  ideality  of  space  and  time  had 
never  been  dreamed  of.  And  thus  after  our  long  wander- 
ings we  come  back  in  a  way  to  the  common  view.  Having 
got  clear  of  all  extra-mental  realities,  we  have  only  to  take 
account  of  mental  realities.  We  are  no  longer  haunted  by 
those  back-lying  noumena  which  ought  to.be  known,  but 
which  cannot  be  because  of  the  masking  mental  form.  "We 
are  allowed,  then,  to  take  the  existence  of  things  for  intel- 
ligence as  their  true  and  only  existence,  and  hence  in  know- 
ing this  existence,  so  far  as  tilings  are  concerned,  we  know 
all  there  is  to  know.  And  thus  the  mind  is  face  to  face 
with  reality  after  all.  Only  we  must  remember  that  there 
nre  realities  and  realities.  Phenomenal  realities  are  not  to 
be  mistaken  for  ontological  ones;  and  the  categories  of  phe- 
nomena must  not  be  applied  to  their  ontological  ground. 
Every  one  can  see  that  the  thought  of  length  is  not  long ; 
and  it  is  just  as  clear  on  reflection  that  the  thought  of  time 
is  not  temporal.  Finally,  our  judgments  of  phenomenal 
time  have  in  them  so  much  of  relativity,  owing  to  the  lim- 


TIME  193 

ited  range  of  our  consciousness  and  our  general  dependence 
and  finitude,  that  we  cannot  be  too  circumspect  in  trans- 
ferring them  to  the  infinite. 

For  the  sake  of  clearness  we  may  sum  up  briefly  what  we 
conceive  to  be  the  outcome  of  the  discussion  : 

1.  Time  is  primarily  an  order  of  relations  in  our  experi- 
ence.    This  order  admits  of  no  question  or  denial. 

2.  There  is  no  ontological  time  separate  from  things  and 
events,  in  which  they  exist  or  occur. 

3.  There  is  no  order  of  ontological  change  of  which  time 
is  the  form  and  to  which  time  may  be  referred,  without  ref- 
erence to  intelligence. 

4.  Both  time  and  change  must  be  referred  to  intelligence, 
as  their  source. 

5.  Neither  time  nor  change  can  be  carried  into  intelli- 
gence as  such  without  making  thought  impossible. 

6.  Neither  time  nor  change  can  be  construed  with  refer- 
ence to  any  extra-mental  fact,  but  only  from  the  stand-point 
of  self-conscious  intelligence. 

7.  Hence  the  temporal  judgment  becomes  relative  to  the 
range  and  contents  of  self-consciousness. 

8.  Non-temporality  is  not  to  be  conceived  as  a  temporal 
coexistence,  as  if  one  should  say  that  the  earth  is  on  all 
sides  of  the  sun  at  the  same  time,  but  rather  as  the  imme- 
diate possession  of  the  objects  by  the  conscious  mind.    This 
relation  cannot  be  construed  in  temporal  terms,  but  must  be 
experienced. 

9.  What  this  may  mean  may  be  gathered  from  reflection 
on  what  we  call  present  experience.     This  is  not  temporal 
in  the  sense  of  having  a  real  before  and  after  in  it.     It  is 
temporal  in  the  sense  of  having  the  temporal  form.     It  is 
non-temporal  in  the  sense  that  the  conscious  self  grasps  all 
its  elements  in  an  indivisible  act,  and  thus  makes  conscious- 
ness possible. 

13 


194  METAPHYSICS 

10.  But  still  experience  has  the  temporal  form ;  and  we 
may  resume  our  temporal  language  with  all  confidence, 
only  guarding  ourselves  against  mistaking  this  form  for  an 
ontological  fact,  and  also  against  overlooking  the  relativity 
in  the  temporal  judgment  due  to  our  limitation. 


CHAPTER  HI 
MATTER,  FORCE,  AND  MOTION 

THE  phenomenality  of  space  implies  of  course  the  phe- 
nomenality  of  all  that  appears  in  space  or  in  spatial  form, 
flatter,  then,  in  the  sense  of  the  apparent  bodies  about  us, 
together  with  their  apparent  movements,  must  be  reckoned 
t'o  the  apparent  rather  than  the  real,  the  phenomenal  rather 
than  the  ontological.  This  does  not,  indeed,  imply  their  il- 
lusory or  fictitious  character,  for  they  constitute  the  chief 
factor  of  objective  and  universal  experience.  As  phenome- 
na they  are  real  in  their  way,  and  as  phenomena  they  have 
their  laws.  A  knowledge  of  their  nature  and  laws  is  al- 
most the  sum  of  practical  wisdom,  and  this  knowledge  can 
be  acquired  on  an  empirical  basis.  The  only  caveat  in- 
volved in  our  doctrine  lies  against  taking  these  material 
phenomena  as  substantial  or  ontological  facts.  With  this 
understanding,  physical  and  mechanical  science  has  a  most 
important  field  for  practical  investigation  and  one  which  it 
may  cultivate  without  being  molested  or  made  afraid  by 
metaphysics. 

Matter 

The  current  notions  of  matter,  as  we  should  expect,  are  a 
heterogeneous  product  of  sense  thinking  and  superficial  re- 
flection. The  thought  is  mainly  determined  by  sense  expe- 
rience and  its  spatial  forms ;  and  whatever  other  metaphys- 


196  METAPHYSICS 

ical  element  is  added  is  adjusted  to  them,  and  takes  on 
something  of  their  character.  We  shall  find  our  advantage 
in  a  study  of  the  popular  notion. 

For  a  person  on  the  sense  plane  matter  presents  no  prob- 
lem whatever.  Our  senses  reveal  various  bodies  in  space, 
and  all  we  have  to  do  is  to  read  off  the  sense  report.  There 
is  no  mystery  in  the  case,  for  everything  is  visibly  there. 
But  reflective  thought,  even  in  its  crude  stages,  finds  itself 
compelled  to  work  over  the  sense  appearance  and  modify 
our  spontaneous  conceptions.  Accordingly,  all  theories  of 
matter  from  hylozoism  to  atomism  have  in  them  a  specu- 
lative element  which  transcends  and  modifies  the  sense 
report. 

For  spontaneous  thought  bodies  in  space  are  undeniably 
given.  The  divisibility  of  body  is  also  given  as  a  fact  ol 
experience.  It  is,  however,  impossible  to  divide  something 
into  nothing ;  and  the  thought  of  infinite  division  admits 
of  no  completion.  We  always  have  something  left  when 
we  stop.  On  all  these  accounts  thought  naturally  takes  the 
direction  of  some  form  of  the  atomic  theory.  Again,  as  so- 
lidity seems  to  be  undeniably  given  in  experience  as  a  prop- 
erty of  matter,  and  as  actual  bodies  admit  of  expansion 
and  contraction,  the  corpuscular  philosophy,  with  its  two  fac- 
tors of  the  atoms  and  the  void,  naturally  emerges.  The 
little  lumps  supply  the  being,  and  the  void  space  founds  the 
possibility  of  form  and  motion.  For  a  long  time  nothing 
more  was  thought  necessary,  unless  possibly  a  prime  mover 
were  occasionally  demanded.  The  atoms,  moving  and  com- 
bining in  the  void,  were  the  sole  reality  in  matter,  and  the 
sufficient  ground  of  material  phenomena.  When  the  de- 
mand for  causation  became  more  prominent,  instead  of  find- 
ing it  in  a  prime  mover,  it  was  finally  resolved  to  carry  it 
into  the  atoms  themselves  under  the  form  of  moving  forces. 
These  were  supposed  to  inhere  in  the  atoms  and  found  their 


MATTER,  FORCE,  AND  MOTION        .  197 

changes.  The  true  material  realities  are  the  atoms  and  their 
inherent  forces,  and  all  explanation  results  from  their  com- 
position and  interaction.  Physical  science  is  generally  based 
on  some  form  of  this  theory. 

There  is  a  certain  formal  completeness  and  superficial 
plausibility  in  this  view.  For  one  interpreting  sense  expe- 
rience by  spatial  and  mechanical  categories,  it  is  hard  to  see 
how  any  other  view  is  possible.  We  cannot  rest  in  visible 
bodies  as  final.  The  mere  fact  of  divisibility  alone  would 
reduce  them  to  compounds.  But  as  we  hold  to  real  space 
and  real  extension,  we  may  well  rest  in  corpuscles,  or  little 
bodies,  as  final.  These  lie  so  far  below  the  range  of  expe- 
rience that  we  can  easily  ignore  the  logical  difficulties  in 
the  notion ;  and  we  can  use  them  without  critical  molesta- 
tion. Thus  we  seem  to  secure  a  solid  foundation  of  reality, 
and  satisfy  the  category  of  being.  And  these  little  bodies 
are  in  space,  and  admit  of  various  movements  and  combi- 
nations. With  this  outfit  we  may  well  explain  visible  body 
by  their  composition,  the  all  -  explaining  category  of  the 
imagination.  Finally,  causation  is  provided  for  by  the 
moving  forces,  and  nothing  more  seems  to  be  needed  for 
successful  and  adequate  speculation.  Indeed,  we  may  even 
doubt  if  anything  more  can  be  allowed.  The  void  is  the 
negation  of  being ;  and  what  is  there  in  the  void  but  the 
atoms?  Certainly  there  is  nothing  in  sight  but  bodies,  and 
reflection  on  the  established  facts  of  experience  teaches 
us  that  these  are  atomic  compounds.  Atoms  we  know,  and 
the  void  we  know,  and  what  is  there  besides? 

How  naive  all  this  is  is  already  familiar  to  us.  Material 
phenomena  are  mistaken  for  ontological  facts ;  and  the  at- 
tempt is  made  to  interpret  the  causal  reality  in  phenomenal 
forms.  Space  and  space  relations  are  supposed  to  be  inde- 
pendent existences,  and  mechanical  causation  is  assumed  as 
a  matter  of  course.  But  this  transparent  clearness  vanishes 


198  •  METAPHYSICS 

as  soon  as  we  recall  the  distinction  between  phenomenal 
and  ontological  reality,  and  between  the  formal  necessity  of 
a  category  and  the  concrete  form  in  which  it  exists.  Being 
there  must  be,  no  doubt,  but  it  does  not  follow  that  it  can 
be  thought  in  the  form  of  lumps.  Causality  there  must  be 
even  for  material  phenomena,  but  for  all  that  it  may  be  im- 
possible to  conceive  it  under  the  form  of  moving  forces  in- 
hering in  solid  corpuscles.  This  uncertainty  of  physical 
metaphysics  deserves  further  illustration.  Instead  of  dis- 
missing the  doctrine  at  once  on  the  strength  of  our  previous 
discussions,  it  seems  better,  and  more  likely  to  produce  con- 
viction, to  show  its  essential  confusion  on  its  own  plane,  as 
soon  as  it  transcends  phenomena  and  their  relations. 

Scientists  are  agreed  as  to  the  necessity  of  the  atomic 
theory  as  opposed  to  the  spatial  continuity  of  matter.  If 
apparent  matter  be  a  true  ontological  existence,  it  has  an 
atomic  structure.  There  is,  however,  no  agreement  as  to 
the  correct  conception  of  the  theory ;  and  in  application  it 
takes  on  different  forms  according  to  the  character  of  the 
facts  on  which  it  is  based.  Physics  and  chemistry,  miner- 
alogy and  biology,  would  lead  to  widely  differing  concep- 
tions, and  these  would  agree  in  little  more  than  in  affirming 
atomism.  For  the  astronomer,  the  atoms  are  simply  centres 
of  gravity ;  and  for  him  molecular  forces  and  ethereal  media 
are  non-existent.  Each  atom  attracts  every  other  with  an 
intensity  which  varies  inversely  as  the  square  of  the  dis 
tance ;  and  he  needs  no  other  assumption.  But  the  physi- 
cist who  studies  other  phenomena  needs  other  assumptions. 
For  him  the  atoms  split  up  into  two  great  classes  of  ponder- 
able and  imponderable,  and  are  endowed  with  various  mo- 
lecular forces  as  well  as  with  the  universal  force  of  gravity. 
Even  these  conceptions  will  be  modified  according  as  he 
studies  heat  or  light  or  electricity  or  magnetism.  The  con- 
ceptions which  are  all-sufficient  for  one  realm  do  not  suf- 


MATTER,  FORCE,  AND  MOTION  199 

fice  for  another.  The  chemist  also  builds  up  an  atomic 
theory  from  the  facts  of  chemistry,  but  his  conception  dif- 
fers very  widely  from  that  of  the  physicist.  The  physicist 
makes  much  of  the  ether ;  while  the  chemist  has  very  little 
use  for  it.  The  physicist  conceives  of  the  atoms  as  endowed 
with  universal  forces ;  while  the  chemist  endows  them  with 
selective  forces.  Except  that  the  theories  of  both  are  atom- 
ic, they  have  very  little  in  common.  The  mineralogist  and 
physiologist  in  like  manner  introduce  new  conceptions. 

Unfortunately,  very  little  attention  has  been  paid  by  stu- 
dents of  physical  science  to  comparing  and  supplementing 
the  several  partial  views  which  have  thus  arisen.  Indeed, 
it  is  not  clear  that  these  views  admit  of  being  united  into 
a  consistent  theory.  Thus  the  doctrine  is  held  in  each  de- 
partment with  only  such  exactness  as  the  facts  of  that  de- 
partment call  for ;  and  if  the  conception  prove  a  fruitful  one 
in  practice,  or  even  a  convenient  one  for  representing  the 
facts  to  the  imagination,  little  attention  is  paid  to  theoreti- 
cal consistency  or  to  agreement  with  the  results  in  other 
departments.  But,  as  thus  held,  the  atomic  theory  can  be 
viewed  only  as  a  convenient  practical  fiction  like  that  of 
fluids  and  currents  in  electricity ;  for  it  would  be  intolera- 
ble that  every  department  of  physical  study  should  have  its 
own  peculiar  set  of  atoms. 

These  partial  views  might  conceivably  be  united  in  one 
view  which  should  embrace  them  all.  But  there  are  still 
deeper  differences  which  touch  the  essential  nature  of  the 
atoms  themselves.  Accordingly,  atomism  has  all  forms 
from  the  corpuscular  philosophy  of  the  Greeks  to  the  cen- 
tres of  force  of  Boscovich  and  the  vortex-rings  of  Sir  Will- 
iam Thomson.  The  most  common  form  is  a  modification 
of  the  corpuscular  philosophy.  In  this  view  the  atoms  and 
the  void  play  their  familiar  part ;  but  the  atoms  are  enabled 
to  play  the  part  by  the  addition  of  moving  forces,  which  in 


200  METAPHYSICS 

some  mysterious  way  dwell  in  the  atoms  without  being  a 
consequence  of  them  and  yet  are  inseparable  from  them. 
Sometimes  the  atom  is  spoken  of  as  the  seat,  or  fulcrum,  of 
the  force,  and  the  force  is  viewed  as  imparted,  implanted, 
located,  etc.  In  this  view  the  most  prominent  feature  is 
the  crude  working  of  the  categories  of  being  and  causation 
under  spatial  conditions,  and  a  still  cruder  conception  of  in- 
herence. 

It  is  also  variously  proposed  to  view  the  atoms  as  alike 
in  essence  but  unlike  in  form,  or  as  alike  in  form  but  as 
unlike  in  size,  or  as  alike  in  form  and  size  but  unlike  in 
grouping,  or  as  alike  in  these  respects  but  unlike  in  energy 
or  in  intensity  of  action  ;  so  that  difference  of  atomic  weight, 
for  example,  shall  not  depend  on  a  difference  of  size  or  quan- 
tity of  matter,  but  on  a  different  intensity  of  attraction ; 
and,  finally,  it  is  proposed  to  view  the  atoms  as  qualitatively 
unlike  apart  from  all  quantitative  and  geometrical  relations. 
Some  of  the  atomic  theories  view  the  atoms  as  having  all 
the  properties  of  the  bodies  about  us;  and  others  view  them 
as  essentially  unlike  the  bodies  which  they  found.  The 
former  are  more  in  harmony  with  our  spontaneous  think- 
ing, while  the  latter  are  more  speculative  and  critical.  But 
whenever  any  of  these  views  claim  to  be  more  than  con- 
venient practical  fictions,  they  must  at  least  be  self-consist- 
ent, and  they  must  also  meet  those  general  demands  which 
we  make  upon  all  reality.  To  determine  the  specific  prop- 
erties of  the  atoms  will  always  belong  to  inductive  science ; 
to  determine  their  general  outline  is  the  work  of  meta- 
physics. 

The  corpuscular,  or  lump,  conception  of  the  atoms  has 
one  very  great  advantage ;  it  is  easily  pictured  to  the  imag- 
ination, and  calls  for  no  effort  of  thought.  It  takes  only 
the  conceptions  of  space,  form,  and  solidity  with  which  we 
are  familiar,  and,  with  these,  claims  to  solve  all  the  prob- 


MATTER,  FORCE,  AND  MOTION  201 

lems  which  phenomenal  matter  presents.  But,  on  the  other 
hand,  it  has  a  methodological  difficulty  in  that  its  explana- 
tions are  but  repetitions  in  the  mass  of  what  is  given  in  the 
unit.  On  this  theory  there  can  be  no  explanation  of  any 
property  of  body  which  is  not  first  assumed  in  the  atom. 
This  is  especially  the  case  with  extension  and  solidity.  The 
extension  of  the  mass  is  viewed  as  the  sum  of  the  exten- 
sions of  the  atoms,  and  the  solidity  of  the  mass  is  viewed  as 
resulting  from  the  solidity  of  the  elements.  Moreover,  this 
theory  has  always  had  an  idealistic  factor  in  it  by  virtue  of 
its  excess  of  materialism.  Looking  at  the  moving  atoms 
with  the  eye  of  pure  reason,  we  see  nothing  but  quantitative 
distinctions  and  relations.  Qualitative  distinctions  and  re- 
lations are  contributed  by  the  mind  of  the  spectator,  and 
these  constitute  the  chief  problem  for  explanation.  With- 
out the  spectator  the  problems  would  not  only  not  be  raised ; 
they  would  not  even  exist.  A  mind  which  could  completely 
grasp  the  moving  elements  as  they  are  in  themselves,  but 
not  as  they  appear,  would  miss  the  most  important  problems 
of  the  system.  Thus  we  reach  the  paradox  that  an  absolute 
knowledge  of  the  system  would  find  in  it  very  little  that 
would  demand  interpretation. 

The  corpuscular  philosophy  finds  its  purest  illustration  in 
the  atomism  of  the  ancient  Greeks.  The  two  factors  of 
their  view  were  the  atoms  and  the  void.  The  atoms  were 
viewed  as  absolutely  solid,  and  as  secure  in  their  solid  single- 
ness against  all  division  and  destruction.  Moving  forces 
were  left  out  of  the  account  altogether.  But,  apart  from 
the  fact  that  the  mutual  independence  ascribed  to  the  atoms 
made  all  interaction,  even  of  impact,  impossible,  it  has 
long  been  recognized  that  such  atoms  would  explain  noth- 
ing. In  particular,  the  facts  of  chemistry  call  for  an  atomic 
conception  which  has  little  but  the  name  in  common  with 
the  ancient  atomism.  The  atoms  which  modern  science 


202  METAPHYSICS 

calls  for  are  atoms  which  are  not  in  mutual  independence 
and  indifference,  but  which  are  parts  of  a  whole,  and  which 
are  not  left  to  chance  as  the  ground  of  their  orderly  com- 
binations. On  this  account  the  new  conception  of  motor- 
forces  has  been  added.  But  these  forces  have  generally 
been  added  in  a  very  clumsy  way.  A  passive  solidity  has 
been  assumed  as  a  foundation  ;  and  then  forces  have  been 
imparted  to  this  inert  lump  in  a  highly  mysterious  fashion. 
No  information  is  given  as  to  where  the  forces  come  from, 
or  what  their  inner  relation  is  to  the  matter  which  they  are 
said  to  inhere  in  or  inhabit.  And  yet,  though  matter  and 
force  are  thus  brought  together  by  an  act  of  pure  violence, 
and  though  neither  seems  to  give  any  account  of  the  other, 
an  edict  is  issued  against  separating  them,  and  it  even  passes 
into  a  first  principle  that  there  is  no  matter  without  force, 
and  no  force  without  matter.  Meanwhile  the  corpuscular 
conception  of  the  atom  as  absolutely  solid  and  as  having  a 
changeless  volume  is  retained  ;  and  then,  to  make  room  for 
motion  ^and  to  account  for  the  form  and  coherence  of  bod- 
ies, these  atoms  are  held  apart  and  together  by  their  forces, 
and  at  distances  compared  with  which  the  diameters  of  the 
atoms  themselves  are  very  small. 

But  from  this  stand-point  the  need  of  viewing  the  atoms 
as  corpuscles,  or  minified  matter,  disappears  entirely.  The 
phenomenal  solidity  of  bodies,  which  is  the  only  solidity  of 
which  we  have  any  knowledge,  is  JIG  longer  the  integral  of 
the  solidities  of  the  atoms,  but  is  purely  a  product  of  a  cer- 
tain balance  of  attractive  and  repulsive  forces  between  the 
elements,  and  dpes  not  represent  any  property  of  the  ele- 
ments themselves.  If  we  allow  that  the  elements  have  an 
absolute  form  and  solidity,  we  have  also  to  allow  that  they 
never  come  into  play  in  accounting  for  the  properties  of 
body ;  and  that  these  properties  are  all  the  outcome  of  a 
dynamism  which  in  itself  is  totally  unlike  the  properties 


MATTER,  FORCE,  AND   MOTION  203 

which  it  founds.  Each  element  excludes  others  from  its 
o\vn  space,  not  by  a  passive  solidity,  but  by  an  active  re- 
pulsion. Indeed,  solidity  considered  simply  as  space-filling 
could  offer  no  resistance  at  all  to  the  entrance  of  other 
bodies  into  the  same  place.  If  there  were  things  between 
which  no  relation  of  repulsion  existed,  there  is  no  assignable 
reason  why  they  should  not  absolutely  penetrate  ;  and  some 
speculators  have  suggested  that  chemical  union  may  be  of 
this  sort.  The  mistake  of  this  notion  does  not  lie  in  a  met- 
aphysical impossibility,  but  in  its  inadequacy  to  the  facts, 
pre-eminently  those  of  isomerism.  On  the  other  hand,  a 
solid  without  cohesive  forces  could  not  exist,  for  in  every 
such  solid  it  would  be  possible  to  distinguish  different  parts ; 
and  the  only  reason  for  the  coherence  of  these  parts  must 
be  found  in  cohesive  forces  between  these  parts.  Hence,  in 
any  case,  solidity  must  be  second,  and  not  first.  The  facts, 
then,  are  (1)  that  in  determining  the  properties  and  form  of 
bodies  we  are  referred,  not  to  similar  properties  and  forms 
of  the  elements,  but  to  their  dynamic  relations,  whereby 
they  found  the  properties  and  forms  of  bodies ;  and  (2) 
that  solidity,  by  its  very  nature,  must  be  a  product  and  not 
an  original  and  changeless  attribute.  No  atom  can  be  re- 
garded as  having  an  absolute  and  changeless  extension, 
but  rather  by  its  own  energy  it  asserts  for  itself  a  certain 
position  and  volume,  from  which  only  a  greater  power  can 
drive  it.  These  simple  facts  serve  to  show  that  the  chief 
qualities  of  bodies,  which  we  may  sum  up  under  the  term 
materiality,  are  products  of  the  interactions  of  the  elements, 
and  not  properties  of  the  elements  themselves. 

The  chief  reason  which  remains  for  the  corpuscular  con- 
ception is  that  which  originally  produced  it.  This  is  not  its 
scientific  value,  but  its  picturability.  The  atom  as  a  dynamic 
element,  or  a  centre  of  force,  is  as  unpicturable  as  a  soul. 
The  imagination,  therefore,  is  relieved  if  allowed  to  give  it 


204  METAPHYSICS 

an  extremely  small  but  fixed  form  and  volume.  It  seems 
easy,  then,  to  tell  what  it  is  and  where  it  is;  while  the 
dynamic  conception  is  comparatively  hard  to  realize ;  and 
withal  the  dynamic  vie\v  seems  so  to  dematerialize  matter 
as  to  be  scarcely  distinguishable  from  idealism.  These  con- 
siderations more  than  anything  else  have  kept  the  corpus- 
cular conception  from  universal  rejection.  The  general 
tendency  of  physics  is  towards  the  dynamic  conception  of 
the  atom  in  so  far  as  the  atom  is  retained  as  real,  but 
in  sluggish  minds  the  old  view  maintains  a  more  or  less 
undisturbed  existence.  The  tendency  towards  dynamism 
is  partly  due  to  the  general  unwillingness  to  explain  the 
same  by  the  same,  which  is  the  case  with  the  corpuscular 
theory,  and  partly  due  to  the  fact  that  the  latter  theory  is 
involved  in  the  gravest  metaphysical  difficulties.  If  the 
atom  be  real  it  must  be  an  agent,  and  its  properties  must 
depend  upon  its  agency.  It  must  also  be  a  unit.  But  in  a 
previous  chapter  we  have  seen  that  the  extended  cannot 
be  a  unit.  An  extended  body  is  possible  only  as  the  parts 
cohere,  and  this,  again,  is  possible  only  as  they  are  con- 
nected by  a  system  of  attractive  forces.  In  such  a  case  the 
atom  appears  as  a  system  of  attracting  and  repelling  points, 
each  of  which  is  the  centre  of  forces  distinct  from  those  of 
all  the  rest ;  and  thus  we  should  be  led  directly  to  the  con- 
ception of  centres  of  force.  Possibly  we  might  retain  the 
indivisibility  of  the  atom  in  such  a  case,  but  only  by  mak- 
ing the  attractions  greater  than  any  possible  dividing  force. 
But  even  this  very  questionable  notion  would  not  save  the 
unity  of  the  atom.  It  would  have  a  unitedness  rather  than 
a  unity.  Only  that  is  a  unit  whose  states  are  states  of  the 
entire  being.  Any  conception  of  states  which  are  states  of 
parts  only  and  not  of  the  whole,  as  when  atoms  are  con- 
ceived as  having  opposite  forces  at  opposite  ends,  cancels 
the  unity  and  with  it  the  reality. 


MATTER,  FORCE,  AND  MOTION  205 

So  long,  then,  as  a  passive  and  extended  solidity  is  viewed 
as  an  attribute  of  the  elements  their  unity  cannot  be  main- 
tained.  Hence  we  conclude  that  the  corpuscular  conception, 
even  in  its  modern  form,  must  be  abandoned  both  as  un- 
necessary and  as  hostile  to  the  unity,  and  thus  to  the  reality 
of  the  atom  itself.  Either  we  must  regard  the  atom  as  a 
convenient,  practical  fiction,  or  else  we  must  view  it  as  a  true 
agent,  which,  Tby  its  activity,  founds  without  having  the 
properties  of  phenomenal  matter. 

But  we  are  certainly  not  out  of  the  woods,  even  with  this 
result,  so  long  as  we  allow  that  the  atoms  are  really  in  space. 
In  that  case  the  atom  becomes  merely  a  punctual  agent, 
having  location  without  extension;  and  this  notion,  when 
closely  looked  into,  grows  more  and  more  bizarre.  But  if 
we  carry  the  atoms  into  the  non-spatial  realm  as  a  set  of 
unpicturable  agents,  they  lose  all  representative  value  for 
the  imagination,  all  logical  value  for  the  understanding  in 
its  explanation  of  phenomena,  and  finally  metaphysics  pro- 
ceeds to  dissolve  them  away  into  forms  of  an  energy  not 
their  own,  thus  cancelling  them  altogether  as  ontological 
facts.  These  are  specimen  difficulties  in  the  notion  of  mat- 
ter as  having  more  than  phenomenal  reality. 

Force 

This  general  uncertainty  of  physical  teaching  concerning 
the  nature  of  matter  appears  equally  in  the  doctrine  re- 
specting its  forces.  Here,  too,  the  metaphysics  of  physics 
is  hopelessly  confused,  owing  to  the  superficialities  of  sense- 
thought  uncorrected  by  critical  reflection.  The  notion  of 
force  arises  from  the  need  of  importing  causality  into  the 
problem,  and  as  the  atoms  are  easily  fancied  to  be  the  only 
things  concerned,  the  force  is  distributed  among  them  as  its 
subjects.  This  is  done  in  a  way  which  causes  no  practical 


206  METAPHYSICS 

mischief,  but  which  leaves  things  metaphysically  at  very 
loose  ends.  The  current  notions  and  phrases  about  force 
are  supposed  to  be  justified  by  the  formal  necessity  of 
affirming  causation.  It  is  worth  while  to  consider,  if  we 
are  to  speak  of  atoms  at  all,  how  we  must  conceive  of  them 
and  their  forces. 

In  discussing  being  we  pointed  out  that  force,  as  com- 
monly conceived  as  inhering  in  things,  is  purely  an  abstrac- 
tion from  certain  forms  of  activity ;  we  have  now  to  at- 
tempt some  nearer  determination.  The  common  conception 
is  that  separate  forces  reside  in  the  thing,  and  that  the 
thing  is  the  home  or  seat  of  the  forces.  But  this  view  rests 
on  the  notion  of  pure  being  and  on  a  hypostasis  of  force. 
The  result  is  an  impossible  dualism,  in  which  the  being  does 
not  explain  the  force,  and  yet  the  force  is  nothing  apart 
from  the  being.  To  this  absurdity  we  are  led  by  mistaking 
the  distinctions  of  language  for  metaphysical  facts.  Scarce- 
ly better  is  the  definition  of  force  as  the  unknown  cause  of 
phenomena.  This  makes  force  at  once  a  thing,  for  only 
things  can  be  causes ;  and  it  also  dispenses  with  everything 
but  force,  for  the  sole  aim  of  speculation  is  to  find  the 
causes  of  phenomena.  But  this  view  at  once  proceeds  to 
stultify  itself  by  next  providing  something  else,  which,  in 
some  mysterious  way,  possesses  or  supports  or  uses  the 
force.  The  fact,  however,  is  that  the  elements  are  so  re- 
lated to  one  another  that,  when  certain  conditions  are  ful- 
filled, they  manifest  peculiar  activities,  which  activities,  how- 
ever, are  always  the  activities  of  the  things  themselves, 
and  not  of  some  inherent  forces.  Of  course,  they  could  not 
act  as  they  do  if  they  were  not  what  they  are ;  but  the 
power  to  do  what  they  do  is  developed  in  the  moment  of 
the  action. 

We  must  here  refer  to  our  general  conception  of  the 
system  as  composed  of  a  set  of  things  which  mutually 


MATTER,  FORCE,  AND   MOTION  207 

change  as  the  plan  of  the  system  requires,  so  that  each 
thing  is  what  it  is,  and  does  what  it  does,  because  all  the 
rest  are  what  they  are,  and  do  what  they  do.  In  such  a 
case,  the  being  of  everything  changes  from  moment  to  mo- 
ment, and  its  possibilities  vary  with  it;  indeed,  its  possi- 
bilities and  its  actualities  are  strictly  identical.  We  do 
not  conceive  being,  then,  as  having  inherent  forces,  but 
as  passing  from  one  form  of  manifestation  to  another  as 
its  circumstances  vary.  We  should  say,  then,  that  a  new 
activity  does  not  spring  from  an  inherent  power  coiled 
up  writhin  it,  but  from  a  pow'er  acquired  in  the  moment 
of  manifestation.  We  may  illustrate  this  by  the  intensity 
of  attraction  between  two  elements.  At  each  new  dis- 
tance they  attract  with  new  intensities.  These  were  not 
something  in  the  thing,  nor  something  put  into  the  thing ; 
they  are  developed  at  every  point.  Any  given  intensity 
represents  the  energy  of  action  which  the  general  relation 
between  the  two  calls  for  at  any  given  point.  In  the 
same  manner,  the  different  forces  of  things,  as  well  as  the 
different  intensities  of  the  same  force,  are  acquired  at  the 
time  of  action,  and  represent  only  the  forms  of  action  which 
the  nature  of  the  system  calls  for  in  their  special  relations. 
But,  since  these  activities  fall  into  certain  classes,  we  ab- 
stract a  specific  cause,  which  is  not  merely  the  thing,  but 
some  cause  in  the  thing.  This  is  a  confusion  of  cause  with 
ground.  The  cause  of  an  act  is  the  agent  itself.  The 
ground  of  the  act  is  that  peculiarity  of  nature  which,  under 
the  fitting  conditions,  makes  it  the  cause  of  that  act,  and 
not  of  some  other. 

We  may  say,  then,  that  a  thing  is  perpetually  acquir- 
ing new  forces  and  losing  others,  according  as  its  rela- 
tions change.  The  conditions  of  some  of  these  manifesta- 
tioTiS  may  always  be  fulfilled,  as  in  the  case  of  gravitation. 
The  conditions  of  some  others  may  be  fulfilled  only  here 


208  METAPHYSICS 

aim  tnere,  and  now  and  then.  Such  are  the  chemical,  mag- 
netic, and  electric  manifestations.  Coexistence  in  the  in- 
finite seems  enough  to  secure  the  first  manifestation ;  the 
conditions  of  the  others  are  far  more  complex.  When  we 
know  the  order  of  their  appearance,  we  have  their  law 
to  a  certain  extent.  When,  in  addition,  we  know  the  law 
of  their  variation,  which,  in  physical  forces,  is  some  func- 
tion of  the  space  between  the  interacting  bodies,  then  we 
have  a  formula  which  can  be  used  for  mathematical  de- 
duction. It  is  this  fact  which  constitutes  the  fruitfulness 
of  the  law  of  gravitation  compared  with  the  law  of  affinity 
or  of  cohesion.  The  former  law  admits  of  exact  mathemat- 
ical expression,  and  its  conditions  are  simple ;  in  particular, 
the  mass  admits  of  being  treated  as  a  unit  located  in  a  point. 
The  problem  of  three  bodies  fails  to  give  a  hint  of  the 
unmanageable  complexity  of  astronomical  problems  which 
would  result  if  this  were  not  the  case.  But  the  law  and  the 
circumstances  being  simple,  and  admitting  of  mathematical 
statement,  they  admit  of  deductive  calculation.  In  the  case 
of  affinity,  the  circumstances  are  not  so  simple,  and  the  law 
admits  of  no  mathematical  formulation,  and  here  we  are 
practically  restricted  to  observation. 

Our  conclusion,  then,  is  that  force  as  used  in  the  physical 
sciences  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  a  something  resident  in 
the  atoms,  but  rather  as  an  abstraction  from  the  various 
forms  of  atomic  activity,  and  the  laws  of  force  are  only  the 
formulas  which  express  the  conditions  of  these  forms  of 
activity,  and  sometimes  the  rate  of  their  variation.  This, 
of  course,  on  the  supposition  that  the  atoms  may  be  viewed 
as  ontologically  real,  and  that  we  are  to  speak  of  them  as 
having  forces.  The  alternative  view  is  to  drop  the  language 
of  causality  altogether  except  in  an  inductive  sense  and 
confine  ourselves  to  studying  the  laws  of  physical  changes. 

Physical  metaphysics  finds  a  still  graver  difficulty  in  the 


MATTER,  FORCE,  AND  MOTION  209 

relation  of  the  atoms  and  their  forces  to  space.  To  sense 
thought,  of  course,  it  seems  sufficient  to  say  that  the  atoms 
are  in  space,  but  we  have  seen  that  this  is  a  very  dark  say- 
ing when  metaphysically  understood.  Sense  thought  finds 
it  equally  a  matter  of  course  that  the  forces  should  vary 
with  the  distance.  But  more  or  less  of  empty  space  does 
not  seem,  upon  reflection,  to  contain  the  least  ground  for 
the  variation  of  force.  The  idea  attributes  a  kind  of  resist- 
ance to  space  which  must  be  overcome  before  the  object 
can  be  reached.  And  since,  on  the  most  realistic  view,  space 
does  nothing,  the  existence  of  a  thing  in  this  or  that  point 
in  space  is  no  ground  for  change  in  the  thing  itself.  Space- 
position,  therefore,  on  any  theory,  must  be  viewed  not  as  a 
cause,  but  an  effect ;  it  is  the  result  of  the  interactions  of 
things  whereby  they  prescribe  to  one  another  the  position 
they  shall  have  in  real  or  apparent  space.  But  this  place- 
determining  power  is  a  purely  metaphysical  one ;  it  is  not 
determined  by  position,  but  determines  position.  Its  own 
determining  ground  must  be  sought  for  in  the  idea,  or  na- 
ture, of  the  whole,  which  is  the  ultimate  source  of  all  law 
and  order.  We  cannot  take  any  other  view  without  eith- 
er reasoning  in  a  circle  or  making  space  an  active  thing. 
Hence  it  follows,  as  we  have  seen  in  discussing  the  nature 
of  the  infinite,  that  the  whole  cannot  be  construed  as  the 
result  of  its  parts,  but  the  parts  can  be  understood  only 
from  the  side  of  the  whole.  The  parts  are  not  independent 
seats  of  independent  forces  which  by  combination  generate 
an  apparent  whole ;  but  the  parts  have  their  existence  and 
their  properties,  or  forces,  only  as  demanded  by  the  mean- 
ing or  nature  of  the  whole.  But  though  space  itself  can 
never  be  regarded  as  the  real  ground  of  force-variation,  it 
may  be  treated  as  its  measure  in  calculation,  because  the 
changing  space  -  relations  are  accurate  exponents  of  tjie 
changing  metaphysical  relations.  Hence  we  can  deal  with 


210  METAPHYSICS 

the  former  with  as  much  certainty  as  if  they  were  the 
latter. 

Nevertheless,  the  fancy  is  entertained  by  many  that  emp- 
ty space  itself  is  a  sufficient  reason  for  force- variation.  Our 
physical  experience  teaches  us  that  we  can  act  directly  only 
on  things  within  reach ;  and  even  then  we  must  not  be  at 
arm's-length.  This  most  vulgar  fact  seems  to  be  at  the  bot- 
tom of  our  notion  that  force  must  vary  with  space.  This 
fact  is  further  aided  by  an  alleged  explanation  drawn  from 
the  geometrical  nature  of  space  itself,  and  the  result  is  a 
claim  that  all  central  forces  must  necessarily  vary  as  the 
inverse  square  of  the  distance.  The  explanation  and  the 
claim  are  totally  baseless.  They  are  founded  on  the  notion 
that  force  is  something  streaming  out  from  the  element  as 
a  kind  of  aura  flowing  from  a  centre.  If  this  view  were 
allowed  there  would  be  a  certain  explanation  both  of  the 
diminution  of  force  with  the  space  and  of  the  law  of  the 
inverse  square;  for  as  the  surface  of  a  sphere  varies  as  the 
square  of  the  radius,  it  follows  that  with  twice  the  radius 
the  surface  would  be  four  times  as  great.  Hence  the  out- 
flowing aura  would  be  distributed  over  a  fourfold  surface, 
and  hence,  again,  it  would  only  be  one-fourth  as  intense  on 
the  unit  of  surface.  But  we  are  freed  from  this  notion, 
which  is  plainly  only  a  product  of  the  imagination.  Noth- 
ing streams  out  from  being,  and  force  is  only  an  abstrac- 
tion from  a  thing's  activity,  and  never  a  thing  itself.  But 
the  imagination  always  wants  a  bridge  on  which  to  cross, 
and  hence  it  forms  the  notion  of  a  passing  and  repassing 
thing,  and  thus  exchanges  the  notion  of  force  acting  at  a 
distance  for  the  old  view  of  action  by  impact. 

If,  however,  the  passing  force  be  a  real  something,  we  must 
know  where  it  comes  from,  and  how  the  atom  can  forever 
generate  this  reality  so  as  to  fill  space  with  it.  If  the  force 
be  only  an  influence,  then  we  have  simply  a  figure  of  speech 


MATTER,  FORCE,  AND  MOTION  211 

as  the  cause  of  effects ;  but  if  the  force  were  allowed  to  be  a 
real  something,  which  passes  from  thing  to  thing  and  pro- 
duces effects,  our  difficulties  would  be  greater  than  ever.  An 
outgoing  ether  would  not  explain  attraction,  and  if  it  did  it 
ought  to  be  as  attractive  on  the  farther  as  on  the  nearer  side 
of  the  body  to  be  moved.  No  body  cuts  off  the  influence 
of  gravitation  by  interposition,  and  hence  the  force  which, 
reaching  the  earth  from  the  sun,  attracts  it  towards  the  sun, 
forthwith  emerges  on  the  other  side,  and  ought  to  attract  it 
from  the  sun.  There  seems  also  to  be  no  reason  why  the 
force  should  attract  in  the  line  of  its  own  motion  rather 
than  in  any  other.  This  theory  does  not  conceive  force  as 
a  tense  cord,  but  as  a  moving  something ;  and  hence  when 
it  reaches  a  body  and  causes  motion  that  motion  might  be 
in  any  direction.  Some  have  sought  to  escape  these  whim- 
sical difficulties  by  the  additional  fancy  that  a  resting  sphere 
of  force  is  encamped  around  every  atom ;  but  this  view 
disposes  entirely  of  the  attempt  to  deduce  the  law  of  force- 
variation  from  the  nature  of  space,  as  that  rests  on  the  as- 
sumption of  movement  from  a  centre.  This  attempt  is  fur- 
ther forbidden  by  the  fact  that,  if  space  be  the  real  ground 
of  variation,  there  can  be  on\y  one  law  of  variation,  as  space 
is  always  and  everywhere  the  same.  And  if  only  one  law, 
then  there  can  be  only  one,  or  no,  force  in  the  system.  For 
if  there  were  both  attraction  and  repulsion,  and  they  were 
balanced  at  one  point,  they  would  be  balanced  at  all  points, 
and  would  cancel  each  other.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  one 
were  stronger  than  the  other  at  one  point,  it  would  be  so  at 
all  points,  and  would  banish  the  other. 

In  speaking  of  space  as  a  ground  of  force-variation  we 
denied  that  it  can  be  such  ground.  But  may  it  not  make 
all  action  at  a  distance  impossible?  If  related  to  force  at 
all,  it  seems  better  able  to  bar  its  action  than  anything  else. 
This  has  long  been  a  vexed  question,  almost  a  black  beast, 


212  METAPHYSICS 

in  physical  speculation  ;  and  certainly  on  the  received  theory 
which  locates  individual  atoms  in  a  real  and  empty  space, 
it  is  a  rather  tough  problem.  If  we  conceive  a  multitude 
of  individual  atoms  separated  from  one  another  by  an  ab- 
solute void,  it  is  utterly  impossible  to  bridge  over  the  abyss 
between  them  by  anything  but  a  pre-established  harmony ; 
and  this  would  only  simulate  action  at  a  distance.  The  void 
would  imply  and  express  the  absence  of  all  essential  relation. 
Xewton,  therefore,  in  his  letter  to  Bentley,  insisted  that  no 
one  with  a  moderate  reflective  power  could  imagine  that  the 
gravitation  of  the  elements  is  due  to  any  action  of  the  atoms 
themselves.  And,  indeed,  it  does  seem  incredible  that  the 
infinitesimal  atom  is  really  filling  space  with  its  influence 
to  the  farthest  atom  of  ether  or  star-dust,  and  yet  without 
any  knowledge  of  itself,  or  its  fellows,  or  the  spaces  across 
which  it  acts,  and  yet  adjusting  itself  absolutely,  instantane- 
ously, and  incessantly  to  each  minutest  change  of  distance, 
in  not  only  one  but  all  the  atoms  of  the  system.  Accord- 
ingly, there  has  always  been  with  physicists  an  anxiety  to 
fill  up  the  void  with  something  through  which  action  should 
be  transmitted,  and  the  result  has  been  the  generation  of  a 
more  or  less  numerous  family  of  ethers.  This  anxiety,  how- 
ever, rests  upon  the  notion  that  action  is  more  intelligible 
when  between  contiguous  things  than  when  between  things 
separate  in  space.  But  we  have  seen,  in  discussing  inter- 
action, that  contiguity  in  space  does  not  remove  the  diffi- 
culty of  interaction,  as  this  lies  in  the  opposition  of  the  no- 
tions of  independence  and  community  ;  so  that  not  action  at 
a  distance,  but  action  at  all  between  two  things  assumed  to  be 
independent,  is  what  reason  finds  so  difficult.  The  attempt  to 
dispense  with  action  at  a  distance  must  really  deny  all  at- 
tractive and  repulsive  forces  to  the  elements,  and  either  appeal 
at  once  to  a  co-ordinating  and  moving  force  in  matter  which  is 
not  of  matter, or  it  must  reduce  all  material  action  to  impact 


MATTER,  FORCE,  AND  MOTION  213 

The  latter  alternative  has  often  been  chosen  by  physicists. 
When  the  dynamic  view  of  matter  was  first  proposed,  the 
general  objection  to  it  was  that  it  was  a  return  to  the  scho- 
lastic doctrine  of  occult  qualities.  The  present  conception, 
which  endows  matter  with  moving  forces,  was  for  a  long 
time  resisted  on  this  ground,  and  the  demand  was  made  that 
all  material  phenomena  be  explained  b}^  the  laws  of  motion 
and  impact.  The  same  unrest  with  the  mysterious  impli- 
cations of  gravity  often  reappears  in  attempts  to  explain 
gravitation  by  the  impact  of  some  assumed  ether  atoms.  To 
begin  with,  these  attempts  are  all  utter  failures.  The  phe- 
nomena of  cohesion  and  affinity  utterly  defy  any  attempt  to 
explain  them  as  the  results  of  impact;  while  the  implica- 
tions of  the  impact  theory  are  without  a  shadow  of  warrant. 
But,  in  the  next  place,  impact  is  far  from  being  so  simple  as 
this  theory  assumes.  On  the  ordinary  theory,  there  is  no 
contact  whatever  of  the  elements,  and  they  are  held  apart 
by  repulsive  forces  of  such  a  kind  that  only  an  infinite  force 
could  bring  the  elements  in  contact.  On  this  theory,  then, 
impact  itself  assumes  action  at  a  distance.  And,  in  general, 
if  force  acts  at  all  between  the  atoms,  it  must  act  at  a  dis- 
tance. An  attractive  force  which  did  not  act  at  a  distance 
could  never  make  itself  known  as  attraction ;  and  a  repul- 
sive force  which  did  not  act  at  a  distance  would  not  be 
repulsion  at  all. 

To  see  this,  conceive  two  solid  cubes  endowed  with  re- 
pulsion which,  however,  cannot  act  at  a  distance.  If  these 
cubes  occupied  the  same  space,  their  repulsions  could  not 
result  in  motion,  no  matter  how  intense  they  might  be,  be- 
cause they  would  be  balanced  in  every  direction.  If  now 
they  be  pressed  together,  there  is  not  the  slightest  reason 
why  they  should  not  telescope  each  other.  In  the  first 
place,  such  bodies  would  meet  only  in  the  geometrical  plane 
which  separates  them,  and  all  the  resistance  to  interpene- 


214  METAPHYSICS 

tration  must  lie  in  that  plane.  But  the  plane  itself  is  noth- 
ing but  an  imaginary  surface  without  resistance ;  and  hence 
the  resistance  must  come  from  the  parts  on  either  side  of 
the  plane.  If,  however,  we  should  allow  that  each  body 
has  a  certain  part  of  itself  in  the  plane,  then  those  parts 
which  are  in  the  plane  would  strictly  coincide,  and,  as  co- 
inciding, there  would  be  no  reason  why  the  repulsion  be- 
tween these  parts  should  take  one  direction  rather  than 
another ;  and  it  would  practically  be  cancelled,  so  that  the 
true  repulsion  would  still  lie  between  those  parts  on  either 
side  of  the  plane  and  external  to  each  other.  But  as  by 
hypothesis  these  parts  cannot  repel  because  at  a  distance, 
there  is  nothing  to  hinder  the  two  bodies  from  sliding  to- 
gether under  pressure.  This  result  would  be  reached  even 
if  we  should  allow  the  atoms  to  be  solid  and  in  absolute 
contact.  We  should  still  have  to  posit  action  at  a  distance. 
But,  as  we  have  frequently  seen,  there  is  no  reason  for  sup- 
posing that  atoms  are  solid  ;  they  are  rather  the  immaterial 
ground  of  phenomenal  solidity.  So,  then,  we  seem  shut  up 
to  affirm  action  at  a  distance. 

But  here  a  new  difficulty  emerges.  If  we  allow  the  gen- 
eral possibility  of  action  at  a  distance,  we  seem  likewise 
shut  up  to  the  paradoxical  admission  that  there  is  no  long- 
er any  reason  for  believing  that  a  thing  is  in  one  place 
rather  than  in  another.  How  do  we  know  that  the  things 
which,  by  resisting  our  effort  and  coercing  our  sensations, 
create  in  us  the  perception  of  a  world  about  us  are  not  real- 
ly located  beyond  the  bounds  of  our  solar  system  ?  Crude 
common -sense,  of  course,  would  reply  that  it  is  directly 
cognizant  of  the  very  being  and  location  of  things ;  but  ev- 
ery one  competent  to  speculate  at  all  knows  better.  He 
knows  that  we  cognize  things  only  through  their  activities 
upon  us,  and  that  if  these  activities  were  maintained,  our 
world-vision  would  remain  unaltered,  no  matter  what  hap 


MA1TER,  FORCE,  AND   MOTION  215 

pened  to  the  things.  But  since  action  may  take  place  at  a 
distance,  why  may  not  the  things  which  act  upon  us  be  lo- 
cated at  any  point  whatever  in  space?  And  since,  in  the 
popular  theory  at  least,  the  void  is  no  bar  to  action,  why 
may  not  things  be  in  some  extra-siderial  region,  and  only 
manifest  themselves  in  our  neighborhood? 

If  it  be  said  that  existence  in  space  means  only  that  a 
thing  acts  at  a  certain  point,  common-sense  is  disturbed,  for 
it  thinks  it  means  more  than  this  by  existence  in  space,  and 
in  addition  the  difficulty  is  not  removed ;  for  if  a  thing  ex- 
ists  in  space  at  all,  then,  on  the  hypothesis  of  action  at  a  dis- 
tance, the  fact  of  action  at  a  point  does  not  prove  that  a  thing 
is  there.  Moreover,  the  atom  acts  at  many  points ;  is  it  in  all 
of  them  ?  By  our  unfortunate  admission  of  action  at  a  dis- 
tance, \ve  have  deprived  ourselves  of  every  valid  test  of  the 
true  whereabouts  of  things.  We  may  fancy  that  in  resist- 
ance we  have  such  a  test,  but  this,  too,  is  untenable.  Both 
attraction  and  resistance  may  point  to  a  certain  centre,  but 
this  is  far  from  proving  that  the  agent  is  really  there ;  for 
since  action  may  take  place  at  a  distance,  it  is  quite  possi- 
ble to  view  the  point  as  the  radiating  centre  of  atomic  man- 
ifestation only.  The  claim  that  the  atom  must  be  at  the 
crossing  of  the  lines  of  attraction  and  repulsion  depends  on 
an  assumption  which  is  not  self-evident.  This  assumption 
is  that  an  atom  can  cause  another  to  move  only  on  the  line 
which  joins  them ;  but,  on  the  hypothesis  of  action  at  a  dis- 
tance, it  is  especially  hard  to  see  why  the  movement  might 
not  take  place  on  any  other  line  whatever.  Of  course,  at- 
traction means  a  drawing-to;  but  etymology  will  not  help 
us  in  this  matter.  If,  then,  action  at  a  distance  be  allowed, 
it  is  theoretically  possible  to  claim  that,  for  all  we  know, 
the  real  agents  of  the  system  are  removed  from  it  by  the 
whole  diameter  of  space.  But  this  is  so  revolting  a  para- 
dox that  it  would  hardly  seem  more  irrational  to  claim  that 


216  METAPHYSICS 

things  may  act  in  some  other  time  than  the  present.  Be- 
sides, on  this  admission,  the  bottom  would  fall  out  of  the 
atomic  theory  itself.  The  great  reason  for  admitting  sep- 
arate atoms  is  the  desire  to  locate  an  agent  at  the  centre  of 
attractions  and  repulsions ;  if  we  locate  the  agent  elsewhere, 
the  only  theory  which  would  be  satisfactory  in  any  way 
would  be  one  which  allowed  one  and  the  same  agent  to  do 
all  the  work.  To  complete  the  paradox,  we  must  add  that 
if  we  insist  that  a  thing  is  wherever  it  acts,  then  we  have 
to  attribute  a  kind  of  omnipresence  to  every  atom ;  as  every 
atom  is  said  to  attract  every  other,  that  is,  to  act  upon  every 
other.  This  view  would  be  embarrassing  enough.  It  would 
lead  at  once  to  the  previous  conclusion,  that  there  is  no  war- 
rant for  saying  that  the  atom  is  in  one  place  rather  than  in 
another.  It  would,  indeed,  be  in  every  place  and  everywhere 
as  one  and  the  same  atom.  Thus  we  should  have  a  very  pe- 
culiar kind  and  case  of  omnipresence. 

These  bizarre  difficulties  are  specimens  of  the  rational 
scandals,  offences,  and  impossibilities  which  infest  the  meta- 
physics of  physics.  The  attempt  to  construct  a  system  out 
of  atoms  and  the  void  alone  shatters  on  these  and  similar 
absurdities,  and  it  is  impossible  to  escape  all  of  them  on  any 
theory  which  allows  the  substantive  reality  of  space.  Prac- 
tically, as  we  have  said,  these  notions  work  no  mischief,  for 
the  important  work  of  science  consists  in  finding  the  laws 
of  phenomena;  and  in  this  work  these  metaphysical  crudi- 
ties remain  harmless  in  the  background.  But  when  they 
are  brought  out  of  this  retirement  and  paraded  as  scientific 
and  final,  then  it  is  in  place  to  point  out  that  they  are  neither 
data  nor  inferences  of  any  sound  science,  but  only  hyposta- 
ses  of  unreflective  sense-thinkinp-.  With  the  best  of  wills  it 

o 

is  impossible  to  save  them  from  destructive  metaphysical 
criticism,  when  they  claim  to  represent  the  ontological  fact 
of  existence. 


.MATTER,  FORCE,  AND  MOTION  217 


Motion 

The  traditional  doctrine  of  motion  and  its  relation  to  mat- 
ter contains  various  difficulties  which  deserve  to  be  men- 
tioned before  setting  forth  its  phenomenality.  We  return  to 
the  view  of  spontaneous  thought  and  work  away  from  it. 

Motion  is  indefinable,  except  in  terms  of  itself.  Like  be- 
ing, change,  and  action,  it  must  be  accepted  as  an  idea  which 
cannot  be  constructed  out  of  anything  else.  If  we  define 
motion  as  a  change  of  place,  or  as  a  passage  from  one  point 
of  space  to  another,  we  but  define  the  same  by  the  same. 
The  change  of  place,  or  the  passage  from  point  to  point,  is 
unintelligible  without  the  intuition  of  motion  itself.  To  one 
who  has  the  intuition,  such  definitions  serve  to  unfold  its 
implications,  but  to  one  without  the  intuition  they  are  as 
useless  as  a  definition  of  sight  is  to  the  blind. 

The  Eleatic  Zeno's  claim  that  motion  implies  contra- 
diction is  sufficiently  disposed  of  by  a  correct  doctrine  of 
change.  In  modern  times  a  series  of  even  more  superficial 
objections  have  been  based  on  the  antithesis  of  absolute  and 
relative  motion.  Absolute  motion  is  declared  impossible, 
and  the  universe,  as  a  whole,  is  said  to  rest.  Rest  and  mo- 
tion, then,  are  alike  relative  and  real  only  as  relative.  These 
objections  may  have  puzzled  many,  but  have  probably  con- 
vinced none.  They  simply  leave  the  mind  in  that  most  un- 
comfortable position  of  being  sure  that  there  is  a  fallacy 
without  being  able  to  point  it  out.  But,  in  this  case,  it  is 
not  difficult  to  detect  both  the  error  of  statement  and  the 
fallacy  of  argument.  The  former  is  discovered  by  simple 
definition.  Absolute  rest  can  only  be  defined  as  continuous 
existence  in  the  same  position  in  absolute  space.  Absolute 
motion,  therefore,  would  be  the  successive  occupation  of  dif- 
ferent positions  in  absolute  space.  If,  now,  there  is  no  ab- 


218  METAPHYSICS 

solute  motion,  then  all  things  are  absolutely  at  rest,  or  re- 
main in  the  same  points  in  absolute  space.  In  that  case, 
relative  motion,  which  is  declared  to  be  real,  becomes  a  mere 
delusion,  with  no  ground  whatever.  If,  then,  we  hold  that 
motion  of  any  kind  is  more  that  a  phenomenon,  we  must 
affirm  the  reality  of  absolute  motion,  and  view  relative 
motion  only  as  the  way  in  which  sundry  absolute  motions 
appear  from  our  stand-point. 

The  fallacy  of  the  argument  against  absolute  motion  is  no 
less  easily  detected.  It  consists  in  assuming  that  the  mental 
co-ordinates  by  which  thought  grasps  the  fact  are  necessary 
to  the  fact  itself.  We  are  told,  for  example,  that  absolute 
motion  is  indistinguishable  from  absolute  rest,  because  mo- 
tion implies  fixed  points  of  reference,  and  in  absolute  space 
there  are  no  such  points.  All  the  points  of  space  are  alike ; 
there  is  no  here  and  no  there,  for  these  terms  are  purely  rel- 
ative to  the  spectator.  But  motion  is  a  passage  from  here 
to  there,  and  hence  is  always  relative  to  the  spectator,  and 
therefore  impossible  in  pure  space.  To  all  this  the  reply  is 
that  motion  is,  indeed,  grasped  and  measured  in  thought 
only  by  setting  up  some  point  or  axes  of  reference;  but 
these  mental  co-ordinates  are  nothing  to  the  motion  itself ; 
least  of  all  do  they  make  the  motion.  We  cannot  define  or 
represent  a  motion  to  ourselves,  without  assuming  some 
stand-point  in  relation  to  which  the  motion  is  to  be  meas- 
ured ;  but  the  motion  itself  is  under  no  obligation  to  be  rep- 
resented, and  moves  on  according  to  its  own  laws,  whether 
we  think  of  it  or  not.  It  certainly  never  occurs  to  the  as- 
tronomer to  fancy  that  the  celestial  equator  and  meridian, 
to  which  he  refers  the  stellar  motions,  make  the  motions. 
He  recognizes  that  these  planes  of  reference  are  but  the 
makeshifts  of  our  minds  in  order  to  grasp  the  fact.  If,  then, 
absolute  space  were  real,  there  need  not  be  the  least  diffi- 
culty in  admitting  absolute  motion.  The  fact  that  every  point 


MATTER,  FORCE,  AND  MOTION  219 

m  such  space  is  distinct  from  every  other  point  would  suf- 
fice for  its  affirmation.  The  entire  system  might  be  viewed 
as  journeying  through  infinite  space,  or  as  revolving  in  it. 
Such  a  conception  of  the  entire  system,  of  course,  could 
never  be  tested,  for  no  facts  whatever  could  prove  or  dis- 
prove it.  Nothing  short  of  a  revelation  would  suffice  for  a 
decision.  Applied  to  our  solar  system,  however,  it  would 
represent  the  fact.  Its  centre  of  gravity  is  in  motion,  and 
the  system,  as  a  whole,  revolves.  In  addition,  the  planets 
themselves  are  revolving  on  their  own  axes  in  absolute  space. 
To  conceive  such  motions,  we  need  points  of  reference  ;  but 
the  existence  of  the  motions,  if  space  be  real,  is  quite  inde- 
pendent of  our  thought  and  its  scaffolding.  Possibly  it  may 
be  urged  that  motion  is,  at  least,  relative  to  space  itself,  and 
that  when  space  itself  is  reckoned  as  a  part  of  the  system, 
motion  can  only  be  relative.  This  may  be  admitted.  Space 
does  not  move,  and  motion  is  in  space.  But  this  motion 
would  change  the  definition,  and  cancel  the  problem  alto- 
gether, in  any  intelligible  sense. 

Concerning  the  relation  of  motion  to  reality,  the  history 
of  speculation  shows  a  complete  change  of  view.  The  an- 
cients, without  exception,  held  that  the  natural  state  of 
things  is  rest.  Things  are  put  in  motion  only  by  external 
agency,  and,  resigned  to  themselves,  come  quickly  to  resl 
again.  Motion  was  regarded  as  a  "violent  state"  of  thingSj 
and  the  moving  thing  was  supposed  to  have  an  inner  strug- 
gle to  escape  from  it.  The  source  of  this  belief  is  evident. 
In  our  sense-experience,  we  have  abundant  illustrations  of 
the  cessation  of  motion  and  of  the  difficulty  of  initiating  it. 
Besides,  we  find  in  ourselves  a  weariness,  resulting  from 
continued  effort,  which  compels  us  to  seek  repose ;  and 
this,  by  a  kind  of  mechanical  anthropomorphism,  is  easily 
transferred  to  things. 

This  view  of  earlier  speculators  has  given  rise  in  later 


220  METAPHYSICS 

times  to  the  opposite  idea,  that  motion  is  the  natural  state 
of  things.  The  conception  of  matter  as  having  no  principle 
of  movement  in  itself,  and  as  tending  to  rest,  led  necessarily 
to  the  doctrine  of  at  least  a  prime  mover  in  the  universe, 
who  should  also  be  immaterial.  But  such  a  view  could  hard- 
ly help  giving  aid  and  comfort  to  theistically  inclined  spec- 
ulators, and  could  not  fail,  therefore,  to  be  obnoxious  to  such 
as  did  not  share  such  tendencies.  These  side-issues  have 
not  been  without  their  effect  in  mechanical  speculations.  A 
more  respectable  ground  of  the  view  is  the  desire  to  escape 
admitting  any  moving  forces  in  matter.  With  this  aim, 
various  theories  of  molecular  vortices  have  been  invented, 
in  which  atoms  originally  endowed  with  motion  are  made 
to  produce  all  material  phenomena  by  simple  variations  of 
the  rate  and  direction  of  motion.  But,  whatever  the  source 
of  the  doctrine,  it  is  hard  to  give  to  natural  any  clear  meaning 
in  this  connection,  and,  in  its  obvious  sense,  the  doctrine  is 
false.  If  motion  were  an  essential  and  inalienable  endow- 
ment of  every  element,  and  not  a  variable  product  of  mov- 
ing forces,  it  might  be  called  natural  to  matter.  In  such  a 
case,  any  element  left  to  itself  would  move  with  a  fixed  ve- 
locity, as  a  result  of  its  own  nature.  But  this  view  is  un- 
tenable, and  leads  to  results  directly  contradicted  by  the 
facts.  It  may  well  be  that  motion  is  a  universal  fact,  as  an 
effect  of  the  moving  forces  of  the  elements;  but  this  is  far 
from  making  it  an  inherent  and  essential  attribute  of  mat- 
ter. In  fact,  motion  is  neither  natural  nor  unnatural,  but  a 
condition  in  which  matter  may  or  may  not  be ;  and  in  this 
sense  matter  may  be  said  to  be  indifferent  to  motion.  If 
in  motion,  it  remains  in  motion  ;  and  if  at  rest,  it  remains 
at  rest.  This  is  the  only  view  which  does  not  conflict  with 
the  law  of  inertia — a  law  which,  whether  an  apriori  truth  or 
not,  is  still  too  well  attested  by  consequences  to  be  ques- 
tioned as  to  its  validity.  The  motions  of  the  elements 


MATTER,  FORCE,  AND  MOTION  221 

are  the  products  of  their  interaction,  and  the  condition  of 
any  element,  whether  in  motion  or  at  rest,  has  its  external 
ground. 

But  this  indifference  of  matter  to  motion  must  not  be 
confounded  with  the  claim  that  matter  is  strictly  the  same, 
whether  at  rest  or  in  motion.  This  view  rests  partly  upon 
the  abstractions  of  mechanics,  in  which  matter  appears  as 
the  rigid  and  indifferent  subject  of  motion,  and  partly  on 
the  fact  that  matter  can  begin  and  cease  to  move  without 
any  change  of  its  prominent  qualities.  Hence  unreflective 
thought,  which  thinks  mainly  under  the  law  of  identity, 
holds  that  matter  in  motion  is  the  same  as  matter  in  rest. 
Now,  whatever  view  we  may  take  of  motion,  this  view  is 
false.  The  motion  of  a  thing  is  simply  its  successive  ap- 
pearance at  the  successive  points  of  its  course.  But  this 
succession  must  have  some  ground.  A  moving  body,  at  :i 
given  point  of  its  path,  differs  from  the  same  body  at  rest 
in  the  same  point ;  otherwise  the  effect  would  be  the  same. 
It  is  idle  to  say  that  the  difference  is  that  one  moves  and 
the  other  rests,  for  the  movement  of  the  first  is  but  its  pas- 
sage from  the  point  in  which  it  is  at  any  instant  to  the  con- 
tiguous one,  and  there  is  no  ground  for  this  passage,  unless 
the  moving  body  have  a  different  internal  state  from  that 
of  the  resting  one.  .No  more  does  it  avail  to  say  that  the 
groun.d  of  the  motion  is  the  attraction  of  other  bodies,  for 
this  attraction  acts  by  no  external  grip  or  drawing,  but  by 
producing  a  new  state  in  the  thing,  and  this  state  is  the  im- 
mediate ground  of  the  new  manifestation.  Motion,  there- 
fore, is  but  the  spatial  manifestation  of  a  peculiar  meta- 
physical state  in  the  moving  thing  itself,  and  this  state 
is  what  distinguishes  the  moving  from  the  resting  thing. 
Without  this  admission,  we  cannot  escape  Zeno's  conclusion 
that  motion  is  impossible ;  for,  at  any  point  of  time,  the 
moving  body  is  at  a  given  point  in  space,  and  if  at  that 


222  METAPHYSICS 

time  and  point  it  is  metaphorically  the  same  as  if  at  rest  \n 
the  same  point,  then  the  moving  body  rests,  and  can  never 
move.  Both  the  law  of  inertia  and  that  of  causation  would 
forbid  its  motion.  The  latter  would  forbid  it  for  the  lack 
of  any  ground  for  the  motion,  and  the  former  would  forbid 
it  because  the  body,  being  at  rest  in  a  point,  must  continue 
so.  We  must,  then,  admit  that,  even  in  the  indivisible 
point  of  time  in  which  there  can  be  no  spatial  manifestation, 
the  moving  body  differs  from  the  resting  one  by  an  internal 
state,  which  is  the  true  ground  of  the  motion.  To  this 
state  we  give  the  name  of  velocity.  In  itself,  velocity  is 
not  motion  any  more  than  a  force  is  a  line.  Motion  is  a 
measure  of  velocity,  just  as  force  may  be  represented  by  a 
line,  but  both  alike  are  forever  different  from  either  mo- 
tions or  lines.  If  velocity  itself  were  motion  instead  of  its 
ground,  then,  in  a  point  of  time,  a  moving  body  could  have 
no  velocity,  and  hence  no  ground  for  passing  from  the  point 
of  space  in  which  it  might  be.  But,  at  any  instant,  a  mov- 
ing body  has  velocity  which  is  not  made,  but  measured,  by 
the  space  passed  over  in  the  unit  of  time.  If  the  velocity 
be  variable,  then  it  is  measured  by  the  space  passed  over  in 
the  unit  of  time,  supposing  the  velocity  to  become  fixed  at 
the  instant  of  measurement.  This  facu  implies  that  velocity 
itself  is  quite  different  from  its  .neacure.  It  is  that  inner 
state  of  a  thing  of  greater  or  less  intensity  which  impels  it 
incessantly  to  change  its  place.  While,  then,  we  can  repre- 
sent it  as  the  quotient  of  the  space  and  time,  or  as  the  first 
differential  coefficient  of  the  space  and  time,  we  must  not 
identify  it  with  either.  Such  a  blunder  would  be  like  iden- 
tifying the  lines  and  differential  coefficients  which  represent 
force  with  force  itself. 

This  necessity,  supposing  that  material  things  are  onto- 
logical  realities,  of  referring  all  change  and  movement  to 
metaphysical  states  in  the  things,  leads  to  a  peculiar  para 


MATTER,  FORCE,  AND  MOTION  223 

dox  when  we  affirm  a  real  motion  in  a  real  space.  Motion 
is  the  result  of  an  internal  state;  and  direction  is  given  in 
the  same  state.  Motion  and  direction  are  inseparable,  and 
both  are  the  outcome  of  a  peculiar  inner  state.  This  fact 
leads  to  a  rather  odd  conclusion.  Spontaneous  thought 
finds  no  difficulty  in  affirming  the  existence  of  a  thing  in 
space,  and  also  the  mutual  indifference  of  the  thing  and 
space.  Space  is  not  altered  by  the  thing's  presence  or  ab- 
sence, and  the  thing  is  not  affected  by  change  of  place.  It 
is,  then,  quite  indifferent  to  the  thing  whether  it  be  in  one 
point  or  another.  The  solar  system  moves  through  space, 
but  remains  the  same.  But,  curiously  enough,  this  indiffer- 
ence cannot  be  maintained  when  the  things  begin  to  move; 
for  then  difference  of  direction,  as  well  as  difference  of  po- 
sition, becomes  possible.  The  first  impulse  is  to  say  that 
difference  of  direction  also  makes  no  difference  to  the  thing, 
that  a  thing  moving  north  is  in  no  respect  different  from 
one  moving  west.  But  this  impulse  is  misleading.  The 
difference  of  direction  must  have  some  ground  in  the  mov- 
ing things,  and  this  can  only  be  found  in  some  peculiarity 
of  internal  condition,  which  holds  one  to  its  northerly  and 
the  other  to  its  westerly  direction.  Without  this  assump- 
tion there  is  no  reason  why  direction  should  not  incessantly 
change.  If  we  should  fall  back  on  the  law  of  the  sufficient 
reason,  we  should  be  especially  unfortunate;  as  the  lack  of 
any  state  determinative  of  direction  could  only  result  in  the 
thing's  coming  at  once  to  a  standstill.  It  will  likely  be 
urged  that  there  is  sufficient  reason  for  the  thing's  going, 
straight  ahead,  in  that  it  is  actually  moving  in  that  direction. 
If,  then,  a  thing  moving  west  were  internally  exactly  like 
one  moving  north,  still  each  would  continue  its  proper  mo- 
tion because  already  in  it.  This  seems  clear,  but  is  really 
unconvincing.  For  motion  is  simply  the  successive  exist- 
ence of  a  body  at  successive  points;  and  the  fact  that  a 


224  METAPHYSICS 

body  has  been  at  points  J.,  B,  C,  etc.,  is  no  reason  why  it 
should  pass  through  the  points  X,  Y,  and  Z.  At  any  given 
point  of  time,  there  must  be  some  reason  why  the  next  in- 
crement of  the  path  should  be  in  one  direction  rather  than 
another.  The  path  passed  over  is  not  in  the  thing,  but  be- 
hind it.  Direction,  geometrically  considered,  cannot  deter- 
mine anything.  Why,  then,  shall  the  body  at  any  point  of 
its  path  take  one  direction  rather  than  another?  There  is 
nothing  to  do  but  to  declare  that  motion  and  direction  are 
given  as  inseparable  elements  of  the  same  internal  state, 
and  that  this  state  varies  with  the  direction.  But,  on  the 
other  hand,  possible  directions  are  numberless ;  and  we  are 
shut  up  to  the  affirmation  that  for  each  one  of  the  direc- 
tions there  is  a  special  and  peculiar  inner  state.  Thus  we 
should  have  to  give  up  the  indifference  of  things  to  space, 
and  declare  that  all  directions,  if  not  all  positions,  in  abso- 
lute space  have  their  representatives  in  the  metaphysical 
states  of  matter.  Tin's  paradox  the  realist  might  find  it 
hard  eitherto  escape  or  to  admit. 

Before  speaking  of  the  general  laws  of  motion,  a  word 
must  be  said  about  its  continuity.  This  is  an  idea  more 
often  mentioned  than  understood.  A  familiar  misunder- 
standing makes  it  mean  that  motion  has  a  constant  quan- 
tity, a  fancy  which  has  long  been  superannuated  in  physics. 
Those  who  hold  it  seem  to  think  that  they  have  the  support 
of  physical  science ;  but  the  conservation  of  energy,  which 
they  apparently  have  in  mind,  is  a  totally  different  doc- 
.trine. 

But  the  continuity  of  motion  is  itself  an  ambiguous 
phrase,  as  it  may  refer  to  space  or  to  velocity.  A  very 
excellent  work  on  mechanics  contains  the  following  defini- 

O 

tion  :  "  Motion  is  essentially  continuous ;  that  is,  a  body 
cannot  pass  from  one  position  to  another  without  passing 
through  a  series  of  intermediate  positions ;  a  point  in  mo- 


MATTER,  FORCE,  AND  MOTION  225 

tion,  therefore,  describes  a  continuous  line."  Here  the  doc- 
trine is  referred  to  space  alone.  But  as  originally  expressed 
by  Leibnitz,  and  as  commonly  understood,  it  refers  rather 
to  velocity,  and  means  that  a  moving  body,  in  passing  from 
one  velocity  to  another,  passes  through  all  intermediate  ve- 
locities. In  this  sense  of  the  law  Leibnitz  and  his  followers 
regarded  it  as  a  self-evident  truth,  and  from  it  they  deduced 
a  number  of  propositions,  notably  that  absolutely  solid  bod- 
ies cannot  exist,  as  the  collision  of  such  bodies  would  also 
collide  with  the  law  of  continuity.  Others  have  deduced 
from  the  same  law  both  the  necessity  of  moving  forces  in 
matter  which  act  at  a  distance,  and  also  the  punctual  char- 
acter of  the  elements.  It  is  plain  that  if  two  absolutely 
solid  bodies  collide,  the  change  of  velocity  must  be  instan- 
taneous ;  for  the  moment  of  collision  is  indivisible,  and  if 
they  rested  for  two  consecutive  instants  the  law  of  inertia 
would  keep  them  at  rest  forever.  There  would,  then,  be  an 
instantaneous  passage  from  motion  to  rest,  or  from  rest  to 
motion,  or  from  one  velocity  to  another,  and  thus  the  law 
of  continuity  would  be  broken.  Hence  bodies  must  begin 
to  act  upon  one  another  before  the  time  of  geometrical  con- 
tact ;  and  hence  must  be  endowed  with  moving  forces  which 
can  act  at  a  distance. 

In  neither  of  these  senses  is  the  continuity  of  motion  a 
necessity  of  thought.  The  ideality  of  space  makes  it  en- 
tirely possible  that  phenomena  should  appear  in  one  position 
and  reappear  in  another  without  appearing  at  the  interme- 
diate positions.  If  such  is  not  the  order  of  experience  we 
must  view  it  simply  as  a  fact,  and  not  as  a  rational  necessity. 

Just  as  little  is  the  continuity  of  velocity  a  rational  ne- 
cessity. The  reasons  given  for  the  doctrine  are  mostly  in- 
consistent with  one  another.  It  is  said,  for  example,  that 
velocity  cannot  increase  by  leaps  without  implying  that  the 
same  body  has  two  different  velocities  at  the  same  instant; 

15 


226  METAPHYSICS 

but  this  is  the  same  fallacy  which  appeared  in  the  objec- 
tions to  change.  Instant  is  taken  to  mean  a  short  duration, 
whereas  in  the  case  assumed  it  would  not  be  a  duration  of 
any  sort,  but  a  limit.  It  would  express  the  point  of  time 
when  one  motion  ceases  and  another  begins.  On  one  side 
of  the  point  the  velocity  would  be  v,  on  the  other  side  it 
would  be  vr  Moreover,  these  objections  are  inconsistent. 
They  do  not  rest  on  the  greatness  of  the  increment,  but  on 
the  fact  of  any  increment  whatever.  Hence  v  +  dv  is  just 
as  obnoxious  to  this  objection  as  v+vr  where  vl  is  a  finite 
velocity  and  dv  is  an  infinitesimal.  If.  then,  the  objection 
were  allowed,  the  changelessness  of  the  Eleatics  would  be 
the  necessary  conclusion;  and  a  variable  velocity  of  any 
kind  would  be  impossible. 

The  end  aimed  at  in  this  argument  is  much  better  reached 
by  saying  that  no  finite  force  can  generate  a  finite  velocity 
in  less  than  finite  time.  This  statement  will  always  be  tol- 
erably secure  from  attack,  because  the  intensity  of  a  force  is 
measured  by  the  velocity  it  can  generate  in  a  finite  unit  of 
time.  If,  then,  a  force  should  generate  a  finite  velocity  in 
infinitesimal  time,  it  would  generate  an  infinite  velocity  in 
finite  time,  and  thus  by  definition  would  be  infinite.  But 
this  conception,  again,  assumes  that  the  force  shall  act  inces- 
santly like  gravitation.  In  the  case  of  absolute  solids,  im- 
pact would  be  attended  by  the  generation  or  destruction  of 
a  finite  velocity  in  a  point  of  time ;  yet  the  force  would  not 
be  infinite,  because  such  impact  would  necessarily  be  instan- 
taneous in  its  action.  Through  overlooking  this  fact,  some 
speculators  have  affirmed  that  in  case  of  impact  the  force 
must  be  infinite;  but  their  argument  has  always  consisted 
in  confusing  action  by  impact  with  action  by  moving  forces. 
And  hence  we  conclude  once  more  that  the  continuity  of 
velocity  is  a  doctrine  which  holds  only  in  a  cystem  which 
derives  all  motion  from  moving  forces,  which  forces,  again, 


MATTER,  FOKCE,  AND  MOTION  227 

act  not  only  through  space,  but  also  through  time.  And 
even  in  such  a  system  the  doctrine  assumes  the  reality  of 
time,  as  if  time  itself  had  a  significance  for  action.  In  our 
view  of  time,  difference  in  the  members  of  the  same  series 
is  time  itself.  It  follows,  then,  that  any  series  which  admits 
of  division  in  thought  will  necessarily  appear  to  be  in  time ; 
and  as  we  can  carry  the  division  of  velocity  to  any  desired 
extent,  velocity  must  appear  as  reached  by  infinitesimal  in- 
crements whose  sum  becomes  perceptible  only  in  finite  time. 
"We  view  velocity  as  quantity,  and  measure  it  by  number. 
But  quantity  admits  of  indefinite  division  ;  and  hence  we  are 
forced  to  make  the  final  units  indefinitely  small.  But  after 
we  have  posited  such  a  divisibility,  we  must  of  course  view 
the  whole  as  the  sum  of  the  infinitesimal  parts  implied  in 
our  position.  Their  summation  in  reality,  however,  must 
be  successive.  Hence,  even  in  the  case  of  impact  of  proper 
solids,  if  a  body  should  instantaneously  pass  from  velocity 
two  to  velocity  four,  we  should  seek  to  divide  the  increment 
into  parts  which  must  all  be  passed  through,  and  should  then 
try  to  reach  the  instantaneousness  of  the  passage  by  increas- 
ing its  rate  to  infinity.  It  is  this  fact,  that  the  divisibility 
of  a  series  is  time,  which  makes  the  continuity  of  velocity 
apparently  self-evident. 

We  leave  now  these  general  considerations  and  pass  to 
the  more  specific  laws  of  motion.  And  fortunately  we  are 
not  left  to  invent  or  discover  these  laws  for  ourselves,  for 
the  science  of  mechanics  has  done  the  work  for  us.  We 
have,  then,  only  to  examine  those  laws  which  are  found 
necessary  in  interpreting  phenomena,  and  which  are  justi- 
fied by  experience.  We  remain  for  the  present  on  the  real- 
istic platform. 

The  first  and  basal  law  of  motion  is  that  of  inertia,  ac- 
cording to  which  a  body  cannot  start  or  stop  itself.  If  at 


228  METAPHYSICS 

rest,  it  remains  at  rest ;  and  if  in  motion,  it  remains  in  uni- 
form motion  in  a  straight  line  unless  interfered  with  from 
without.  Many  attempts  have  been  made  to  show  this  law 
to  be  a  necessity  of  thought,  but  without  success.  If  the 
non-spontaneity  of  the  elements  be  allowed,  the  law  is,  of 
course,  an  identical  judgment,  for  the  law  is  simply  a  denial 
of  spontaneity  with  regard  to  space-relations.  A  change  of 
condition  is  always  an  effect,  and  presupposes  some  cause; 
and  if  an  element  has  no  influence  over  its  own  states,  of 
course  all  change  must  come  from  without.  But  when  the 
point  is  to  know  whether  the  law  is  an  a/priori  necessity,  we 
must  inquire  whether  there  is  any  ground  for  saying  that 
the  elements  must  be  of  this  sort.  That  they  are  such  may 
be  allowed ;  but  that  they  must  be  such  is  not  made  to  ap- 
pear. The  apparent  self-evidence  in  the  case  is  largely  due 
to  the  abstraction  of  a  material  point  with  which  mechanics 
is  wont  to  begin.  This  point  is  conceived  as  the  inert  and 
rigid  subject  of  possible  motion,  and  in  itself  is  so  emptied 
of  all  quality  as  to  contain  no  ground  of  activity  of  any  sort. 
The  deduction  of  the  law  from  this  conception  is  easy  enough ; 
but  this  conception  is  a  pure  figment  of  the  imagination. 
As  applied  to  a  real  element,  even  the  first  part  of  the  law, 
which  asserts  that  a  body  at  rest  will  remain  at  rest  unless 
moved  by  something  outside  of  it,  is  not  self-evident.  It  is 
not  self-evident  that  an  element,  if  it  could  exist  alone  in 
space,  could  not,  whatever  its  nature,  begin  motion;  for 
motion,  as  we  have  seen,  is  but  the  spatial  expression  of  an 
internal  state,  and  if  that  state  were  given,  motion  would 
result.  It  is  not  self-evident  that  the  inner  changes  of  such 
a  thing  could  never  result  in  that  state  which  expresses  it- 
self in  motion. 

The  common  proof  of  the  first  part  of  the  law  consists  in 
bidding  us  conceive  a  single  element  in  void  space,  and  in 
pointing  out  that  there  is  no  more  reason  why  it  should 


MATTER,  FORCE,  AND  MOTION  229 

move  in  one  direction  rather  than  in  another.  Then  the 
conclusion  is  drawn  that  the  element  will  remain  at  rest. 
But  the  law  of  the  sufficient  reason,  to  which  appeal  is  here 
made,  is  a  very  treacherous  ally.  We  could  use  it  with 
equal  propriety  to  prove  that  the  atom  could  not  be  in  space 
or  in  time.  For  every  point  of  space  or  time  is  like  every 
other,  and  hence  there  is  no  reason  why  it  should  be  in  one 
rather  than  in  any  other;  and  hence  it  cannot  be  in  either 
space  or  time.  It  is  well  known  that  Leibnitz,  the  formu-. 
lator  of  this  law,  was  perpetually  on  the  verge  of  pantheism 
because  of  its  influence.  But  we  may  allow  that  there 
would  be  no  reason  in  space  itself  for  motion  in  one  direc- 
tion rather  than  in  another ;  yet  that  would  not  prove  that 
there  might  not  be  a  reason  in  the  thing.  In  no  case  does 
space  determine  the  direction  of  motion;  this  is  due  to  the 
interaction  of  things,  and  the  point  here  is  to  know  why 
an  element  might  not  of  itself  pass  into  that  internal  state 
which  appears  as  motion.  It  is  said  that  if  it  did,  the  mo- 
tion would  not' arise  from  rest,  but  from  an  internal  motion  ; 
but  the  series  of  metaphysical  changes  in  things  are  mo- 
tions only  in  a  rhetorical  sense.  If,  then,  a  thing  could  exist 
alone  and  maintain  a  series  of  inner  changes  in  its  solitary 
existence,  it  is  not  inconceivable  that  it  should  pass  into  mo- 
tion alone.  For  all  we  can  say,  there  might  be  a  tendency 
in  things  to  seek  a  certain  state,  as  in  elastic  bodies,  where 
any  departure  from  equilibrium  results  in  an  effort  to  re- 
store the  balance.  A  better  illustration  is  found  in  our  own 
mental  life,  where  every  state  is  not  compatible  with  inner 
harmony,  and  in  which  there  is  a  corresponding  effort  to  re- 
store the  internal  equilibrium.  Things,  then,  might  be  such 
as  to  be  in  conflict  with  themselves  when  forced  out  of  a 
certain  state,  and  hence  they  might  have  an  inner  tendency 
towards  that  state,  and  this  state  might  be  one  which  should 
manifest  itself  as  either  rest  or  motion,  according  to  its  nature. 


230  METAPHYSICS 

But  it  has  been  further  said  that  motion  could  not  result 
even  in  this  case,  because  direction  is  necessary  to  motion. 
If,  then,  this  state  which  implies  motion  should  exist,  it 
could  not  produce  motion  because  there  would  be  nothing 
to  determine  its  direction.  Motion  would  be  possible  in  any 
one  of  an  indefinite  number  of  directions,  and  as  every  one 
would  have  as  good  a  claim  as  every  other,  the  motion  could 
not  begin  at  all.  This  is  a  return  to  the  doctrine  of  the 
sufficient  reason,  and  does  not  reach  the  difficulty.  Since 
motion  involves  direction,  we  should  simply  say  that  the 
state  supposed  to  be  produced  would  be  one  which  should 
contain  the  ground  of  direction  in  it.  Of  course,  the  ques- 
tion comes  up,  Why  one  direction  rather  than  another? 
And  the  answer  must  be  a  confession  of  ignorance.  But 
for  one  wrho  believes  in  the  reality  of  space  and  time,  the 
same  question  would  arise  concerning  the  existence  of  the 
element.  It  would  be  easy  to  develop  a  great  astonishment 
over  the  fact  that  the  atom  should  be  in  any  one  point 
rather  than  in  some  one  of  the  countless  other  points,  each 
of  which  has  as  good  a  right  to  its  presence.  And  this  as- 
tonishment would  have  as  much  ground  as  the  wonder  over 
the  atom's  motion  in  space.  Provided  the  existence  of  an 
atom  in  space  meant  anything  intelligible,  its  movement 
and  direction  would  be  no  more  wonderful  than  its  exist- 
ence in  a  fixed  point.  The  fact,  whichever  it  might  be, 
would  simply  have  to  be  admitted.  Even  in  the  actual  sys- 
tem we  come  down  to  the  same  difficulty.  It  might  be 
said  that  no  thing  can  cause  another  to  move  by  any  attrac- 
tive force,  because  the  possible  directions  are  infinite.  The 
word  attraction  must  not  mislead  us  into  overlooking  this 
difficulty.  It  is  by  no  means  self-evident  that  motion  must 
take  place'  along  the  line  which  joins  the  bodies.  For  all 
we  can  say,  it  might  be  on  any  other  line  whatever.  Hence 
the  attracting  body  must  also  determine  the  direction,  and 


MATTER,  FORCE,  AND  MOTION  231 

by  the  law  of  the  sufficient  reason  this  is  impossible.  But 
by  the  law  of  fact  the  conclusion  is  absurd.  Indeed,  the 
entire  process  by  which  this  law  is  deduced  is  purely  ficti- 
tious. The  single  atom  in  void  space  is  a  contradiction,  be- 
cause the  atoms  have  their  existence  and  properties  only  in 
the  system  of  which  they  are  parts  or  implications.  The 
sole  use  of  such  a  fiction  is  to  impress  the  law  upon  the  im- 
agination. It  should  never  be  tolerated  for  an  instant  as 
an  argument.  But  if  we  will  resort  to  such  a  fiction,  we 
must  declare  that,  for  aught  any  philosopher  or  physicist 
knows,  a  single  element  in  space  might  be  such  as  to  set 
itself  in  motion. 

The  second  part  of  the  law  is  just  as  little  an  apriori 
truth  on  the  current  view  of  matter.  To  the  unreflecting, 
indeed,  it  even  seems  false ;  but  this  is  due  entirely  to  the 
bondage  of  the  senses.  First,  the  constant  direction  is  no 
necessity  of  thought.  Direction  itself  is  given  from  within, 
and  not  from  without.  Of  course,  in  reality  the  direction 
is  primarily  determined  from  without,  but  only  through  an 
internal  state,  so  that  the  thing  is  not  drawn,  but  driven 
from  within  towards  a  certain  point.  The  immediate  reason 
why  a  thing  is  moving  in  a  certain  direction  and  at  a  cer- 
tain rate  is  not  found  in  external  things,  but  in  its  own  inner 
state.  This  is  especially  apparent  on  the  current  view  that 
if  outer  things  should  all  fall  away,  the  thing  would  con- 
tinue to  move  in  the  same  direction  and  at  the  same  rate. 
Direction,  then,  is  finally  given  in  the  inner  state  of  the 
moving  thing.  There  is,  therefore,  no  absurdity  in  suppos- 
ing that  a  thing  should  change  its  own  direction.  That  it 
does  not  do  so  is  a  fact,  not  a  necessity.  Here,  also,  appeal 
is  made  to  the  principle  of  the  sufficient  reason,  and  it  is 
urged  that  there  is  no  reason  why  the  change  should  be  on 
one  side  rather  than  on  the  other,  etc.  Of  course,  there  is 
no  reason  in  space,  but  to  say  that  there  is  none  in  the 


232  METAPHYSICS 

thing  is  simply  to  beg  the  question.     This  part  of  the  law 
also  is  manifestly  no  necessity,  but  at  most  only  a  fact. 

It  remains  to  consider  the  last  factor  of  the  law  of 
inertia,  the  uniformity  of  motion  when  not  interfered  with 
by  external  objects.  This  also  follows  necessarily  from  the 
assumption  that  a  material  element  cannot  change  its  own 
state;  but  it  is  no  more  a  necessary  truth  than  the  other 
factors  of  the  law.  But,  curiously  enough,  a  better  argument 
can  be  made  for  this  part  of  the  law  than  for  the  others.  If 
we  assume  that  a  finite  change  is  reached  only  through  suc- 
cessive increments,  and  hence  that  a  given  change  is  only 
the  sum  of  the  increments,  then  it  is  plain  that  there  could 
be  no  change  without  the  law ;  and  hence  motion  could 
never  begin  nor  end,  as  this  beginning  or  ending  would  be 
a  form  of  change.  If,  then,  motion  can  begin  or  cease,  the 
law  of  inertia  must  be  admitted  as  an  implication  of  this 
fact.  Taking  the  case  of  beginning  motion,  it  is  plain  that 
if  every  increment  perished  as  fast  as  produced,  there  could 
be  no  sum.  Each  new  increment  would  begin  with  zero, 
and  could  never  get  beyond  it.  Let  us  take  the  case  of  a 
body  falling  from  rest.  At  the  end  of  the  first  unit  of  time, 
which  may  be  taken  as  infinitesimal,  the  body  has  a  certain 
velocity  from  gravitation.  In  the  second  instant,  the  body 
is  supposed  to  retain  the  velocity  acquired  in  the  first,  and 
to  gain  an  additional  increment ;  and  so  on  in  successive  in- 
stants. If,  now,  we  suppose  the  acceleration  uniform,  the 
velocity  at  the  end  of  a  given  time  will  be  the  velocity  ac- 
quired in  the  unit  of  time  multiplied  by  the  number  of 
units.  But  it  is  plain  that  this  could  not  be  the  case  if  the 
law  of  inertia  did  not  hold ;  for  the  first  increment  of  ve- 
locity, dv,  in  the  first  instant,  dt,  would  perish  at  once ;  and 
hence  the  next  increment  of  velocity  would  begin  not  with 
c?y,  but  with  plain  zero.  Hence  at  the  end  of  any  time,  t, 
the  velocity  would  still  be  zero,  and  the  body  would  not 


MATTER,  FORCE,  AND  MOTION  233 

have  moved.  It  may  at  first  appear  as  if  the  body  should 
have  moved  some  during  the  several  instants,  dt,  but  this  is 
seen  to  be  a  mistake,  when  we  remember  that  as  long  as  dt 
expresses  a  real  duration,  we  cannot  assume  that  dv  remains 
constant  through  dt  without  assuming  the  law  of  inertia. 
The  untruth  of  the  law  would  make  even  this  impossible, 
and  hence  each  minimum  increment  of  velocity  would  per- 
ish as  soon  as  born.  While,  then,  we  cannot  directly  prove 
this  part  of  the  law  of  inertia,  we  can  show  that  without  it 
no  motion  could  ever  begin. 

Respect  for  those  who  have  urged  this  argument  would 
incline  us  to  accept  it,  if  we  held  the  realistic  view,  especial- 
ly as  it  is  by  far  the  best  argument  advanced.  It  does  not 
aim  to  show  that  the  law  is  a  necessity  of  thought,  but  that 
it  is  a  necessary  implication  of  admitted  facts.  It  depends, 
however,  entirely  upon  the  assumed  truth  of  the  law  of  con- 
tinuity, or  on  the  assumption  that  no  natural  force  can  in- 
stantaneously produce  or  destroy  a  finite  velocity.  If,  how- 
ever, gravity  were  capable  of  instantaneously  generating 
any  finite  velocity,  motion  would  be  possible  without  the  law 
of  inertia ;  for  velocity  would  be  renewed  as  fast  as  lost,  and 
this  would  be  equivalent  to  the  constancy  of  the  original 
velocity.  In  a  fountain  under  constant  pressure  the  column 
of  water  stands  always  at  the  same  height.  There  is,  in- 
deed, incessant  going,  but  there  is  also  incessant  coming; 
and  the  one  balances  the  other.  If  gravity  were  a  constant 
force,  no  acceleration  could  occur  under  such  circumstances; 
but  if  gravity  itself  varied,  variable  velocity  would  result. 
Nor  would  gravity  in  such  a  case  be  an  infinite  force ;  for 
it  would  never  generate  an  infinite  velocity.  The  summa- 
tion of  the  finite  velocities  instantaneously  produced  into  an 
infinite  sum  would  be  impossible  without  assuming  the  law 
of  inertia.  This  law  not  holding,  the  velocity  would  remain 
finite,  and  the  present  order  would  remain  unchanged. 


234  METAPHYSICS 

There  is  no  need  to  consider  the  pretended  proof  from 
experience.  Nothing  remains  at  rest  absolutely,  and  noth- 
ing moves  with  uniform  velocity  in  a  straight  line.  If  a 
body  be  thrown  into  the  air,  it  quickly  loses  its  motion  even 
in  the  absence  of  that  friction  which  plays  so  prominent  a 
part  in  the  alleged  experimental  proofs  of  the  law.  As- 
suming the  law  to  be  correct,  we  must  account  for  these 
variations  by  external  forces ;  and  we  throw  on  these  forces 
the  burden  of  explaining  the  variations.  But  why  might 
we  not  assume  the  forces,  and  throw  the  burden  of  expla- 
nation on  the  laws  of  motion  ?  Or  might  we  not,  in  the 
spirit  of  Leibnitz's  monadology,  find  the  ground  of  all 
change  in  each  element  alone,  so  that  they  shall  have  vari- 
ous laws  of  motion  according  to  the  demands  of  the  system  ? 
In  that  case  the  laws  both  of  force  and  motion  would  be 
only  the  components  into  which  the  facts  fall  for  purposes 
of  our  calculation ;  and  the  agreement  of  fact  and  calcula- 
tion would  only  prove  the  practical  validity  of  the  laws, 
not  their  reality.  If  things  can  exist  independently,  this 
view  is  as  good  as  any. 

Thus  far  we  have  considered  this  law  from  the  common 
stand-point  of  a  real  space  with  things  moving  in  it.  This 
view  we  have  found  to  involve  some  peculiar  paradoxes 
concerning  the  relation  of  space  to  motion  and  direction. 
In  addition  we  have  found  reason  to  complain  of  the  meth- 
od of  proof.  This  consists  in  setting  the  moving  subject 
apart  in  unreal  abstraction,  and  then  deducing  laws  for 
reality  from  purely  fictitious  and  impossible  cases.  Thus 
the  idea  of  a  system  is  overlooked  entirely,  and  the  attempt 
is  made  to  find  the  laws  of  the  system  by  denying  in  effect 
that  a  true  system  exists.  The  individual  has  been  assumed 
as  capable  of  existing  by  itself;  and  against  this  view  our 
previous  criticisms  are  valid.  Of  such  elements,  one  law 
would  antecedently  be  no  more  probable  than  another ;  and 


MATTER,  FORCE,  AND  MOTION  235 

the  validity  of  a  law  up  to  a  certain  point  would  be  no  war- 
rant for  its  universality.  If  any  deduction  of  this  law  is 
possible,  it  must  be  from  considering  the  nature  of  the 
system  and  not  from  reflecting  on  those  parts  which  have 
been  hypostasized  into  an  unreal  and  impossible  indepen- 
dence. It  may,  then,  be  allowed  to  inquire  whether  any 
rational  insight  into  this  law  of  motion  can  be  reached  from 
the  general  character  of  the  system. 

Cosmology  deals  only  with  the  system  of  nature,  or  with 
what  we  mean  by  the  physical  system.  But  in  discussing 
interaction  we  have  seen  that  it  is  impossible  to  construct 
a  system  out  of  mutually  independent  elements.  The  nat- 
ure and  action  of  each  thing  must  be  determined  by  the 
nature  and  idea  of  the  whole.  But  this  idea  itself  can  de- 
termine nothing  except  as  it  is  set  in  reality.  Hence  the 
logical  implications  of  the  idea  are  realized  in  the  actual 
members  of  the  system ;  and  the  demands  of  the  whole 
upon  each  are  realized  through  the  mutual  interaction  of 
the  members.  Each,  then,  is  what  it  is,  and  does  what  it 
does,  because  all  the  rest  are  what  they  are  and  do  what  the}' 
do.  Interaction  in  general  means  simply  the  determination 
of  one  thing  by  another;  and  in  a  system  where  there  is 
nothing  but  interaction  the  activities  of  each  thing  are  nec- 
essarily objective,  and  the  determinations  of  each  thing  are 
necessarily  from  without.  But  this  is  the  conception  we 
must  form  of  the  physical  system.  In  it  we  know  of  noth- 
ing but  interaction,  or  mutual  determination.  There  is  no 
ground  for  affirming  any  subjectivity  or  self-determination 
in  them ;  and  they  are  members  of  the  system  only  as  each 
is  what  the  system  demands.  If  in  addition  to  their  cos- 
mological  activity  they  also  maintain  an  inner  life,  they  be- 
long by  this  element  to  the  realm  of  psychology  and  not  to 
cosmology.  But  a  cosmology  is  possible  only  as  the  mem- 
bers interact  and  determine  one  another.  Law  and  svstem 


236  METAPHYSICS 

\vould  not  otherwise  exist.  Hence  the  law  of  inertia  in  its 
fullest  extent  must  reign  in  such  a  system.  No  element 
can  change  its  own  state  whatever  it  may  be ;  but  the 
ground  of  change  must  always  be  found  outside  of  the  ele- 
ment itself.  If  it  were  otherwise,  then  the  state  of  an  ele- 
ment at  any  moment  would  not  be  an  expression  of  the 
demands  of  the  system  upon  it ;  and  this  is  contrary  to 
the  notion  of  a  system.  Not  even  the  suggestion  already 
made  that  things  may  tend  to  a  certain  state  can  be  longer 
allowed ;  for  things  have  no  right  to  any  state  on  their  own 
account,  but  only  to  such  as  the  state  of  the  system  as  a 
whole  demands.  Hence  change  of  any  and  every  kind  in  a 
physical  element  must  be  referred  to  external  causes.  This 
is  the  law  of  inertia  in  its  very  broadest  sense ;  and  its  ap- 
plication to  motion  is  only  a  special  and  limited  case.  And 
we  reach  this  conclusion  not  by  considering  such  hyposta- 
sized  impossibilities  as  the  existence  of  a  single  element  in 
void  space,  but  by  reflecting  on  the  demands  which  a  phys- 
ical system  must  make  upon  each  of  its  members.  In  so 
far  as  any  of  them  are  capable  of  independent  action,  they 
become  rebels  against  the  sj'stem  or  seceders  from  it.  These 
considerations  do  not,  indeed,  prove  the  law  to  be  an  onto- 
logical  necessity,  for  the  system  itself  is  no  necessity ;  but 
they  do  prove  that  there  can  be  no  physical  system  without 
the  law.  We  need  not,  then,  doubt  this  law  because  we 
know  nothing  about  the  mysterious  nature  of  things ;  for 
the  existence  of  a  system  at  all  implies  the  law.  Nor  need 
the  conclusion  be  confined  to  the  physical  elements  alone. 
Even  the  finite  spirit,  to  a  very  large  extent,  comes  under 
this  law  ;  and  so  far  as  it  does  not,  it  exists  in  relative  inde- 
pendence of  the  physical  system.  If  the  mental  life  were 
absolutely  determined  by  our  interaction  with  the  system, 
the  law  of  inertia,  in  its  broadest  sense,  would  be  absolute 
for  mind  as  well  as  for  matter. 


MATTER,  FORCE,  AND  MOTION  237 

The  law  of  inertia  is  the  basal  law  of  motion.  In  addi- 
tion, two  others  are  commonly  given,  which  are  as  much 
laws  of  force  as  of  motion.  The  first  of  these,  the  second 
law  of  Newton,  is  that  the  amount  of  motion  is  propor- 
tional to  the  moving  force,  and  is  in  the  direction  of  its 
action.  The  first  part  of  this  law  is  simple  enough.  Mo- 
tion being  an  effect,  must  of  course  vary  with  its  cause ; 
and,  besides,  the  intensity  of  the  force  is  measured  by  the 
motion  it  causes.  This  part  of  the  law  could  hardly  fail  to 
be  exact.  But  the  second  part  of  the  law  contains  implicitly 
the  doctrine  of  the  parallelogram  of  forces,  and  this  is  not  so 
self-evidently  true.  We  postpone  its  consideration,  and  pass 
to  the  next  law,  Newton's  third  law  of  motion,  the  equality 
of  action  and  reaction.  This  is  not  properly  a  law  of  mo- 
tion, but  of  action.  In  speaking  of  being,  we  pointed  out 
that  there  can  be  no  action  without  reaction.  In  such  a 
case  the  object  would  in  no  way  determine  the  agent,  and 
the  effect  would  be  created  outright.  Hence  all  interaction 
involves,  reaction,  and  we  may  lay  it  down  as  an  axiom  of 
metaphysics  that  there  can  be  no  action  without  reaction 
But  this  axiom  in  no  way  determines  the  nature  and  form 
of  the  reaction,  and  is  far  from  giving  us  the  third  law  of 
motion.  This  law  of  motion  is,  besides,  thoroughly  ambigu- 
ous, and  is  self-evident  only  in  one,  and  that  its  least  impor- 
tant, sense.  The  action  and  reaction  may  be  purely  static. 
as  when  one  thing  rests  on  another.  In  this  sense  the  law 
is  a  necessity  of  equilibrium.  If  the  table  did  not  press  up 
as  much  as  the  weight  on  it  presses  down,  it  would  be  broken. 
The  foundations  must  meet  the  downward  pressure  of  the 
building  by  an  equal  upward  pressure,  or  motion  and  col- 
lapse will  result.  But  action  and  reaction  may  be  dynamic 
also,  as  when  the  earth  attracts  the  sun  and  the  sun  attracts 
the  earth ;  and  in  this  case  the  law  is  no  self-evident  neces- 
sity. It  is  common  to  speak  of  this  as  a  case  of  tension,  and 


238  METAPHYSICS 

to  illustrate  by  a  tense  cable.  If  a  person  in  one  boat  pulls 
at  another  boat,  each  boat  moves  towards  the  other,  and  ac- 
tion and  reaction  are  equal.  At  any  point  whatever  in  the 
cable  there  is  equal  tension  in  both  directions.  But  this  il- 
lustration is  of  no  use  until  it  is  shown  that  attraction  takes 
place  through  a  cable.  There  is  no  difficulty  in  conceiving 
that  a  magnet  should  attract  iron  without  being  attracted 
by  it.  The  magnet  causes  in  the  iron  a  state  which  tends 
to  translate  itself  into  motion  towards  the  magnet,  but  this 
in  no  way  implies  that  the  iron  must  cause  a  similar  state  in 
the  magnet.  Neither  act  implies  the  other.  The  same  is 
true  for  attraction  in  general.  The  attraction  of  any  one 
element  does  not  imply  the  attraction  of  any  other.  This 
is  all  the  more  evident  from  the  fact  that  many  physicists 
have  spoken  very  freely  of  repulsive  elements  which  meet 
attraction  with  repulsion.  It  is,  indeed,  a  grave  misuse  of 
language  to  speak  of  anything  as  reaction  which  is  not  di- 
rectly elicited  by  the  preceding  action.  Repulsion  due  to 
pressure,  or  to  repulsive  forces  called  into  play  by  previous 
motion,  is  properly  described  as  reaction,  because  it  results 
from  the  previous  action ;  but  the  attraction  of  one  element 
upon  another  is  in  no  sense  a  reaction  from  the  attraction  of 
the  other  upon  it.  This  confusion  of  so  many  things  under 
a  common  term  is  what  makes  this  law  such  an  inexhaus- 
tible min?  of  truth  in  the  view  of  English  physicists.  That 
the  law,  in  this  wide  sense,  is  based  entirely  upon  induction 
needs  no  further  proof. 

The  next  law  of  motion  which  calls  for  consideration  is 
that  relation  to  the  composition  of  motions.  This  law  is 
implicit  in  Newton's  second  law  of  motion.  If  the  abstrac- 
tions of  kinematics  were  realities,  we  might  at  once  allow 
the  parallelogram  of  motions  to  be  a  rational  necessity.  If 
the  tendency  to  move  in  each  of  two  directions  is  to  be  sat- 
isfied, it  can  only  be  as  the  motion  is  along  the  diagonal  of 


MATTER,  FORCE,  AND  MOTION  239 

the  parallelogram  on  the  lines  representing  the  tendencies 
and  directions.  But,  in  reality,  it  is  not  a  question  of  com- 
pounding motions,  but  of  finding  the  resultant  of  forces 
which  tend  to  cause  the  motions;  and  this  introduces  new 
difficulties  into  the  question.  The  law  is  sufficiently  justified 
in  practice  to  exclude  any  doubt  of  its  validity  in  all  molar 
motions.  Its  necessity,  however,  is  quite  another  thing,  and 
depends  on  certain  assumptions  which  are  far  from  self- 
evident.  The  chief  one  is  that  each  force  shall  have  its  full 
and  proper  effect  in  a  crowd  as  well  as  when  acting  alone. 
Thus  if  A  and  B  both  attract  (7,  the  law  assumes  that  each 
shall  have  its  proper  influence  without  regard  to  the  other. 
On  this  assumption  the  resultant  must  be  represented  by 
the  diagonal  of  the  parallelogram  on  A  and  B.  But  this  is 
so  far  from  necessary  that  it  is  antecedently  improbable.  ^It 
would  seem  as  if  the  effect  of  a  new  impulse  ought  to  de- 
pend on  the  previous  state  of  the  subject.  This  is  the  case 
in  the  only  subject  of  which  we  have  direct  knowledge. 
The  effect  of  a  new  thought  or  desire  depends  very  largely 
on  the  character  of  the  thoughts  and  desires  already  in  the 
mind.  The  same  thing  affects  us  diversely  according  to  our 
mood  or  preoccupation.  It  is,  therefore,  a  surprise  to  find 
that  the  elements  are  never  preoccupied,  but  are  always 
open  to  any  new  impulse  whatever.  This  is  so  strange,  and 
from  the  stand-point  of  the  mental  life  so  paradoxical,  that 
we  can  allow  the  law  only  as  a  fact,  and  only  so  far  as  it  is 
justified  by  experience.  It  is  possible  that  in  the  molecular 
realm,  especially  in  chemistry  and  biology,  the  law  may  be 
modified. 

Another  assumption  is  commonly  read  into  this  law  which 
does  not  belong  in  it.  The  law  itself  says  nothing  of  the 
nature  or  origin  of  the  forces,  but  views  them  all  alike  as 
moving  forces.  They  may  be  qualitatively  distinct  other- 
wise ;  but  as  moving  forces  they  all  stand  on  the  same  plane, 


240  METAPHYSICS 

and  their  effects  are  combined  according  to  the  parallelo- 
gram of  motions.  But  it  is  generally  further  assumed  that 
the  forces  themselves  act  in  the  same  way,  whether  singly 
or  in  a  crowd.  The  action  of  a  given  element  is  not  affected 
by  aggregation,  but  only  by  its  own  position  in  space.  The 
same  amount  of  matter,  at  the  same  distance  from  the  earth, 
will  attract  with  the  same  intensity  whatever  its  form  may 
be.  But  this  also  is  no  necessity  of  thought,  and  from  the 
stand-point  of  human  experience  it  is  antecedently  improb- 
able. If  such  variation  were  allowed,  it  would,  indeed, 
increase  the  difficulty  of  calculation  indefinitely ;  but  this 
proves  nothing.  As  it  is,  we  regard  the  action  of  a  com- 
pound as  the  sum  of  the  acts  of  the  components,  and  we 
reach  the  total  action  by  summing  up  the  effects  of  the  sep- 
arate factors.  If  it  were  otherwise,  we  should  have  a  prob- 
lem immeasurably  more  complex  than  that  of  three  bodies. 
In  the  latter  case  we  have  to  find  the  positions  of  bodies 
from  forces  which  depend  on  the  positions  which  are  to  be 
found;  but  in  the  former  case  we  should  have  the  addi- 
tional difficulty  of  not  knowing  even  the  law  of  the  forces. 
The  parallelogram  of  forces  might  still  be  valid,  but  it 
would  be  useless.  The  actual  forces  would  depend  upon 
the  aggregation  or  velocity  of  the  elements,  and  could  be 
known  only  from  their  resultant.  Nevertheless,  the  inde- 
pendent action  of  each  element  as  assumed  in  mechanics  is 
so  far  from  a  necessary  truth  that  it  is  not  even  known  to 
be  true  at  all  except  in  the  case  of  gravity.  In  particular 
it  has  been  suggested  as  a  help  to  the  mechanical  theory  of 
life  that  possibly  the  elements  in  the  organism  no  longer 
work  under  this  law,  but  under  some  other  which  expresses 
the  idea  of  the  organism.  In  that  case  the  elements  would 
owe  their  properties  to  the  mode  of  aggregation.  It  is  dif- 
ficult to  get  any  clear  idea  from  this  theory  beyond  the 
negative  suggestion  that  the  common  assumption  of  the 


MATTER,  FORCE,  AND  MOTION  241 

independent  action  of  each  element  may  not  be  true.  At 
all  events,  it  is  plain  that  if  the  common  doctrine  is  correct, 
it  cannot  be  viewed  as  a  rational  necessity,  but  only  as  a 
fact. 

So  much  for  mechanics  from  the  realistic  stand -point. 
Our  own  metaphysical  doctrine  changes  all  this,  and  we 
have  now  to  say  a  word  concerning  mechanics  on  the  ideal- 
istic view. 

Theoretical  mechanics  is  purely  an  abstract  science,  and 
as  an  abstraction  would  be  perfectly  valid  for  logic,  if  it 
had  no  significance  for  reality.  The  manipulation  of  the 
assumed  data  is  quite  independent  of  concrete  facts.  But 
when  it  comes  to  regarding  these  abstractions  as  realities, 
it  is  then  in  place  to  inquire  into  their  true  nature.  Pur- 
suing this  inquiry,  we  find  that  neither  matter  nor  force 
nor  motion  has  any  such  existence  as  we  have  attributed  to 
them.  Mechanics,  then,  must  be  looked  upon  at  best  as 
only  a  science  of  phenomena,  and  a  good  part  of  it  must  be 
viewed  as  of  the  nature  of  a  device  for  calculation.  A 
great  many  problems  in  mathematics  cannot  be  directly 
treated;  and  then  we  resort  to  various  devices  of  sub- 
stitution or  transformation,  whereby  they  are  made  amen- 
able to  our  calculus.  But  these  devices  are  no  part  of  the 
fact ;  they  are  only  our  shifts  for  dealing  with  it.  A  large 
part  of  mechanics  is  of  this  sort.  The  compositions  and 
decompositions  of  forces  and  motions,  the  analysis  of  mo- 
tion into  abstract  laws,  the  breaking  up  of  complex  facts 
into  simple  ones,  are  mainly  to  be  looked  upon  as  devices 
of  method,  and  not  as  some  actual  process  in  reality.  They 
are  purely  relative  to  ourselves,  as  much  so  as  the  degrees 
of  the  circle  or  the  meridians  and  parallels  of  the  geog- 
rapher. 

And  in  so  far  as  mechanics  deals  with  the  objective  order, 

16 


242  METAPHYSICS 

it  is  only  phenomenal.  We  must  reduce  the  whole  apparent 
world  in  space  and  time  to  phenomenal  existence,  and  study 
its  phenomenal  laws,  leaving  the  metaphysical  question  to 
philosophy.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  phenomena  have  laws. 
They  come  together,  vary  together,  succeed  one  another  ac- 
cording to  rule.  These  laws  are  largely  spatial  and  tem- 
poral, and  admit  of  geometrical  and  numerical  expression. 
Every  such  expression  is  valuable  if  it  helps  us  to  a  knowl- 
edge of  the  order  of  phenomena,  and  especially  if  it  gives 
us  any  practical  control  of  them.  These  laws  have  to  be 
learned  from  experience.  Neither  the  laws  of  motion  nor 
the  so-called  laws  of  force  admit  of  a/priori  deduction,  and 
all  alike  are  valuable  only  for  the  practical  control  of  phe- 
nomena to  which  they  may  help  us.  But  in  all  of  this  we 
are  dealing  only  with  phenomena,  and  not. with  the  essential 
dynamics  of  the  system.  The  true  efficient  causality  lies  in 
a  realm  into  which  science  as  such  has  neither  the  call  nor 
the  power  to  penetrate. 

Again,  speech  will  always  substantiate  the  constant  phe- 
nomena of  perception,  and  for  obvious  reasons.  Without 
fixed  conceptions  thought  would  vanish.  Unless  the  phe- 
nomenal world  presented  relatively  fixed  objects,  we  could 
do  nothing  with  it.  Hence,  except  upon  occasion,  the  phe- 
nomena revealed  in  perception  will  be  spoken 'of  as  things; 
and  there  is  no  objection,  if  we  remember  that  this  is  only 
a  convenient  form  of  speech,  as  when  we  speak  of  the  set- 
ting of  the  sun.  In  like  manner  the  study  of  the  phe- 
nomena of  body  ma}7  suggest  that  they  result  from  more 
elementary  phenomena;  and  there  is  no  objection  to  sub- 
stantiating these  elementary  phenomena  under  the  name  of 
molecules  and  atoms,  if  any  practical  advantage  or  con- 
venience of  representation  be  found  to  result.  But  such 
practical  convenience  must  not  mislead  us  into  overlooking 
the  purely  formal  character  of  these  notions.  The  material 


MATTER,  FORCE,  AND  MOTION  243 

world  is  not  compounded  of  atoms  and  their  forces,  but  is 
rather  a  product  of  one  infinite,  omnipresent,  eternal  en- 
ergy by  which  it  is  continually  supported,  and  from  which 
it  incessantly  proceeds. 

But  because  this  world  shows  a  constant  phenomenal 
order,  and  because  this  order  admits  of  being  to  some  ex- 
tent expressed  and  construed  by  us  under  the  forms  of 
space  and  time  and  number,  we  may  resume  with  prac- 
tical confidence  the  language  of  daily  life  and  of  mechani- 
cal science,  only  guarding  ourselves  against  mistaking  the 
form  of  the  world  for  an  ontological  reality,  or  for  its  ulti- 
mate causal  ground. 

Criticism,  however,  is  in  its  full  right  when  it  reminds 
us  that  our  confidence  in  concrete  science  must  always 
be  practical  rather  than  speculative,  and  hence  must  grow 
shadowy  when  the  doctrines  are  remote  from  any  practical 
interest.  The  holding  together  of  the  experienced  order  is 
a  condition  of  living  at  all ;  and  faith  in  the  order  to  that 
extent  is  secured  by  a  psychological  expectation  which  is 
too  strong  for  any  scepticism.  But  when  it  comes  to  trans- 
forming this  expectation  into  a  logical  warrant,  logic  has 
to  confess  its  failure.  And  as  a  compromise  between  the 
imperious  practical  necessity  and  the  insight  of  the  critical 
intellect,  logic  advises  us  to  limit  our  speculative  affirma- 
tions in  the  scientific  field  to  a  reasonable  degree  of  exten- 
sion to  adjacent  cases,  or  to  remember  their  purely  hypo- 
thetical character. 


NATURE 

ALL  the  categories  of  reason  manifest  themselves,  at 
least  implicitly,  even  in  the  crude  products  of  spontaneous 
thought.  Space,  time,  matter,  motion,  and  force  seem  to 
supply  all  the  materials  for  objective  thought  and  specu- 
lation. They  are  the  factors  into  which,  apparently,  experi- 
ence resolves  itself  upon  analysis,  and  out  of  which  experi- 
ence must  be  built.  But  there  is  one  demand  of  thought 
which  these  factors  alone  do  not  supply.  In  themselves 
they  give  no  totality,  no  system,  nothing  complete  and 
rounded  off  into  an  all-embracing  whole,  but  only  a  hete- 
rogeneous collection  of  things  and  events.  This  demand 
for  system  and  totality  the  mind  has  met  by  forming  the 
notion  of  nature  or  the  cosmos  or  the  universe,  the  im- 
plicit aim  being  to  pass  from  the  discontinuous  events 
and  scattered  existences  of  experience  to  a  law -giving 
whole. 

This  nature  Kant  called  an  idea  of  the  reason,  and  we 
have  ourselves  seen  that  it  is  primarily  an  ideal  of  reason 
rather  than  a  fact  of  experience.  Experience  keeps  us 
among  details ;  the  building  these  into  a  systematic  whole 
is  a  special  venture  of  the  mind  itself,  in  which  it  follows 
not  so  much  the  compulsion  of  the  facts  as  the  impulsion  of 
its  own  rational  Jaw.  Kant  held  the  idea  to  be  regulative 
only,  and  not  objectively  valid.  To  this  view  he  was  led 
partly  by  the  logic  of  his  system  and  partly  by  the  heresy 


NATURE  245 

of  extra-mental  realities.  For  one  who  has  reached  the  in- 
sight, that  thought  can  never  recognize  anything  which  is 
not  rooted  in  thought,  the  Kantian  contention  is  antiquated 
in  its  traditional  form.  How  we  must  think  about  things 
is  the  only  question  which  can  rationally  be  raised  in  any 
case.  Hence,  instead  of  wasting  time  in  barren  discussions 
concerning  the  relative  or  absolute  validity  of  thought,  we 
do  well  rather  to  inquire  what  thought  really  gives  us  when 
it  becomes  reflective  and  critical.  The  final  utterances  of 
thought  admit  of  no  real  doubt,  but  only  of  verbal  denial". 

The  end  sought  in  the  notion  of  nature  is  justified,  and 
must  in  some  way  be  reached.  But  the  formal  justifica- 
tion of  a  category  by  no  means  insures  its  right  applica- 
tion. After  we  are  sure  that  there  is  causation,  the  form 
under  which  we  must  think  it  remains  an  open  question. 
So,  after  we  are  sure  that  there  is  a  law -giving  system 
underlying  experience,  the  form  under  which  we  shall  con- 
ceive it  is  a  problem  for  further  investigation.  How  we 
shall  think  of  nature,  then,  is  our  next  inquiry.  The  sig- 
nificance of  the  study  arises  from  the  fact  that  there  is 
probably  no  other  notion  in  the  range  of  thought  which 
contains  so  much  bad  logic  and  crude  metaphysics,  and 
which  is  at  once  the  source  and  expression  of  so  much  con- 
fusion and  error.  To  see  this,  one  need  only  recall  the  tra- 
ditional debates  over  the  natural  and  the  supernatural,  and 
the  various  interesting  functions  ascribed  to  "  Nature  "  by 
popular  rhetoric  and  speculation.  There  is  enough  of  this 
crude  matter  floating  about  to  give  a  large  measure  of  jus- 
tification to  Kant's  claim.  This  nature  of  popular  thought 
is  more  than  relative ;  it  is  fictitious. 

What,  then,  is  nature?  From  our  own  metaphysical 
stand-point  this  question  admits  of  a  brief  answer.  Indeed, 
it  has  already  been  implicitly  answered ;  and  for  the  prac- 
tised thinker  nothing  more  is  needed  than  to  gather  up  into 


246  METAPHYSICS 

concise  and  explicit  statement  the  implications  of  the  prin- 
ciples already  established.  But  for  the  sake  of  the  beginner 
and  the  weaker  brother — and  both  of  these  are  always  with 
us — it  seems  pedagogically  desirable,  even  at  the  expense  of 
much  repetition,  to  take  a  somewhat  roundabout  way.  The 
popular  view  must  be  studied  in  its  logical  and  psychologi- 
cal origin,  if  we  would  understand  its  plausibility,  and  also 
its  inherent  and  incurable  confusion.  It  must  also  be  stud- 
ied in  its  concrete  forms  and  specifications  if  we  would 
thoroughly  understand  it. 

There  are  two  conceptions  of  nature  implicit  in  popular 
speculation  which  are  rarely  distinguished,  and  each  of 
which  becomes  explicit  upon  occasion.  One  view  identifies 
nature  with  physical  nature,  and  the  other  identifies  it  with 
the  system  of  law.  In  the  former  view  man  and  spirit 
stand  in  antithesis  to  nature.  With  this  view  spontaneous 
thought  generally  begins,  at  least  by  the  time  it  has  at- 
tained to  the  early  stages  of  self-conscious  reflection.  Then, 
as  the  unity  of  the  world  begins  to  appear  in  experience, 
and  the  reign  of  law  manifests  itself  in  the  human  realm, 
and  the  desire  for  one  all-embracing  system  gives  implicit 
direction  to  thought,  nature  expands  beyond  the  physical 
realm  and  becomes  identical  with  the  universal  system  of 
law.  In  all  of  this  the  speculator  is  rarely  intelligible  to 
himself,  but  he  is  perfectly  intelligible  to  the  philosophic 
critic,  who  sees  in  this  performance  the  unconscious  work- 
ing of  unmastered  logical  principles. 

But  in  popular  thought  and  experience  physical  nature 
bulks  so  large  as  to  be  pre-eminently,  if  not  exclusively, 
what  we  mean  by  nature.  Most  of  our  theorizing  on  the 
subject,  also,  rests  on  a  physical  basis.  We  shall  do  well, 
therefore,  to  stud}7  first  this  ph}Tsical  conception  of  nature, 
and  afterwards  advance,  if  need  be,  to  the  more  abstract  con- 
ception of  nature  as  the  system  of  law. 


NATURE  247 


Nature  as  Matter  and  Force 

As  the  untrained  mind  is  naturally  objective  in  its  think- 
ing, the  things  and  bodies  about  us  are  taken  for  substantial 
realities  as  a  matter  of  course ;  and  they  tend,  in  advance 
of  reflection,  to  become  the  standard  by  which  all  reality 
must  be  measured,  or  to  which  it  must  conform.  Spirits 
may  be  doubted,  and,  at  best,  are  somewhat  hypothetical, 
but  things  are  undeniably  there.  And  as  these  things  by 
an  easy  generalization  may  be  gathered  under  the  one  head, 
matter,  and  their  activities  may  be  ascribed  to  the  one  cause, 
force,  matter  and  force  come  to  be  the  supreme  and  basal 
realities  of  objective  experience.  Space  and  time,  then, 
furnish  the  scene ;  matter  furnishes  the  existence ;  and  force, 
manifesting  itself  in  motion,  furnishes  the  causality.  These 
five  factors  constitute  nature,  and  from  them  nature  is  to 
be  construed  and  comprehended.  According  to  a  popular 
and  showy  cosmic  formula,  cosmic  processes  consist  of  an  in- 
tegration of  matter  and  concomitant  dissipation  of  motion. 
Here  space  and  time  are  implied ;  matter  is  expressed ; 
and  force,  as  the  grammarians  would  say,  is  elegantly  un- 
derstood. And  we  are  often  impressively,  or  at  least  em- 
phatically, told  that  all  interpretation  of  nature  must  be  in 
terms  of  these  factors.  Anything  else  would  be  unscien- 
tific, or  something  just  as  bad. 

Here  we  have  a  confusion  of  a  metaphysical  proposition 
with  a  principle  of  inductive  method.  Our  study  of  expla- 
nation in  the  Theory  of  Thought  and  Knowledge  showed 
•that  our  practical  study  of  nature  must  mainly  consist  in 
looking  for  the  laws  of  coexistence  and  sequence,  and  of 
combination  and  concomitant  variation  among  phenomena, 
and  that  our  valuable  practical  knowledge  must  very  large- 
Iv  consist  in  a  knowledge  of  these  laws.  Even  on  a  phe- 

*  O 


248  METAPHYSICS 

nomenal  theory  of  matter,  space,  and  time,  matter  and  mo- 
tion must  be  the  great  categories  of  inductive  study  and 
practical  understanding.  Matter  is  the  phenomenal  subject 
without  which  thought  and  speech  would  be  crippled ;  and 
space,  time,  and  motion  represent  the  prominent  relations 
existing  among  material  phenomena.  In  this  methodologi- 
cal sense  we  accept  and  emphasize  the  importance  of  the 
categories  of  space  and  time,  matter  and  motion,  for  the 
practical  study  and  mastery  of  experience.  But  we  cannot 
allow  them  to  represent  independent  ontological  facts.  The 
universe  has  only  a  phenomenal  existence ;  and  its  causality 
must  be  traced  to  the  fundamental  reality  behind  it.  Nat- 
ure, then,  is  phenomenon.  Nature  as  matter  and  force  is 
a  fiction  of  crude  thought,  arising  from  the  substantiation 
of  physical  phenomena,  and  the  application  to  them  of  cat- 
egories which  find  their  true  significance  only  in  another 
field. 

But  of  all  this  sense  thought  has  no  suspicion,  and  on  the 
basis  of  the  undoubted  metaphysical  reality  of  space,  time, 
matter,  motion,  and  force,  it  proceeds  to  build  up  a  me- 
chanical doctrine  of  nature.  Nature  is  made  into  a  mechan- 
ism of  impersonal  things  and  forces,  and  all  its  changes  go 
on  mechanically.  At  present,  at  least,  it  runs  itself,  and,  on 
due  consideration  of  the  indestructibility  of  matter  and  the 
conservation  of  energy,  it  even  becomes  doubtful  if  nature 
has  not  always  run  itself.  Of  the  phenomenality  of  nature, 
of  course,  there  is  not  the  slightest  suspicion.  This  notion 
also  deserves  examination,  as  it  is  the  perennial  source  of  a 
great  cloud  of  whimsies  and  divers  conflicts  of  science  and 
religion. 

Nature  as  Mechanism 

Nature,  then,  is  a  mechanism  ;  and  all  natural  phenomena 
are  to  be  mechanically  explained.  This  is  agreed  and  in- 


NATURE  249 

sisted  upon.  There  has  never  been,  however,  the  clearest 
conception  of  what  mechanism  is  to  mean.  The  notion  it- 
self has  undergone  various  changes,  all  of  which  have  left 
traces  in  the  current  view.  Some  have  insisted  that  a  pure- 
ly mechanical  theory  must  assume  nothing  but  matter  and 
motion  under  the  conditions  of  space  and  time.  Force  is  a 
dynamic  idea,  not  a  mechanical  one.  Hence  it  has  been 
claimed  that  a  strictly  mechanical  theory  of  things  is  found 
only  in  the  Greek  atomism,  which,  without  appealing  to 
moving  forces  or  occult  qualities  of  any  kind,  sought  to  con- 
strue the  system  from  atoms  and  the  void  alone.  Descartes 
went  even  further  and  rejected  the  Greek  conception  as  not 
purely  mechanical.  This  he  did  partly  on  the  ground  that 
the  Greeks  assumed  the  void  as  real,  and  partly  because  they 
posited  weight  as  a  property  of  the  atoms.  The  reality  of 
the  void  he  denied  as  absurd,  and  the  assumption  of  weight 
he  viewed  as  a  return  to  the  dreary  waste  of  occult  qualities. 
For  Descartes  the  essence  of  matter  was  extension,  and  for 
him  the  mechanical  theory  implied  that  all  heterogeneity 
of  quantity  and  quality  in  the  material  world  can  be  ex- 
plained as  modifications  of  the  one  homogeneous  property 
of  extension  and  the  one  experienced  fact  of  motion.  Any 
theory  which  came  short  of  this  simplicity  was  in  so  far 
a  departure  from  the  mechanical  view.  Accordingly  the 
dynamic  conception  of  matter  was  for  a  long  time  resisted 
as  not  mechanical.  Matter,  it  was  held,  can  act  only  by 
impact ;  and  any  other  theory  was  rejected  as  a  return  to 
occult  qualities.  In  this  view  that  alone  is  a  mechanical 
explanation  which  refers  a  phenomenon  to  a  combination 
of  particles  whose  essence  is  extension,  and  which  act  only 
by  impact.  Extension,  solidity,  motion,  and  impact  are 
viewed  as  self-sufficient  ideas,  and  as  the  only  outfit  de- 
manded by  the  mechanical  philosophy.  Hence,  in  the  Car- 
tesian philosophy,  all  dynamic  theories  of  matter  are  op- 


250  METAPHYSICS 

posed  to  mechanism ;  and  the  antithesis  of  mechanism  is  not 
organism,  but  dynamism. 

This  conception  of  mechanism  arose  partly  from  the  facts 
of  sense  experience  and  partly  from  the  analogies  of  the 
machines  of  our  own  invention.  The  bodies  about  us  are 
apparently  in  the  passive  voice,  and  move  only  as  they  are 
moved.  Our  machines  also  generate  no  force,  but  only 
transmit  force  imparted  from  without.  With  this  concep- 
tion of  mechanism  we  are  forced  to  affirm  a  prime  mover 
in  any  case,  and,  if  material  phenomena  refuse  to  be  ex- 
plained as  the  result  of  impact,  we  have  to  assume  an  extra- 
material  power  as  the  ever-present  source  of  the  energies 
of  nature. 

But  since  the  time  of  Newton  the  mechanical  theory  has 
been  transformed  by  importing  causation  into  the  mech- 
anism. Nature  is  not  a  mechanism  in  the  sense  of  trans- 
mitting or  modifying  forces  imparted  from  without,  but 
rather  in  the  sense  that  all  phenomena  are  produced  by  res- 
ident forces  according  to  mechanical  laws.  And  yet  traces 
are  not  lacking  of  the  feeling  that  a  pure  mechanism  ought 
not  to  appeal  to  other  notions  than  those  mentioned. 
Still,  the  holders  of  this  view  make  the  freest  use  of  the 
notion  of  moving  forces ;  and  it  is  chiefly  in  occasional  at- 
tempts to  explain  these  forces  as  the  result  of  pressure 
or  of  impact  that  the  inner  unrest  appears.  But  the  mov- 
ing forces  assumed  are  made  as  colorless  as  possible ;  and 
thus  the  mechanical  theory  becomes  about  identical  with 
theoretical  mechanics.  In  this  science  we  have  the  three 
factors  of  matter,  force,  and  motion  to  determine  their 
mutual  relations.  Here,  too,  all  qualitative  differences  are 
ignored.  Matter  is  simply  a  rigid  mass  or  an  aggregate  of 
rigid  atoms.  Force  is  viewed  simply  as  causing  or  retard- 
ing motion.  All  is  quantity  in  the  theory ;  and  quality  is 
dealt  with  only  as  it  can  be  transformed  into  quantity. 


NATUKE  251 

The  system  thus  reached  differs  from  the  corpuscular  theory 
only  in  the  conception  of  moving  forces ;  but  these  are  so 
colorless  as  not  to  change  the  appearance  of  the  whole. 
Both  views  are  equally  monotonous.  All  that  is  possible 
in  either  is  a  redistribution  of  matter  according  to  the  laws 
of  motion.  This  is  produced  in  one  case  by  the  atoms 
knocking  against  one  another;  in  the  other  case  the  atoms 
pull  or  push  one  another;  but  in  both  cases  the  process  is 
a  perfect  monotone.  Accordingly,  a  mechanical  system  is 
often  said  to  be  one  in  which  there  is  nothing  but  a  re- 
distribution of  matter  and  motion;  and  the  claim  that 
the  system  is  mechanical  is  understood  to  mean  that  every- 
thing can  be  explained  in  terms  of  matter  and  motion  ;  and 
matter  is  conceived  as  essentially  the  same  in  all  its  com- 
binations. This  is  the  current  popular  conception  of  the 
mechanical  theory. 

This  also  is  an  ontological  doctrine.  It  claims  to  set  forth 
not  merely  a  practical  interpretation  of  physical  phenom- 
ena, but  also  the  r  ^fintial  things  and  forces  by  which 
those  phenomena  are  produced.  Its  ontological  untena- 
bility  is  already  familiar  to  us ;  and  equally  familiar  is  its 
logical  inadequacy,  in  the  form  given,  to  the  work  assign- 
ed it.  As  soon  as  we  think  concretely  and  adequately,  it 
becomes  plain  that  nothing  whatever  can  be  explained  by 
mechanism,  atomic  or  otherwise,  which  is  not  assumed  in 
principle  in  the  mechanism.  It  is  only  the  imposture  and 
deceit  of  words,  or  the  delusive  unities  and  simplifications 
of  speech,  which  prevent  us  from  seeing  this.  The  material 
mechanism  explains  the  physical  facts  only  because  we  build 
the  mechanism  to  contain  the  facts,  and  thus  it  becomes  only 
another  aspect  of  the  facts  themselves. 

This  aspect  of  all  mechanical  explanation  has  been  dwelt 
upon  at  length  in  the  Theory  of  Thought  and  Knowkdge  ; 
but  the  fallacy  of  the  universal,  which  is  in  play  here,  is 


252  METAPHYSICS 

so  subtle  and  pervasive  that  it  seems  desirable  to  show 
once  more  the  emptiness  of  all  such  explanation,  when  it 
assumes  to  be  ontological  and  final.  The  persuasion  that 
matter  and  force  already  explain  much  and  are  daily  ex- 
plaining more,  so  that  no  one  can  really  set  any  bounds  to 
their  capabilities,  is  one  which  goeth  not  readily  out,  not 
even  when  its  fallacious  and  illusory  character  is  brought 
to  light.  No  single  anointing  will  open  the  eyes  which  are 
blind  concerning  this  matter. 

Now,  returning  to  our  atoms,  which  for  the  present  we 
allow  to  be  real  things  in  space,  it  is  plain,  first  of  all,  that 
we  can  do  nothing  with  them  unless  we  regard  them  as 
dynamic.  Bare  lumps  can  only  lie  around.  They  would 
not  even  explain  heaps,  unless  we  assumed  a  mover  out- 
side of  them  to  give  the  original  shove  and  direction,  or 
shoves  and  directions.  We  must  then  posit  moving  forces 
within.  How  to  do  this  at  all  is  a  problem  of  notorious 
metaphysical  difficulty;  and  how  to  do  it  so  as  to  make 
the  forces  adequate  to  their  task  is  a  problem  of  exceeding 
logical  difficulty.  For  unless  these  forces  are  under  some 
structural  law  they  will  explain  only  heaps  again.  Simple 
pulling  and  pushing  in  a  straight  line,  as  in  the  case  of 
linear  forces,  makes  no  provision  for  organization,  but  only 
for  amorphous  masses.  Just  as  little  do  they  provide  for 
the  qualitative  changes  arising  in  the  cosmic  process.  A 
linear  force  like  gravity  might  explain  aggregation,  but  it 
contains  no  account  of  the  selective  and  qualitative  action 
of  affinity,  no  account  of  the  building  forces  of  crystalliza- 
tion, no  account  of  the  infinitely  complex  products  of  or- 
ganization. 

Assuming,  then,  the  existence  of  our  mechanical  system, 
we  have  a  double  order  of  facts,  one  of  spatial  change,  com- 
bination and  separation  in  space,  and  one  of  a  metaph}Tsical 
and  dynamic  nature.  The  former  is  a  visible,  or  at  least 


NATURE  253 

picturable,  change,  among  things ;  the  latter  is  an  invisible 
and  unpicturable  change  in  things.  The  former  depends 
•  on  the  latter.  All  spatial  changes  among  things  must  be 
viewed  as  translations  into  phenomenal  form  of  dynamic 
relations  in  things.  These  are  the  real  ground  of  whatever 
takes  place  under  the  spatial  form.  Nothing  whatever 
which  takes  place  in  the  spatial  order  explains  itself,  or  • 
anything  else,  until  it  is  taken  as  the  exponent  of  a  hidden 
dynamic  order.  If  to  a  collection  of  bricks  we  should  add 
another  brick,  no  one  could  find  in  that  fact  the  slightest 
ground  for  any  qualitative  change  in  the  collection.  We 
might  conceivably  pile  them  in  various  shapes,  or  arrange 
them  at  the  angles  of  different  geometrical  figures,  but  we 
could  find  in  all  this  no  reason  for  varying  behavior  on 
the  part  of  the  bricks.  If  to  a  given  chemical  molecule  we 
should  add  another  chemical  element,  they  must  remain  as 
mutually  indifferent  as  the  bricks,  unless  we  assume  a 
system  of  dynamic  relations  within  the  elements  themselves 
which  determines  their  interaction  and  the  form  of  their 
manifestation. 

This  invisible  dynamic  system  is  largely  overlooked  by 
superficial  thought ;  and  its  complexity  is  overlooked  alto- 
gether. Such  thought  has  the  atoms  and  the  void  for  its 
principal  data,  and  it  can  easily  conceive  the  atoms  as  vari- 
ously grouped  within  this  void.  The  spatial  imagination 
serves  for  this  insight;  and  the  demand  for  causation  is 
met  by  a  simple  reference  to  force  in  general.  If  one  asks 
how  these  peculiar  groupings  are  accounted  for  and  how 
they  themselves  account  for  anything,  he  must  be  content 
to  wait  long  for  an  answer. 

Two  points  are  to  be  borne  in  mind.  First,  the  depend- 
ence of  the  spatial  system  on  an  unpicturable  dynamic  sys- 
tem. AVe  may  resolve  to  locate  the  forces  in  the  elements, 
but  it  is  strictly  impossible  for  us  to  represent  our  meaning 


254  METAPHYSICS 

in  any  way  whatever.  Spatial  combination  we  can  picture. 
Volitional  causality  we  experience.  But  here  is  a  dynam- 
ism which  is  less  than  the  latter  and  more  than  the  former, 
and  we  have  absolutely  no  data  of  experience  by  which  to 
represent  such  a  notion.  We  have  indeed  located  the  forces 
in  the  spatial  elements,  but  they  are  not  in  them  so  as  to 
be  objects  of  any  possible  intuition.  How  does  affinity  or 
gravity  look?  Does  a  necessity  have  shape?  or  is  a  dy- 
namic law  something  which  might  be  thrown  on  a  screen, 
if  the  light  were  strong  enough  ?  If  by  mechanism  we 
understand  the  spatial  system,  its  ideas  are  clear,  but  it  is 
limited  to  phenomena  and  explains  nothing.  If  we  extend 
mechanism  to  include  the  dynamics  of  the  system,  we  are 
no  longer  dealing  with  clear  ideas,  but  rather  with  the  ab- 
stract categories  of  cause  and  ground,  and  are  dealing  with 
these  in  such  a  way  as  to  make  impossible  any  concrete  con- 
ception of  our  meaning,  and  indeed  in  such  a  way  as  to  con- 
tradict the, categories  themselves. 

The  second  point  to  be  borne  in  mind  is  that  if  we  would 
make  our  mechanism  adequate  we  must  make  it  as  complex 
as  the  facts  themselves.  This  point  becomes  self-evident  as 
soon  as  we  get  a  logical  grasp  of  the  problem.  In  all  re- 
ferring of  effects  to  causes,  in  a  mechanical  scheme,  we  are 
bound  to  determine  the  thought  of  the  causes  by  the  effects. 
The  causes  we  infer  or  postulate  must  be  the  causes  of  just 
the  effects  in  question,  no  more,  no  less,  and  no  other.  That 
is,  we  carry  the  effects  in  principle  into  the  causes,  and  in 
such  a  way  that  whoever  should  think  the  causes  exhaust- 
ively would  find  that  they  contain,  or  imply  and  necessitate, 
the  effects.  If  the  causes  do  not  imply  the  effects,  the  effects 
are  not  provided  for.  If  they  do  imply  them,  then  the  ef- 
fects are  explained  by  being  smuggled  into  the  data  of  the 
explanation.  This,  as  we  have  seen  in  the  Theory  of  Thought 
and  Knowledge,  is  the  deadlock  into  which  every  mechani- 


NATURE  255 

cal  explanation  inevitably  falls  when  it  assumes  to  be  onto- 
logical  and  final. 

The  blindness  of  popular  thought  at  this  point  is  due  to 
the  fallacy  of  the  universal.  We  construct  our  mechanism 
with  very  simple  factors — space,  time,  matter,  motion,  and 
force.  These  show  no  complexity,  and  at  the  same  time 
they  seem  to  be  all-embracing.  What  is  there,  at  least  in 
the  outer  world,  which  does  not  come  under  some  of  these 
categories  ?  and  as  mechanics  is  the  science  of  these  factors, 
what  is  there  which  mechanics  does  not  explain  ?  But  this 
is  an  illusive  simplicity.  These  categories  apply  to  the  con- 
crete facts  without  implying  any  of  them.  The  concrete 
fact  is  not  space,  time,  and  motion  in  general,  but  an  indef- 
inite multitude  of  particular  forms,  groupings,  and  move- 
ments in  particular  temporal  relations.  Neither  is  the  con- 
crete fact  matter  and  force.  These  are  only  class  terms  of 
which  the  reality  in  this  scheme  is  a  great  multitude  of  par- 
ticular elements,  each  of  complex  nature  and  engaged  in  a 
highly  complex  interaction  with  every  other.  The  elements 
must  be  such  as  to  involve  to  the  minutest  detail  all  they 
will  ever  do.  If  we  ask  what  the  "  such  "  is  which  the  ele- 
ments must  be  in  order  to  do  the  work,  the  answer  must  be 
that  no  inspection  of  the  elements  as  existing  in  space  will 
ever  reveal  it.  It  is  an  unpicturable,  dynamic  such.  And 
the  such  itself  is  manifold.  It  is  not  such,  but  an  indefinite 
number  of  suches,  involving  not  merely  the  general  dynamic 
relations  of  the  elements,  but  all  the  myriad  structural  and 
organic  laws  which  run  through  the  world  of  things.  Ho\v 
this  can  be,  indeed,  passes  all  picturing  and  even  all  under- 
standing ;  but  nevertheless  we  know  that  it  is  so  by  hypoth- 
esis, and  we  know  that  it  must  be  so  in  the  same  satisfac- 
tory way — by  hypothesis. 

Space,  time,  matter,  motion,  and  force  may  indeed  be  said 
to  be  the  elementary  factors  out  of  which  nature  is  built ; 


256  METAPHYSICS 

but  they  are  the  component  factors  in  the  same  sense  in 
which  the  letters  of  the  alphabet  are  the  components  of  lit- 
erature. Take  away  the  letters  and  literature  would  disap- 
pear, as  lacking  the  instruments  of  expression.  And  yet 
there  is  a  great  deal  more  in  literature  than  the  alphabet, 
or  even  than  the  dictionary.  The  collocations  of  letters 
into  words,  the  information  of  words  with  meanings  and 
their  grouping  into  discourse,  must  also  be  taken  into  ac- 
count. In  like  manner  in  the  mechanical  system  we  must 
consider  not  merely  the  simple  abstract  ideas  of  space,  time, 
matter,  motion,  and  force,  but  we  must  take  account  also 
of  the  concrete  forms,  relations,  laws,  and  products  which 
exist  or  emerge  in  the  process.  But  by  this  time  the  mech- 
anism has  become  as  complex  as  the  facts  themselves.  As 
an  explanation  of  the  facts,  it  is  a  tautology.  If  the  facts 
needed  explanation  before  we  built  the  mechanism,  they 
need  it  equally  after  the  building,  for  the  mechanism  only 
repeats  the  facts. 

Thus  logic  shows  the  tautologous  character  of  all  me- 
chanical explanation  of  a  metaphysical  type.  Mechanism 
can  make  no  new  departures;  it  can  only  unfold  its  own 
implications.  Our  previous  study  has  also  shown  the  un- 
tenability  of  the  metaphysics  on  which  this  mechanical 
theory  rests.  Nature  in  the  sense  of  a  system  of  matter 
and  force,  moving  and  acting  in  space  and  time,  and  form- 
ing a  substantial  mechanism,  is  only  a  phantom  of  sense 
thinking  which  arises  from  hypostasizing  the  phenomena  of 
objective  experience.  With  this  result  the  notion  of  mech- 
anism begins  to  be  wavering  and  uncertain.  In  any  case 
the  notion  of  self-running  material  machinery  must  be  emp- 
tied out  of  it,  and  mechanism  must  be  restricted  to  a  phe- 
nomenal plane  and  significance.  The  term,  too,  is  some- 
what misleading  because  of  the  company  it  has  kept,  and 
because  of  its  physical,  if  not  materialistic,  connotation. 


NATURE  257 

Mechanism  has  a  perfectly  clear  meaning  only  for  the  com- 
position or  decomposition  of  motions  and  masses.  When 
it  goes  beyond  this  to  abstract  mechanics  it  is  infected  with 
the  uncertainties  of  the  metaphysics  of  dynamics,  and  even 
then  it  has  no  clear  meaning  except  as  applied  to  bodies 
separated  in  space  and  to  quantities  which  can  be  summed 
up  in  time.  From  this  point  on  all  is  dark.  When  we 
come  to  organization  we  may  posit  subtle  tendencies,  or 
mysterious  affinities,  or  latent  organizing  powers ;  but  of 
all  these  no  mechanical  representation  whatever  is  possible. 
We  shall  do  well,  therefore,  to  reserve  the'  term  mechanism 
for  the  spatial  and  temporal  composition  or  decomposition 
of  motions,  masses,  and  quantities,  and  to  replace  it  in  other 
applications  by  the  more  general  and  abstract  term  law. 
This  will  include  mechanism  in  its  proper  field,  and  will  also 
embrace  the  larger  field  of  life  and  man  to  which  mechan- 
ism does  not  manifestly  apply. 


If  we  should  ask  for  a  definition  of  the  natural,  the  first 
answer  would  almost  certainly  limit  it  to  the  physical  field. 
But  a  little  reflection  would  soon  show  the  narrowness  of 
this  view.  Mental  and  social  movements,  as  well  as  phys- 
ical changes,  arise  naturally.  Life,  mind,  society,  all  human 
activity  and  progress,  show  an  order  of  uniformity ;  and  all 
changes  in  accordance  with  that  order  are  called  natural. 
The  result  of  these  considerations  is  to  make  the  natural 
coextensive  with  law,  and  thus  finally  nature  comes  to  be 
identified  with  the  order  of  law.  This  is  that  second  con- 
ception of  nature  which,  we  have  said,  is  implied  in  popular 
speculation. 

Of  course,  in  uncritical  thought  this  nature  is  metaphys- 
ically conceived.  Xature  is  not  merely  an  order  of  phe- 

17 


258  METAPHYSICS 

nomena,  but  a  cause  or  system  of  causes.  There  is  here 
a  failure  to  distinguish  the  phenomenal  and  the  causal,  and 
also  a  confusion  of  the  formal  necessity  of  affirming  causal- 
ity with  a  particular  conception  of  its  form  and  location. 
The  untenability  of  this  metaphysics  needs  no  further  expo- 
sition. 

But  in  this  conception  of  nature  as  the  order  of  law  there 
is  an  important  truth  which  we  must  disengage  from  its 
crude  metaphysics.  It  is  this  truth  which  constitutes  the 
significance  of  the  mechanical  theory  of  nature,  and  the 
gist  of  what  we  call  scientific  method.  But  this  truth 
must  be  sought  in  logic  and  epistemology  and  not  in  sense 
metaphysics.  We  proceed  to  the  exposition. 

Logic  shows  that  experience  arises  only  as  the  categories 
of  thought  are  applied  to  the  raw  material  of  the  sensi- 
bility; and  that  a  mastery  of  experience  is  possible  only 
as  phenomena  are  subject  to  fixed  laws.  The  mind,  then, 
in  its  effort  to  rationalize,  comprehend,  and  control  experi- 
ence, must  reflect  upon  the  categories  of  its  procedure  and 
must  look  for  the  laws  of  phenomena.  Undigested  experi- 
ence gives  us  phenomena  in  very  rude  and  crude  masses, 
and  the  mind  attains  to  any  mastery  of  this  experience 
only  as  it  subordinates  these  masses  to  law,  and  especially 
as  it  analyzes  them  into  their  simplest  elements,  and  dis- 
covers the  elementary  laws  which  govern  their  coexistence 
and  combination.  When  this  is  done  we  get  a  practical 
mastery  of  experience  and  some  proximate  insight  also. 
We  see  how  things  and  events  hang  together  in  an  order 
of  law,  how  one  state  of  things  grows  out  of  another  state 
of  things  and  produces  a  new  state  of  things.  With  this 
knowledge  we  get  a  basis  for  practical  expectation  and  a 
means  of  controlling  phenomena  to  some  extent. 

This  mode  of  procedure,  we  have  said,  is  the  gist  of  sci- 
entific method ;  and  the  great  bulk  of  our  valuable  knowl- 


NATURE  259 

edge  of  the  world  and  man  is  obtained  in  this  way.  And 
the  study  of  things  by  this  method  can  be  carried  on  on  a 
purely  inductive  basis.  Its  postulate  is  an  order  of  lawr 
and  its  aim  is  to  connect  things  and  events  with  one  an- 
other in  this  order.  It  does  not  pretend  to  deduce  the  order, 
nor  to  tell  how  it  is  possible  or  is  produced.  It  accepts  the 
order  as  a  fact,  and  seeks  to  find  how  things  and  events  hang 
together  within  the  order. 

Xow  such  an  order,  though  no  metaphysical  necessity,  is 
a  necessary  postulate  of  human  thought,  and  some  knowl- 
edge of  this  order  is  necessary  in  order  to  live  at  all.  Study 
in  any  field  proceeds  on  this  basis.  The  very  notion  of  sys- 
tem implies  it.  The  study  of  life,  of  mind,  of  society,  of 
history,  assumes  that  there  are  elementary  laws  by  which 
the  whole  is  to  be  understood.  Our  efforts  at  education,  at 
mutual  influence,  at  self-government,  all  rest  on  the  notion 
of  fixed  laws  through  which  alone  our  aims  can  be  realized. 
It  is  plain,  therefore,  that,  whatever  our  metaphysics,  the 
laws  which  obtain  among  phenomena  are  a  most  important 
object  of  study.  For  all  speculators  alike,  practical  wisdom 
must  centre  here. 

If,  now,  there  were  any  advantage  in  it,  we  might  call 
this  order  of  law  mechanism.  This  has  been  done,  and  the 
universality  of  mechanism  has  been  proclaimed.  We  might, 
without  utter  linguistic  impropriety,  speak  of  the  mental 
mechanism,  the  social  mechanism,  the  mechanism  of  feel- 
ings or  ideas,  etc.  These  phrases  may  be  allowed  upon  oc- 
casion, but  the  associated  connotations  of  the  terms  are 
such  as  to  make  them  misleading  except  for  the  initiated. 
We  had  better,  therefore,  speak  of  the  realm  of  law  rather 
than  of  the  realm  of  mechanism. 

But  the  notion  of  nature  in  popular  thought  is  so  rooted 
in  metaphysics  that  special  effort  is  needed  to  make  the 
phenomenality  of  nature  even  intelligible.  When  we  speak 


260  METAPHYSICS 

of  events  coming  about  in  an  order  of  law,  it  is  easy  to 
conclude  that  the  law  explains  them  as  being  their  effi- 
cient cause.  But  logic  has  taught  us  to  distinguish  between 
inductive  and  productive  causality.  The  former  expresses 
only  phenomenal  conditions,  and  has  nothing  to  do  with 
efficiency.  The  question,  how  things  are  brought  about,  is 
itself  ambiguous.  It  may  mean,  How  are  phenomena  con- 
nected in  an  order  of  discoverable  law  ?  and  it  may  mean, 
What  are  the  causes  which  produce  them?  The  former 
question  belongs  to  inductive  science,  and  may  be  answered 
on  a  purely  experiential  basis.  The  latter  question  runs 
into  metaphysics,  and  must  be  tested  by  metaphysical  can- 
ons. The  two  questions  are  never  sufficiently  distinguished 
by  popular  scientific  thought,  which  oscillates  confusedly 
between  them. 

The  non-existence  of  any  ontological  mechanism  is  already 
an  article  of  metaphysical  faith  with  us.  Our  previous 
study  has  convinced  us  of  the  phenomenality  of  all  that 
appears  in  space  or  that  exists  in  space  relations.  It  has 
also  shown  that  impersonal  being  in  general  can  be  viewed 
only  as  an  unwarranted  hypostasis  of  phenomena.  Nature 
as  an  order  of  law,  then,  has  only  phenomenal  existence ; 
and  the  explanations  within  the  order  have  only  phenome- 
nal application.  They  have  no  causality  in  them,  and  they 
do  not  penetrate  to  the  seat  of  power. 

And  these  explanations  remain  on  the  surface  in  any 
case.  They  commonly  consist  in  linking  event  with  event 
in  an  order  of  law,  but  there  is  rarely  any  insight  into  the 
antecedent  which  shows  the  consequent  to  be  a  necessary 
implication.  Events  follow,  indeed,  in  a  certain  order,  but, 
for  all  we  can  see,  any  other  order  .whatever  is  just  as 
possible.  We  learn  the  order  by  observation  ;  and  after  we 
have  learned  it,  when  the  antecedents  are  given,  we  predict 
the  consequents,  simply  as  an  opaque  expectation.  It  is 


NATURE  261 

only  in  the  abstractions  of  pure  kinematics  and  pure  dynam- 
ics that  we  can  trace  the  antecedent  into  the  consequent, 
or  exhibit  the  consequent  as  the  resultant,  of  the  antece- 
dents. But  as  soon  as  we  come  to  concrete  reality  this 
insight  fails  entirely.  We  jolt  and  bump  along  from  one 
event  to  another  with  not  the  slightest  reason  for  expecting 
one  event  rather  than  any  other,  except  the  fact  that  the 
expected  event  is  the  kind  which  hitherto  has  happened  in 
our  experience.  We  expect  wheat  from  wheat  and  barley 
from  barley ;  and  we  know  the  practical  conditions  of  rais- 
ing wheat  and  barley  ;  but  we  know  absolutely  nothing  of 
the  causality  at  work,  and  we  are  totally  unable  to  connect 
the  successive  steps  of  the  process  by  any  causal  or  deduc- 
tive bond  in  the  phenomena  themselves. 

When  we  come  to  life,  mind,  and  society,  scientific 
method  itself  begins  to  lose  its  objectivity  and  sinks  tow- 
ards a  relative  validity.  In  the  inorganic  realm  compo- 
sition is  the  great  category  ;  and  here  explanation  takes 
on  the  form  of  analysis  and  synthesis.  The  whole  is  un- 
derstood through  its  parts.  But  this  is  impossible  with 
organic  and  intellectual  wholes.  Here  the  parts  exist  only 
through  the  whole,  and,  instead  of  being  the  factors  out  of 
which  the  whole  is  built,  they  are  simply  particular  aspects 
of  the  whole  which  are  separated  by  abstraction  for  the 
sake  of  logical  convenience.  This  is  especially  the  case  in 
•psychology.  The  faculties  are  not  the  factors  out  of  which 
the  mind  is  built  up.  The  sensations  are  not  atoms  of  feel- 
ing out  of  which  mental  molecules  and  masses  are  con- 
structed. These  mechanical  analogies  are  misleading  and 
illusory.  Our  analysis  of  the  mind  gives  not  components 
but  aspects,  distinctions  rather  than  divisions.  And  the 
mind  is  not  to  be  understood  through  these  aspects,  but, 
conversely,  they  are  to  be  understood  through  the  mind. 
In  this  realm  our  analysis  and  synthesis  are  relative  to 


262  METAPHYSICS 

ourselves,  and  represent  logical  devices  rather  than  the 
fact. 

This  field  of  experienced  law  is  the  field  of  inductive 
science.  Its  practical  importance  cannot  be  overestimat- 
ed, but  its  theoretical  significance  is  easily  misunderstood. 
Crude  thought  turns  it  into  ontology,  finds  in  it  the  order 
of  efficient  causation,  and  makes  everything  hard  and  fast 
by  importing  the  notion  of  necessity  into  it.  For  us  this  is 
an  "  overcome  stand-point."  The  only  definition  of  nature 
which  criticism  can  allow  is,  the  sum-total  and  system  of 
phenomena  which  are  subject  to  law.  The  definition  of 
physical  nature  is,  the  sum-total  of  spatial  phenomena  and 
their  laws.  This  nature  is  throughout  effect,  and  contains 
no  causation  and  no  necessity  in  it.  To  use  the  scholastic 
phrase,  it  is  natura  naturata.  Nature  as  cause  may  be  sim- 
ply a  name  for  the  cause  of  natural  phenomena.  In  that 
case  the  name  hag  no  connotation  and  simply  denotes  a 
problem.  But  when  nature  as  cause  is  posited  as  some  blind 
agent  or  agents,  it  represents  only  bad  metaphysics.  This 
is  natura  naturans,  and  is  simply  an  idol  of  the  sense  tribe 
or  of  the  metaphysical  den. 

But  we  find,  however,  that  laws  obtain  among  phenom- 
ena, and  that  by  a  study  of  them  we  can  get  a  very  consid- 
erable practical  mastery  over  phenomena.  These  give  us 
no  theoretical  insight  into  the  causal  ground  and  connec- 
tions of  things.  They  remain  on  the  surface,  and  are  to  be 
studied  purely  for  their  practical  significance,  or  for  what 
they  may  help  us  to.  Any  scientific  or  other  generalization 
is  to  be  welcomed  which  will  give  us  a  more  convenient 
expression  of  the  natural  order,  or  a  greater  mastery  of  it, 
but  no  metaphysical  insight  is  to  be  found  in  this  field. 


NATURE  263 


Nature  as  Continuous 

The  habit  of  looking  upon  nature  as  a  system  of  neces- 
sary causality  easily  leads  to  the  conception  that  all  phe- 
nomena are  to  be  explained  within  the  system  itself.  There 
must  be  no  interferences  or  irruptions  from  without,  under 
penalty  of  the  speculator's  displeasure.  This  conviction 
expresses  itself  in  the  law  of  continuity. 

This  law  is  another  principle  of  superficial  reflection 
which  contains  some  truth  and  some  error,  but  still  more 
confusion.  It  is,  indeed,  rooted  in  a  genuine  rational  de- 
mand, but  the  meaning  is  far  from  clear.  Continuity  of 
some  kind  there  must  be,  but  what  it  is  and  where  it  is 
remain  a  problem. 

The  law  of  continuity  is  one  which  has  had  great  promi- 
nence in  the  history  of  speculation.  This  law  was  first 
formulated  by  Leibnitz,  and  was  at  first  confined  to  mo- 
tion only.  Afterwards  it  was  extended  to  every  depart- 
ment of  thought  and  experience.  The  evolutionists  in  par- 
ticular have  made  it  one  of  their  first  principles  and  the 
most  fundamental  law  of  progress.  In  this  wide  sense  the 
law  has  no  fixed  and  scarcely  any  assignable  meaning.  As 
used  by  some  speculators,  it  seems  to  exclude  all  antitheses 
whatever ;  and  Spencer's  attempt  to  deduce  all  heterogene- 
ity from  the  homogeneous  may  be  viewed  as  an  attempt  to 
give  the  law  this  universal  significance.  The-Leibnitzians, 
also,  were  fond  of  making  the  increments  of  variation  in- 
finitesimal in  all  directions,  so  that  all  widely  separated 
groups  are  joined  by  missing  links  or  are  produced  by  in- 
finitesimal variations.  On  the  basis  of  this  conception, 
Leibnitz  ventured  to  affirm  something  like  the  development 
of  species,  and  the  indistinguishability  of  all  realms  at  their 
points  of  junction.  He  also  ruled  out  all  absolute  oppo- 


264:  METAPHYSICS 

sitions  like  rest  and  motion,  and  all  incommensurable  reali- 
ties as  space  and  time.  On  the  same  ground  he  denied  all 
beginning  in  time  and  all  bounds  in  space.  Rest  is  insensi- 
ble motion.  Space  and  time  are  ideas ;  and  creation  means 
only  dependence.  This  doctrine  of  continuity  in  general 
has  had  great  favor  \vith  flighty  and  impatient  speculators 
from  its  first  announcement,  because  it  is  at  once  so  effec- 
tive and  so  cheap.  If  missing  links  are  sought  for  and  fail 
to  be  found,  it  is  easy  to  say  that  the  law  of  continuity 
proves  that  they  must  have  existed  even  if  they  cannot  be 
found.  The  distinction  between  the  organic  and  the  in- 
organic is  easily  removed  by  the  same  method.  In  psychol- 
ogy, also,  the  empiricist  has  no  difficulty  in  showing  that 
sensation  is  the  only  fact,  because  to  allow  anything  differ- 
ent would  be  to  break  continuity.  But  while  one  speculator 
deduces  life  from  the  lifeless  by  the  principle  of  continuity, 
another  denies  the  possibility  on  the  same  ground.  Conti- 
nuity, he  urges,  demands  that  life  shall  come  from  life,  and 
forbids  any  other  view.  Materialism  likewise  is  affirmed 
and  denied  in  the  name  of  continuity.  Unfortunately  these 
speculators  have  never  bethought  themselves  to  give  a  gen- 
eral demonstration  of  this  law,  nor  even  to  define  the  vari- 
ous senses  in  which  it  is  used.  Sometimes  it  is  simply  a 
denial  of  creation  and  the  supernatural ;  sometimes  it  means 
that  nature  never  makes  a  leap ;  sometimes  it  means  that 
all  phenomena  are  but  phases  of  a  common  process,  and 
that  from  any  fact  whatever  in  the  system  we  can  pass  to 
any  other,  however  different,  by  simple  modifications  of  this 
process.  In  short,  it  means  anything  which  happens  to  be 
desirable.  These  flighty  imaginings  can  be  escaped  only 
as  we  apply  the  law  to  some  concrete  matter  and  fix  its 
significance  and  value  for  that  matter. 

What  is  it,  then,  in  the  case  -of  nature  which  is  continu- 
ous ?     Is  it  natural  things  in  their  existence,  or  natural 


NATURE  265 

causality,  or  nature  as  phenomenon  ?  The  suspicion  begins 
to  dawn  upon  us  that  nature  is  not  continuous  in  any  of 
these  senses,  and  that  the  continuity  of  nature  is  to  be 
.found  in  the  continuous  validity  of  the  system  of  law  and 
in  the  continuity  of  the  thought  of  which  nature  is  the 
flowing  expression. 

That  nature  is  continuous  in  its  existence  is  a  metaphys- 
ical proposition.  It  might  mean  that  nature  itself  is  a  con- 
tinuous substantial  somewhat,  or  that  the  material  elements 
are  continuous  in  their  existence,  and  suffer  no  increase  or 
diminution  of  their  number.  Both  propositions  are  already 
condemned.  The  necessary  dependence  of  the  finite  on  the 
fundamental  reality  reduces  it  to  contingent  existence,  and 
leaves  us  entirely  unable  to  say  how,  or  when,  or  in  what 
order  finite  things  shall  begin,  or  how  long  they  shall  con- 
tinue, or  when,  or  in  what  order,  they  shall  cease  to  be.  A 
metaphysical  doctrine  with  so  many  riders  as  this  can  never 
be  put  forward  as  a  first  principle.  In  addition,  metaphys- 
ics reduces  all  impersonal  existence  to  a  flowing  form  of 
the  activity  of  the  fundamental  reality.  The  only  meta- 
physical continuity  in  the  case  is  the  continuity  of  the  in- 
finite being  in  which  nature  has  its  root. 

But  natural  causality  is  continuous.  To  question  this 
would  be  fatal  to  all  science.  But  here  again  we  have  con- 
fusion. Some  causality  must  be  continuous,  without  doubt; 
the  cessation  of  all  causality  would  be  the  vanishing  of  nat- 
ure. If  natural  causality  means  the  causality  which  sup- 
ports nature,  it  is  continuous,  not  indeed  as  a  necessity,  but 
as  a  matter  of  fact.  How  long  it  shall  remain  continuous, 
however,  is  unknown  to  all  but  the  uncritical  dogmatist, 
and  he  simply  mistakes  the  monotony  of  his  thinking  for 
a  law  of  existence.  If  by  natural  causality  we  mean  the 
causality  of  nature,  considered  as  an  impersonal  agent  or 
system  of  agents,  we  have  to  say  that  there  is  no  such  thing. 


266  METAPHYSICS 

Again,  what  the  uncritical  speculator  really  needs  here 
is  not  a  metaphysical  doctrine  about  natural  causality,  but 
rather  an  inductive  postulate  of  the  continuity  of  natural 
law.  As  long  as  the  order  of  law  holds  we  may  hope  to 
construe  experience.  If  this  order  should  fail  us,  all  hope  of 
dealing  with  experience  would  vanish.  But  no  metaphysical 
principle  whatever  can  assure  us  of  this  continuity.  There 
is  nothing  in  the  conception  of  impersonal  causality  to  as- 
sure us  that  it  is  shut  up  to  a  uniform  manifestation.  The 
continuity  of  law,  therefore,  is  a  pure  postulate  which  must 
either  be  referred  to  an  abiding  purpose  in  the  cosmic  in- 
telligence, or  else  be  accepted  out  of  hand  as  an  opaque 
fact. 

The  continuity  of  nature  as  phenomenon  means  the  same 
thing,  the  continuity  of  phenomenal  laws.  In  the  strictest 
sense  a  moving  world  has  no  continuity  in  itself,  but  only 
for  the  observing  or  producing  mind.  Apart  from  this 
mind,  nature,  supposing  it  to  exist  at  all,  would  be  a  mi- 
rage of  vanishing  phantoms,  each  and  all  perishing  in  the 
attempt  to  be  born.  But  granting  the  observer  and  the 
phenomenal  world,  the  only  continuity  possible  would  be 
the  continuous  succession  of  phenomena  according  to  the 
same  laws.  The  new  phenomena  as  events  would  be  other 
than  the  old,  however  similar  they  might  be,  as  a  new  day 
is  another  day  notwithstanding  its  logical  equivalence  to 
old  days.  But  all  the  phenomena,  new  and  old  alike,  would 
be  comprehended  in  the  same  scheme  of  law  and  relation  : 
and  this  fact  constitutes  the  unity  and  continuity  of  the 
system.  From  the  phenomenal  stand-point  nature  has  no 
other  continuity. 

Possibly  we  may  still  think  that  there  is  a  deeper  con 
tinuity,  in  that  the  antecedents  condition  and  explain  the 
consequents.  Causal  break  and  irruption  are  thus  excluded, 
and  we  find  our  way  from  antecedent  to  consequent  with- 


NATURE  267 

out  logical  jolt  or  jar.  But  here  again  the  thought  is  am- 
biguous, and  is  untenable  in  both  its  meanings.  We  have 
just  pointed  out  the  impossibility  of  tracing,  either  phe- 
nomenally or  metaphysically,  the  antecedent  into  the  con- 
sequent. We  see  an  order  of  succession,  but  the  inner  con- 
nection eludes  us.  In  passing  from  one  phenomenon  to 
another,  thought  moves  along  no  continuously  welded  line 
of  logic,  but  rather  by  a  corduroy  road  with  all  the  accom- 
paniments of  bumping  and  jolting.  Except  in  a  very  gen- 
eral sense,  nature,  as  we  know  it,  abounds  in  discontinuities. 
This  has  to  be  admitted  even  by  tne  believer  in  an  ontolog- 
ical  mechanism  as  the  reality  of  nature.  For,  as  we  saw,  he 
must  recognize  a  double  aspect  to  his  system,  a  spatial  and 
a  dynamic.  And  the  spatial  is  but  the  translation  into  phe- 
nomenal form  of  the  dynamic,  and  has  no  continuity  in  it- 
self. The  movements  of  a  thing  may  sometimes  be  the  con- 
tinuations or  resultants  of  previous  movements,  but  more 
often  they  are  the  expression  of  invisible  dynamic  changes. 
A  kinematic  system  would  be  perpetually  at  fault  in  its 
conclusions,  because  the  motions  of  the  system  have  their 
roots  not  in  previous  movements,  but  in  an  invisible  dynam- 
ism. Thus  the  continuity  disappears  from  the  phenomenal, 
where  we  might  get  at  it,  and  takes  refuge  in  metaphysical 
theory. 

The  only  inductive  continuity  we  can  find  or  allow  is 
one  of  phenomenal  law.  And  this  law  produces  nothing 
and  really  prescribes  nothing.  It  merely  states  a  uniform- 
ity of  the  phenomenal  order.  It  erects  no  barrier  of  neces- 
sity against  any  one.  The  order  of  law  is  plastic,  and  its 
continuity  does  not  consist  in  a  rigid  identity  and  monotony 
of  its  factors  from  everlasting  to  everlasting,  but  in  a  sub- 
ordination of  all  factors,  new  and  old  alike,  to  the  same 
laws.  For  every  believer  in  freedom  there  are  mental 
states  or  acts  which  cannot  be  deduced  from  the  antece- 


268  METAPHYSICS 

dent  states.  These  are  pure  self-determinations  which  can 
be  understood  in  their  purpose,  but  cannot  be  explained  in 
their  origin.  By  their  very  nature  they  lie  beyond  scientific 
explanation,  yet  when  they  have  arisen  they  then  become 
subject  to  the  fundamental  laws  of  mental  action.  At  th'e 
basis  of  the  mental  life,  also,  we  meet  with  elements  which 
cannot  be  deduced  from  the  antecedent  state  of  mind. 
These  are  our  sensations,  and  are  contributed  or  excited 
from  without.  But  after  they  have  been  aroused,  they  then 
combine  according  to  certain  laws  inherent  in  the  nature 
of  the  mind.  Hence  the  integrity  of  the  mental  mechan- 
ism does  not  consist  in  a  self-enclosed  continuity  of  mental 
states,  but  in  the  identity  of  those  laws  which  determine 
the  combination  and  succession  of  mental  states,  whether 
arising  from  interaction  with  the  outer  world  or  from  the 
pure  self-determinations  of  the  mind.  The  same  must  be 
said  of  the  cosmical  mechanism.  Here  too,  for  every  be- 
liever in  freedom,  there  is  much  which  cannot  be  explained 
as  the  result  of  the  antecedent  state  of  the  system.  Human 
thought  and  purpose  have  realized  themselves  in  the  phys- 
ical world,  and  have  produced  effects  which  the  system, 
left  to  itself,  would  never  have  reached.  A  great  multitude 
of  forms  and  collocations  of  matter  can  be  traced  back  to 
human  volition  guided  by  purpose ;  and  beyond  that  they 
have  no  representation  whatever.  These  interventions, 
however,  have  violated  no  laws  of  nature.  They  arise  from 
the  introduction  of  a  new  antecedent,  and  the  i3sultant 
varies  accordingly.  And  the  effect  produced  enters  at  once 
into  the  great  web  of  law,  and  is  combined  with  other 
effects  according  to  a  common  scheme.  Hence  the  integ- 
rity of  the  cosmic  mechanism,  as  in  the  case  of  the  mental 
mechanism,  does  not  consist  in  a  self-enclosed  movement,  but 
in  the  subjection  of  all  its  factors  to  the  same  general  laws. 
The  conception  of  the  cosmic  mechanism  as  incapable  of 


NATURE  269 

taking  up  new  factors  or  new  impulses,  and  subjecting  them 
to  a  common  order  of  law,  is  borrowed  entirely  from  our 
experience  with  the  coarsest  of  human  inventions.  The 
actual  cosmic  mechanism  is  able  to  receive  the  greatest 
variety  of  impulses  from  without,  and  to  combine  them  with 
the  part  according  to  fixed  laws.  Only  in  this  way  can  it 
be  adapted  to  the  use  of  our  intelligence  at  all. 

We  conclude,  then,  once  more  that  the  continuity  of  nat- 
ure means  simply  the  continuity  of  phenomenal  law,  and 
we  see  that  this  continuity  in  no  way  conflicts  with  the 
complete  pliability  of  the  system  to  free  intelligence,  which 
may  found  it  or  be  in  interaction  with  it.  The  laws  of  the 
system  are  no  independent  necessities  by  which  the  action 
of  the  fundamental  reality  is  bound ;  they  are  rather  and 
only  the  rules  according  to  which  that  reality  proceeds. 
Neither  are  they  anything  which  opposes  a  rigid  bar  to 
finite  freedom ;  they  are  rather  the  conditions  of  any  effec- 
tive exercise  of  freedom. 

Thus  we  set  aside  the  error  which  frequently  appears  in 
popular  speculation,  the  fancy,  namely,  that  the  actual  sys- 
tem of  law  shuts  everything  up  to  a  rigid  fixity  which  can 
be  modified  only  by  irruption  and  violence.  Unless  appear- 
ances are  very  deceiving,  we  live  under  a  system  of  law, 
and  we  find  that  system  within  certain  limits  pliable  to  our 
purposes  and  serving  our  aims.  The  system  of  law  is  the 
one  thing  which  founds  our  control  of  nature,  and  by  means 
of  it  we  contrive  to  bring  a  great  many  things  to  pass  which 
the  system  of  law,  left  to  itself,  would  never  accomplish. 
The  multitude  of  machines  of  human  invention  owe  all 
their  value  to  the  laws  of  nature,  but  those  laws  alone 
would  never  have  produced  one  of  them. 

The  same  considerations  apply  to  the  ultimatum  often 
proposed  by  closet  speculators,  either  absolute  continuity  or 
no  science.  For  science  as  absolute  system,  comprehending 


270  METAPHYSICS    • 

all  things  in  a  spatial  and  temporal  order,  and  rigidly  de- 
ducing every  consequent  from  its  antecedents,  thus  bind- 
ing all  things  together  by  an  "  iron  chain  of  necessity,"  etc., 
the  assumption  in  question  may  well  be  a  "  postulate,"  but 
whether  we  are  to  grant  the  postulate  remains  for  decision. 
There  is  something  humorous  in  supposing  a  thing  real  be- 
cause it  is  postulated.  Such  intimidations  are  formidable 
only  in  the  closet.  A  set  of  sprites  cognizant  of  physical 
phenomena,  but  not  of  human  personality,  might  set  them- 
selves to  study  the  physics  of  bodily  movement.  They 
might  discover  a  great  many  uniformities  in  which  all  might 
agree ;  but  if  they  should  proceed  to  lay  it  down  as  an  ab- 
solute postulate  that  every  physical  movement  must  be  rig- 
orously deduced  from  an  antecedent  movement,  and  espe- 
cially that  no  extra-physical  influence  of  a  volitional  nature 
was  to  be  allowed,  under  penalty  of  exploding  science,  we 
should  think  that  they  had  got  hold  of  the  writings  of  some 
of  our  romantic  continuity  theorists  and  dealers  in  absolute 
science. 

But  whatever  freedom  we  allow  our  hypothetical  sprites, 
it  is  high  time  we  saw  through  these  fictions  of  abstract 
theory.  Absolute  continuity  may  be  a  postulate  of  absolute 
science,  but  it  is  no  postulate  of  the  only  science  we  have, 
and  the  only  one  worth  having.  If  we  allow  that  human 
wills,  or  other  wills,  are  playing  into  nature  for  its  modifi- 
cation, there  is  still  a  great  realm  of  discoverable  phenome- 
nal uniformity  which  is  the  fruitful  field  of  practical  science. 
This  remains,  whatever  our  theory  of  causation  and  meta- 
physical connection.  Even  if  we  suppose  that  it  is  free- 
dom which  acts  through  the  law,  the  law  remains,  and  the 
knowledge  of  it  is  as  valuable  as  ever.  Freedom  in  nature 
cancels  no  law  of  physics.  Freedom  in  willing  cancels  no 
law  of  mind.  The  claim  that  the  realm  of  law  would  go 
if  we  admitted  that  our  volition  has  any  causal  efficiency, 


NATURE  271 

without  or  within,  is  not  speech,  but  interjectional  ejacula- 
tion. It  is  a  product  of  that  superficial  closet  speculation 
which  has  been  so  prolific  of  verbal  intimidations. 

Evolution 

The  popular  notion  of  nature,  we  have  said  again  and 
again,  is  a  confused  compound  of  phenomenal  law,  crude 
metaphysics,  and  misunderstood  epistemological  postulates. 
This  confusion  finds  further  illustration  in  the  current  doc- 
trine of  evolution.  The  factitious  importance  which  this 
doctrine  has  acquired  for  speculators  of  the  hearsay  and  of 
the  physiological  type  warrants  us  in  continuing  to  trace 
the  familiar  confusion. 

Evolution  may  be  either  a  cosmic  formula  or  a  biological 
doctrine.  For  the  present  we  take  it  in  the  former  sense. 

As  a  cosmic  formula  evolution  may  have  two  distinct 
meanings.  It  may  be  a  description  of  the  genesis  and  his- 
tory of  the  facts  to  which  it  is  applied,  and  it  may  be  such 
a  description,  plus  a  theory  of  their  causes.  In  other  words, 
evolution  may  be  a  description  of  the  order  of  phenomenal 
origin  and  development,  and  it  may  be  a  theory  of  the  met- 
aphysical causes  which  underlie  that  development.  These 
two  conceptions  are  seldom  distinguished ;  and  it  is  their 
confusion,  or  conglomeration,  which  makes  evolution  so  im- 
mensely significant,  on  the  one  hand,  and  such  a  bugbear 
on  the  other. 

The  formula  of  evolution  as  a  description  of  the  phenome- 
nal order  is  familiar  to  every  reader.  The  simplest  and 
lowest  forms  of  existence  preceded  the  higher  and  more 
complex  forms.  Nothing  begins  ready-made.  The  present 
grows  out  of  the  past,  the  complex  out  of  the  simple,  the 
high  out  of  the  low,  the  heterogeneous  out  of  the  homo- 
geneous. In  the  inorganic  world,  if  we  should  trace  its  his- 


272  METAPHYSICS 

tory  backward,  we  should  find  simpler  and  simpler  physical 
conditions,  until  we  came  to  some  simple  state  of  dispersed 
matter — say,  a  nebulous  cloud.  In  the  organic  world,  if 
we  should  trace  living  forms  backward  along  genealogi- 
cal lines,  we  should  find  those  lines  converging  towards  a 
common  point  of  radiation.  The  forms  of  life  would  grow 
simpler,  until  in  some  very  simple  form  or  forms  we.  should 
find  the  common  starting-point  from  which  the  complex 
forms  of  to-day  have  been  developed.  The  same  order  is 
to  be  observed  in  the  development  of  mind,  society,  civiliza- 
tion, and  institutions  in  general. 

Now  evolution  in  this  sense  is  simply  a  description  of  an 
order  of  development,  a  statement  of  what,  granting  the 
theory,  an  observer  might  have  seen  if  he  had  been  able  to 
inspect  the  cosmic  movement  from  its  simplest  stages  until 
now.  It  is  a  statement  of  method  and  is  silent  about  cau- 
sation ;  and  the  method  itself  is  compatible  with  any  kind 
of  causation.  One  might  hold  to  this  phenomenal  order 
and  be  an  agnostic,  or  a  positivist,  or  an  idealist,  or  a  theo- 
logian, as  to  the  causation. 

Th's  conception  of  the  phenomenal  history  of  the  world 
as  showing  such  a  continuous  progress  from  the  simple  to 
the  complex,  from  the  low  to  the  high,  we  may  call  the  doc- 
trine of  evolution  in  its  scientific  sense.  It  lies  within  the 
field  of  science,  and  is  open  to  scientific  proof  or  disproof. 
Whenever  the  doctrine  transcends  this  field  of  phenomenal 
description,  and  claims  to  give  a  theory  of  the  productive 
causes,  it  then  becomes  metaphysics,  and  must  be  handed 
over  to  philosophical  criticism  for  adjudication. 

Evolution,  then,  in  the  scientific  sense,  is  neither  a  con- 
trolling law  nor  a  producing  cause,  but  simply  a  description 
of  a  phenomenal  order.  And  it  is  plain  that  there  might 
be  entire  unanimity  concerning  evolution  in  this  sense  along 
with  complete  disharmony  in  its  metaphysical  interpreta- 


NATURE  273 

tion.  In  such  cases  we  have  at  bottom,  not  a  scientific 
difference,  but  a  battle  of  philosophies.  The  theorists  agree 
on  the  facts,  but  interpret  them  by  different  schemes  of 
metaphysics.  This  is  the  reason  why  some  thinkers  find  in 
evolution  a  veritable  aid  to  faith,  while  others  see  in  it 
nothing  but  atheism.  And  the  latter  class  are  not  entirely 
without  excuse,  owing  to  the  failure  to  keep  the  scientific 
and  the  metaphysical  questions  apart,  and  especially  owing 
to  the  bad  metaphysics  by  which  the  facts  have  commonly 
been  interpreted. 

This  metaphysics  has  commonly  been  of  the  mechanical 
and  materialistic  type,  and  almost  invariably  it  has  main- 
tained a  doctrine  of  necessity.  Nature  has  been  erected 
into  a  self-contained  and  self-sufficient  system ;  and  natural 
laws  have  been  viewed  as  self-executing  necessities.  Under 
the  influence  of  these  crude  notions  evolution  has  been  de- 
"clared  to  maintain  natural  against  supernatural  causation, 
and  continuity  and  uniformity  against  break  and  irruption. 
This  antithesis  has  become  a  standing  part  of  the  popular 
discussion. 

It  is  worth  noting,  also,  that  much  of  the  current  argu- 
ment ill  comports  with  the  underlying  philosophy.  It  is 
supposed  that  natural  causation  somehow  secures  phenome- 
nal continuity  and  progress,  and,  conversely,  that  such  con- 
tinuity is  especially  favorable  to  the  belief  in  natural  causa- 
tion. But  there  is  absolutely  no  logical  connection  between 
natural  causation,  in  the  sense  of  material  or  physical  or 
necessary  causation,  and  the  law  of  evolution,  in  the  sense  of 
gradual  progress  from  the  simple  to  the  complex.  Natural 
causation,  in  the  sense  mentioned,  contains  no  provision  what- 
ever for  phenomenal  uniformity  or  progress.  For  all  we 
can  say,  such  causation  might  have  a  purely  kaleidoscopic 
effect,  and  might  perpetually  cancel  its  own  products.  The 
continuity  of  physical  causes  and  forces  would  be  compati- 

18 


274  METAPHYSICS 

ble  with  the  most  chaotic  sequences  of  phenomena,  and  the 
system  might  advance  by  perpetual  explosion  and  catas- 
trophe. If  the  actual  system  does  not  thus  proceed,  it  is 
not  because  it  is  natural,  but  because  it  is  confined  by  its 
laws  and  the  relation  of  its  parts  to  orderly  and  progressive 
movement. 

And,  on  the  other  hand,  if  we  assume  that  nature  is  a  self- 
enclosed,  self-executing  mechanical  order,  what  significance 
for  the  evolution  argument  is  there  in  the  presence  or  ab- 
sence of  missing  links,  or  in  the  fact  of  progress  by  slow 
gradation?  This  conception  of  nature  does,  indeed,  imply 
that  every  product  must  be  the  result  of  its  antecedents,  but 
it  implies  no  given  order  or  measure  of  likeness.  In  a  sys- 
tem assumed  to  be  self-executing  the  present  gro\vs  out  or. 
the  past  as  a  matter  of  definition.  Missing  links  might 
modify  our  conception  of  the  order  of  procedure,  but  they 
would  not  affect  our  general  view  of  causation.  Sometimes' 
the  speculators  have  a  suspicion  of  this  fact,  and  point  out 
that  the  absence  of  missing  links,  and  even  the  fact  of  prog- 
ress, are  no  necessary  part  of  the  evolution  doctrine.  The 
great  thing  is  to  maintain  the  continuity  of  natural  causa- 
tion, whatever  the  breaks  and  faults  in  the  phenomenal 
order.  Evolution,  it  is  said,  permits  us  to  recognize  any 
number  of  phenomenal  fractures,  if  only  we  reject  all  inter- 
ference with  natural  causation.  The  work  must  be  natural, 
and  must  be  carried  on  by  "resident  forces,"  if  it  is  to  be 
true  evolutionary  doctrine.  But  by  this  time  the  speculator 
has  unwittingly  changed  his  position  without  forsaking  the 
old  one.  If  the  inquirer  asks  for  the  ground  of  progress,  he 
is  referred  to  evolution.  If  he  should  express  surprise  that 
evolution  must  be  progressive,  he  is  told  that  he  is  mistaken. 
Evolution  implies  neither  progress  nor  regress,  but  only 
continuity.  If  the  inquirer  should  find  it  still  more  surpris- 
ing that  there  should  actually  be  order  and  progress  when 


NATURE  275 

evolution  is  thus  undetermined  in  its  nature,  the  speculator 
will  probably  refer  him  back  to  evolution  again ;  for  is  not 
evolution  a  change  from  an  indefinite,  incoherent  homoge- 
neity to  a  definite,  coherent  heterogeneity  through  con- 
tinuous differentiations  and  integrations?  Thus  with  one 
barrel  or  the  other  the  popular  evolutionist  is  pretty  sure 
to  bring  down  the  game.  For  the  critic,  however,  who  is 
not  so  easily  intimidated,  the  two  questions  remain  in  plain 
sight :  First,  does  evolution  necessarily  mean  qualitative 
progress  ?  If  so,  a  necessarily  progressive  universe  is  a 
highly  interesting  subject  for  reflection,  and  readily  lends 
itself  to  teleological  interpretations.  Secondly,  does  evolu- 
tion mean  only  causal  continuity ;  and  is  it  equally  compati- 
ble with  either  progress  or  regress?  If  so,  how  is  the  actual 
progress  to  be  explained? 

Something  of  an  opposite  confusion  is  beginning  to  creep 
into  the  thought  of  evolutionists  of  the  theistic  type.  They 
bring  forward  the  familiar  arguments  from  gill -slits  and 
that  sort  of  thing,  and  point  out  that  it  is  a  mockery  of  our 
intelligence  to  see  in  these  anything  but  a  proof  of  genetic 
connection.  But  when  they  introduce  God  as  the  cause  of 
the  successive  members  of  the  evolving  series,  the  series 
seems  not  to  have  in  it  anything  sufficiently  independent 
and  abiding  to  give  the  argument  a  footing.  In  a  phenom- 
enal system  nothing  abides,  but  the  order  is  incessantly 
reproduced;  and  if  similar  factors  appear  along  the  line, 
the  later  appearances  are  in  no  way  due  to  the  earlier  ones, 
but  to  the  law  of  the  whole.  If  there  were  a  tendency  to 
gill -slits  ensconced  somewhere  in  nature,  we  might  refer 
the  later  mislocated  slits  to  it;  but  when  the  infinite  is  the 
cause  of  the  members  of  the  series,  it  would  seem  that, 
whatever  mockery  of  our  intelligence  it  might  involve,  we 
must,  after  all,  refer  them  to  the  Creator,  who,  for  reasons 
known  only  to  himself,  has  seen  fit  to  produce  them.  The 


276  METAPHYSICS 

wicked  are  not  the  only  persons   who  stand  in  slippery 
places. 

But  all  this  is  something  of  an  aside,  and  has  its  justifica- 
tion only  as  illustrating  the  confusion  of  popular  specula- 
tion. 

Evolution  as  a  theory  of  causation  is  simply  a  piece  of 
bad  metaphysics  produced  by  bad  logic.  Logic  shows  that 
in  a  mechanical  or  necessary  scheme  of  any  kind  we  can 
reach  neither  the  one  from  the  many  nor  the  many  from 
the  one,  neither  the  high  from  the  low  nor  the  low  from  the 
high,  neither  the  definite  from  the  indefinite  nor  the  indef- 
inite from  the  definite.  If  we  seem  to  do  so  we  merely  fall 
a  prey  to  the  fallacy  of  the  universal  and  mistake  the  sim- 
plifications of  logical  manipulation  for  the  order  of  concrete 
fact.  If  there  be  a  real  progress  from  the  simple  to  the 
complex,  there  must  be  a  free  intelligence  as  its  author.  If 
there  be  no  such  free  intelligence,  there  is  no  progress,  but 
only  an  unintelligible  passage  from  potentiality  to  actual- 
ity. This  in  reality  and  for  clear  thought.  Of  course  all 
things  are  possible  to  a  cloudy  intelligence ;  having  no  clear 
ideas,  it  can  pass  from  everything  to  nothing  and  from  noth- 
ing to  everything  with  admirable  facility.  A  vocabulary 
supplies  all  its  needs. 

For  the  further  clearing  up  of  our  thought  concerning 
the  relation  of  inductive  science  to  metaphysics  we  recall 
again  some  results  reached  in  the  Theory  of  Thought  and 
Knowledge.  Explanation  in  general,  we  saw,  consists  in  re- 
ferring an  event  to  its  causes,  or  in  connecting  it  with  other 
events  according  to  law,  or  in  relating  it  in  a  scheme  of 
purpose.  In  the  first  case  explanation  is  metaphysical,  in 
the  second  scientific,  in  the  third  teleological. 

In  popular  speculation  the  first  and  second  are  confused 
because  of  the  general  failure  to  distinguish  the  phenomenal 
the  ontological.     But  when  thought  is  clear  all  three 


NATURE  077 

forms  are  seen  to  be  distinct  and  alike  necessary  for  the 
full  satisfaction  of  our  mental  demands.  When  we  have 
named  the  cause  and  the  purpose  of  nature,  we  have  gained 
no  insight  into  the  methods  of  the  cause,  or  of  the  way  in 
H'hich  the  purpose  is  realized.  And  when  we  have  discov- 
ered the  uniformities  of  nature,  we  have  gained  no  knowl- 
edge either  of  the  cause  or  of  the  purpose  of  nature.  When 
we  are  speaking  of  causes,  metaphysics  is  in  its  full  right 
and  has  the  final  word.  When  we  are  speaking  of  methods, 
inductive  science  has  the  right  of  way.  We  are  seeking  to 
connect  events  with  other  events  in  an  order  of  law;  and 
both  metaphysics  and  teleology  are  irrelevant.  We  can 
make  absolutely  no  use  of  theological  suggestions  in  this 
field.  We  may,  indeed,  not  find  the  law  we  seek,  but  the 
law,  whatever  it  may  be,  must  be  sought  within  the  order 
of  phenomenal  experience.  Finally,  when  we  are  seeking 
to  interpret  nature  teleologically,  it  is  quite  irrelevant  to 
object  the  way  in  which  events  are  brought  about.  No 
doubt  events  come  to  pass  in  some  way,  but  that  does  not 
decide  whether  they  mean  anything  when  they  do  come  to 
pass.  Walls  are  built  by  laying  stone  on  stone  or  brick  on 
brick ;  but  this  fact  does  not  reveal  the  plan  of  the  building, 
still  less  does  it  disprove  a  plan. 

We  repeat  this  matter  in  another  form.  Apart  from  the 
general  question  of  causality,  every  event  has  a  dual  aspect. 
We  may  view  it  from  the  stand-point  of  purpose,  and  try  to 
tell  what  it  means.  And  we  may  view  it  as  an  occurrence 
in  the  cosmic  series,  and  try  to  comprehend  it  in  the  order 
of  law.  In  the  former  case  it  expresses  a  purpose ;  in  the 
latter  case  it  is  an  outcome  of  law.  In  the  former  case  it 
appears  as  purposed ;  in  the  latter  it  appears  as  product. 
These  two  points  of  view  are  necessary  for  our  complete 
understanding  of  .anything ;  and  they  can  never  collide 
except  through  that  crude  metaphysics  which  erects  the 


278  METAPHYSICS 

system  of  law  into  a  self -running  and  independent  mech- 
anism. 

Separate  things  should  be  kept  separate.  The  cosmic 
movement  has  these  several  aspects ;  and  neither  the  sci- 
entific nor  the  teleological  aspect  admits  of  perfect  insight. 
However  much  we  may  believe  in  purpose,  \ve  can  trace  it 
but  a  little  way.  And  however  much  we  may  believe  in 
the  reign  of  law,  we  can  trace  it  only  in  general  outlines 
and  in  a  superficial  manner.  We  trace  it  in  a  way  which 
serves  for  practical  purposes  rather  than  for  theoretical  in- 
sight. If  we  seek  to  go  farther  than  this  we  stumble  into 
metaphysics,  and  begin  to  talk  of  "subtle  tendencies"  and 
"the  nature  of  things,"  and  possibly  even  of  "Nature"  her- 
self; and  these  are  mouth-tilling  rather  than  mind-filling 
phrases.  When  we  examine  ourselves  we  find  that  we  have 
nothing  in  mind  in  such  cases  beyond  the  abstract  category 
of  ground  ;  and  metaphysics  shows  that  this  notion  vanishes 
unless  we  raise  it  to  the  form  of  free  intelligence.  We  need 
to  bear  these  several  aspects  of  the  problem  in  mind  in  order 
to  vindicate  for  each  its  proper  field  and  significance,  and 
especially  to  ward  off  that  crude  dogmatism  which  makes 
the  dicta  of  science  all-embracing  and  final.  Inductive  sci- 
ence has  the  right  of  way  in  its  own  field,  and  only  in  its 
own  field.  And  after  it  has  made  all  possible  discoveries  in 
that  field  the  metaphysical  and  teleological  problems  re- 
main untouched. 

We  are  really  not  under  obligation  to  have  a  scientific 
theory  unless  we  can  find  it  in  the  facts ;  or,  rather,  we  are 
under  obligation  not  to  have  such  a  theory  unless  we  can 
find  it  in  the  facts.  When  the  facts  themselves  do  not  give 
it  we  must  wait  for  light,  and  meanwhile  have  recourse  to 
teleology  and  metaphysics  for  such  help  as  they  can  give. 
But  no  theory  is  better  than  a  fictitious  one.  Ignorance  is 
often  a  virtue,  but  sham  knowledge  is  an  intellectual  crime. 


NATURE  279 

Lord  Salisbury,  in  his  Presidential  Address  before  the  Brit- 
ish Association  for  the  Advancement  of  Science,  gives  the 
following  quotation  from  a  distinguished  scientist,  which 
well  illustrates  the  confusion  of  current  thought  on  this 
matter : 

"  We  accept  natural  selection,  not  because  we  are  able  to 
demonstrate  the  process  in  detail,  not  even  because  we  can 
with  more  or  less  ease  imagine  it,  but  simply  because  we 
must — because  it  is  the  only  possible  explanation  that  we 
can  conceive.  We  must  assume  natural  selection  to  be  the 
principle  of  the  explanation  of  the  metamorphoses,  because 
all  other  apparent  principles  of  explanation  fail  us,  and  it  is 
inconceivable  that  there  should  be  yet  another  capable  of 
explaining  the  adaptation  of  organisms  without  assuming 
the  help  of  a  principle  of  design." 

This  is  a  very  instructive  quotation.  It  shows  the  logical 
rashness  of  the  dogmatic  mind,  which  must  have  a  theory 
at  all  hazards.  The  process  cannot  be  demonstrated  in  de- 
tail; it  cannot  even  be  imagined  in  most  of  its  supposed  ap- 
plications. And  yet  it  must  be  affirmed,  for  we  must  have 
a  theory  ;  and  we  cannot  conceive  of  any  other  which  would 
not  involve  design.  But  why  must  we  have  a  theory  unless 
it  helps  us  to  insight  ?  We  cannot  conceive  of  any  other,  but 
it  seems  that  we  cannot  even  conceive  of  this.  It  is  only 
the  ill-starred  mind  which  must  have  a  theory  that  would 
insist  on  theorizing  under  such  circumstances.  All  other 
minds  would  recognize  the  impossibility  of  referring  the 
metamorphoses  of  the  organic  world  to  any  inductively  dis- 
covered principle,  and  would  content  themselves  with  classi- 
fying and  describing  organic  forms  according  to  their  affin- 
ities and  various  relations.  This  would  not  take  us  very 
far,  indeed,  but  it  would  be  real  and  not  sham  knowledge, 
so  far  as  it  went. 

The   emptiness   of   this  principle   of  selection   has  been 


280  METAPHYSICS 

pointed  out  in  the  Theory  of  Thought  and  Knowledge. 
When  the  anthropomorphism  is  eliminated,  we  said,  the 
principle  reduces  to  the  survival  of  the  fittest;  and  when 
the  ambiguity  is  eliminated  from  the  latter  principle,  it  in 
turn  reduces  to  the  statement  that  the  able  to  survive  sur- 
vive and  the  unable  to  survive  do  not  survive.  That  this 
is  true  is  certainly  unquestionable,  but  unless  we  can  point 
out  in  particular  cases  the  fitness  which  leads  to  survival, 
or  the  un fitness  which  leads  to  non-survival,  we  make  no 
progress.  We  merely  shuffle  the  abstract  notions  of  fitness 
and  unfitness,  and  draw  the  barren  conclusion  that  what- 
ever survives  does  so  because  of  its  fitness,  and  whatever 
fails  to  survive  does  so  because  of  its  unfitness.  We  know 
that  it  was  fit  because  it  survived,  and  unfit  because  it  failed 
to  survive ;  and,  being  fit  or  unfit,  it  could  not  fail  to  sur- 
vive or  not  survive;  and  what  more  is  there  to  wonder 
about  ? 

Some  of  these  days  even  teleology  will  be  found  to  be  a 
relief  from  this  barren  play  of  words.  Meanwhile,  we  point 
out  that  to  get  any  light  from  this  principle,  we  must  be 
able  to  show  what  the  fitnesses  and  un  fitnesses  are,  and 
in  particular  how  the  fitnesses  arise,  and  how  they  fall  out 
in  such  a  way  that  an  orderly  system  of  organic  existence 
emerges.  When  the  unfit  is  defined  as  unable  to  survive, 
we  can  readily  see  that  it  cannot  survive;  but  the  arrival 
of  the  fit,  and  its  arrival  in  so  many  forms,  are  left  quite 
unaccounted  for  by  the  great  principle  of  natural  selection. 
Yet  these  arrivals  contain  the  knot  of  the  problem.  A  few 
cases  of  arrival  and  survival  may  make  no  impression  of 
purpose,  but  when  the  sum  of  arrivals  and  survivals  is  the 
orderly  system  of  living  things  the  case  is  different.  But 
popular  thought  lingers  among  details  without  any  thought 
of  the  whole,  and  thus  gets  no  impression  of  purpose  what- 
ever. 


NATURE  281 

There  are  a  great  many  showy  arguments  which  in  their 
abstract  form  seem  invincible,  but  which,  nevertheless,  look 
very  different  when  concretely  applied.  Then  it  often  ap- 
pears that  various  riders  have  to  be  added  which  reduce 
them  to  commonplaces,  if  not  to  nothingness.  The  follow- 
ing is  an  illustration : 

u  Organic  form  is  the  result  of  motion. 

"Motion  takes  the  direction  of  least  resistance. 

"  Therefore  organic  form  is  the  result  of  motion  in  the 
direction  of  least  resistance." 

The  major  premise  is  undeniable.  The  minor  premise  is 
a  mechanical  axiom.  The  conclusion  necessarily  follows. 
And  thus  we  see  from  this  beautifully  simple  syllogism  how 
the  organic  world  necessarily  results  from  elementary  me- 
chanical laws.  To  be  sure,  we  cannot  by  any  reflection  on 
those  laws  deduce  the  result,  but,  by  reflection  on  the  re- 
sult, we  see  that  it  must  come  under  the  law.  If,  then, 
any  one  should  be  inclined  to  wonder  at  the  complexity  of 
organic  forms,  we  quietly  refer  him  to  the  principle  that 
motion  takes  the  direction  of  least  resistance. 

But  the  argument  admits  of  endless  application.    Thus: 

The  writing  of  a  book,  say  Paradise  Lost,  is  a  case  of 
motion. 

Motion  takes  the  direction  of  least  resistance. 

Therefore,  the  writing  of  Paradise  Lost  is  the  result  of 
motion  in  the  direction  of  least  resistance. 

This  argument  is  just  as  good  as  the  other.  And  now  it 
begins  to  dawn  upon  us,  either  that  the  line  of  least  resist- 
ance is  an  enormously  complicated  affair,  which  implicitly 
contains  the  whole  system  of  effects,  or  else  that  the  line  is 
determined  by  something  beyond  it.  If,  for  instance,  the 
line  of  least  resistance  is  determined  by  some  immanent 
organic  law,  or  by  the  thought,  purpose,  and  volition  of 
the  writer,  the  formal  argument  is  as  good  as  ever,  but  its 


282  METAPHYSICS 

purely  verbal  character  is  evident.  The  application  to  nat- 
ural selection  and  the  survival  of  the  fittest  is  manifest. 

Our  scientist  insisted  that  we  must  affirm  natural  selec- 
tion as  the  principle  of  the  metamorphoses  in  the  organic 
world.  The  reply  is  that  we  are  not  under  obligation  to 
affirm  this  or  any  other  principle,  unless  it  pays  expenses. 
Now  it  is  perfectly  clear  that  this  principle,  when  raised 
from  a  very  subordinate  position  and  made  universal,  be- 
comes a  barren  formalism,  leading  to  no  insight,  and  large- 
ly a  tautology.  The  rest  of  his  claim  is  equally  instructive. 
Either  we  must  affirm  natural  selection  or  have  recourse  to 
design.  Of  course  this  would  be  in  the  highest  degree  un- 
scientific. 

And  it  would  be  unscientific  in  the  technical  sense.  In- 
ductive science  as  such  knows  nothing  of  God,  and  has  no 
occasion  to  know  anything.  It  moves  in  another  field  al- 
together. Design  is  not  technically  a  scientific  hypothe- 
sis. If  one  were  trying  to  see  how  the  parts  of  a  com- 
plex mechanism  hang  together,  it  would  be  quite  absurd  to 
tell  him  to  look  for  the  design.  Design  might  throw  light 
upon  the  existence  of  the  whole,  when  one  is  looking  for 
the  ground  of  the  arrangement  of  the  parts,  but  it  can  never 
tell  what  the  arrangement  is.  Equally  irrelevant  is  the 
reference  to  design  in  the  world  movement,  when  one  is 
looking  for  the  forms  of  that  movement,  and  for  the  laws 
according  to"  which  phenomena  are  connected.  But  of  this 
division  of  labor  our  scientist  has  no  suspicion.  He  tacitly 
erects  nature  into  a  self-running  mechanism  which  has  no 
root  in  purpose,  and  opposes  natural  selection  to  design  as 
being  its  contradiction. 

Now  all  this  is  very  crude  and  superficial  logic  and  met- 
aphysics. Science  as  such  has  no  place  for  design ;  but 
reason,  which  is  the  source  of  science,  has  a  place  for  de- 
sign. Teleology  is  unscientific  in  the  technical  and  limited 


NATURE  283 

sense,  but  it  is  not  unscientific  in  the  sense  of  being  false. 
Moreover,  it  seems  there  is  no  scientific  explanation.  The 
one  offered  cannot  be  demonstrated  in  detail,  and  cannot 
even  be  imagined  in  many  of  its  applications.  Besides,  if 
we  had  a  scientific  explanation,  it  would  not  exclude  the 
teleological  one ;  for  this  only  claims  that  the  net  result  of 
ail  the  arrivals  and  survivals  in  the  organic  world  is  such  as 
to  be  unintelligible  without  the  assumption  that  they  root 
in  purpose  somewhere,  whatever  the  method  by  which  they 
have  been  reached.  Nor  is  the  view  any  more  unscientific 
than  the  alternative  doctrine,  when  the  scientific  explana- 
tion is  thought  through  to  its  metaphysical  basis.  If  we 
reject  the  control  of  purpose,  then  we  must  find  the  ground 
for  all  the  complex  forms  of  nature  in  the  nature  of  things, 
subtle  tendencies,  latent  laws,  mysterious  affinities,  etc.  But 
this  matter  is  not  only  unscientific  in  the  technical  sense;  it 
is  unscientific  in  any  sense,  being  simply  bad  and  impossible 
metaphysics. 

Nature  as  the  System  of  the  Finite 

From  the  form  of  our  experience  the  physical  world  is 
the  great  object  of  thought.  Hence  it  results  that  the  no- 
tion of  nature  is  generally  and  often  exclusively  built  on 
physical  lines.  But  by  and  by  we  recollect  that  man  is 
also  a  part  of  existence,  and  that  we  must  make  some  pro- 
vision for  him.  Then  if  our  thought  is  not  very  critical 
we  tend  to  make  man  a  physical  product.  Or  if  we  see  the 
impossibility  of  this  view  we  tend  to  transform  our  thought 
of  nature  so  as  to  make  it  all-inclusive.  "We  see  that  man 
cannot  be  made  a  function  of  physical  nature,  but  then 
physical  nature  is  not  the  sum  or  sole  reality  of  nature. 
It  is  rather  only  one  aspect  of  that  all-embracing  nature 
which  produces  alike  the  inorganic  and  the  organic,  the 


284  METAPHYSICS 

physical  and  the  spiritual.  The  apparent  antitheses  of  ex- 
perience, as  the  living  and  the  dead,  the  spiritual  and  the 
material,  man  and  nature,  are  only  phenomenal ;  and  they 
all  vanish  in  the  unity  of  the  one  mysterious  nature  from 
which  all  things  proceed.  If  we  knew  all  we  should  see 
that  all  things  are  natural  and  hive  their  natural  explana- 
tion. 

This  notion  results  from  the  desire  for  unity  working 
under  the  limitations  of  sense  metaphysics.  Eliminate 
these,  and  this  mysterious  nature  becomes  simply  a  name 
for  the  fundamental  reality,  and  its  properties  remain  a 
problem  for  investigation.  But  there  is  implicit  in  the  doc- 
trine the  conception  of  an  impersonal  existence  and  of 
necessary  causation,  and  the  claim  is  that  if  we  knew  this 
impersonal  somewhat  and  its  necessary  activities,  we  should 
find  it  including  and  explaining  the  whole  system  of  the 
finite. 

The  untenability  of  this  notion  we  have  long  since  seen. 
Both  the  impersonal  existence  and  the  necessary  causation 
have  been  cast  out  as  evil.  This  nature  is  one  of  the  idols 
of  the  speculative  den  which  is  seen  in  its  true  character 
as  soon  as  it  is  brought  into  the  Hght.  Epistemology  con- 
vinces us  that  nature  has  neither  existence  nor  meaning 
except  for  and  through  intelligence. 

Yet  after  all  there  is  a  certain  interest  underlying  this 
notion  of  nature ;  but  the  speculator  does  not  know  what 
it  is,  and  seeks  to  satisfy  it  in  impossible  ways.  The  things 
to  be  secured  are  the  continuity  of  law  and  the  possibility 
of  comprehending  all  things  under  some  law-giving  plan. 
Things  must  not  exist  at  random.  Events  must  not  occur 
at  hap-hazard.  Whatever  antitheses  may  be  found  in  ex- 
perience, they  must  admit  of  being  comprehended  in  a 
deeper  plan  which  unites  and  explains  them.  But  these 
demands  cannot  be  met  by  any  impersonal  mechanism, 


NATURE  285 

but  only  by  the  constitutive  intelligence  which  founds  and 
maintains  the  order.  Considered  in  itself,  nature  is  simply 
a  form  of  working  for  the  expression  and  realization  of  a 
thought  or  plan.  Its  continuity  is  intellectual,  and  all  its 
laws  and  phenomena,  its  constants  and  variables,  are  to  be 
understood  from  the  side  of  this  plan.  In  the  realm  of  nat- 
ure that  which  was  does  not  in  the  deepest  sense  explain 
that  which  is,  but  that  which  was,  that  which  is,  and  that 
which  will  be,  are  all  to  be  explained,  logically,  by  their  re- 
lations to  one  another  in  the  plan  of  the  whole,  and,  meta- 
physically, by  that  Living  Will  which  not  only  worketh 
hitherto,  but  worketh  still  and  worketh  forevermore.  Log- 
icall\T,  all  things  explain  all  things,  that  is,  imply  all  things 
in  the  plan  of  the  whole,  the  future  implying  the  past 
as  much  as  the  past  implies  the  future.  Dynamically,  no 
impersonal  thing  explains  anything,  for  all  such  things 
are  but  phases,  constant  or  variable,  of  an  activity  beyond 
them. 


Every  one  familiar  with  anti-religious  polemics  will  recog- 
nize that  the  discussion  has  largely  proceeded  on  a  certain 
conception  of  the  natural.  Evolution  would  never  conflict 
with  religion  but  for  a  peculiar  conception  of  the  natural. 
Xo  one  would  ever  have  dreamed  of  a  conflict  between 
science  and  religion  but  for  a  particular  conception  of  the 
natural.  In  history,  also,  all  alleged  supernatural  occur- 
rences are  to  be  looked  upon  either  as  fictions  or  as  mis- 
understood natural  events.  A  natural  interpretation  of  all 
events  is  insisted  upon,  and  this  is  held  to  exclude  the  super- 
natural. Thus  the  natural  and  the  supernatural  are  set  up 
as  mutually  exclusive,  so  that  the  more  we  have  of  the  one 
the  less  we  must  have  of  the  other. 

Of  course  an  event  may  be  natural  and  yet  be  apparently 


286  METAPHYSICS 

a  great  departure  from  the  familiar  order.  The  continuity 
of  natural  law  is  compatible  with  great  phenomenal  discon- 
tinuity. We  often  have  apparent  departures  from  the  famil- 
iar order ;  but,  on  closer  inspection,  it  is  found  that  the  es- 
sential order  of  law  is  maintained  even  in  its  seeming  in- 
fraction. Thus,  an  earthquake  may  be  a  departure  from 
the  accustomed  immobility  of  the  earth's  crust ;  but  it  is 
nevertheless  the  outcome  of  the  familiar  laws  of  physics. 
Thus,  again,  the  freezing  of  water  in  a  flame  seems  like  a 
contradiction  of  natural  law ;  and  yet  the  laws  of  physics 
are  not  violated,  but  rather  illustrated,  by  this  fact.  Hav- 
ing once  mastered  this  distinction  between  essential  contin- 
uity and  phenomenal  discontinuity,  we  become  somewhat 
tolerant  even  of  apparently  miraculous  stories,  only  nothing 
of  the  supernatural  must  be  allowed  in  them.  Cures  at 
shrines,  or  by  means  of  relics  or  holy  water,  or  by  formulas 
of  blessing  or  exorcism,  become  quite  credible  if  we  may 
view  them  as  cases  of  the  influence  of  the  mind  on  the 
body.  Even  witches,  who  have  long  been  under  the  ban. 
are  becoming  a  fairly  intelligible  folk  since  the  development 
of  hypnotism 

Now  in  this  there  is  a  double  assumption.  First,  nature 
is  supposed  to  be  a  metaphysical  system  with  divers  res- 
ident forces  by  virtue  of  which  it  produces  a  great  variety 
of  effects  which,  as  products  of  nature,  are  natural.  Second- 
ly, this  nature  is  tacitly  and  often  avowedly  supposed  not 
to  root  in,  or  be  subordinate  to,  intelligence  anywhere.  If 
rooted  in  intelligence  at  all  it  is  so  only  as  to  its  general 
forms  and  laws,  and  not  as  to  its  details.  In  either  case, 
nature  is  conceived  as  a  blind  causality  which  does  a  great 
many  unintended  things  on  its  own  account.  This  notion 
is  the  source  of  the  difficulty  so  many  feel  over  the  doc- 
trine of  evolution',  and  also  of  the  traditional  polemic  con- 
cerning prayer  and  special  interpositions  in  general.  The 


NATURE  287 

naturalistic  interpretations  of  religious  history  have  the 
same  root.  In  all  of  these  cases  there  is  a  latent  or  ex- 
plicit assumption  that  whatever  can  be  referred  to  natural 
agency  is  thereby  rescued  from  any  purposive  interpreta- 
tion. 

But  allowing  that  nature  is  at  present  a  metaphysical 
fact  with  inherent  resident  forces,  this  conclusion  does  not 
follow,  unless  it  be  shown  that  nature  is  essential!}7  blind, 
mechanical,  and  self -existent.  If  nature  be  dependent  on 
intelligence,  then  all  its  phases  and  products  must  be  re- 
ferred to  intelligence.  All  that  the  rational  believer  in  pur- 
pose cares  to  maintain  is  that  natural  products  are  intended, 
however  realized ;  and  what  the  unbeliever  should  show,  in 
order  to  give  his  claim  any  significance,  is  that  they  root  in 
no  purpose  anywhere.  If  an  event  represents  a  divine  pur- 
pose, it  is  as  truly  purposeful,  when  realized  th  *ough  natural 
processes,  as  it  would  be  if  produced  by  fiat ;  and  it  would 
be  as  "special"  or  "particular,"  if  thus  produced,  as  it 
would  be  if  created  on  the  spot.  In  any  other  sense  than 
that  of  being  intended,  it  is  unnecessary  to  insist  upon  any- 
thing special  or  particular  in  the  flow  of  events ;  and  in  this 
sense  it  is  hard  to  see  how  any  theist  can  reserve  anything 
from  being  special  and  particular.  We  may  not  be  able, 
indeed,  to  trace  the  meaning  in  an  event,  but  if  there  be 
meaning  in  anything  there  is  meaning  in  all  things.  It  is 
only  superficial  thought  which  fancies  that  mechanism  dis- 
places meanings. 

Familiar  oversights  are  apt  to  master  us  here.  First,  the 
fallacy  of  the  universal  misleads  us  into  thinking  that  the 
creative  act  produced  only  a  system  of  things  in  general, 
and  that  this  system  then  wrought  out  on  its  own  account 
a  set  of  particular  effects  for  which  no  one  is  responsible. 
General  laws  and  classes  were  the  first  and  only  created 
product;  and  thereafter  things  got  on  by  themselves.  But 


288  METAPHYSICS 

these  laws  and  classes  as  such  contain  no  hint  of  concrete 
and  particular  things  and  events ;  and  hence  the  latter  are 
thought  to  be  no  part  of  the  original  plan.  Through  this 
deceit  of  the  universal  they  fall  out  of  our  thought,  and  are 
supposed  not  to  have  been  in  the  creative  thought.  Thus, 
finally,  they  sink  down  into  unintended  by-products  of  the 
natural  mechanism,  and  admit  of  being  thought  meanly  of. 

The  nai've  superficiality  of  all  this  is  evident.  General 
laws  and  classes  can  have  real  existence  only  in  concrete 
and  particular  application.  There  is  and  can  be  no  system 
of  things  in  general.  If  then  we  suppose  that  God  created 
a  system  of  nature  which  was  intended  to  unfold  according 
to  inherent  laws,  we  must  say  that  the  creative  act  implied 
and  carried  with  it  all  that  should  ever  arrive  in  the  un- 
folding of  the  system.  There  is  no  way  by  which  things 
or  events  could  slip  in  which  were  not  provided  for  in  the 
primal  arrangement.  Mechanism  can  only  unfold  its  own 
implications ;  it  can  make  no  new  departures  so  as  to  reach 
anything  essentially  new.  And  if  we  suppose  the  Creator 
to  have  known  what  he  was  doing,  we  must  suppose  him 
either  to  have  intended  the  implications,  or  to  have  been 
unable  to  prevent  them.  But  the  reality  of  the  purpose  is 
missed  because  of  the  deceit  of  the  universal ;  and  even  if 
we  allow  it,  it  fails  to  make  any  impression  upon  us,  from 
being  far  removed  in  time.  Here  we  overlook  the  relativity 
of  our  time  estimates  and  practically  fancy  that  a  purpose 
so  distant  must  have  faded  out  of  the  divine  interest,  if  not 
out  of  the  divine  thought  altogether. 

The  question  of  natural  and  supernatural,  so  far  as  it  has 
a  religious  interest,  is  purely  one  of  intended  or  unintended. 
But  this  question  is  obscured  by  supposing  the  issue  to  con- 
cern the  method  of  realization ;  as  if  the  natural  were  nec- 
essarily unrelated  to  intelligence,  and  as  if  purpose  could  be 
realized  only  by  unnatural  methods. 


NATURE  289 

These  conclusions  would  hold  even  if  nature  were  a  meta- 
physical reality  ;  but  nature  is  nothing  of  the  kind.  There 
is  no  substantial  nature,  but  only  natural  events;  and  a  nat- 
ural event  is  one  which  occurs  in  an  order  of  law,  or  one 
which  we  can  connect  with  other  events  according  to  rule. 
But  this  order  has  no  causality  in  it.  In  the  causal  sense 
it  explains  nothing.  It  is  only  a  rule  according  to  which 
some  power  beyond  it  proceeds.  Its  value  for  us  is  prac- 
tical rather  than  speculative.  But  the  cause  lies  beyond  the 
law ;  this  is  the  supernatural.  But  this  cause  is  essentially 
personal  and  purposive ;  and  the  system  of  law  represents 
only  the  general  form  of  its  free  causality.  The  supernat- 
ural, then,  is  nothing  foreign  to  nature  and  making  occa- 
sional raids  into  nature,  but  so  far  as  nature  as  a  whole  is 
concerned,  the  supernatural  is  the  ever-present  ground  and 
administrator  of  the  natural.  It  is  not  something  of  a 
scenic  ami  arbitrary  character  apart  from  nature,  but  rather 
a  supreme  reason  and  will  realizing  its  purposes  under  the 
form  of  nature.  Hence  events  in  general  must  be  said  to 
be  at  once  natural  in  the  mode  of  their  occurrence,  and 
supernatural  in  their  causation.  The  commonest  event, 
say  the  falling  of  a  stone,  is  as  supernatural  in  its  causality 
as  any  miracle  would  be ;  for  in  both  alike  the  fundamental 
reality,  or  God,  would  be  equally  implicated.  As  soon  as 
•we  eliminate  the  crude  metaphysics  of  uncritical  thought 
we  see  that  there  is  no  more  needless  conflict  anywhere  in 
speculation  than  this  which  sets  the  natural  and  supernatu- 
ral apart  in  mutual  hostility. 

Miracles 

There  is  probably  no  discussion  in  which  the  ratio  of  bad 
logic  to  good  has  been  greater  than  in  that  concerning  mir- 
acles. With  our  conception  of  the  divine  immanence,  of  a 

19 


290  METAPHYSICS 

natural  supernatural  and  a  supernatural  natural,  the  ques- 
tion loses  all  essential  importance.  Miracles  in  themselves 
would  be  no  more  divinely  wrought  than  any  natural  event 
whatever.  The  only  place  or  function  we  could  find  for 
miracles  would  be  as  signs  of  a  divine  power  and  purpose 
which  men  immersed  in  sense  could  not  find  in  the  ordinary 
course  of  nature.  They  might  be  necessary  condescensions 
to  human  weakness,  but  they  would  root  no  more  intimate- 
ly in  the  divine  will  and  purpose  than  any  familiar  event. 

How  to  define  a  miracle  has  always  been  a  question  of 
difficulty ;  and  the  tendency  has  been  to  give  specimens  in- 
stead of  definitions.  Thus,  to  raise  the  dead  would  be  a 
miracle.  Answers  to  prayer  concerning  familiar  matters, 
it  is  said,  would  not  be  miracles.  To  the  charge  made  by 
the  unbeliever  that  an  answer  to  prayer  involves  a  miracle, 
the  believer  commonly  replies  with  denial.  Miracles  are 
the  great  wonders  which  were  needed  for  the  original  estab- 
lishment of  the  faith,  or  for  its  vindication  against  its  ene- 
mies ;  and  the  age  of  miracles  has  long  since  passed  away. 

But  this  attempt  to  fix  the  definition  of  miracle  by  sam- 
ple never  fails  to  awaken  criticism.  It  seems  to  make  the 
miraculous  character  to  depend  not  on  the  fact  of  a  depart- 
ure from  the  order  of  nature,  but  on  the  size  of  the  depart- 
ure. Small  departures,  then,  are  not  miraculous,  but  large 
ones  are.  Now  a  disciple  of  logical  rigor  and  vigor  can 
never  endure  any  such  shuffling  and  shilly-shallying  as  this; 
and  he  hastens  to  announce  that  any  departure  from  the 
order  of  nature  is  a  miracle,  and  of  course  is  to  be  denied. 
Not  merely  the  stories  of  sacred  books,  but  answers  to  pray- 
er of  all  sorts,  providential  interferences,  spiritual  leadings, 
inspirations,  etc.,  must  be  set  aside  as  miraculous. 

There  is  an  air  of  great  clearness  to  this  which  almost 
excuses  its  peremptoriness.  Unfortunately,  this  clearness  is 
only  apparent.  If  we  mean  by  a  departure  from  the  order 


NATURE  291 

of  nature  the  production  of  something  which  nature  left 
to  itself  would  not  produce,  we  must  say  that  physical  nat- 
ure, where  the  admission  of  miracle  is  pre-eminently  per- 
horresced,  is  the  scene  of  continuous  miracles.  For  that  nat- 
ure is  perpetually  undergoing  modification  and  taking  on 
new  forms  because  of  human  volitions  which  play  into  it 
and  produce  effects.  These  effects  cannot  be  deduced  from 
the  antecedent  state  of  the  physical  system,  but  are  inter- 
ferences, interpolations,  interjections  from  without.  If  these 
are  miracles,  and  so  abundant,  there  seems  to  be  no  good 
speculative  reason  why  we  should  object  to  miracles  in  gen- 
eral. But  if  they  are  not  miracles,  then,  it  appears,  we  may 
have  interferences,  etc.,  which  represent  and  realize  purpose 
in  the  system,  but  which,  as  being  every-day  occurrences, 
are  not  to  be  called  miraculous. 

Miracle,  then,  in  the  sense  of  effects  interpolated  into  the 
order  of  law  without  being  a  consequence  of  that  order, 
would  seem  to  be  a  fairly  familiar  fact  of  experience.  If 
we  should  think  to  avoid  this  conclusion  by  saying  that 
physical  nature  alone  would  not  explain  the  effects,  but 
nature  as  a  whole,  including  man,  would  explain,  we  should 
have  a  perfectly  barren  contention,  as  long  as  we  left  man 
free,  and  a  self-destructive  one  if  we  should  include  man  in 
a  scheme  of  necessity. 

These  considerations  suggest,  what  reflection  confirms, 
that  the  traditional  debate  respecting  miracle  is  marked  by 
all  the  confusion  and  uncertainty  which  appear  in  the  pop- 
ular notions  of  the  natural  and  supernatural.  Neither  party 
to  the  debate  is  certain  of  its  own  position  or  has  any  con- 
sistent position ;  and  whichever  part}7  attacks  wins. 

From  our  own  point  of  view  the  natural  has  its  source 
and  abiding  cause  in  the  fundamental  reality,  which  is  liv- 
ing will  and  intelligence ;  and  physical  nature  is  throughout 
only  the  form  and  product  of  its  immanent  and  ceaseless 


292  METAPHYSICS 

causality.  The  question  of  miracle,  then,  is  not  a  question 
of  natural  versus  supernatural,  nor  a  question  of  causality, 
but  solely  and  only  a  question  of  the  phenomenal  relations 
of  the  event  in  question.  The  natural  event  is  one  which 
comes  in  a  familiar  order,  or  one  which  we  can  relate  to 
other  events  according  to  rule.  The  miracle  could  only  be 
viewed  as  an  event  arriving  apart  from  the  accustomed 
order  and  defying  reduction  to  rule. 

This  question  goes  deeper  than  at  first  appears.  It  raises 
first  the  query  what  objective  and  logical  ground  we  have 
for  believing  in  a  fixed  and  all-embracing  natural  order. 
The  answer  must  be  that  we  have  no  such  ground  which 
does  not  either  rest  on  theistic  faith  or  else  float  in  the 
air  as  a  subjective  postulate.  Thought  needs  such  an  order 
for  the  realization  of  its  own  tendencies,  but  that  does  not 
prove  its  existence.  In  a  rational  system  we  can  infer  some- 
thing from  the  experience  and  anticipations  of  our  own  rea- 
son, but  in  a  system  not  rooted  in  reason  nothing  can  be 
inferred.  In  an  atheistic  scheme  psychological  expecta- 
tions may  be  formed,  but  they  constitute  no  logical  warrant. 
Nothing  is  possible  on  such  a  view  but  dogmatic  assump- 
tion. 

An  order  of  law,  then,  becomes  a  rational  thing  and  fur- 
nishes ground  for  rational  assumption  only  on  a  theistic 
basis.  From  the  orderly  nature  of  intellect  \ve  should  ex- 
pect order  and  consistency  in  its  activities  and  products. 
Now  from  this  stand-point  there  is  a  decided  presumption 
against  miracle,  and  .the  presumption  arises  from  the  nature 
of  intelligence  itself.  And  nothing  can  save  us  from  re- 
jecting miraculous  stories  as  antecedently  incredible,  except 
the  showing  of  an  adequate  reason  for  their  performance. 
And  in  deciding  what  an  adequate  reason  may  be,  men  will 
judge  one  way  or  the  other  in  accordance  with  their  explicit 
or  implicit  assumption  concerning  the  meaning  of  the  world 


NATURE  293 

and  life.  If  they  think  that  nature  is  there  on  its  own  ac- 
count, and  that  its  highest  law  is  that  £  M F"  shall  remain 
a  constant  quantity,  there  is  no  question  as  to  their  position 
on  miracles.  The  one  sacred  thing  will  be  \  MV*,  and  if 
there  be  anything  which  interferes  with  that,  anathema  sit. 
And  if,  on  the  other  hand,  there  be  any  who  hold  that  nat- 
ure is  second  and  not  first,  that  it  is  meant  to  serve  moral 
and  religious  ends,  they  will  find  no  apriori  difficulty  in 
the  notion  of  miracle  if  they  find  it  occurring  in  connection 
with  spiritual  exigencies  which  could  have  been  met  in  no 
other  way  as  well.  Abstract  and  unrelated  wonders  might 
conceivably  be  proved  by  abstract  testimony,  but  such  ques- 
tions have  only  academic  existence;  and  however  much 
evidence  might  be  offered  for  such  wonders,  they  would 
inevitably  fade  out  of  rational  belief,  until  at  last  no  one 
would  even  take  the  pains  to  deny  them.  The  reason  is 
that  such  wonders  are  essentially  incredible  in  a  world 
which  roots  in  a  supreme  reason  and  a  worthy  purpose. 
But  faith  or  unfaith  in  all  miracles  roots  too  deep  in  life  to 
be  entirely  amenable  to  logic.  Logic,  however,  may  be 
allowed  to  remark  that  those  persons  who  think  that  "  sci- 
ence demonstrates  the  impossibility  of  miracles"  or  that 
"  science  shows  that  miracles  have  never  occurred  "  might 
possibly  be  helped  by  a  few  lessons  in  logic. 

But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  believer  in  the  omnipresent 
supernatural,  if  he  be  at  all  skilled  in  logical  and  psycholog- 
ical reflection,  or  learned  in  history,  will  steadfastly  main- 
tain that  the  supernatural  manifests  itself  chiefly  and  al- 
most exclusively  under  the  natural  form.  Only  thus  can 
nature  be  the  instrument  of  our  instruction  and  develop- 
ment. Only  thus  can  the  mental  and  moral  sanity  of  in- 
dividuals and  the  community  be  secured.  Only  thus  can 
the  low,  wonder-loving  tendencies  of  the  untrained  intellect 
be  prevented  from  plunging  men  into  unfathomable  depths 


294  METAPHYSICS 

of  superstition.  Only  thus,  finally,  can  many  individuals 
be  saved  from  abysses  of  fanaticism  and  conceited  unchari- 
tableness,  because  of  fancied  visions  and  revelations.  In  a 
time  when  men  have  lost  themselves  in  the  mazes  of  imper- 
sonal mechanism,  they  need  enlightenment  so  as  to  find 
God  in  the  law,  but  at  all  times  they  eq.ually  need  to  recog- 
nize the  law,  even  if  it  should  temporarily  hide  God  from 
them. 

Nature  as  Idea 

In  the  Theory  of  Thought  and  Knowledge  we  have  dis- 
cussed the  general  question  of  idealism,  pointing  out,  how- 
ever, that  the  full  discussion  involves  metaphysics  as  well 
as  epistemology.  We  recur  to  the  subject  here  for  the  sake 
of  emphasizing  the  phenomenality  of  external  nature ;  that 
is,  its  existence  only  in,  for,  and  through  intelligence.  On 
whatever  line  we  approach  the  subject,  we  find  thought 
able  to  save  itself  from  contradiction  and  collapse  only  as 
all  reality  is  taken  up  into  mind.  The  extra-mental  world 
of  sense-thought  is  seen  to  be  a  misreading  of  experience ; 
and  it  must  inevitably  vanish  before  criticism.  A  thought 
world  is  the  only  knowable  world ;  and  a  thought  world  is 
the  only  real  world.  And  of  this  world  intelligence  is  at 
once  the  origin  and  the  abiding  seat.  Nature  as  being  van- 
ishes instantly  unless  we  raise  our  thought  to  the  abiding 
idea  which  binds  the  successive  phases  into  one  .conception. 
The  rational  ideas  and  relations  and  system  in  what  we  call 
things  are  the  only  thing  with  which  thought  can  deal ;  and 
they  are  nothing  in  abstraction  from  a  mind  which  consti- 
tutes and  maintains  them. 

Here  our  study  of  nature  ends.  It  has  been  of  set  pur- 
pose exceedingly  repetitious,  as  in  no  other  way  did  it  seem 
possible  to  reveal  the  multitudinous  forms  which  the  bad 


NATURE  295 

metaphysics  of  crude  thought  assumes  on  this  subject.  We 
emerge  finally  with  the  conception  of  the  finite  spirit  in  the 
presence  of  a  phenomenal  system  which  forever  proceeds 
from  the  immanent  energy  of  the  one  Living  Will.  This 
system  cannot  be  deduced  by  any  apriori  reflection,  but 
must  be  learned  from  experience.  Still  it  is  possible  to  learn 
something  of  its  laws  and  to  construe  some  of  its  mean- 
ings ;  and  all  our  effort  should  be  directed  to  this  end. 

In  neither  case,  however,  can  we  reach  anything  like  com- 
pleteness. From  our  theistic  stand-point,  we  are  forced  to 
find  the  reason  why  the  system  is  as  it  is  in  the  purposes  of 
the  infinite.  This  fact,  in  itself,  would  not  be  incompatible 
with  an  insight  into  these  purposes,  and  into  the  means  of 
their  realization  ;  but  both  the  purposes  and  the  methods  of 
accomplishment  are  largely  hidden  from  our  knowledge. 
In  most  cases,  where  design  is  manifest,  the  end  seems  to 
have  little  worth ;  and  where  a  worthy  end  is  affirmed,  the 
system  seems  quite  indifferent,  if  not  inimical,  to  its  realiza- 
tion. The  only  end  which  can  be  allowed  to  have  absolute 
value  is  an  ethical  one ;  but  it  is  hard  to  detect  any  relation 
to  such  an  end  in  the  mass  of  cosmic  details.  It  is  still 
harder  to  find  any  reason  why  this  end  might  not  have  been 
secured  in  a  more  direct  and  efficient  way.  Viewed  as  a 
whole,  the  great  cosmic  drift  does  not  seem  to  set  very  de- 
cidedly in  any  direction,  and  the  mass  of  results  seem  more 
like  products  than  purposes.  The  great  forms  of  elemen- 
tary activity  are  maintained,  and  in  their  interaction  they 
give  rise  to  various  products  to  which  it  is  difficult  to  as- 
cribe any  further  significance.  The  belief  in  purpose  in  the 
system  has  its  special  embarrassments  as  well  as  its  ad- 
vantages. We  cannot  do  without  it,  and  it  is  not  easy  to 
do  with  it.  In  particular,  it  precipitates  upon  us  the  great 
mass  of  failure,  insignificance,  and  mischief  which  forms  so 
large  a  part  of  visible  nature,  and  demands  an  interpretation. 


296  METAPHYSICS 

And  here  all  human  wisdom  is  at  an  end.  The  problem  of 
evil  to  which  these  questions  belong  admits  of  no  speculative 
solution  at  present.  "We  cannot  give  up  our  affirmation  of 
purpose,  but  we  must  admit  that  the  purposes  of  the  sys- 
tem are  mostly  inscrutable.  Yet,  still,  we  hold  that  neither 
the  existence  nor  the  circumstances  of  the  cosmos  are  in 
any  respect  ontological  necessities,  but,  both  in  extent  and 
duration  and  character,  it  is  what  the  plan  of  the  creator 
calls  for.  Whether  uniform  or  variable,  stationary  or  pro- 
gressive, depends  on  something  deeper  than  itself.  It  is 
possible  that  the  elementary  forms  of  action  are  fixed ;  and 
it  is  equally  possible  that  these  also  undergo  variation.  The 
necessary  uniformity  of  natural  law  is  a  postulate  for  which 
we  have  not  the  slightest  rational  warrant.  Experience  is 
the  only  source  from  which  we  learn  what  the  laws  of  nat- 
ure are,  and  from  which  we  learn  that  they  are  even  rela- 
tively fixed.  To  what  extent  they  are  relative  to  ourselves, 
our  circumstances,  our  terrestrial  life,  is  beyond  us. 

Of  course  speculators  of  the  dogmatic  type  will  take  um- 
brage at  this  conclusion ;  and  they  will  complain  that  sci- 
ence is  not  provided  with  a  secure  basis,  and  that  honor 
enough  is  not  done  to  the  majestic  conception  of  nature,  the 
mother  of  us  all,  natura  naturans,  ordo  ordinans,  etc.  But 
as  to  science,  we  must  remember  the  relativity  and  incom- 
pleteness of  actual  science.  If  it  will  hold  for  "a  reason- 
able degree  of  extension  to  adjacent  cases,*  it  will  do  all  we 
can  ask  of  it.  As  to  absolute  science,  the  will  and  purpose 
of  the  supreme  reason  will  seem  the  best  foundation  we  can 
get  to  all  but  those  whose  peculiar  type  and  experience  of 
intelligence  make  a  lump  the  only  thing  that  is  sure  and 
steadfast.  And  as  to  that  nature  with  the  big  names,  the 
only  way  of  getting  it  is  to  ignore,  or  be  ignorant  of,  all 
the  results  of  philosophic  criticism,  and  demonstrate  its  ex- 
istence by  giving  us  the  speculator's  word  of  honor. 


part  Iff 
PSYCHOLOGY 


CHAPTER    I 
THE   SOUL 

THUS  far  we  have  dealt  either  with  the  general  meta- 
physical categories  or  with  so-called  material  existence.  In 
Part  II  especially  we  have  treated  of  physical  nature.  We 
have  now  to  consider  the  world  of  mind. 

As  the  metaphysics  of  nature  does  not  involve  a  study  of 
details,  but  only  of  the  fundamental  conceptions  on  which 
the  doctrine  of  nature  rests,  so  the  metaphysics  of  mind 
does  not  concern  itself  with  the  details  of  descriptive  psy- 
chology, but  only  with  the  basal  ideas  on  which  that  psy- 
chology rests.  Until  these  are  mastered,  empirical  psychol- 
ogy is  a  mere  chaos  of  alleged  facts,  partly  true  and  partly 
false.  And  the  facts  themselves,  like  the  facts  of  physical 
nature,  depend  for  their  interpretation  on  some  metaphys- 
ical conception.  Accordingly,  it  is  found  that  the  various 
schools  of  psychology,  like  the  various  schools  of  cosmic 
speculation,  agree  as  to  the  phenomena,  but  differ  in  their 
metaphysics.  Hence,  also,  harmony  and  advance  are  to  be 
secured,  less  by  a  thoughtless  heaping  up  of  observations 
than  by  a  study  of  the  metaphysics  of  psychology.  In 
duction  which  is  guided  by  no  principle  leads  to  nothing, 
whether  in  psychology  or  elsewhere. 

The  central  point  in  popular  psychology  is  the  doctrine 
of  the  soul.  This  necessarily  results  from  the  form  of  our 
mental  life.  In  all  articulate  experience  the  self  appears  as 
the  abiding  subject,  the  same  yesterday  and  to-day.  The 


300  METAPHYSICS 

experience  is  owned  ;  and  the  owning  self  which  thinks  and 
feels  and  wills  we  call  the  soul.  The  soul  is  equally  the 
central  point  in  metaphysical  psychology ;  and  the  concep- 
tion we  form  of  it  has  profound  significance  for  our  doctrine 
of  thought  and  knowledge,  and  thus  finally  for  philosophy 
and  science  themselves.  However  abstract  the  question 
may  be,  it  has  deep  practical  significance. 

In  spontaneous  consciousness  the  mental  subject  is  given 
as  active  and  abiding ;  and  the  race  has  constructed  various 
names  for  it,  as  mind,  soul,  spirit,  and  their  equivalents,  to 
indicate  its  reality.  The  structure  of  all  thought  and  lan- 
guage concerning  the  inner  life  also  implies  it.  This  gen- 
eral conviction  of  the  race  we  believe  to  be  correct.  Never- 
theless it  is  disputed  on  various  grounds ;  and  the  soul  is 
declared  by  many  to  be  only  a  name  for  a  group  of  states 
of  consciousness,  more  or  less  complex,  which  are  produced 
in  some  way  or  other,  but  which  inhere  in  no  substantial 
or  active  subject.  This  view  we  proceed  to  discuss. 

The  question  concerning  the  reality  of  the  soul  is  com- 
monly called  the  question  of  materialism  or  spiritualism ; 
but  these  terms  are  hardly  exact  without  some  further  de- 
termination. The  true  question  is  whether  the  soul  be  a 
proper  agent  acting  out  of  itself,  or  whether  it  is  only  a 
name  for  a  set  of  states  of  consciousness  produced  and 
brought  together  from  without,  by  physical  organization  or 
otherwise.  The  view  which  maintains  the  former  position 
we  call  spiritualism. 

For  the  other  view  there  is  no  single  satisfactory  name. 
Materialism  is  the  term  most  commonly  used,  but  it  is  of- 
ten repudiated  with  warmth,  and  even  with  indignation, 
by  those  to  whom  it  is  applied.  In  the  general  confusion 
which  infests  the  metaphysics  of  physics,  materialism  itself 
has  become  ambiguous.  It  may  imply  the  crude  theory  of 
matter  held  by  uncritical  common-sense,  and  it  may  imply 


THE  SOUL  301 

merely  the  unreality  of  mind.  Clearly  one  might  be  a  ma- 
terialist in  the  latter  sense  without  being  such  in  the  former. 
One  might  repudiate  altogether  the  crude  lump  notion  of 
matter,  regarding  it  as  something  subtle,  mystic,  wonder- 
ful, and  at  the  same  time  he  might  hold  that  the  mind  is 
only  the  unsubstantial  product  of  organization.  This  is  the 
source  of  those  indignant  denials  of  materialism  which  com- 
mon-sense finds  so  bewildering  on  the  part  of  many  specu- 
lators of  the  evolution  type.  Materialism  may  be  defined 
by  its  doctrine  of  matter  or  by  its  doctrine  of  mind.  Com- 
mon-sense defines  it  by  its  doctrine  of  mind ;  and  whenever 
it  finds  any  one  affirming  the  inactivity  and  unsubstantial- 
ity  of  mind,  it  calls  him  a  materialist.  For  common-sense 
every  system  which  reduces  mind  to  a  sum  of  mental  states 
and  then  views  these  states  as  the  result  of  organization  is 
materialistic,  no  matter  what  it  may  call  .itself,  or  what  its 
metaphysics  may  be.  It  may  be  nihilism,  idealism,  panthe- 
ism, or  agnosticism  in  its  doctrine  of  existence,  and  be  ma- 
terialism in  its  doctrine  of  mind.  Historically  these  appar- 
ent contradictions  have  often  been  yoked  together  in  one 
system. 

Materialism 

The  denial  of  the  substantial  reality  of  the  soul  finds  its 
popular  expression  in  traditional  materialism.  On  this  view 
the  soul  is  substantially  nothing.  The  various  states  of  con- 
sciousness exhaust  the  fact,  and  these  are  produced  by  the 
physical  organism.  The  organism  in  turn  is  only  a  special 
material  aggregate.  A  complete  knowledge  of  its  factors 
would  enable  us  to  understand  its  mental  as  well  as  its 
physical  manifestations. 

If  we  should  appeal  to  the  results  of  our  previous  study 
we  might  regard  the  debate  as  already  decided  against  ma- 
terialism. We  have  found  that  matter  is  only  a  substanti- 


302  METAPHYSICS 

ated  phenomenon,  and  can  lay  no  claim  to  a  properly  sub 
stantive  existence.  Only  spirit  fills  out  the  notion  of  being  ; 
and  the  only  being  of  which  we  have  any  proper  experience 
is  ourselves.  But  inasmuch  as  we  have  returned  again  and 
again  to  the  stand-point  of  spontaneous  thought,  we  do  so 
once  more  and  open  the  discussion  on  the  assumed  reality 
of  matter  and  on  the  basis  of  popular  metaphysics.  In  this 
way  we  shall  better  understand  the  superficiality  of  the 
doctrine.  Later  on  we  shall  consider  the  deeper  metaphys- 
ical difficulties  in  the  light  of  a  profounder  metaphysics. 

The  positive  argument  for  materialism  is  undecisive.  It 
consists  entirely  in  appealing  to  the  familiar  fact  that  the 
condition  and  development  of  the  organism  have  important 
bearings  on  the  mental  life.  But  this  fact  would  result  on 
any  theory.  If,  as  every  one  admits,  the  mind  is  now  or- 
ganically conditioned,  it  is  plain  that  the  health  and  per- 
fection of  the  organism  must  have  a  profound  significance 
for  the  conscious  life.  But  there  is  no  need  to  dwell  upon 
truths  so  nearly  self-evident.  It  will  always  be  a  highly  im- 
portant duty  of  the  physician  to  study  the  mental  signif- 
icance of  pathological  physical  states;  but  only  extreme 
superficiality  can  expect  thereby  to  solve  the  problem  of 
the  soul. 

The  chief  source  of  materialism  of  this  type  is  ignorance 
of  both  physical  and  mental  science.  The  physical  and  the 
mental  life  appear  together,  advance  together,  fail  together, 
and  disappear  together.  Viewing  these  facts  superficially, 
we  very  naturally  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  physical 
causes  the  mental.  The  conclusion  is  perfectly  clear  and 
perfectly  cogent. 

But  as  soon  as  we  come  close  to  the  facts  both  the  clear- 
ness and  the  cogency  vanish.  The  first  thing  which  strikes 
us  is  the  complete  unlikeness  of  physical  and  mental  facts. 
Thoughts  and  feelings  have  nothing  in  common  with  mat- 


THE   SOUL  303 

ter  and  motion ;  and  no  amount  of  reflection  will  serve  to 
identify  them,  or  to  deduce  one  from  the  other  as  its  neces- 
sary implication.  But  physical  science  deals  only  with  mat- 
ter and  motion  and  moving  forces,  and  ail  its  explanations 
are  in  terras  of  these  factors.  The  molecule  and  the  mass 
are  only  specific  groupings  of  material  elements ;  and  the 
forces  with  which  physics  deals  are  known  only  as  related 
to  motion.  Hence  a  physical  explanation  of  thought  and 
feeling  must  consist  in  a  representation  of  them  in  terms 
of  material  movements  and  groupings.  Just  as  a  given 
number  of  elements  grouped  in  a  certain  way  is  a  chem- 
ical molecule,  so,  if  thought  is  to  be  physically  explained, 
we  must  be  able  to  say  that  a  certain  number  of  elements 
grouped  or  moving  in  a  certain  way  is  a  thought. 

In  other  words:  all  physical  forces  are  moving  forces, 
and  their  effects  consist  in  modifying  the  groupings  and 
movements  of  the  elements.  The  new  grouping  or  move- 
ment is  the  effect.  If  now  the  production  of  thought  is  to  be 
assimilated  to  causation  in  the  physical  world,  we  must  say 
that  a  certain  grouping  of  chemical  elements  is  a  thought ; 
and  it  might  conceivably  be  brought  under  a  microscope 
and  looked  at.  But  if  thought  is  not  such  a  grouping,  then 
it  demonstrably  lies  outside  of  the  range  of  physical  causa- 
tion as  the  term  is  understood  in  exact  science. 

All  but  the  crudest  materialists  recognize  the  absurdity 
of  calling  thought  a  movement  or  grouping  of  the  physical 
elements,  and  the  impossibility  of  viewing  it  as  a  case  of 
physical  causation,  as  generally  understood.  The  notion 
that  matter  as  commonly  conceived  can  explain  life  and 
mind  they  declare  "absurd,  monstrous,  and  fit  only  for  the 
intellectual  gibbet."  They  propose,  however,  to  escape  the 
absurdity  by  a  new  definition  of  matter.  Matter  conceived 
as  the  movable  explains  only  motion  and  aggregation  ;  but 


304  METAPHYSICS 

is  it  not  possible  that  we  have  held  too  low  a  view  of  mat- 
ter? Indeed,  how  can  we  tell  what  matter  is,  except  by  ob- 
serving what  it  does?  In  its  inorganic  state  it  does,  indeed, 
show  no  signs  of  life  and  mind  ;  but  it  has  other  properties 
also  which  appear  only  under  certain  conditions.  Its  chem- 
ical affinities  are  not  always  manifest;  and  its  building 
energies,  as  in  crystallization,  do  not  always  appear.  Apart 
from  experience,  who  would  have  dreamed  that  a  slender 
wire  could  take  up  human  speech  and  deliver  it  miles  away, 
or  that  water  contains  such  mystic  building  powers  as  it 
shows  on  the  frosted  pane  ?  Again,  all  matter  has  relation 
to  magnetism  and  electricity ;  and  yet  these  qualities  but 
seldom  reveal  themselves.  Why  may  we  not  say  that  men- 
tal properties  also  are  hidden  in  the  mysterious  nature  of 
matter,  and  manifest  themselves  upon  occasion?  They 
would  not,  indeed,  be  deduced  from  the  other  properties  of 
matter;  but  they  would,  nevertheless,  belong  to  the  same 
subject  as  the  physical  qualities.  All  definitions  of  matter 
which  exclude  life  and  mind  are  inadequate,  if  not  untrue, 
we  are  told ;  but  what  warrants  us  in  excluding  them  ? 
"What  matter  as  the  movable  cannot  do,  matter  as  the 
mystic  may  well  accomplish.  Why  not  ? 

This  is  the  higher  materialism.  It  views  materiality  and 
mentality  as  opposite  sides  of  the  same  substance.  It  even 
regards  itself  as  the  higher  unity  which  transcends  and 
reconciles  both  materialism  and  spiritualism.  Vulgar  ma- 
terialism, on  the  other  hand,  it  stigmatizes  as  the  material- 
ism of  the  savage.  Monism  is  the  name  which  this  view 
especially  affects  at  present. 

This  monism  is  the  crude  product  of  crude  reflection,  and 
represents  some  of  the  most  extraordinary  antics  in  the 
history  of  speculation.  Genuine  speculative  principles  are 
latent  in  it,  but,  not  being  mastered,  they  lead  only  to  con- 
fusion. In  this  respect  they  are  like  the  religious  principles 


THE   SOUL  305 

latent  in  fetichisra  or  totemism ;  they  fail  to  lift  the  prod- 
uct into  rationality,  and  leave  it  on  the  plane  of  supersti- 
tion. We  must  seek  to  help  the  doctrine  to  self-conscious- 
ness. 

It  is  difficult  to  give  this  view  a  form  sufficiently  defin- 
ite for  criticism.  Its  root  in  sense  metaphysics  is  manifest. 
Existence  in  space  is  tacitly  assumed  to  be  the  only  real  ex- 
istence, and,  of  course,  all  phenomena  must  find  their  source 
in  it.  "When,  then,  vital  or  mental  manifestations  are  dis- 
covered, there  is  nothing  to  do  but  to  refer  them  to  matter, 
and  to  enlarge  the  notion  of  matter  so  as  to  meet  the  new 
demand.  The  ontology  of  sense  thinking  hardly  admits  of 
any  other  conclusion. 

There  is  no  need  to  criticise  this  ontology,  as  we  have 
long  since  set  it  aside.  But  it  is  worth  while  to  study  the 
curious  logic  of  the  view  in  question.  There  is  an  air  of 
profundity  and  cogency  in  the  reasoning  which  disappears 
on  examination.  Thus,  when  it  is  proposed  to  define  mat- 
ter as  the  mysterious  cause  of  all  phenomena,  both  of  the 
outer  and  of  the  inner  world,  it  is  plain  that  we  get  only  a 
phrase  for  our  pains.  The  cause  being  mysterious,  its  nat- 
ure remains  a  problem.  The  cause  of  mind  is  matter  by 
definition,  but  what  matter?  Matter  as  the  sufficient  ex- 
planation of  physics?  Not  at  all.  Such  a  conception  is 
"absurd,  monstrous,  and  fit  only  for  the  intellectual  gib- 
bet." It  is  that  matter  of  which  we  read,  "If  life  and 
thought  be  the  very  flower  of  both  [matter  and  force],  any 
definition  which  omits  life  and  thought  must  be  inadequate, 
if  not  untrue."  Such  matter  might  well  explain  mind,  being 
already  mind  itself. 

Of  course  this  matter  is  not  the  phenomenal  bodies  about 
us,  as  trees  and  stones  and  clods  in  general.  Such  things 
would  never  be  offered  in  explanation  of  thought,  or  as  hav- 
ing a  thought  side.  The  matter  in  question  is  not  phenom- 
20 


306  METAPHYSICS 

enal,  but  ontological,  the  dynamic  matter  of  scientific  theory 
or  of  physical  metaphysics.  Here,  if  anywhere,  the  sub- 
jective aspect  is  to  be  found. 

But  is  this  matter  one  or  many  ?  The  term  indeed  is  one, 
but  what  of  the  thing?  As  the  materialist  is  very  fond  of 
physical  science,  and  generally  gives  it  to  be  understood 
that  he  has  the  prestige  and  majesty  of  science  on  his  side, 
we  naturally  conclude  that  matter  is  to  be  taken  in  the  sci- 
entific sense.  Matter  then  is  many ;  and  the  reality  is  a 
multitude  of  physical  elements,  each  of  which  is  endowed 
with  sundry  mystic  or  mental  properties  whereby,  upon  oc- 
casion, they  become  the  sufficient  explanation  of  our  mental 
life.  The  real  thing  is  the  elements,  and  their  main  business 
is  to  be  and  carry  on  the  physical  order ;  but  now  and  then, 
especially,  if  not  entirely,  in  connection  with  organized  bod- 
ies, they  do  a  little  in  the  mental  line.  Thus  physics  is  as- 
sured of  its  field  and  essential  priority,  and  psychology  be- 
comes an  unimportant  appendix  of  the  physical  realm,  of 
somewhat  obscure  origin  no  doubt,  yet  certainly  rooted  in 
the  physical  world. 

This  notion  has  a  certain  plausibility  for  superficial  re- 
flection. To  be  sure  it  does  not  really  deduce  the  mental 
from  the  physical,  for  both  aspects  are  posited  as  original 
endowments  of  the  elements,  yet  a  certain  unitty  seems  to 
be  secured  by  calling  them  endowments  of  the  same  thing 
Unless  carefully  managed,  also,  the  doctrine  results  in  turn 
ing  the  elements  into  little  souls,  in  order  to  explain  away 
the  only  souls  of  which  we  know  anything,  namely,  our 
own.  But  this,  too,  is  easily  overlooked.  Finally,  the  doc- 
trine is  the  extreme  of  pluralism,  but  this  is  readily  hidden 
by  calling  it  monism — a  device  so  effective  that  it  is  likely 
long  to  remain  in  fashion. 

But  an  unhappy  dualism  has  emerged  in  the  doctrine  in 
the  attempt  to  fix  the  relation  of  the  physical  and  the  men- 


THE  SOUL  307 

tal  facts.  We  may  call  the  changes  of  position,  grouping, 
and  movement,  which  arise  in  connection  with  thought,  the 
physical  series;  and  the  changes  of  thought  and  feeling 
which  attend  the  physical  changes,  the  mental  series.  Some 
persons  with  a  gift  for  expression  have  called  them  respec- 
tively neurosis  and  psychosis.  How  does  this  doctrine  con- 
ceive their  relation  ?  Several  conceptions  are  possible. 

First,  the  two  series  may  be  conceived  as  mutually  inde- 
pendent. They  both  depend  indeed  upon  a  common  subject, 
but  within  the  unity  of  that  subject  each  series  goes  along 
by  itself.  In  that  case  the  mental  series  would  be  self-con- 
tained and  independent,  so  far  as  the  physical  series  is  con- 
cerned. Nothing  that  happens  in  the  latter  would  be  the 
ground  for  anything  in  the  former;  and  there  would  be  no 
reason  for  affirming  a  real  physical  series.  Psychosis  does 
not  amount  to  much  in  reality,  but  it  is  important  in  the 
theory  of  knowledge;  and  neurosis  must  be  careful  in  deal- 
ing with  it,  or  it  may  cancel  itself. 

But  the  materialist  is  sound  on  neurosis.  The  physical 
series  is  the  independent  and  universal  fact;  and  psychosis 
must  accommodate  itself  thereto.  Out  of  this  necessity 
arises  a  second  view  and  also  a  second  difficulty.  The  phys- 
ical series  is  subject  only  to  the  laws  of  force  and  motion. 
If  now  we  aim  to  make  the  physical  series  self-contained 
and  independent,  we  must  deny  that  physical  energy  ever 
becomes  anything  else.  For  if  physical  energy  is  really 
spent  in  producing  thought  as  thought,  the  continuity  of 
the  physical  series  would  be  broken,  and  energy  would  dis- 
appear from  the  physical  into  the  mental  realm.  In  that 
case,  either  energy  would  be  lost,  or  thoughts  would  be  as 
real  and  as  active  as  things.  The  latter  view  cannot  com- 
mend itself  to  us  as  materialists,  and  hence  we  are  shut  up 
to  the  view  that  the  physical  series  is  self-contained  and 
independent.  It  suffers  no  loss  and  no  irruption.  Both 


308  -METAPHYSICS 

energy  and  continuity  are  absolutely  conserved.  Each  phys- 
ical antecedent  is  entirely  exhausted  in  its  physical  con- 
sequent ;  and  conversely  each  physical  consequent  is  fully 
explained  by  its  physical  antecedent.  In  the  strictest  sense, 
the  physical  series  goes  along  by  itself,  and  subject  only  to 
the  laws  of  force  and  motion.  But  in  such  a  view,  thought 
as  such  cannot  be  an  effect  of  the  physical  series ;  for  under 
the  law  of  conservation  there  can  be  no  effect  which  does 
not  in  turn  become  a  cause.  If  energy  is  expended,  it  pro- 
duces some  other  form  of  energy  either  kinetic  or  potential, 
and  this  new  form  possesses  all  the  causal  efficiency  of  the 
'old.  Hence,  as  the  physical  series  is  assumed  to  be  contin- 
uous, and  thought  is  powerless,  thought  is  shut  out  from  the 
series  of  cause  and  effect.  We  must,  then,  hold  that  phys- 
ical energy  is  never  spent  in  producing  thought  as  thought, 
but  only  in  producing  those  physical  states  which  have 
thoughts  for  their  inner  face.  These  thoughts,  again,  as 
thoughts,  are  powerless.  They  affect  the  physical  series  not 
as  thoughts,  but  as  having  physical  states  for  their  outer 
face.  The  thought -series  as  such  is  not  the  effect  of  the 
physical  series,  but  simply  its  attendant.  When  the  phys- 
ical series  is  of  a  certain  kind  and  intensity,  it  has  a  subjec- 
tive side ;  but  the  reality,  the  energy,  the  ground  of  move- 
ment are  entirely  in  the  physical  series,  and  this  goes  along 
by  itself.  No  study  of  this  series  as  such  would  reveal  the 
thought-series  which  accompanies  it. 

The  view  thus  presented  is  the  current  one  among  mate- 
rialists. From  fixing  their  thoughts  exclusively  on  the  phys- 
ical series,  and  from  their  desire  to  avail  themselves  of  the 
doctrines  of  physics,  they  have  been  led  to  deny  all  energy 
to  thought  as  such,  and  to  affirm  the  continuity  and  inde- 
pendence of  the  physical  series.  Sometimes  they  will  not 
even  allow  thought  to  be  a  phenomenon  of  matter,  but  de- 
grade it  to  an  "epiphenomenon."  This  of  course  saves  the 


THE   SOUL  309 

physical  continuity,  but  at  the  expense  of  another  order  of 
difficulty.  Thought  is  reduced  to  a  powerless  attendant  on 
some  phases  of  the  physical  series,  or  to  a  subjective  aspect 
of  certain  physical  activities.  But  there  is  no  assignable 
ground  for  this  subjective  attendant  in  general,  and  of  course 
there  is  no  ground  why  it  should  attend  as  and  when  it 
does.  If  we  could  look  into  a  brain,  we  should  see  on  this 
theory  a  great  variety  of  molecules  in  various  kinds  of 
movement.  We  might  see  right-  or  left-hand  spiral  move- 
ments, or  circular,  or  elliptical,  or  oscillatory  movements. 
Some  of  these  movements  would  be  attended  by  thoughts 
and  some  not.  But  what  is  the  ground  of  difference  ?  As- 
sume that  an  elliptical  movement  of  definite  velocity  is 
attended  by  thought,  while  an  oscillatory  movement  is  not 
so  attended,  there  is  still  no  reason  why  either  movement 
should  be  attended  by  thought,  and  also  none  why  one 
should  be  thus  attended  rather  than  the  other.  Both  the 
elliptical  and  the  oscillatory  movements  confine  themselves 
strictly  to  being  what  they  are ;  and  neither  by  hypothesis 
loses  anything  which  passes  into  the  thought-realm.  If  we 
might  say  that  an  elliptical  movement  is  a  thought,  we  might 
get  along ;  but  this  view  has  been  turned  over  to  the  savage. 
But  since  the  elliptical  movement  confines  itself  to  moving, 
and  loses  nothing  for  purposes  of  thinking,  the  thought- 
series  appears  as  a  gratuitous  and  magical  addition  to  the 
thing-series.  There  is  no  reason  why  it  should  appear  at 
all,  and  none  why  it  should  appear  where  and  when  it  does. 
The  most  profound  reflection  upon  molecular  groups  and 
movements  reveals  no  reason  why  any  should  be  accom- 
panied by  an  incommensurable  attendant,  thought,  or  why 
one  rather  than  another  should  be  thus  attended.  If  there 
were  a  mental  subject  in  interaction  with  the  physical  series, 
it  is  easy  to  conceive  that  different  states  of  that  series  might 
be  attended  by  different  mental  states ;  but  when  this  is  not 


310  METAPHYSICS 

the  case,  the  connection  is  one  of  pure  magic.  The  epiphe- 
noraena,  being  nothing,  may  need  no  explanation ;  but  if 
they  should  need  an  explanation,  there  is  nothing  in  the 
physical  series  to  account  for  them. 

Magic,  however,  is  an  evil  word,  and  we  must  seek  to  es- 
cape it.  We  recur,  then,  to  the  doctrine  that  matter  has  a 
mental  as  well  as  a  physical  side,  and  that  the  former  is  as 
original  as  the  latter.  But  in  order  to  explain  the  form  and 
peculiar  character  of  any  specific  mental  manifestation,  we 
must  further  allow  that  the  mental  side  is  in  interaction 
with  the  physical  side.  Without  this  admission,  thought 
might  appear  at  one  place  as  well  as  at  another,  and  in  one 
form  as  well  as  in  any  other.  The  opposite  faces  in  no  way 
remove  the  necessity  and  complexity  of  this  interaction. 
Thought  in  general  is  only  a  class-term ;  the  reality  is  al- 
ways specific  thoughts  about  specific  things ;  and  in  order 
that  these  thoughts  shall  appear  as,  and  where,  and  when 
they  do,  it  is  necessary  that  the  inner  series  and  the  outer 
series  shall  be  in  mutual  determination.  But  this  necessi- 
tates the  further  admission  that  the  mental  series  is  as  real 
a  form  of  energy  as  the  physical  series ;  and  this  raises  the 
question  whether  matter  as  moving  or  matter  as  thinking 
and  willing  be  the  ultimate  fact. 

We  are  not  at  present  seeking  to  disprove  materialism, 
but  only  to  understand  it ;  and  the  task  is  no  easy  one. 
Into  this  discussion  of  the  relation  of  the  two  series  an  am- 
biguity and  an  unreal  simplification  have  already  crept.  By 
the  mental  series  we  may  mean  the  thoughts  and  feelings 

•/  o  o 

which  we  call  ours,  or  we  may  mean  the  mystical  endow- 
ments, the  subjective  aspects,  of  the  elements  themselves. 
For  the  sake  of  clearness  these  meanings  must  be  kept  dis- 
tinct. But  this  complicates  the  matter  most  unpleasantly. 
We  have  now  three  factors,  the  physical  order,  the  sub- 
jective aspects  of  the  elements,  and  our  own  thoughts 


THE    SOUL 

and  feelings;  and  we  have  to  determine  their  mutual  rela- 
tions. 

When  the  materialist  is  pressed  with  these  difficulties  he 
is  apt  to  solve  the  problem  by  saying  that  the  mental  series 
is  an  aspect,  or  phenomenon,  or  epiphenomenon  of  the  ph}rs- 
ical  series.  Here  the  mental  series  means  our  thoughts 
and  feelings;  and  phenomenon  is  the  word  which  removes 
all  difficulties.  Unfortunately,  it  is  the  most  treacherous 
ally  the  materialist  can  have ;  for  where  there  is  no  subject 
there  are  no  '"aspects"  and  no  "phenomena."  Suppose  n 
atoms  turn  in  a  left-hand  spiral,  and  love  is  an  aspect  of  this 
fact.  But  for  whom?  For  the  atoms?  If  so,  for  all,  or 
for  each,  or  for  only  one  ?  If  not  for  the  atoms,  for  what 
or  for  whom  ?  For  the  motion  itself  perhaps !  A  phenom- 
enon as  such  cannot  exist  apart  from  consciousness.  Hence 
a  doctrine  which  would  make  thought  phenomenal  tacitly 
assumes  the  very  mental  subject  it  aims  to  deny. 

The  same  is  true  for  a  still  more  thoughtless  doctrine 
sometimes  put  forward,  according  to  which  the  two  series 
are  identical.  They  are  the  same  thing  viewed  in  different 
ways.  So  far  as  this  is  intelligible  it  is  absurd.  The  thing 
series  is  a  set  of  moving  elements ;  the  thought  series  is  a 
group  of  mental  states.  That  one  should  cause  the  other 
is  an  intelligible  proposition,  however  false  ;  that  one  is  the 
other  is  meaningless.  Besides,  the  two  ways  of  looking 
which  make  the  one  double  imply  a  mind  outside  of  the 
machine  to  make  the  notion  possible. 

We  next  need  light  on  two  other  points  of  about  equal 
difficulty,  the  relation  of  the  physical  aspect  to  the  mental 
aspect  of  the  elements  themselves,  and  the  relation  of  that 
mental  aspect  to  our  thoughts  and  feelings. 

The  first  point  remains  in  profound  obscurity.  The  ma- 
terialist seldom  troubles  himself  about  matters  so  occult. 
He  knows  that  the  inner  aspect  is  there,  and  we  know  it 


312  METAPHYSICS 

because  he  tells  us.  It  does  not  seem  to  be  a  source  of  phys- 
ical change,  for  that  is  provided  for  by  the  laws  of  force 
and  motion ;  and  we  could  not  allow  it  to  be  such  a  source 
without  seriously  affronting  the  law  of  physical  continuity. 
And,  on  the  other  hand,  if  we  allow  no  dynamic  relation 
between  the  inner  and  the  outer  we  are  quite  at  a  loss  to 
see,  first,  how  the  inner  gets  any  hint  how  and  when  to 
manifest  itself;  and,  secondly,  how  it  can  manifest  itself  in 
any  case,  seeing  that  the  physical  order  is  closed  against  it. 

The  second  question,  the  relation  of  the  inner  aspect  to 
our  thought,  is  at  once  more  intelligible  and  more  difficult. 
Here  we  come  upon  the  unreal  simplification  mentioned  a 
page  or  so  back.  We  speak  of  the  aspect  as  one,  whereas 
it  is  many.  The  elements  being  many,  so  are  the  aspects. 
Now  what  are  these  aspects  ?  Are  they  thoughts  and  feel- 
ings? If  so  the  elements  are  souls;  and  we  are  in  the 
extraordinary  position  of  starting  out  to  find  a  physical 
explanation  of  our  mental  life,  and  coming  back  with  a  set 
of  hypothetical  souls  with  which  to  explain  away  the  only 
soul  we  know  anything  about.  If  the  aspects  are  not 
thoughts  and  feelings,  what  light  do  they  throw  upon  our 
conscious  life  ?  There  is  no  longer  any  thought  in  the  case, 
but  only  words. 

But  allowing  the  aspects  to  be  true  thoughts  and  feelings, 
what  is  their  relation  to  our  thoughts  and  feelings  ?  Are 
they  a  kind  of  raw  material  out  of  which  our  thoughts  are 
made  ?  Such  a  notion  could  be  entertained  only  by  an  un- 
tutored imagination.  Is  there  any  way  whereby  these  as- 
pects may  leave  their  respective  subjects  and  congregate  in" 
the  void  to  form  a  compound  mental  state  which  passes  for 
me?  Such  a  notion  is  as  bad  as  the  former.  As  well  might 
a  series  of  motions  break  loose  from  moving  things  and 
compound  themselves  in  the  void  to  form  a  new  motion 
which  should  be  the  motion  of  nothing.  These  mental  as- 


THE  SOUL  313 

pects,  supposing  them  to  be  there,  are  absolutely  useless  in 
explaining  our  thoughts  and  feelings.  They  help  the  imag- 
ination by  making  possible  crude  fancies  about  "  mind-stuff." 
They  help  the  uncritical  mind  which  has  not  learned  the 
distinction  between  formal  logical  manipulation  and  real, 
concrete  thinking.  The)'  make  a  show  of  satisfying  the 
demand  for  unity  and  continuity  in  the  system,  but  it  is  a 
false  show.  These  notions  are  barely  intelligible  at  their 
best,  and  when  taken  in  earnest  they  soon  appear  in  their 
utter  worthlessness. 

When  matter  is  many  the  simple  analysis  of  materialism 
reveals  its  hopeless  confusion.  As  long  as  we  treat  the 
problem  in  a  vague  and  superficial  way,  there  is  a  kind  of 
plausibility  to  it,  but  as  soon  as  we  understand  the  problem, 
materialism  is  with  difficult}7  saved  from  perishing  of  its 
own  absurdity  without  any  further  argument.  Like  the 
swine  of  the  parable,  it  seems  possessed  to  rush  down  steep 
places  of  nonsense  into  abysses  of  fatuity.  But  possibly 
we  shall  do  better  if  we  regard  matter  as  one. 

There  is  just  vagueness  enough  in  popular  scientific 
thought  to  make  this  notion  acceptable.  The  frequent 
use  of  such  terms  as  monism,  popular  misunderstandings  of 
the  doctrine  of  energy,  its  conservation  and  transformation, 
and  the  growing  tendency  to  regard  the  elements  them- 
selves as  only  functions  of  an  energy  beyond  them,  lend 
favor  to  the  view.  Let  us  say,  then,  that  matter  is  one ;  is 
materialism  any  more  tenable?  Or,  since  monism  is  the 
name  preferred  by  the  holders  of  the  new  view,  is  monism 
any  more  successful  than  materialism  in  accounting  for  our 
mental  life  ? 


314  METAPHYSICS 


Monism 

In  this  view  we  have  one  substance  or  energy  with  two 
aspects,  an  objective  and  a  subjective  one,  or  a  pln'sical  and 
a  mental  one.  In  Spinoza's  system,  which  was  the  earliest 
specimen  of  monism  of  this  type,  the  one  substance  had  two 
attributes ;  in  modern  systems  it  is  more  common  to  speak 
of  two  aspects,  or  faces,  or  modes  of  manifestation.  Two 
points  must  be  considered,  the  metaphysics  of  the  view  and 
its  bearing  on  the  question  of  the  soul. 

The  first  point  is  very  obscure  in  the  theory.  Are  the 
two  faces  of  the  one  only  aspects,  or  properly  objective 
attributes?  Spinoza  himself  was  not  certain.  Commonly 
they  were  objective  attributes,  but  at  times  even  he  regard- 
ed them  as  points  of  view,  or  ways  of  regarding  the  one 
substance — that  is,  as  phenomena.  The  modern  monist  com- 
monly views  them  as  phenomena. 

Supposing  them  mutually  independent  attributes,  several 
questions  arise.  First,  what  becomes  of  the  unity  of  the 
substance?  Secondly,  how  is  the  parallelism  of  thought 
and  thing  which  knowledge  presupposes  secured  ?  Thirdly, 
seeing  that  knowledge  is  a  mode  of  thinking  and  falls  with- 
in the  thought  attribute,  how  can  we  admit  a  thing  attri- 
bute at  all,  except  as  a  phenomenon  or  mode  of  thought  ? 

But  supposing  the  faces  to  be  only  phenomenal,  then  the 
question  arises,  whence  the  thought  which  is  the  condition 
of  all  phenomena,  and  without  which  there  could  be  no 
faces,  or  aspects,  or  unity  of  any  sort  ?  If  it  is  our  thought 
which  sees  the  one  as  double  and  gives  it  its  attributes,  then 
that  thought  turns  out  to  be  the  precondition  of  the  monis- 
tic system  itself.  If  it  is  not  our  thought,  it  is  nevertheless 
thought ;  and  then  our  system  involves  the  one  substance 
with  the  two  aspects  of  thought  and  extension,  and  back  of 


THE   SOUL  315 

these  another  order  of  thought  as  the  condition  of  the  as- 
pects and  their  bond  of  union.  Without  this  deus  ex  machina 
the  system  is  contradictory ;  and  with  it  the  system  is  ab- 
surd. 

Again,  the  two  attributes,  whatever  they  may  be,  cannot 
be  conceived  as  passive  qualities  like  extension,  but  rather 
as  forms  of  activity.  Thought  exists  only  in  and  through 
thinking,  and  the  physical  world  exists  only  through  the 
constant  forthgoing  of  energy.  In  that  case  we  have  one 
agent  energizing  in  two  entirely  incommensurable  forms, 
and  apparently  in  such  a  way  that  the  left  hand  knoweth 
not  what  the  right  hand  doeth.  Thought  counts  for  noth- 
ing in  the  physical  ongoing;  and  the  physical  ongoing  has 
no  significance  for  thought.  There  is  not  even  a  strained 
relation  between  them ;  and  yet  knowledge  is  made  possi- 
ble by  hypothesis. 

That  the  metaphysics  of  this  monism  is  pretty  crude  is 
evident.  A  monism  of  some  kind  we  must  have,  but  mon- 
isms of  this  sort  are  such  only  in  name.  Active  intelligence 
is  the  supreme  condition  of  any  real  monism  ;  and  when  we 
seek  it  elsewhere  and  look  for  thought  among  the  objects 
of  thought,  we  are  sure  to  fall  into  such  vagaries  and  cru- 
dities as  those  we  have  been  considering. 

But  supposing  the  metaphysics  possible,  does  this  view 
help  us  to  dispense  with  a  real  self  in  understanding  the 
mental  life  ?  That  it  does  not  soon  appears.  Allowing  all 
these  queer  things  about  aspects  and  faces,  our  thought  is 
not  explained.  If  we  conceive  the  inner  aspect  of  the  one 
substance  to  be  other  or  less  than  thought,  no  thought  is 
explained.  If  we  conceive  it  to  be  thought  or  thoughts, 
our  thoughts  are  not  explained.  If  the  one  substance  has 
thoughts  and  feelings  they  belong  to  it  and  not  to  us ;  and 
they  contain  any  account  of  our  thoughts  only  for  those 
unhappy  beings  who  believe  in  mind -stuff,  or  who  fancy 


316  METAPHYSICS 

that  thought  may  be  cut  up  and  parcelled  out,  or  that 
thought  is  a  material  phenomenon  which  might  conceivably 
be  seen,  or  which  can  exist  in  any  other  way  than  in  and 
through  the  act  of  the  thinker.  For  all  others  it  is  plain 
that  this  view  begins,  continues,  and  ends  in  hopeless  super- 
ficiality and  confusion. 

Thus  far  we  have  foeen  mainly  trying  to  understand  the 
metaphysics  of  materialism,  and  we  find  it  shaky  enough. 
Our  only  interest  in  it  is  pathological.  It  is  an  instructive 
illustration  of  the  implicit  working  of  speculative  principles 
in  minds  which  have  not  risen  above  the  sense  plane.  The 
sense  categories  warp  the  higher  principles  to  themselves, 
producing  the  most  fantastic  results ;  and  meanwhile  there 
is  not  sufficient  critical  insight  to  detect  the  illusory  nature 
of  the  performance.  With  our  conviction  of  the  phenomenal- 
ity  of  matter  and  of  all  impersonal  existence,  and  with  the 
further  conviction  that  active  intelligence  is  the  only  reality, 
whether  in  the  inner  or  in  the  outer  world,  materialistic 
metaphysics  from  beginning  to  end  is  simply  illusion  and 
error. 

But  materialism  is  weaker  in  its  psychology  and  episte- 
mology  than  in  its  metaphysics.  To  this  point  a  word  must 
be  devoted. 

Materialism  has  generally  adopted  the  psychology  and 
epistemology  of  empiricism.  To  be  sure,  the  two  doctrines 
are  mutually  destructive,  but  uncritical  eyes  are  easily  hold- 
en.  In  this  view  particular  sensitive  states  are  produced  in 
or  by  the  nerves,  and  out  of  these  the  higher  contents  of 
consciousness  are  built  by  repetition  and  association,  aided 
and  abetted  by  heredity. 

In  opposition  to  this  view  we  recall  the  conclusions  reach- 
ed in  the  Theory  of  Thought  and  Knowledge.  We  saw  that 
thought  is  impossible  except  through  a  unitary,  abiding  and 


THE  SOUL  317 

active  self,  that  this  self  has  never  been  other  than  verbally 
denied,  and  that  when  denied  it  is  always  forthwith  reaf- 
firmed in  some  figure  of  speech,  or  assumed  in  the  language 
employed.  The  very  nature  of  thought  and  language  makes 
it  impossible  to  maintain  the  denial  without  self-contradic- 
tion. Metaphysics  further  has  shown  that  the  bdf  is  the 
only  reality  of  which  we  have  any  knowledge,  and  the  only 
thing  which  fills  out  the  notion  of  reality  in  distinction 
from  phenomena. 

As  to  the  epistemology  of  materialism,  it  can  hardly  be 
said  to  have  any.  It  takes  knowledge  for  granted  and  as  a 
matter  of  course.  That  knowledge  is  a  problem,  and  that 
not  every  speculative  theory  is  compatible  with  knowledge, 
are  facts  undreamed  of.  Nevertheless,  while  materialists 
may  have  no  theory  of  knowledge,  materialism  has  a  bear- 
ing on  knowledge.  Its  logical  outcome  is  to  make  all 
knowledge  impossible.  As  a  system  of  necessity  it  breaks 
down  on  the  problem  of  error,  and  reason  collapses  in  hope- 
less scepticism. 

For  the  practised  reader  this  point  needs  no  further  illus- 
tration, but  for  the  sake  of  the  beginner  we  may  be  par- 
doned for  some  repetition  of  matter  which  ought  to  be 
familiar. 

We  have  previously  pointed  out  that  the  materialistic 
doctrine  of  the  relation  of  the  thought-series  to  the  physical 
series  is  essentially  unclear.  The  materialist  cannot  allow 
the  mental  series  to  be  independent  of  the  physical  series ; 
for  this  would  be  to  abandon  his  monism  and  surrender  his 
own  theory.  No  more  can  he  allow  the  mind  to  be  a  real 
and  active  something;  for  this  also  is  contran7  to  the  hy- 
pothesis. In  some  way  the  mental  series  must  be  made 
to  depend  on  the  physical  series;  and  this  can  be  done 
only  by  teaching  the  materiality  of  thought,  or  by  mak- 
ing thought  a  powerless  attendant  upon  the  physical  series. 


318  METAPHYSICS 

The  latter  course  is  the  one  generally  adopted.  The  phys- 
ical series  is  viewed  as  going  on  by  itself,  and  as  subject 
only  to  the  laws  of  force  and  motion ;  and  the  mental  series 
is  simply  the  subjective  shadow  which  the  physical  series 
casts.  As  such  it  contributes  nothing  and  subtracts  noth- 
ing. A  shadow  effects  nothing;  and,  in  turn,  no  energy  is 
expended  in  making  it.  The  physical  series  is  not  affected 
from  without,  and  nothing  is  drawn  off  from  it  to  make 
thoughts  and  feelings.  Hence,  the  presence  and  movement 
of  the  mental  series  are  determined  by  the  physical  series, 
just  as  the  presence,  form,  and  movement  of  a  shadow  are 
determined  by  the  body  which  casts  it.  The  existence  of 
any  thought  or  feeling  is  due  to  the  general  form  of  nervous 
action.  The  existence  of  this  or  that  particular  thought  or 
feeling  is  due  to  specific  peculiarities  of  nervous  action  with- 
in the  limits  prescribed  by  the  general  form. 

The  powerlessness  of  the  mental  series  has  been  sharply 
stated  by  Professor  Huxley  in  his  lecture  "  On  the  Hypoth- 
esis that  Animals  are  Automata,"  where  he  says  that  he 
knows  of  no  reason  for  believing  that  any  mental  state  can 
affect  any  physical  state,  and  adds,  "  It  follows  that,  to  take 
an  extreme  illustration,  the  feeling  we  call  volition  is  not 
the  cause  of  a  voluntary  act,  but  the  symbol  of  that  state 
of  the  brain  which  is  the  immediate  cause  of  that  act."  The 
general  view  has  been  wrought  out  at  great  length  by  Mr. 
Spencer  in  his  "  Principles  of  Psychology,"  where,  along 
with  many  bewildering  remarks  about  opposite  faces  of  the 
unknowable,  he  represents  the  mental  face  as  completely 
determined  by  the  physical  face,  so  that  memory,  reflec- 
tion, reasoning,  and  consciousness  in  general  are  only  the 
subjective  shadows  of  molecular  changes  in  the  brain,  or  of 
what  he  calls  nascent  motor  excitations.  Mental  movement 
of  every  sort  is  due,  not  to  any  self-determination  of  reason, 
but  to  the  nervous  mechanism ;  and  this,  in  turn,  is  subject 


THE   SOUL  319 

only  to  the  laws  of  molecular  mechanics.  The  coexistence 
of  ideas  means  the  coexistence  of  the  appropriate  nervous 
states.  The  comparison  of  ideas  means  the  interaction 
of  these  states.  A  conclusion,  or  a  choice,  means  that 
one  nervous  set  has  displaced  another  nervous  set.  The 
processes  of  logic  represent  no  fixed  and  necessary  order 
of  reason,  but  only  the  subjective  side  of  a  conflict  among 
nervous  states.  A  conclusion  actually  reached,  or  a  view 
actually  held,  represents  no  fixed  truth,  but  only  the  su- 
perior strength  of  the  corresponding  nervous  combination. 
Truth  in  any  case  is  only  a  nervous  resultant,  and  depends 
upon  the  nerves.  We  now  inquire  into  the  bearing  of 
this  view  on  knowledge. 

We  point  out  in  the  first  place  that  we  reach  the  thing- 
series  only  through  the  thought-series.  We  know  that  there 
are  things  and  what  they  are  only  through  thought.  Hence, 
while  the  thing-series  may  be  first  and  fundamental  in  the 
order  of  fact,  in  the  order  of  knowledge  the  thought-series 
is  first.  A  first  question,  then,  would  be,  What  warrant  is 
there  for  affirming  any  thing-series?  Why  may  not  the 
thing-series  be  after  all  only  a  phase  of  the  thought-series  ? 
From  Hume  to  Spencer,  the  thing-series  has  been  defined 
as  a  series  of  vivid  states  of  consciousness,  while  the  ego  is 
a  series  of  faint  states  of  consciousness.  But,  vivid  or  faint, 
this  definition  makes  both  subject  and  object  states  of  con- 
sciousness; and,  hence,  both  belong  to  the  thought -series. 
The  ego,  as  a  series  of  states  of  consciousness,  can  lead  to 
nothing  beyond  itself;  and  the  object,  as  a  series  of  con- 
scious states,  exists  only  in  thought.  Here  is  the  place 
where  materialism  always  tumbles  into  nihilistic  idealism 
whenever  it  attempts  to  reason  out  a  theory  of  perception. 
It  is  well  known  that  Spencer,  at  this  point,  when  his  theory 
was  about  to  collapse  into  nihilism,  saved  himself  by  rein- 
stating the  ego  as  a  true  agent.  In  his  argument  with  the 


320  METAPHYSICS 

idealist  the  ego  acquires  a  new  character.  It  is  no  longer 
a  series  of  faint  impressions,  or  the  inner  side  of  nerve- 
motions,  but  a  true  source  of  energy ;  and  the  warrant  for 
affirming  a  thing -series,  apart  from  the  thought -series,  is 
found  in  the  fact  that  our  energy  is  resisted  by  an  energy 
not  our  own.  This  is  excellent  doctrine,  but  it  does  not 
agree  with  the  other  doctrine,  that  the  ego  is  only  the  sum 
of  mental  states,  and  that  mental  states  affect  no  physical 
states;  for  it  makes  our  own  consciousness  of  effort  and 
energy  the  turning-point  of  the  entire  debate  between  the 
nihilist  and  the  realist.  It  saves  realism  by  surrendering 
materialism ;  and  nihilism  can  be  escaped  in  no  other  way. 
We  pass  to  another  point.  All  arguments  for  the  suffi- 
ciency of  matter  assume  a  valid  knowledge  of  matter.  That 
X  is  adequate  or  inadequate  is  a  proposition  which  admits 
of  no  discussion.  It  is,  then,  a  matter  of  interest  to  know 
what  warrant  there  is  for  affirming  that  the  thought-series 
rightly  represents  the  thing-series.  The  general  fact  that 
the  latter  determines  the  former  in  no  way  implies  that  the 
latter  must  determine  the  former  so  as  to  correspond  with 
itself.  If  an  organism  be  able  to  generate  thoughts,  it  by 
no  means  follows  that  the  thoughts  must  represent  external 
reality.  The  thoughts  might  be  as  subjective  as  the  fancies 
produced  in  dreams.  One  would  expect  that  the  thoughts 
would  represent,  if  anything,  the  organic  processes  of  which 
they  are  said  to  be  the  inner  face ;  whereas  they  never  refer 
to  these,  and  commonly  refer  to  things  entirely  apart  from 
the  organism.  Nervous  combinations  and  movements  are 
said  to  have  ideas  for  their  mental  face;  and  the  natural 
thought  would  be  that  those  ideas  would  be  ideas  of  their 
peculiar  nervous  correlates.  But  this  is  never  the  case ;  in- 
deed, that  there  are  such  correlates  is  even  now  a  matter 
of  not  very  cogent  inference.  This  complete  silence  of  the 
organism  as  to  what  is  going  on  in  itself,  and  the  report  in- 


THE    SOUL  321 

stead  of  what  is  taking  place  in  the  outer  world,  are  very 
remarkable  facts.  Certainly,  when  matter  is  declared  to  be 
a  double-faced  entity  we  should  expect  to  find  the  mental 
face  reflecting  that  part  of  the  physical  face  which  attends 
it,  or  which  is  next  to  it ;  but  the  mental  face  never  reflects 
the  physical  series  which  produces  it,  but  some  other  and 
unconnected  series.  Thus  a  set  of  rays  of  light  fall  upon 
the  body  and  a  thought  results,  but  not  a  thought  of  the 
nerve -processes,  or  molecular  motions  which  produce  the 
thought,  but  a  thought  of  some  external  luminous  object. 
It  is  strange,  indeed,  that  anything  should  result,  but  that 
the  thought  should  be  a  reproduction  of  the  object  is  sur- 
prising in  a  far  higher  degree.  The  wonder  is  still  greater 
in  our  perception  of  others'  thoughts.  Here  some  waves  of 
air  fall  upon  the  ear,  and  at  once  the  nerves  produce  thoughts 
with  the  added  assurance  that  they  are  the  reproduction  of 
a  thought-series  which  exists  apart  from  our  own. 

We  can  now  understand  the  problem.  If  knowledge  is 
to  be  possible,  the  mental  series  must  rightly  represent  the 
physical  series  and  all  other  mental  series ;  but  what  ground 
is  there  for  affirming  that  they  must  correspond  ?  And  for 
the  materialist  there  is  no  answer  except  in  some  debased 
form  of  the  pre-established  harmony.  He  must  assume  not 
only  that  matter  in  general  is  capable  of  generating  thoughts, 
but  that  it  is  shut  up  by  its  nature  to  the  generation  of 
thoughts  which  correspond  to  the  outward  fact.  He  must 
even  assume  that  bodies  are  so  related  to  the  universe  as 
to  be  under  obligation  to  generate  correct  thoughts  about 
things  in  general.  Leibnitz  found  some  reason  for  the  har- 
mony in  the  fact  of  its  pre-establishment ;  but  the  material- 
ist has  simply  to  assert  it  as  an  opaque  fact, 

Still  the  problem  has  not  been  entirely  unnoticed.  Nota- 
bly Mr.  Spencer  has  sought  to  account  for  the  harmony  in 
question  by  a  theory  framed  from  natural  selection  and 

21 


322  METAPHYSICS 

heredity.  According  to  this  view,  there  is  no  original  need 
that  matter  should  think  rightly ;  but  if  any  organism  should 
think  wrongly,  it  would  soon  collide  with  reality  and  perish. 
Eight  thinking,  therefore,  is  necessary  to  continued  exist- 
ence. Natural  selection  must  tend  to  pick  out  the  sound 
thinkers  from  the  unsound ;  and  by  heredity  their  tenden- 
cies will  be  integrated  and  transmitted.  The  final  result 
will  be  that  thought  will  at  last  be  adjusted  to  things,  yet 
without  any  reference  to  an  opaque  and  uncaused  harmony. 
The  ingenuity  of  this  view  is  wonderful ;  still  more  so  is 
the  uncritical  faith  which  can  receive  it.  For  since  thought 
has  no  effect  on  physical  processes,  it  is  hard  to  see  what 
effect  for  good  or  evil  thought  can  have.  The  survival  of 
the  organism  is  a  purely  physical  matter,  with  which,  by 
hypothesis,  thought  has  nothing  to  do.  There  seems  to  be 
here  a  trace  of  the  antiquated  notion  of  self-control,  accord- 
ing to  which  our  knowledge  determines  our  course.  In  a 
system  of  freedom  the  theory  would  have  application ;  but 
when  thought  is  only  the  powerless  shadow  of  reality,  its 
misadjustment  is  insignificant.  In  this  theory,  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  organism  is  not  due  to  a  maladjustment  of 
thought,  but  to  a  maladjustment  of  the  organism.  The 
organisms  which  perish  are  not  those  which  think  wrongly, 
but  those  which  cannot  maintain  their  equilibrium  with  the 
environment.  But  there  is  nothing  in  this  which  implies 
that  those  organisms  which  are  in  equilibrium  with  the  en- 
vironment must  produce  true  thoughts  of  the  environment. 
The  crystal  maintains  itself  against  its  surroundings  by  vir- 
tue of  its  physical  structure ;  but  it  does  not  follow  that  if 
a  crystal  should  have  thoughts  they  must  reflect  the  sur- 
roundings. But  why  should  the  same  equilibrium  imply 
more  in  the  organism?  "Why  must  organisms  which  can 
physically  maintain  themselves  think  rightly  about  their 
surroundings?  This  they  must  do  if  knowledge  is  to  have 


THE  SOUL  323 

any  validity ;  but  it  is  hard  to  find  any  reason  for  it.  "We 
are  forced  either  to  abandon  knowledge  or  else  to  fall  back 
again  on  a  grotesque  harmony  between  organisms  and  their 
surroundings,  such  that  when  they  take  to  thinking  they 
can  but  reflect  their  environment.  But  this  is  Leibnitz's 
theory  of  pre-established  harmony  in  its  most  debased  form. 
Leibnitz  was  not  content  to  affirm  the  harmony  between 
mind  and  its  objects ;  he  explained  it  by  its  pre-establish- 
ment.  Materialism  degrades  it  to  a  physical  significance 
and  leaves  it  unaccountable. 

Again,  it  is  very  remarkable  that  the  narrow  range  of  the 
Spencerian  principle  should  have  been  overlooked.  If  it 
were  true,  it  would  provide  for  valid  thoughts  only  as  they 
are  related  to  survival ;  whereas  the  bulk  of  our  thoughts 
have  no  bearing  on  survival.  A  mistake  in  our  theory  of 
double  stars  or  in  solar  physics  would  not  be  attended  with 
any  physical  disaster.  The  true  theory  and  the  false  theory 
are  equally  without  significance  for  survival.  And  since 
this  is  the  case  with  the  mass  of  our  alleged  knowledge,  the 
action  of  natural  selection  can  never  come  into  play  to  sep- 
arate the  true  from  the  false.  What  warrant,  then,  have 
we  for  trusting  the  report  of  thought  on  these  things  ?  The 
uninitiated  may  be  tempted  to  think  that  we  reach  these 
things  by  reasoning ;  but  on  this  theory,  reasoning  itself  is 
only  a  function  of  the  nerves.  It  is  but  the  subjective  side 
of  the  nervous  mechanism ;  and  there  is  no  assignable  rea- 
son why  the  nerves  should  reason  more  accurately  than  they 
perceive.  If  reasoning  were  an  independent  mental  activity, 
self-poised  and  self- verif}7  ing,  the  case  would  be  different; 
but  the  mind  is  only  the  sum  of  mental  phenomena;  and 
these  phenomena  are  called  up  and  shifted  by  the  nervous 
mechanism.  Once  more,  then,  what  warrant  is  there  for 
trusting  our  nerves?  That  they  should  produce  thoughts 
about  everything  is  very  remarkable;  but  that  these  thoughts 


324  METAPHYSICS 

should  represent  the  reality  is  in  the  highest  degree  sur- 
prising. The  mental  series,  which  originally  was  the  sub- 
jective face  of  sundry  nervous  movements,  turns  out  to  be 
the  inner  face  of  all  physical  series  or  movements,  with  the 
one  amazing  exception  of  the  physical  series  on  which  it 
depends.  To  retain  our  trust  in  knowledge,  we  must  make 
once  more  the  assumption  of  a  pre-established  harmony  in 
its  worst  form.  Who  would  have  expected  to  find  the 
ghost  of  LeibnitZj  in  a  somewhat  degraded  state,  lurking 
among  the  ponderous  phrases  of  the  Spencerian  philosophy. 
"We  see,  then,  that  natural  selection,  as  a  principle  of 
belief,  does  not  escape  the  admission  of  an  uncaused  har- 
mony between  the  body  and  the  environment.  We  next 
point  out  a  peculiar  difficulty  which  arises  from  this  princi- 
ple, if  we  allow  it  to  be  valid.  It  follows  directly  from  it 
that  no  belief  can  become  wide-spread  which  is  contrary  to 
reality ;  for  maladjusted  beliefs  must  lead  to  collision  with 
the  nature  of  things  and  consequent  destruction.  It  further 
follows  that  every  widespread  and  enduring  belief  must 
correspond  to  the  nature  of  things.  Certainly  those  beliefs 
which  originated  in  the  earliest  times,  and  which  have  main- 
tained themselves  ever  since,  must  be  viewed  as  having  far 
higher  probability  than  the  late  opinions  of  a  sect.  The 
great  catholic  convictions  of  the  race  represent  the  sifting 
action  of  the  universe  from  the  beginning.  The}7  are,  there- 
fore, the  only  ones  which,  on  the  theory,  can  lay  the  slight- 
est claim  to  our  acceptance.  It  is,  then,  in  the  highest  de- 
gree inconsistent  when  the  disciples  of  this  view  reject  a 
belief  because  it  is  old  and  reaches  back  to  the  infancy  of 
the  race ;  for  this  is  the  very  characteristic  of  true  beliefs. 
A  belief  which  has  only  recently  appeared  can  hardly  lay 
any  claim  to  be  considered  at  all.  What,  then,  shall  we  do 
with  such  beliefs  as  the  belief  in  God,  freedom,  the  spiritu- 
ality and  immortality  of  the  soul,  and  the  existence  of  a 


THE   SOUL  325 

moral  government  in  the  universe  ?  Of  course,  as  materi- 
alists, we  cannot  accept  them;  but  how  can  we  as  mate- 
rialists reject  them?  The  same  brain  which  has  ground 
out  the  truths  of  materialism  has  also  ground  out  these 
other  notions.  That  they  are  not  fatally  maladjusted  to 
the  nature  of  things  is  proved  by  their  continued  exist- 
ence ;  and,  by  hypothesis,  they  are  products  of  that  natural 
selection  whose  especial  business  it  is  to  sift  the  true  from 
the  false.  There  is  nothing  to  do  but  to  attempt  a  distinc- 
tion between  maladjusted  thoughts  which  lead  to  destruc- 
tion and  others  which  do  not.  Our  thoughts  of  God  and 
supersensible  things  are  of  the  nature  of  dreams.  They  lie 
outside  of  any  possible  physical  experience,  and  hence  they 
cannot  collide  with  reality  any  more  than  could  a  ghost. 
Unfortunately,  it  is  not  easy  to  draw  this  line  so  as  to  con- 
serve those  physical  truths  which  lie  outside  of  any  possible 
experience,  and  at  the  same  time  put  religious  and  other  ob- 
noxious ideas  to  flight.  It  is  a  very  grave  circumstance 
that  matter  should  be  so  given  to  dream  and  error.  Of 
course,  the  uninitiated  will  think  that  reasoning  will  serve 
our  purpose;  but  reasoning  itself  is  a  part  of  the  nerve- 
process. 

Throughout  the  past,  natural  selection  has  favored  anti- 
materialistic  views;  in  the  future  the  same  process  must 
eliminate  materialism.  It  is  plain  that  those  beliefs  which 
make  most  of  the  person  and  which  give  one  most  energy 
and  hope  must  in  the  long  run  have  an  advantage  over 
others  which  are  relatively  discouraging  and  depressing. 
Hence,  in  the  end,  beliefs  which  tend  to  righteousness  and 
cheerfulness  must  overcome  all  beliefs  which  tend  to  loose- 
ness and  despair.  The  former  will  tend  to  conserve  the 
physical  and  moral  health  both  of  the  person  and  of  society, 
and  the  latter  will  be  in  alliance  with  destruction.  If  it 
be  said  that  we  here  forget  our  previous  assumption  that  a 


326  METAPHYSICS 

mental  state  cannot  affect  a  physical  state,  we  reply  that 
that  assumption  is  not  our  own,  but  the  theorist's.  We  do 
not  assume  any  responsibility  for  any  of  these  views;  we 
inquire  merely  into  their  implications.  And  since  the  the- 
orist has  introduced  natural  selection  as  a  determining  prin- 
ciple of  belief,  we  inquire  whither  it  will  carry  us.  That 
this  principle  does  not  agree  with  the  other  principle,  that 
the  physical  series  goes  along  by  itself,  is  not  our  affair. 
And  even  if  the  uvo  did  agree,  it  would  be  highly  unscien- 
tific to  hold  that  a  change  of  opinion  will  have  no  effect  on 
action.  As  opinion,  of  course  it  would  be  powerless,  but  as 
opinions  are  only  the  subjective  side  of  nervous  states,  it 
follows  that  a  change  of  opinion  points  to  a  change  in  the 
nervous  processes,  and  hence  it  must  lead  to  change  of 
action.  Now,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  belief  in  God,  immor- 
tality, and  moral  government,  has  a  great  value  both  for 
personal  and  social  well-being.  It  is  the  great  source  of  cour- 
age, hope,  cheerfulness,  and  steadfastness  in  righteousness. 
And,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  undoubted  that  materialism, 
atheism,  etc.,  are  relatively  depressing  and  demoralizing. 
The  rapid  spread  of  pessimism  among  the  more  earnest  of 
the  advanced  thinkers  is  sufficient  proof  of  this.  Hence, 
under  the  operation  of  natural  selection,  the  former  set  of 
beliefs  will  have  a  decided  advantage  over  the  latter,  and 
in  the  end  they  must  conquer.  That  matter  can  form  the 
conception  of  freedom,  the  soul,  and  God  we  know  by  the 
fact ;  hence,  they  are  plainly  not  repugnant  to  the  nature 
of  matter.  The  direction  which  its  future  thinking  must 
take  under  the  influence  of  natural  selection  is  plain.  Matter 
must  come  at  last  to  a  firm  faith  in  the  soul,  immortality, 
and  God.  Of  course,  the  eager  objector,  carried  away  by 
his  nerves,  urges  that  believing  them  would  not  make  them 
true,  but  only  cherished  delusions.  It  is  odd  how  hard  it  is 
for  one  to  master  his  own  theory.  By  hypothesis,  matter  is 


THE   SOUL  327 

capable  of  valid  thinking ;  and  why  should  we  not  trust  it 
when  it  thinks  about  God  as  well  as  when  it  thinks  about 
the  world  ?  We  do  not  insist  that  it  is  equally  trustworthy ; 
\ve  only  ask  for  some  standard  whereby  one  set  of  thoughts 
can  be  ruled  out,  while  another  is  retained.  Of  course,  we 
are  beyond  the  point  where  we  fancied  that  reason  itself  is 
such  a  standard ;  for  reasoning  is  a  part  of  the  nerve-proc- 
ess. It  does  not  contain  any  standard  of  truth  in  itself,  but 
comes  and  goes  according  to  the  principles  of  nerve-me- 
chanics. 

As  materialists,  then,  we  are  shut  up  to  the  doctrine  of 
an  opaque  harmony  between  thought  and  thing.  But  while 
this  doctrine  is  necessary  to  save  knowledge  from  one  dan- 
ger, it  exposes  it  to  another  equally  great.  The  theory  calls 
for  the  most  exact  and  consistent  knowledge ;  and  unfortu- 
nately we  have  no  such  knowledge.  How,  then,  are  we  to 
decide  between  opposing  views  ?  The  most  natural  assump- 
tion would  be  that  those  views  are  most  likely  to  be  true 
which  matter  produces  most  freely ;  but,  sadly  enough,  the 
average  brain  is  not  so  made  as  to  grind  out  materialism 
and  atheism.  Matter  in  its  thinking  has  a  strong  tendency 
towards  theism,  morality,  and  the  spiritual  conception  of 
the  soul;  and  it  has  even  devoted  much  attention  in  the 
past  to  theology  and  metaphysics.  Of  course,  these  views 
are  false,  but  how  are  we  to  escape  them  ?  If  the  human 
mind  were  something  which  is  capable  of  free  reflection, 
and  which  develops  variously  according  to  its  circumstances, 
we  might  account  for  much  variation  by  the  mental  environ- 
ment ;  but,  of  course,  this  is  not  the  case.  It  is  indifferent 
to  a  molecule  where  it  is,  and  it  ought  to  be  indifferent  to 
any  complex  of  molecules.  In  particular,  it  is  hard  to  see 
how  the  organism  can  be  affected  by  its  mental  atmosphere. 
Prejudice  and  superstition  might  influence  minds ;  but  they 
do  not  seem  adequate  to  influence  material  movements.  Be- 


328  METAPHYSICS 

sides,  if  they  could,  they  are  themselves  the  outcome  of  ma- 
terial activity.  If  there  be  prejudice,  superstition,  and  stu- 
pidity in  the  \vorld,  matter  is  to  blame  for  it.  It  is  mat- 
ter that  hath  made  both  us  and  our  opinions,  and  not  we 
ourselves.  If,  then,  there  could  be  any  distinction  between 
reason  and  unreason  in  this  system,  we  should  be  forced 
to  allow  that,  along  with  a  little  right  thinking,  matter  has 
done  a  vast  deal  of  wrong  thinking.  It  has  an  inherent 
tendency  to  irrationality  and  falsehood.  It  is  the  sole  source 
of  theologies,  superstitions,  and  anthropomorphisms,  as  well 
as  of  the  sun-clear  truths  of  advanced  science.  If  we  were 
persons  with  faculties  which  could  be  carelessly  used  or 
wilfully  misused,  these  things  might  be  laid  to  the  charge 
of  individual  carelessness  or  stupidity  or  dishonesty  ;  but  as 
we  are  not  such  persons,  all  these  things  must  be  charged 
to  matter  itself.  This  conclusion  remains  if  we  call  matter 
the  unknowable,  the  mysterious  one,  or  anything  else  which 
may  strike  our  fancy.  In  every  system,  of  necessity  we 
have  to  posit  in  being,  along  with  reason,  a  strong  tendency 
to  unreason,  which  throws  discredit  on  all  knowledge.  Ac- 
cording to  the  materialist  himself,  for  one  sound  opinion 
matter  has  produced  a  myriad  unsound  and  grotesque  ones. 
But  even  yet  we  have  no  ground  for  distinguishing  the 
rational  from  the  irrational.  In  the  old  philosophy  the  dis- 
tinction between  a  rational  and  an  irrational  belief  is,  that 
the  former  rests  on  grounds  which  justify  it,  while  the  lat- 
ter is  groundless.  But  materialism  cancels  this  distinction 
entirely,  and  reduces  all  beliefs  to  effects  in  us.  It  recog- 
nizes production  only,  and  allows  of  no  deduction.  All  our 
beliefs  are  explained  by  their  causes,  and  none  have  any 
rational  advantage  over  any  other.  The  only  distinction 
is  of  relative  extent ;  and  the  only  standard  possible,  unless 
we  yield  to  pure  ipsedixitism,  is  to  take  a  vote  and  view 
rational  beliefs  as  those  which  are  most  widespread  and  en- 


THE   SOUL  329 

during.  But  even  this  is  impossible.  In  raising  the  ques- 
tion how  to  decide  between  opposing  beliefs  we  have  im- 
plicitly assumed  that  reasoning  is  possible,  and  that  we  have 
power  over  our  beliefs.  In  discussing  the  problem  of  error 
we  pointed  out  that  rationality  and  the  distinction  between 
truth  and  error  are  possible  only  in  the  fact  of  freedom. 
Where  there  is  no  freedom,  there  is  no  reason.  So  far  from 
having  power  over  our  beliefs,  we  are  our  beliefs,  and  they 
are  determined  solely  by  the  nerves.  If  there  were  any 
reason  left,  the  only  conclusion  it  could  draw  would  be  that 
one  belief  is  as  good  as  another  as  long  as  it  lasts.  The 
actual  is  all,  and  any  rational  distinction  between  true  and 
false  vanishes. 

Thus  we  have  traced  the  materialistic  theory  of  knowl- 
edge to  its  outcome,  and  the  outcome  is  overwhelming  scep- 
ticism. The  theory  can  lay  no  claim  to  be  either  scientific 
or  philosophic,  because  it  makes  both  science  and  philosophy 
impossible.  Looking  at  the  world  with  materialistic  eyes, 
we  see  a  necessary  kaleidoscopic  process.  Parts  of  the  proc- 
ess are  attended  by  thoughts,  partly  true,  but  mostly  false. 
All  of  these  thoughts  which  collide  with  materialism  are 
known  to  be  false,  not  by  reasoning,  but  by  hypothesis. 
Throughout  the  world-process  there  is  a  strong  and  almost 
overwhelming  tendency  to  dream  and  falsehood ;  and,  but 
for  certain  advanced  thoughts,  error  would  have  reigned 
supreme.  We  say  advanced  thoughts,  for,  by  hypothesis, 
thinkers  do  not  exist.  Looking  at  human  life  and  action, 
we  see  pure  automatism.  The  action  of  men  and  women 
may  be  attended  with  thought  and  feeling;  but  from  the 
beginning  it  has  taken  place  without  any  intervention  of 
thought  and  feeling;  for  there  is  no  reason  for  believing 
that  any  mental  state  can  affect  any  pl^sical  state.  Even 
the  materialist's  thought  and  purpose  count  for  nothing  in 
the  exposition  and  publication  of  his  philosophy.  By  his 


330  METAPHYSICS 

own  theory  all  that  has  ever  been  done  in  this  direction  has 
taken  place  without  any  control  or  guidance  of  thought — a 
statement  which  is  the  most  credible  of  the  materialist's 
many  utterances.  Indeed,  this  statement  throws  light  on 
many  of  the  homilies  from  this  quarter.  It  has  long  been 
a  puzzle  to  the  critical  mind  how  any  rational  being  could 
produce  some  things  which  have  appeared  from  materialistic 
speculators.  But  now  we  see  that  reason  had  nothing  to 
do  with  their  production,  and  the  wonder  rather  becomes 
that  the  nerves  should  do  so  well. 

Thus  the  metaphysics,  the  psychology  and  the  episte- 
mology  of  materialism  appear  equally  superficial  or  self- 
destructive.  It  is  properly  a  philosophical  superstition  rath- 
er than  a  philosophical  doctrine,  for  a  certain  measure  of 
rationality  is  necessary  to  constitute  a  doctrine.  All  that  is 
needed  to  dispose  of  it  is  to  understand  it,  and  it  vanishes 
of  itself. 

And  where  in  the  meantime  is  the  soul.  Spatially,  it  is 
nowhere,  having  neither  form  nor  spatial  relations.  Actual- 
ly, however,  it  is  the  self  that  thinks  and  feels  and  wills, 
and  in  this  activity  experiences  and  knows  itself  as  the 
active  and  abiding  subject  of  this  inner  life.  It  is  not  some- 
thing which  can  be  sensuously  presented  ;  it  is  what  we  all 
experience  as  ourselves.  It  is  not  a  sense  object,  it  is  the 
living  subject  in  unchangeable  antithesis  to  all  sense  objects. 
It  is  not  an  object,  it  is  the  subject  which  is  the  condition 
of  all  objects.  Through  oversight  of  this  fact,  the  materi- 
alist always  seeks  to  find  the  subject  among  its  objects, 
where  in  the  nature  of  the  case  it  never  can  be.  He  like- 
wise seeks  to  construe  the  subject  in  the  forms  of  spatial 
objects,  and  this  leads  to  absurdity.  He  looks  for  the  sub- 
ject in  the  wrong  place,  and  failing  to  find  it,  concludes  that 
it  does  not  exist.  But  mind,  as  the  knowing  subject,  can 
never  be  found  among  its  external  objects.  In  this  respect, 


THE   SOUL  331 

it  is  like  vision,  which  gives  us  all  objects,  but  never  gives 
us  itself.  And  the  materialist  who  concludes  to  its  non- 
existence  is  like  a  physiologist  who  should  so  lose  himself 
among  the  objects  of  vision  as  to  forget,  or  even  deny,  that 
there  must  be  an  eye  in  order  to  vision.  The  mind  is  the 
eye,  which  sees,  and,  of  course,  cannot  be  found  among  the 
things  seen.  But  this  the  monist  incessantly  forgets,  and, 
after  he  has  looked  through  the  list  of  objects  which  the 
mind  has  given  him  without  finding  the  knower  among 
them,  he  forthwith  proceeds  to  deny  the  knower.  If,  in 
addition,  he  has  looked  carefully  through  the  brain,  and 
caught  no  glimpse  of  the  mind,  he  becomes  fixed  in  his 
denial.  Thus  the  order  of  fact  is  inverted.  The  real  is 
made  phenomenal,  and  the  phenomenal  is  viewed  as  real. 
Of  all  the  extraordinary  delusions  which  have  ever  possess- 
ed the  human  mind,  this  is  the  most  extraordinary.  Over- 
looking the  necessarily  antithetical  nature  of  subject  and 
object,  the  subject  looks  for  himself  among  the  objects,  and, 
confounded  by  the  failure  to  find  anything,  overlooks  and 
denies  himself  entirely.  The  knowing  self — which  is  the 
primal  reality  in  knowledge,  and  the  only  reality  of  which 
we  have  proper  consciousness — is  denied,  because  it  will  not 
consent  to  become  a  phenomenon,  although,  in  the  nature 
of  the  case,  it  never  can  do  so. 

As  against  materialism,  the  affirmation  of  the  soul  as  the 
active  and  abiding  subject  of  the  mental  life  must  stand. 
The  case  of  spiritualism  versus  materialism  must  be  declared 
closed  and  a  verdict  given  for  the  former.  But  some  more 
subtle  difficulties  arise  from  the  side  of  epistemology  and 
metaphysics ;  and  these  we  have  next  to  consider.  These, 
however,  have  no  tendency  to  establish  materialism,  but 
rather  to  dissolve  the  soul  away  into  a  phenomenal  and 
metaphysical  haze  of  a  pantheistic  type.  This  is  another 


332  METAPHYSICS 

doctrine  altogether  from  the  traditional  materialism  which 
explains  the  mental  life  by  the  combination  and  interac- 
tion of  physical  agents. 

And  first  it  is  said  that  this  doctrine  of  the  soul,  though 
true  for  phenomena,  is  not  true  for  noumena.  The  self  as 
it  appears  is  indeed  the  unitary  subject  of  the  mental  life, 
but  this  fact  allows  no  conclusion  as  to  the  unity  of  the 
noumenal  self. 

A  first  remark  in  reply  would  be  that  if  the  unity  of  the 
self  in  experience  does  not  warrant  us  in  concluding  to  its 
substantial  unity,  still  less  does  it  warrant  us  in  concluding 
to  its  composition.  A  thing  must  always  be  allowed  to  be 
what  it  seems  unless  reasons  can  be  given  for  going  behind 
the  appearance.  But  the  true  answer  to  the  objection  lies 
in  a  fact  dwelt  upon  in  the  Introduction.  We  there  saw 
that  the  question,  What  is  being?  reduces  always  to  this 
other,  How  must  we  think  about  being?  The  self  as  we 
know  it  is  the  only  self  there  is  to  know ;  and  the  only 
question  which  can  arise  concerning  it  is,  How  must  we 
think  of  it?  We  insist  that  in  the  face  of  all  the  facts  we 
must  think  of  it  as  one  and  not  many,  as  simple  and  not 
compound.  Objections  to  this  conclusion  must  take  the 
form  of  showing  that  the  facts  can  be  otherwise  interpret- 
ed in  articulate  thought.  Objections  based  on  the  phenom- 
enality  of  human  thought  rest  at  bottom  on  the  crude  fancy 
that  there  may  be  some  form  of  thought  which  can  grasp 
reality  otherwise  than  by  thinking  of  it,  and  on  the  further 
superstition  of  extra-mental  reality. 

This  style  of  objection  dates  back  to  Kant ;  and  since  his 
time  certain  speculators  have  given  themselves  an  air  of 
great  profundity  by  speaking  of  the  empirical,  or  phenom- 
enal, and  the  noumenal  ego.  In  order  to  carry  through  his 
phenomenalism  of  thought  and  knowledge,  Kant  denied  the 
possibility  of  concluding  from  the  unity  of  the  ego  in  con- 


THE    SOUL  333 

sciousness  to  its  unity  in  being,  alleging  that  if  such  a  con- 
clusion were  allowed,  it  would  overturn  his  entire  criticism. 
But  this  reason  was  purely  personal,  and  has  no  value  in 
logic.  Indeed  Kant's  regard  for  his  system  led  him  to  use 
extremely  feeble  arguments  in  his  criticism  of  rational  psy- 
chology. He  insists  strongly  on  the  unity  of  the  empirical 
ego  and  on  the  "  synthetic  unity  of  apperception  "  as  a  nec- 
essary condition  of  consciousness ;  but  he  disputes  the  spec- 
ulative conclusion  that  the  transcendental  ego  must  be  a 
numerical  unity. 

Unfortunately,  the  nature  of  this  empirical  ego,  and  its 
relation  to  the  transcendental  ego,  are  left  very  unclear.  If 
we  say  that  the  empirical  ego  is  the  form  under  which  the 
noumenal  subject  appears,  the  question  at  once  arises,  To 
whom  does  the  empirical  ego  appear,  and  what  recognizes 
the  appearance  ?  There  can  be  no  appearance  without  some- 
thing which  appears  and  something  to  which  it  appears. 
If  the  ego  is  the  appearance,  what  is  the  ego  which  perceives 
it  ?  If  it  be  said  that  the  empirical  ego  is  but  the  aggregate 
of  conscious  mental  states,  we  must  know  the  subject  of 
these  mental  states.  It  cannot  be  the  empirical  ego,  for 
that  is  the  states  themselves ;  and  it  would  be  quite  absurd 
to  speak  of  an  aggregate  of  states  as  its  own  subject.  If 
we  should  push  these  questions,  it  would  at  last  appear  that 
the  transcendental  ego  is  not  something  lying  beyond  all 
consciousness  and  knowledge,  but  is  simply  that  abiding 
self  revealed  in  consciousness  and  thought  as  one.  Besides, 
the  unity  of  the  ego  is  not  affirmed  because  we  appear  to 
ourselves  as  units,  but  because  we  appear  to  ourselves  at  all. 
The  unity  of  the  true  ego  is  necessary  to  the  existence  of 
any  mental  life. 

But,  says  Kant,  the  unity  and  identity  of  the  subject  does 
not  prove  the  unity  and  identity  of  the  substance.  He  no- 
where attempts  to  show  how  an  aggregate  can  give  rise  to 


334:  METAPHYSICS 

a  unitary  consciousness ;  but  he  uses  an  illustration  to  show 
how  identity  of  the  subject  might  be  combined  with  non- 
identity  of  the  substance.  When  an  elastic  ball  strikes  an- 
other of  equal  mass,  the  motion  of  the  former  is  transferred 
to  the  latter.  He  speaks  of  this  as  one  body  transferring 
its  state  to  another.  In  the  same  way,  he  suggests,  a  men- 
tal substance  might  transfer  its  entire  consciousness  to  an- 
other. The  consciousness  being  thus  passed  along  from 
one  to  another,  the  subject  would  remain  identical,  while 
the  substance  would  be  incessantly  changing.  Kant  was 
doubtless  led  to  this  strange  notion  by  his  anxiety  to  ward 
off  all  attempts  at  ontological  knowledge ;  but  whatever  its 
ground,  and  however  great  Kant's  genius,  this  is  certainly 
a  case  where  good  Homer  nods.  For,  in  the  first  place, 
states  are  incapable  of  transfer  except  in  a  figurative  sense. 
The  moving  ball  does  not  transfer  its  motion,  but  sets  an- 
other ball  in  motion.  Kant  adopts  here  the  crudest  possi- 
ble conception  of  inherence,  and  speaks  as  if  states,  or  at- 
tributes, could  be  loosened  from  their  subject  and  transferred 
bodily  to  something  else.  The  subject  appears  as  the  bearer 
of  properties  instead  of  the  agent  which,  by  its  activity, 
founds  properties.  Hence  the  idea  of  a  bodily  transfer. 
This  notion  we  have  transcended.  The  only  possible  con- 
ception of  his  illustration  would  be  that  one  substance  might 
by  its  action  on  another  cause  that  other  to  assume  a  men- 
tal state  like  its  own,  so  that  it  should  seem  to  itself  to 
have  had  a  past  experience  when  it  had  not  had  it. 

But  this  notion  of  a  transmitted  consciousness  is  a  gra- 
tuitous violation  of  appearances  instead  of  their  explanation. 
Moreover,  it  fails  to  do  what  it  is  invented  for.  For,  in  the 
case  supposed,  there  would  not  be  a  single  and  identical 
mental  life,  but  a  number  of  similar  mental  lives,  each  of 
which  has  its  unitary  subject.  There  would  be  much  that 
is  magical  in  such  a  view;  but  the  point  in  dispute,  the 


THE  SOUL  335 

unity  of  the  being,  is  admitted.  If,  however,  the  mental 
subject,  the  conscious,  active  ego,  is  passed  along,  it  would 
by  hypothesis  be  the  same  mental  subject  after  all.  The 
ego,  the  personality,  would  not  change,  but  only  the  un- 
known and  inactive  substance.  But  this  substance  is  a 
myth.  Here  appears  a  crude  notion  of  substance  in  Kant's 
view.  He  views  it  as  a  mysterious  substratum,  whereas 
substance  and  subject,  or  agent,  are  identical.  We  have 
repudiated  the  substratum-notion  as  the  product  of  sense- 
bondage.  That  which  can  act  and  be  acted  upon  is  the  es- 
sential idea  of  substance.  When,  then,  we  have  found  the 
mental  subject,  we  have  found  the  mental  substance,  for 
subject  and  substance  are  identical.  Kant's  admission  of 
the  necessary  unity  of  the  mental  subject  is  all  we  ask. 
The  mental  subject  is  all  we  recognize.  We  admit  no  sub- 
stance behind  the  subject  and  outside  of  knowledge.  The 
ego  which  thinks,  feels,  and  acts  is  all  there  is  to  know ; 
and  for  us  the  fact  that  the  ego  knows  itself  as  the  subject 
of  its  acts,  and  as  one  in  the  unity  of  its  consciousness, 
together  with  the  further  fact  that  this  unit}7  appears  on 
reflection  as  the  absolute  postulate  of  the  mental  life,  is  the 
highest  possible  proof  of  its  unity  and  reality.  We  must 
repeat  the  conclusion  reached  in  our  ontological  studies, 
that  a  thing  is  to  be  viewed  as  real  and  substantial  not  be- 
cause it  has  a  kernel  of  substance  in  itself,  but  because  it  is 
able  to  assert  itself  in  activity.  Things  do  not  have  being 
or  substance,  but  they  act,  and  by  virtue  of  this  activity 
they  acquire  the  right  to  be  considered  as  existing.  In  like 
manner  the  soul  has  no  being  in  it ;  but  it  knows  itself  as 
active  and  as  acted  upon ;  and  in  this  fact  and  knowledge 
it  has  the  only  possible  mark  of  reality. 

Finally,  we  mention  the  argument  based  upon  Kant's 
phenomenalism.  The  self  as  object  of  knowledge  must 
come  under  the  conditions  of  knowledge ;  and  by  so  doing 


336  METAPHYSICS 

it  must  become  a  phenomenon.  Our  self-knowledge,  there- 
fore, only  reveals  the  phenomenal  self,  or  the  self  as  we  ap- 
pear to  ourselves,  and  never  the  noumenal  subject,  or  the 
self  as  it  really  is.  Whether  any  one  was  ever  convinced  by 
this  argument  may  be  doubted ;  at  any  rate,  no  one  ought 
to  have  been  convinced  by  it.  As  to  the  possibility  of  self- 
knowledge,  experience  only  can  decide.  We  have  no  knowl- 
edge of  any  sort  which  can  deal  with  this  problem  apart 
from  experience.  The  application  of  the  categories  to  the 
knowledge  of  self  does  not  make  it  fictitious.  In  treating 
of  scepticism  we  have  seen  that  a  thorough-going  doctrine 
of  relativity  cancels  noumena  altogether.  They  must  either 
consent  to  be  known,  or  go  out  of  existence.  There  is  a 
real  as  well  as  a  formal  application  of  the  categories.  In 
the  case  of  physical  phenomena  the  application  is  formal ; 
in  the  case  of  the  soul  it  is  real.  The  soul  itself  as  object 
of  knowledge  does  come  under  the  categories ;  but  it  does 
not  come  under  them  as  abstract  principles  imposed  from 
without,  but  as  the  living  principles  of  intelligence  itself, 
revealed  and  understood  in  experience.  Without  this  ad- 
mission, the  transcendental  ego  vanishes  from  thought  alto- 
gether ;  and  with  it  we  have  valid  knowledge. 

But  now  we  come  upon  some  more  subtle  speculative 
suggestions  which  constitute  real  difficulties  in  the  doctrine 
of  the  soul.  These  have  nothing  in  common  with  the  crude 
fancies  of  materialism,  but  come  from  the  depths  of  meta- 
physics. 

And  first,  it  may  be  asked,  what  have  we  won  in  calling 
the  soul  real  and  abiding  ?  Is  not  the  experienced  life,  the 
stream  of  thought  and  feeling,  the  main  thing  after  all ;  and 
is  not  this  just  as  good  without  metaphysics  as  with  it? 

The  underlying  question  here  concerns  the  application  of 
the  categories  of  being  and  identity  to  the  soul;  and  the 


THE   SOUL  337 

suggestion  is  that  in  any  case  they  are  barren,  and  that  the 
stream  of  thought  itself  is  all  we  can  find,  and  all  we  need 
to  find.  We  consider  the  two  categories  in  order. 

In  reflecting  on  this  subject  with  any  precision  one  begins 
to  realize  how  imperfect  language  is  as  an  instrument  of 
expression,  when  abstract  matters  are  under  discussion. 
And  we  need  to  bear  in  mind  not  only  what  we  may  mean 
by  our  terms,  but  also  what  others  will  understand  them  to 
mean,  !N"ow  in  calling  a  thing  real,  common-sense  means 
to  affirm  that  the  thing  is  not  an  illusion,  a  fiction,  a  phan- 
tom of  an  ignorant  or  disordered  intelligence,  but  is  some- 
thing which  acts  or  is  acted  upon,  and  thus  appears  as  a 
veritable  factor  in  the  actual  ongoing  of  the  world.  And 
from  this  point  of  view,  what  we  mean  by  calling  the  soul 
real  is  just  what  we  mean  by  calling  anything  real,  namely, 
that  it  acts  and  is  acted  upon,  and  that  it  is  a  determining 
factor  in  the  world  of  change  and  effects.  And  what  we 
gain  by  calling  the  soul  real  in  this  sense  is  double.  First, 
negatively,  we  rescue  the  soul  from  the  position  of  a  fiction 
or  hallucination.  Second,  positively,  we  satisfy  the  rational 
demand  for  a  sufficient  reason  for  the  mental  life,  we  supply 
the  unity  without  which  the  thought  life  falls  asunder,  and 
we  secure  some  ground  for  the  conviction  of  responsibility 
on  which  society  is  based.  To  call  the  soul  unreal  involves 
failure  in  all  these  respects,  and  carries  both  theoretical  and 
practical  demoralization  with  it.  This  from  the  stand-point 
of  popular  speech. 

It  is  also  to  be  noted  that  whatever  difficulty  there  may 
be  in  the  notion  of  reality  it  emerges  at  least  no  less  when 
applied  to  matter  than  when  applied  to  mind.  Indeed  we 
have  abundantly  seen  that  the  category  of  causal  reality 
cannot  be  applied  to  matter  without  contradiction.  The 
notion  breaks  up  and  vanishes  under  criticism ;  and  the  soul 
is  the  only  thing  which  fills  out  the  notion  of  reality.  Hence 


338  METAPHYSICS 

no  one  who  admits  the  reality  of  matter  ought  to  have  the 
least  difficulty  in  admitting  the  reality  of  the  soul;  for  the 
evidence  in  favor  of  the  reality  of  the  soul  is  indefinitely 
stronger  than  that  for  the  reality  of  matter.  And  it  fills 
one,  first  with  astonishment  and  then  with  compassion,  to 
find  persons  objecting  to  the  reality  of  the  soul  as  a  useless 
or  groundless  metaphysical  doctrine,  while  admitting  all 
sorts  of  physical  metaphysics  as  undeniable  first  principles. 
What  wonder  that  with  such  blind  leaders  of  the  blind  we 
fall  into  the  ditch  of  " mind-stuff"  and  similar  infantilities. 

If,  then,  wTe  question  the  reality  of  the  soul,  we  ought  to 
have  it  clearly  understood  that  we  do  not  mean  thereby 
that  it  is  a  fiction,  or  that  it  cannot  act  or  be  acted  upon, 
or  that  it  is  relatively  unreal  in  comparison  with  matter, 
but  only  that  it  is  unreal  in  comparison  with  some  absolute 
reality.  This  only,  we  may  say,  truly  is.  All  other  things 
are  comprehended  in  an  order  of  becoming,  and  hence  are 
relatively  shadows  and  vanishing.  But  such  doctrine  moves 
over  the  head  of  common-sense  altogether;  and  criticism 
must  never  fail  to  remind  us  that,  however  true  it  may  be, 
it  does  not  remove  the  fact  that  we  still  are  real  in  the 
sense  that  we  can  act  and  be  acted  upon,  and  may  be  held 
responsible  for  our  actions. 

But  it  is  probable  that  the  objections  to  regarding  the 
soul  as  real,  so  far  as  they  do  not  spring  from  crude  mate- 
rialism, are  not  due  to  these  high  considerations  regarding 
the  relation  of  the  finite  to  the  infinite,  but  rather  to  a  kind 
of  lumpish  notion  of  reality  itself.  There  seems  to  be  a 
fancy  that  an  agent  is  constituted  real  by  the  category,  and 
that  this  category  might  conceivably  be  discovered  in  the 
agent,  if  the  light  were  strong  enough.  A  little  reflection 
shows  the  artificial  and  mechanical  nature  of  such  a  notion ; 
and  reality  is  ruled  out  as  a  useless  fiction.  How  complete- 
ly this  inverts  the  true  order  is  plain  to  us.  The  soul  is  not 


THE  SOUL  339 

constituted  real  by  a  category  located  within ;  but  it  acts 
and  thus  acquires  the  only  possible  claim  to  be  considered 
real.  The  reality  of  the  soul  consists  in  its  ability  to  act ; 
other  reality  it  has  none.  How  the  soul  can  act  there  is  no 
telling.  In  thinking  of  the  soul  we  must  not  look  for  a 
lump,  nor  for  a  category,  nor  for  a  picture,  but  for  the 
agent  which  thinks  and  feels  and  wills,  and  knows  itself  in 
so  doing.  And  this  soul  is  neither  in  the  heights  nor  in  the 
depths;  it  is  very  nigh  indeed,  for  it  is  simply  the  living 
self. 

Much  the  same  line  of  thought  must  be  repeated  concern- 
ing the  soul's  identity.  For  common-sense,  identity,  as  ap- 
plied to  things,  means  simply  numerical  identity,  or  that 
the  present  being  is  continuous  with  the  past  being.  The 
being  A  has  not  disappeared  and  another,  B,  numerically 
distinct  from  A,  has  not  taken  its  place.  Such  a  solution  of 
identity  would  make  thought  impossible.  The  soul,  then,  is 
real  and  abiding  or  identical. 

But  in  discussing  the  problem  of  change  we  found  un- 
suspected obscurities  and  perplexities  in  this  notion  of  iden- 
tity. We  seemed  compelled  to  admit  some  species  of  con- 
tinuity in  the  successive  stages  of  things,  but  identity  seemed 
provided  for  onty  in  consciousness.  Recalling  this  result 
we  might  argue  as  follows : 

After  all,  the  identity  must  lie  in  consciousness  or  the 
stream  of  thought  itself ;  for  if  we  conceive  this  lacking,  the 
remaining  identity  is  a  barren  if  not  a  meaningless  thing. 
Consciousness  not  merely  reveals,  but  makes,  the  only  iden- 
tity worth  talking  about.  Further,  there  is  no  way  of  see- 
ing how  the  soul  as  bare  substance  could  ever  provide  for 
the  identity  of  consciousness.  And  now  that  we  have  done 
away  with  the  soul  as  lump  or  inert  substance,  what  remains 
but  to  say  that  the  stream  of  thought  is  all  ? 

There  is  something  to  this,  but  we  are  not  completely  car- 


34:0  METAPHYSICS 

ried  along.  The  argument  seems  to  rest  on  an  improper 
logical  disjunction.  In  any  logical  judgment  the  subject  is 
not  the  subject  except  as  modified  by  the  predicate.  If  I 
say  the  rose  is  red,  it  is  not  every  rose  which  can  be  the  sub- 
ject but  only  the  red  rose ;  and  in  any  particular  case  only 
the  particular  red  rose  in  question.  So  the  subject  of  con- 
sciousness is  not  the  soul,  considered  as  blank  substance  or 
blank  subject,  but  the  conscious  soul ;  and  the  thing  which 
is  identical  is  neither  consciousness  in  abstraction  from  the 
soul,  nor  the  soul  in  abstraction  from  consciousness,  but  the 
conscious  soul.  The  thought  has  this  dual  aspect  and  can- 
not be  completed  without  embracing  both.  Abstract  sub- 
jects and  abstract  predicates  are  logical  fictions,  and  we 
must  not  allow  ourselves  to  be  deceived  by  them. 

If,  however,  we  are  not  satisfied  with  this,  and  still  in- 
sist on  finding  the  identity  in  consciousness  alone,  we  reach 
the  same  result  in  another  way.  For  consciousness  as  a 
succession  of  particular  states  is  not  identical  or  even  pos- 
sible. The  successive  states  are  all  perishing  existences  and 
are  all  mutually  other  and  external.  That  stream  of  thought 
is  in  the  same  case.  It  is  a  stream  only  for  that  which  is 
not  a  stream.  Hence  the  consciousness  in  which  identity 
resides  is  not  the  particular  states  nor  the  flowing  stream, 
but  something  continuous  and  active.  It  must  comprise  the 
states  in  its  own  unity ;  it  must  distinguish  itself  from  them 
as  their  abiding  subject,  and  must  work  them  over  into  the 
forms  of  intelligence.  Thus  it  becomes  only  another  name 
for  the  soul  itself. 

And  here,  as  in  the  case  of  reality,  the  objector  is  tacitly 
under  the  influence  of  a  crude  notion  of  identity.  He  sup- 
poses that  there  is  a  category  of  identity  whereby  the  soul 
is  enabled  to  be  or  become  identical.  But  this  also  inverts 
the  true  order.  We  have  seen  that  intelligence  cannot  be 
understood  through  the  categories,  but  that  the  categories 


THE  SOUL  341 

must  be  understood  through  intelligence.  Active  intelli- 
gence is  the  only  illustration  of  the  concrete  meaning  of  the 
metaphysical  categories.  Hence  if  we  would  know  what 
concrete  identity  is  we  must  not  look  about  for  an  abstract 
category  to  tell  us,  but  must  rather  consider  the  self-identi- 
fying action  of  intelligence.  There  is  no  other  real  identity; 
and  indeed,  closely  considered,  real  identity  has  no  other 
meaning  than  that  which  emerges  in  the  self-identification 
of  intelligence. 

But  what  of  the  soul  when  it  is  unconscious?  Is  it  not 
the  same  soul  after  a  season  of  unconsciousness  tha.t  it  was 
before ;  and  is  there  not  therefore  some  identity  of  being 
which  is  quite  independent  of  self-identification  in  conscious- 
ness? 

Before  it  was  the  metaphysical  doubter  who  spoke ;  now 
it  is  the  metaphysical  realist.  The  former  sought  to  find 
the  identity  in  the  flowing  consciousness;  the  latter  seeks 
it  in  some  back -lying  substance.  If  sameness  can  endure 
across  unconsciousness,  then  consciousness  does  not  consti- 
tute sameness.  If  unconsciousness  continued,  and  conscious- 
ness never  returned,  we  might,  indeed,  be  at  a  loss  to  tell 
what  the  sameness  would  amount  to,  or  in  what  it  would 
consist ;  but  since  the  same  being  has  pauses  of  conscious- 
ness in  the  identity  of  his  existence,  we  clearly  see  that 
consciousness  is  not  the  seat  of  identity. 

This  question  takes  us  into  the  depths,  and  a  completely 
satisfactory  answer  is  hard  to  find.  The  matter  is  compli- 
cated with  the  dependence  of  the  finite  and  the  relativity  of 
time  also ;  and  the  answer  must  be  given  in  sections. 

We  may  first  point  out  that  this  question  assumes  that 
things  exist  in  a  real  time,  which  is  not  the  case.  There  is 
no  time  in  which  things  exist ;  neither  is  there  any  absolute 
time  to  which  all  existence  is  to  be  referred.  Time  is  rela- 
tive to  self-consciousness,  and  not  conversely.  The  fact  al- 


342  METAPHYSICS 

leged  means  simply  a  fault  in  the  self-consciousness  of  one 
being  judged  by  the  self-consciousness  of  another  being,  or 
by  conceived  possibilities  of  consciousness.  We  might,  then, 
offer  this  relativity  of  time  as  vacating  the  inference  from 
the  alleged  fact. 

But  this  is  a  dark  saying  for  all  but  the  very  elect,  and 
only  fe\v  can  hear  it.  Let  us  fall  back,  then,  on  our  distinc- 
tion between  continuity  and  identity,  and  say  that  continuity 
of  being  might  conceivably  abide  across  periods  of  uncon- 
sciousness, but  that  only  consciousness  can  raise  continuity 
to  identity.  This  continuity  is  what  common-sense  means 
by  identity,  and  it  cannot  be  denied  without  dissolving  the 
mental  life  away  into  a  magical  phantasmagoria. 

So  much  may  be  affirmed  with  all  conviction,  but  if  we 
ask  in  what  this  continuity  consists  we  begin  again  to  grope. 
Many  will  find  no  difficulty.  The  same  thing  just  exists, 
and  no  more  need  be  said  about  it.  But  for  us  who  have 
done  away  with  rigid  lumps  and  changeless  cores  and  ab- 
stract identities,  this  nai've  solution  is  impossible ;  and  there 
seems  to  be  no  way  out  except  to  fall  back  upon  some  no- 
tions which  began  to  dawn  upon  us  when  treating  of  in- 
teraction and  the  relation  of  the  finite  to  the  infinite.  We 
there  saw  that  no  finite  thing  has  its  existence  in  itself. 
A  finite  thing  has  its  existence  only  in  dependence  on  the 
infinite,  and  in  relation  to  other  members  of  the  system. 
It  is  then  a  dependent  and  relative,  and,  so  to  speak,  only  a 
partial  existence.  The  full  and  complete  notion  of  exist- 
ence is  realized  only  in  the  absolute  and  infinite  intelligence. 
All  other  existence  is  partial  and  incomplete. 

When  we  are  dealing  with  the  world  of  things  we  dis- 
cover that  they  have  existence  only  for  others.  To  some 
extent  they  exist  for  us ;  but  they  have  their  essential  ex- 
istence for  God.  And  for  him  their  existence  consists  in 
the  idea  they  express  and  in  the  activity  in  which  the  idea 


THE  SOUL  343 

finds  expression.  The  identity  of  the  idea  is  the  identity 
of  the  thing ;  and  the  continuity  of  the  activity  of  expres- 
sion is  the  continuity  of  the  thing.  As  having  existence  for 
others,  they  are  real  in  one  way.  As  having  no  existence 
for  themselves,  they  are  unreal  in  one  way ;  that  is,  they 
have  only  phenomenal  existence. 

Something  of  this  double  aspect  appears  in  our  own  ex- 
istence. "We  have  to  distinguish  our  existence  for  ourselves 
from  our  existence  for  others.  The  soul  has  its  existence 
primarily  in  the  divine  thought  and  act,  and  it  may  remain 
on  the  plane  of  existence  for  others  without  at  once  attain- 
ing to,  or  always  possessing,  existence  for  itself.  Apart 
from  the  latter  the  soul  has  its  existence  and  continuity 
solely  in  the  divine  thought  and  will.  However  mysterious 
this  result  may  be,  it  seems  to  be  the  conclusion  to  which 
we  are  shut  up.  How  that  which  begins  without  selfhood 
and  in  absolute  dependence  can  yet  attain  to  selfhood  and 
a  measure  of  independence  is  the  mystery  of  finite  existence. 

If  it  be  said  that  on  this  view  the  true  existence  of  the 
soul,  its  existence  for  self,  is  a  discontinuous  thing,  and  hence 
without  any  but  a  magical  identity,  the  answer  is  found  in 
what  we  have  already  said.  The  objection  assumes,  first,  a 
real  time,  and,  secondly,  that  we  have  some  real  notion  of 
identity  other  than  what  we  experience.  Both  assumptions 
are  false.  There  is  no  real  time  in  which  the  unpicturable 
pauses  of  finite  existence  occur,  and  we  have  no  proper  no- 
tion of  concrete  identity  by  which  to  determine  whether 
experienced  identity  be  genuine  or  not.  We  form  the  no- 
tion of  abstract  metaphysical  identity  by  conceiving  con- 
tinuous existence  through  real  time;  and  any  solution  of 
continuity  is  held  to  destroy  identity.  But  this  notion  has 
no  application  when  time  is  made  phenomenal.  Then  ex- 
perienced identity  is  the  only  identity,  and  of  course  the 
only  test  of  identity.  The  self -identification  of  the  soul, 


344  METAPHYSICS 

then,  is  the  best  proof  of  identity,  for  identity  has  no  other 
meaning.  Whatever  may  lie  beyond  this  must  be  sought 
not  in  the  realm  of  metaphysical  abstractions,  but  in  the 
thought  and  self-consciousness  of  the  infinite. 

After  these  long  wanderings  through  the  dry  places  of 
metaphysics,  it  may  be  well  to  rest  ourselves  by  taking  an 
account  of  stock,  so  as  to  see  where  we  stand,  or  where  we 
think  we  stand.  "We  do  so  in  the  form  of  question  and  answer. 

1.  Can  the  mental  life  be  deduced  from  physical  organ- 
ization ? 

No.  All  that  takes  place  in  the  organism  can  be  reduced 
to  some  form  of  movement  and  grouping  of  the  physical 
elements;  and  no  reflection  on  such  movement  and  group- 
ing will  ever  reveal  thought  and  feeling  as  an  analytical 
consequence.  Moreover,  all  physical  causation  consists  in 
producing  new  movements  and  groupings  of  the  elements. 
Antecedent  movements  and  groups  are  the  cause;  conse- 
quent movements  and  groups  are  the  effect.  Hence  thought, 
which  is  not  a  physical  movement  or  grouping,  lies  outside 
of  physical  causation. 

2.  Can  the  mental  life  be  understood  without  admitting 
a  real  something,  the  self  or  soul,  which  cannot  be  identified 
with  the  physical  elements,  and  which  is  the  abiding  sub- 
ject of  thought  and  feeling  ? 

Again,  no.  Capital  facts  and  the  most  cogent  kind  of 
reasoning  unite  in  enforcing  this  answer.  However  myste- 
rious and  inscrutable  the  physical  elements  may  be,  the 
mental  life  cannot  be  viewed  as  a  resultant  of  their  inter- 
action. It  is,  rather,  demonstrably  impossible  without  the 
one  and  abiding  self. 

3.  May  not  this  self  be  dispensed  with  if  we  suppose  mat- 
ter to  be  one  and  duly  furnish  it  with  mysterious  subjective 
faces  or  aspects? 


THE  SOUL 

Once  more,  no.  The  nature  of  thought  and  consciousness 
necessitates  the  admission  of  the  one  abiding  self  as  their 
indispensable  condition. 

4.  Can  the  mental  facts  be  described  in  terms  of  their 
physical  attendants  or  conditions  ? 

Still  the  answer  is,  no.  The  antecedents  are  some  form 
of  molecular  grouping  and  movement ;  the  consequent  is  a 
thought  or  feeling.  The  latter  may  be  summoned  or  ex- 
cited by  the  former,  but  it  can  in  no  way  be  expressed  or 
understood  in  terms  of  the  former.  The  incommensurability 
is  absolute.  We  trace  the  physical  series  a  certain  way, 
and  then  we  reach  a  fact  of  another  order,  a  sensation  or 
perception.  Facts  of  the  latter  kind  are  known  only  in  and 
through  consciousness,  and  never  through  reflection  on  their 
antecedents.  The  two  orders  are  as  incommensurable  as 
the  letters  of  a  printed  page  are  with  the  meaning  they 
convey. 

Hence  physiological  psychology  presupposes  the  psychol- 
ogy of  introspection.  If  our  aim  is  to  explain  the  mental 
facts  of  course  we  must  first  know  the  facts.  Or  if  the  aim 
is  to  find  the  physical  attendants  or  conditions  of  the  men- 
tal facts,  again  we  must  know  the  facts.  Without  this 
knowledge  we  have  no  problem ;  and  without  introspection 
we  have  not  this  knowledge.  Introspection,  then,  must 
observe  the  facts  and  classify  and  formulate  them  before 
physiological  psychology  can  begin. 

5.  Is  the  mental  life  dependent  on  the  organism  ? 

This  question  is  unclear.  Dependence  may  be  understood 
in  the  sense  of  causal  production  by  the  organism  or  it  may 
mean  an  order  of  concomitant  variation  in  the  physical  and 
the  mental  series.  In  the  former  sense  the  mental  life  is 
not  dependent  on  the  organism.  In  the  latter  sense  there 
is  mutual  dependence  of  each  on  the  other.  There  are  men- 
tal states  arising  in  connection  with  organic  states;  and 


346  METAPHYSICS 

there  are  organic  states  arising  in  connection  with  mental 
states.  In  this  sense  the  causality  works  both  ways. 

But  the  question  is  further  unclear.  It  may  mean,  Could 
a  mental  life  go  on  apart  from  any  organism  ?  Could  our 
mental  life  go  on  apart  from  any  organism?  Could  it  go 
on  apart  from  the  present  organism  ? 

To  question  one,  the  answer  must  be  that  an  absolute 
mental  life  would  need  no  organism.  To  question  two,  the 
answer  is  that  the  finite  spirit,  in  so  far  as  it  is  in  interac- 
tion with  other  spirits  and  with  the  cosmic  system,  must 
always  need  some  fixed  system  for  receiving  and  giving  im- 
pulses ;  otherwise  it  would  not  be  in  the  world  at  all.  If 
this  means  organism  then  organism  is  necessary.  To  ques- 
tion three  the  answer  is  that  it  is  easily  conceivable  that 
our  mental  life  should  go  on  under  other  organic  conditions. 
The  actual  organism  is  only  a  stimulus  to  mental  unfolding 
and  a  servant  of  the  unfolded  life ;  and  there  is  no  difficul- 
ty in  the  thought  that  this  service  should  be  performed  in 
other  and  better  ways.  At  present,  however,  the  organism 
is  mentally  conditioned  and  the  mind  is  organically  con- 
ditioned, in  the  sense  of  mutual  concomitance  in  their  re- 
spective changes. 

6.  Can  we  learn  anything  of  these  conditions  ? 

Without  doubt.  In  a  general  way  we  already  know 
much,  and  it  is  conceivable  that  we  should  know  much 
more.  The  interdependence  of  mind  and  body  might  be 
specified  into  minute  details.  We  know  that  we  see  with 
the  eye  and  not  with  the  ear,  while  we  hear  with  the  ear 
and  not  with  the  fingers.  It  is  conceivable  that,  in  like 
manner,  other  mental  functions  should  find  their  physical 
attendants  located  in  some  specific  part  of  the  brain,  and 
not  in  the  brain  as  a  whole.  Such  a  fact,  if  established, 
would  contain  no  ground  for  alarm  or  even  surprise.  On 
the  other  hand,  it  is  conceivable  that  growing  knowledge 


THE   SOUL 

should  extend  the  significance  of  the  mind  for  the  or- 
ganism far  beyond  what  is  at  present  surmised.  In  a  gen- 
eral way,  physicians  have  long  recognized  the  importance 
of  mental  health  for  physical  health ;  and  that  a  merry 
heart  doeth  good  like  a  medicine  is  a  truth  of  ancient  recog- 
nition. 

Here  then  is  a  large  and  important  field  of  study,  to  find 
and  fix  the  facts  of  the  mutual  dependence  of  mind  and 
body.  This  field  belongs  to  the  physician  and  the  physio- 
logical psychologist.  The  only  caveat  the  critic  cares  to 
issue  is  to  beware  not  to  take  the  order  of  concomitant  va- 
riation for  one  of  materialistic  causation. 

At  the  same  time  it  is  plain  that  this  can  be  done  only 
in  a  general  way.  By  long  and  careful  pathological  study 
a  doctrine  of  localization  might  conceivably  be  proved  for 
various  mental  functions,  and  important  correlations  and 
concomitances  might  be  discovered  between  physical  and 
mental  pathology.  Such  facts  lie  within  the  range  of  pos- 
sible discovery  and  might  be  valuable  if  established.  But 
when  we  begin  to  theorize  on  the  molecular  structure  of 
the  brain  and  the  peculiar  molecular  structure  and  func- 
tions whereby  the  brain  serves  as  the  organ  of  thought, 
then  we  pass  beyond  the  range  of  our  faculties  and  lose  our- 
selves in  vain  imaginings.  What  takes  place  in  the  living 
brain  as  the  centre  of  the  physical  system  is  only  a  matter 
of  hypothesis ;  what  takes  place  in  the  brain  as  the  organ 
of  thought  is  a  subject  of  the  vaguest  surmise.  That  this 
is  so  is  manifest  upon  inspection.  Unfortunately,  this  field 
has  been  ravaged  by  dealers  in  mind-stuff  who  think  only 
in  physical  images,  and  they  have  made  such  fearful  and 
wonderful  discoveries  that  one  is  at  a  loss  to  say  which  is 
the  more  mythological,  their  psychology  or  their  anatomy 
and  physiology.  "  Memory-pills  "  are  already  advertised  ; 
and  we  may  confidently  expect  the  discovery  of  the  thought 


348  METAPHYSICS 

microbe,  to  be  followed  by  the  preparation  of  "  cultures " 
for  inoculation. 

7.  What  shall  we  say  of  psychology  without  a  soul  ? 

There  is  no  such  thing.  The  phrase  is  either  absurd,  or 
else  it  is  a  misleading  expression  for  the  following  common- 
place fact : 

It  is  possible  to  do  detailed  work  in  psychology  without 
in  any  way  going  into  the  metaphysics  or  the  presupposi- 
tions of  psychology.  Detailed  studies  of  the  senses,  or  the 
general  dependence  of  the  mental  life  on  physical  conditions, 
and  pretty  much  all  special  questions,  are  of  this  sort.  Such 
inquiries  can  be  carried  on  on  the  general  basis  of  experi- 
ence without  ever  asking  how  experience  is  possible.  It 
ought,  however,  to  be  possible  to  distinguish  between  this 
familiar  fact  and  the  denial  which  the  phrase  seems  to  im- 
ply. Such  phrases  are  not  needed  to  express  either  the 
problem  or  its  solution.  The  fact  of  experience  is  exhausted 
in  the  discovery  that  the  mental  life  has  physical  processes 
for  its  concomitant ;  and  the  aim  of  the  wise  man  must  be 
to  find  the  law  of  this  concomitance,  without  confusing  or 
distorting  the  fact  by  importing  materialistic  suggestions 
into  it  in  the  guise  of  figures  of  speech.  The  extreme  deli- 
cacy and  sensitiveness  of  intellectual  conscience  which  finds 
in  the  soul  an  unscientific  metaphysical  entity  would  lead 
us  to  expect  equal  caution  in  assuming  physical  entities  and 
in  using  materialistic  metaphors.  But,  as  of  old,  those  who 
strain  out  the  gnat  are  apt  to  bolt  the  camel. 

Herewith  we  close  our  catechism  and  our  profession  of 
faith  concerning  the  soul  in  itself. 


CHAPTER   n 
SOUL  AND  BODY 

IT  may  be  metaphysical,  or  anything  else  disagreeable, 
but  there  is  no  escape  from  regarding  the  soul  as  some- 
thing substantially  real.  It  abides,  acts,  and  is  acted  upon  ; 
and  these  are  the  essential  marks  of  ontological  reality. 
Whatever  it  may  be  with  respect  to  the  infinite,  no  other 
finite  thing  can  show  so  good  a  title  to  the  name  of  reality. 
In  comparison  with  the  body,  the  soul  is  the  more  real  of 
the  two ;  for  the  former  is  in  perpetual  flux,  and,  as  body, 
it  is  at  best  only  a  more  or  less  constant  form  of  the  inces- 
sant flow  of  the  physical  elements ;  and  these,  in  turn,  are 
suspected  of  being  only  abstract  hypostases  of  phenomena. 
But  this  is  commonly  overlooked.  That  the  body  is  sub- 
stantially real  common  sense  never  doubts;  and  even  the 
contemners  of  metaphysics  in  psychology  are  clear  as  to 
the  metaphysics  of  body.  Finally,  from  the  phenomenal 
point  of  view,  the  body  is  an  important  adjunct  of  the  in- 
ner life ;  and  we  need  to  get  some  conception  of  its  mean- 
ing and  function.  Thus  we  are  introduced  to  a  new  problem, 
that  concerning  the  mutual  relations  of  the  body  and  the 
soul.  Our  aim  is  not  to  go  into  details,  but  only  to  deter- 
mine the  general  form  both  of  the  problem  and  of  its  solu- 
tion. 

Popular  thought  with  its  all-embracing  category  of  space 
has  often  puzzled  itself  with  questions  concerning  the  mut- 
ual space  relations  of  soul  and  body ;  and  many  whimsies 


350  METAPHYSICS 

have  been  entertained  concerning  the  whereabouts  of  the 
soul  and  its  location  in  the  body.  These  questions  we  pass 
over  as  vacated  by  the  phenomenality  of  space.  The  in- 
teraction of  soul  and  body,  however,  is  a  more  important 
problem. 

Interaction  of  Soul  and  Body 

This  problem  is  vaguely  conceived  in  both  popular  and 
scientific  thought.  For  the  former,  space  is  the  supreme 
category,  and  all  existence  is  spatial  and  spatially  deter- 
mined. Hence  results  a  variety  of  vague  fancies  respecting 
the  soul  as  having  form,  small  or  great,  and  as  various- 
ly located  in  the  body,  sometimes  filling  out  the  body  as  a 
pervasive  aura,  and  sometimes  confined  to  the  brain.  In 
popular  scientific  thought  traces  of  these  whimsies  are  not 
lacking ;  and,  apart  from  them,  the  problem  is  ambiguously 
conceived  because  of  the  double  meaning  of  interaction 
itself. 

Causation,  as  we  have  so  often  said,  may  be  taken  in  an 
inductive  and  in  a  metaphysical  sense.  In  the  inductive 
sense  interaction  means  simply  the  laws  of  mutual  change 
or  of  concomitant  variation  among  things.  In  this  sense 
the  interaction  of  soul  and  body  means  only  that  there  is 
an  order  of  concomitant  variation  in  mental  and  organic 
changes ;  and  the  inductive  problem  is  to  discover  the  law 
of  these  changes. 

As  thus  understood  the  problem  involves  no  doctrine  of 
causality  whatever ;  and  the  workers  in  this  field  often  give 
out  that  they  eschew  all  reference  to  metaphysical  efficiency. 
Commonly,  however,  they  are  mistaken.  They  bring  a  full 
line  of  physical  metaphysics  with  them,  which  the}7  hold  in 
high  esteem  ;  and  after  they  have  talked  a  while  it  becomes 
clear  that,  at  least  tacitly,  they  regard  the  physical  order 
as  a  substantial  and  independent  fact,  while  the  mental  order 


SOUL  AtfD  BODY  351 

is  only  a  secondary  and  shadowy  appendix  of  the  physical. 
Out  of  this  confused  state  of  mind  only  further  confusion 
can  come ;  and  the  inductive  problem,  which  has  no  alliance 
with  materialism,  becomes  involved  in  the  imbecilities  of 
that  superstition. 

From  our  own  metaphysical  stand -point  the  inductive 
problem  is  the  only  one  we  have  to  consider.  The  tradi- 
tional notions  of  interaction  have  been  set  aside,  and  the 
body  itself  reduced  to  a  phenomenal  significance.  But  there 
still  remains  the  important  field  of  study  to  discover  the  laws 
of  concomitant  variation  in  physical  and  mental  changes, 
or  to  find  what  mental  states  go  with  what  physical  states 
and  what  physical  states  go  with  what  mental  states.  This 
is  the  task  of  the  physiological  psychologist.  And  no  one 
can  have  any  interest  in  forbidding  his  work,  or  in  wishing 
him  other  than  complete  success.  But  nothing  is  likely  to 
be  accomplished  except  by  those  who  have  a  competent 
knowledge  of  real  psychology  and  of  real  anatomy  and 
physiology.  The  picture  psychology  and  hearsay  anatomy 
which  have  been  so  prominent  in  this  field  have  their  chief 
value  as  sources  of  educational  treatises,  rather  than  of 
scientific  progress. 

But  in  spite  of  the  pretended  rejection  of  metaphysics, 
this  question  of  the  interaction  of  soul  and  body  is  sure  to 
be  approached  by  the  rank  and  file  of  investigators  with 
full  faith  in  the  metaphysics  of  common-sense.  Hence  it  is 
worth  while  to  consider  the  form  under  which  the  inter- 
action is  to  be  conceived,  assuming  the  body  to  be  sub- 
stantially real,  or  to  be  an  aggregate  of  substantial  realities. 

By  interaction  in  that  case  we  could  only  mean  that  soul 
and  body  affect  each  other.  Indeed  the  union  of  the  two 
has  no  other  meaning  than  this  fact  of  mutual  influence. 
On  the  most  realistic  theory  there  is  no  other  interaction  or 
bond  of  union  than  this  reciprocal  influence. 


352  METAPHYSICS 

The  imagination  has  commonly  confused  the  problem  by 
attempting  to  construe  it  spatially.  The  body  is  conceived 
as  a  physical  aggregate ;  and  the  attempt  is  made  to  picture 
the  soul  as  somewhere  within  this  aggregate,  either  as  a 
manikin  located  within  the  brain  and  nervous  system,  or 
as  a  pervasive  and  all-embracing  aura.  Then  the  elements 
of  the  nervous  system  are  supposed  at  certain  times  and 
places  to  start  aside  from  the  line  of  the  physical  resultant 
of  their  antecedent  states  without  any  visible  reason ;  and 
by  this  time  the  notion  breaks  down  from  its  own  absurdity. 
The  manikin  soul  is  absurd;  and  the  laws  of  continuity 
and  the  conservation  of  energy  are  affronted  by  such  a 
procedure. 

Some  of  these  difficulties  disappear  on  grasping  the  phe- 
nomenality  of  space.  On  that  view  we  give  up  the  attempt 
to  picture  the  causal  realities  of  the  system.  Souls  and 
atoms  f.like,  supposing  the  latter  real,  lie  among  the  unpict- 
urabie  agencies  of  the  system.  Shape,  size,  form,  and  where- 
abouts are  inadmissible  notions  when  we  pass  beyond  phe- 
nomena. 

The  horror  felt  at  the  atoms  not  moving  in  a  line  with 
the  physical  resultant  is  a  purely  home-made  one.  The  in- 
visible dynamic  states  of  the  elements  are  the  forces  which 
determine  the  resultant;  and  that  some  of  these  states 
should  be  in  the  soul  is  qpriori<yait6  as  credible  as  that 
they  should  be  only  in  the  physical  elements,  and  empirically 
it  is  quite  as  well  established.  The  dogmatic  assumption 
that  the  physical  system  is  complete  in  itself,  and  closed 
against  all  modification  from  without,  is  the  only  thing  dis- 
turbed thereby.  And  seeing  that  this  assumption  implies 
that  our  thoughts  and  volitions  have  no  significance  in  the 
direction  of  our  bodies,  it  deserves  to  be  disturbed  on  the 
ground  both  of  experience  and  of  good  sense. 

The  conservation  of  energy,  to  which  reference  has  been 


SOUL  AND  BODY  353 

made,  has  been  the  source  of  much  pathetic  blundering  at 
this  point.  Of  course  the  doctrine,  so  far  as  proved,  does 
not  forbid  us  to  admit  that  our  thoughts  and  volitions  count 
in  the  control  of  the  organism,  if  the  facts  point  that  way. 
On  this  matter  the  wayfaring  man  can  judge  as  well  as  the 
scientists.  But  some  speculators,  whose  knowledge  would 
seem  to  be  mainly  of  the  hearsay  type,  have  been  pleased 
to  erect  the  doctrine  into  an  absolute  necessity  which  for- 
bids the  slightest  modification.  This  is  pure  delusion  and 
error.  Particularly,  psychologists  who  have  wished  to 
stand  well  with  physics  have  fallen  into  this  blunder.  And 
then  they  have  said  the  oddest  things  about  double-faced 
somewhats,  the  complete  continuity  of  the  physical  series, 
and  the  impossibility  of  modifying  it  from  the  mental  side. 
Of  course  this  implies  that  the  body  starts,  stops,  and  di- 
rects itself,  speech  and  all,  without  control  from  thought ; 
and  they  have  given  out  that  we  must  not  think  other- 
wise under  penalty  of  conflicting  with  science.  This  illus- 
trates the  extremes  to  which  a  romantic  devotion  to  mis- 
understood abstractions  can  carry  a  mind  of  the  passive 
type. 

The  notion  is  traditional  that  the  interaction  of  soul  and 
body  is  a  specially  difficult  conception.  This  mistake  is 
partly  due  to  the  spatial  fancies  referred  to,  and  partly  to 
the  further  fancy  that  interaction  must  be  by  impact.  All 
are  alike  groundless.  Given  the  conception  of  interacting 
members,  it  is  quite  impossible  to  tell  apriori  what  states 
shall  arise  in  J.,  B,  and  C  under  the  condition  X.  They 
might  conceivably  be  the  same,  and  they  might  be  very 
different,  according  to  the  nature  of  the  subjects. 

Oversight  of  this  fact  has  led  to  the  invention  of  go-be- 
tweens to  mediate  the  interaction  of  soul  and  body.  That 
certain  motions  in  the  brain  should  be  the  cause  of  sensa- 
tions in  consciousness  is  thought  to  involve  a  break  of  con- 


354  METAPHYSICS 

tinuity  too  great  for  belief.  Accordingly,  the  attempt  has 
been  made  to  refine  the  motions,  on  the  one  side,  and  on 
the  other,  to  reduce  the  sensations  to  a  sub-conscious  form 
which  should  be  less  unlike  their  physical  ground.  This 
attempt  is  a  product  of  the  imagination,  and  gives  no  relief 
to  thought.  Allowing  the  elements  to  be  real  agents,  their 
motions  are  not  the  cause  of  sensation ;  the  cause  is  rather 
the  metaphysical  dynamic  states  of  which  the  motions  are 
the  spatial  expression.  Now  why,  when  certain  brain  mole- 
cules are  in  the  metaphysical  state  which  expresses  itself  in 
motion,  the  soul  should  pass  into  the  state  of  conscious  sen- 
sation is  of  course  mysterious  enough  ;  but  it  is  no  more  so 
than  that  a  piece  of  iron  should  become  magnetic  when  an 
electric  current  passes  round  it.  In  both  cases  the  mystery 
of  interaction  is  equally  involved;  and  in  both  cases  the 
mystery  is  equally  great.  Neither  the  fact  nor  the  order 
of  interaction  admits  of  apriori  deduction,  even  on  the 
most  realistic  theory  ;  neither  have  we  any  insight  into  the 
possibilities  which  would  make  one  order  antecedently  more 
credible  than  another.  The  reason  why  any  order  of  inter- 
action is  as  it  is  must  ultimately  be  sought  in  the  plan  of 
the  fundamental  reality.  The  unity  of  the  system  cannot 
consist  in  the  likeness  of  the  interacting  members,  but  rather 
in  their  subordination,  with  all  their  likenesses  or  antitheses, 
to  the  plan  of  the  whole. 

No  theory  whatever  can  escape  this  sharp  antithesis  of 
the  physical  and  the  mental.  It  is  no  special  difficulty  of 
spiritualism,  but  lies  with  equal  or  even  greater  force  against 
materialism.  The  materialist  and  the  believer  in  double- 
faced  substances  cannot  give  the  slightest  reason  why  a 
given  subjective  phase  should  attend  a  certain  objective 
phase  and  not  rather  some  other.  It  must  be  affirmed  as 
an  opaque  fact,  or  else  the  reason  must  be  found  in  the  plan 
of  the  whole. 


SOUL   AND  BODY  355 

This  general  conclusion  must  stand.  There  is,  however, 
some  apparent  mitigation  of  the  antithesis  in  the  fact  of  the 
organism.  The  interaction  of  soul  and  body  takes  place 
under  the  organic  form.  It  is  not,  then,  all  physical  ele- 
ments, or  the  same  physical  elements  al  \vays,  which  inter- 
act with  the  soul,  but  only  those  elements  which  are  com- 
prised within  the  range  of  an  organic  activity ;  thus  the 
organism  seems  to  be  a  kind  of  link  between  the  inorganic 
physical  and  the  mental.  As  physical,  it  is  allied  to  the 
world  of  matter ;  and,  as  living,  it  is  allied  to  the  world  of 
mind.  Thus  it  appears  in  a  measure  to  mediate  the  sharp 
opposition  of  mind  and  matter.  That  thought  should  at- 
tend, or  be  summoned  by,  any  sort  of  inorganic  physical 
movements  seems  something  like  an  affront  to  the  law  of 
continuity,  but  that  thought  should  attend  organic  changes 
impresses  us  as  a  much  more  manageable  thesis.  And, 
conversely,  that,  upon  occasion  of  thought  and  volition, 
inorganic  physical  changes  should  arise  which  were  not  con- 
sequents of  their  physical  antecedents  would  seem  to  many 
altogether  incredible,  who  would  yet  find  it  quite  within 
the  limits  of  credibility  that  organic  physical  changes  should 
result  from  mental  states.  The  supposed  relief  here  may 
turn  out  to  be  fictitious;  nevertheless  there  is  sufficient  faith 
in  it,  both  in  popular  thought  and  in  current  speculation, 
to  make  it  desirable  to  examine  it.  This  raises  the  ques- 
tion what  the  organism  is  and  how  it  comes  to  exist. 

The  Body  as  Organism 

Still  assuming  the  reality  of  the  physical  elements,  we 
have  three  factors  in  the  problem  as  a  whole :  (1)  the  ele- 
ments which  compose  the  organism ;  (2)  the  cause  of  their 
union  into  an  organism ;  and  (3)  the  subject  of  the  mental 
life  which  is  manifested  in  connection  with  the  organism. 


356  METAPHYSICS 

The  consideration  of  these  points  will  prepare  the  way  for 
our  final  view. 

Of  course  on  the  realistic  physical  basis  the  organism  is 
substantially  nothing.  It  is  a  highly  complex  aggregate  of 
physical  elements,  but  if  these  were  removed  nothing  would 
remain.  Allowing,  however,  as  universally  recognized,  that 
we  find  in  the  organism  factors  and  processes  which  are 
found  in  the  inorganic  realm,  we  must  also  allow  that  we 
find  them  subordinated  to  an  organic  law,  so  that  they 
build  an  organism  which  is  as  different  from  the  component 
elements  as  an  architectural  structure  is  more  than  the  un- 
formed material  of  which  it  is  built.  Where  shall  we  find 
the  seat  of  this  law  ? 

First,  we  may  seek  to  find  it  in  the  elements  themselves. 
This  leads,  as  we  shall  see,  to  fantastic  and  grotesque  as- 
sumptions. 

Secondly,  we  may  ascribe  it  to  life,  as  something  distinct 
from  the  elements,  on  the  one  hand,  and  from  the  soul,  on 
the  other.  This  view  is  not  so  clear  as  it  seems,  nor  so  use- 
ful either. 

Thirdly,  we  may  view  the  soul  itself  as  the  ground  of 
form.  It  has  a  phase  of  organic  activity  and  one  of  con- 
scious activity.  Both  of  these  are  united  as  the  expression 
of  the  nature  of  the  one  soul.  In  this  view  we  should  have 
the  following  stages : 

1.  The  soul  in  interaction  with  the  general  physical  sys- 
tem builds  and  maintains  an  organism  within  certain  limits 
and  under  certain  conditions  set  by  its  own  nature  and  the 
general  laws  of  the  system. 

2.  This  organized  matter  is  already  within  the  sphere  of 
the  soul's  activity  as  well  as  under  the  general  physical  laws. 

3.  Hence  the  organism  is  partly  a  physical  and  partly  a 
psychical  function.     Its  interaction  with  the  extra-organic 
realm  involves  the  organic  activity  of  the  soul ;  and  because 


SOUL  AND  BODY  357 

of  the  unity  of  the  soul  it  could  hardly  fail  to  have  signif- 
icance for  the  mental  activity. 

4.  Conscious  activity  based  upon  and  growing  out  of  the 
organic  activity  is  the  final  stage.  Thus  the  continuity  of 
the  organic  and  the  mental  world  is  in  a  measure  assured 
and  some  reason  given  for  their  intimate  inter-relations. 

On  the  assumed  reality  of  the  physical  elements,  this  is 
the  view  which  offers  least  resistance  to  thought.  In  all 
complex  organisms,  whether  in  the  animal  or  plant  world, 
\ve  should  have  to  assume  an  organic  subject  as  the  ground 
of  form.  When  these  subjects  also  rise  into  conscious  men- 
tal life  we  have  souls. 

No  one  of  these  views  quite  agrees  with  that  which  our 
more  idealistic  metaphysics  demands.  But  before  develop- 
ing this  view  it  seems  well  to  expound  more  at  length  the 
two  first  views  mentioned.  Between  them  they  divide  the 
assent  of  popular  thought  in  this  field,  and  both  alike 
abound  in  bad  logic  and  crude  metaphysics. 


Mechanism  and  Vitalism 

There  has  been  a  very  general  demand  in  recent  years 
that  the  organism  be  viewed  as  a  function  of  its  component 
elements,  just  as  any  machine  is  a  function  of  its  parts.  As 
aquosity,  it  was  said,  is  not  needed  to  explain  the  water 
molecule,  but  only  the  hydrogen  and  oxygen  which  com- 
pose it,  and  as  horologity  is  not  needed  to  explain  the  run- 
ning of  a  clock,  but  only  the  parts  in  their  actual  relations ; 
so  vitality  is  not  needed  to  explain  the  existence  and  pro]> 
erties  of  the  organism,  but  only  the  component  elements 
with  their  inherent  laws  and  complex  interactions.  Vitality 
is  as  great  a  fiction  as  aquosity  or  horologity.  This  was 
called  the  mechanical  view  of  life  and  was  opposed  by  the 
defenders  of  vitalism. 


358  METAPHYSICS 

The  mechanical  view  has  often  been  ambiguously  con- 
ceived.  Sometimes  the  claim  has  been  made  that  physics 
and  chemistry  explain  life,  but  this  was  due  to  logical  su- 
perficiality. Physics  and  chemistry  explain  nothing  but 
themselves,  and  indeed  they  explain  nothing  in  any  case, 
being  but  names  for  certain  orders  of  phenomena.  The  ele- 
ments as  doing  only  what  they  are  found  to  do  in  the  phys- 
ical or  chemical  laboratory  could  do  nothing  else,  unless  we 
assume  other  and  hidden  powers  which  might  be  manifest- 
ed upon  occasion.  It  was  this  insight  which  led  Professor 
Tyndall  to  say  that  the  attempt  to  explain  life  by  matter 
as  conceived  in  the  inorganic  sciences  is  "absurd,  monstrous, 
and  fit  only  for  the  intellectual  gibbet."  Accordingly  he 
proposed  to  enlarge  the  notion  of  matter  and  endow  it  with 
various  mystic  and  subtle  properties  and  potencies. 

And  this  is  the  form  which  the  mechanical  view  must 
take  if  it  is  to  be  held  at  all.  The  forces  of  the  elements 
are  only  abstractions  from  the  activities  of  the  elements ; 
and  the  elements  do  whatever  is  done.  And  as  the  elements 
in  certain  relations  manifest  physical  and  chemical  proper- 
ties, so  in  certain  other  relations  they  manifest  vital  prop- 
erties. But  just  as  the  properties  of  an  inorganic  atomic  or 
molecular  complex  depend  on  the  properties  of  the  con- 
stituent elements,  so  the  properties  of  an  organic  molecular 
complex  depend  on  the  properties  of  the  constituent  atoms. 
The  mechanical  theory,  therefore,  can  assume  a  vital  force 
with  just  the  same  right  as  it  does  a  chemical  force.  In- 
deed, it  must  assume  both,  but  both  in  the  same  sense.  To 
explain  gravitation,  it  assumes  a  peculiar  endowment  of  the 
elements  and  calls  it  gravity.  To  explain  chemical  action, 
it  assumes  another  peculiar  endowment  of  the  atoms  and 
calls  it  affinity.  So  also  to  explain  vital  phenomena,  it  as- 
sumes again  a  peculiar  endowment  of  the  elements  and  calls 
it  vitality.  These  several  -ities  all  stand  on  the  same  basis. 


SOUL  AND  BODY  359 

They  are  all  alike  necessary  and  are  all  alike  but  abstrac- 
tions from  the  several  forms  of  atomic  interaction. 

Many  upholders  of  vitalism  surrender  at  this  point.  They 
think  it  sufficient  to  point  out  that  the  elements,  as  capable 
of  only  physical  and  chemical  manifestation,  are  inadequate 
to  vital  manifestation,  and  that  hence  we  must  posit  a  new 
endowment  to  account  for  the  new  manifestation.  This  is 
true  enough,  and  follows  as  a  matter  of  definition ;  but  as 
long  as  the  new  endowment  is  posited  in  the  physical  ele- 
ments, and  not  in  some  separate  agent,  we  still  hold  the 
mechanical  theory.  Physics  and  chemistry  do  not  explain 
even  magnetism ;  but  we  never  dream  that  magnetism  is 
something  independent  of  the  elements ;  we  regard  it  sim- 
ply as  a  manifestation  of  the  nature  of  the  elements  under 
peculiar  circumstances.  No  one  denies  vitality  as  a  mode 
of  agency :  the  dispute  is  over  vitality  as  an  agent.  All  the 
other  -Hies  are  forms  of  agency,  and  the  mechanical  theorist 
holds  that  vitality  is  no  more.  The  agents  are  the  physical 
elements  in  every  case. 

The  mechanical  theory  is  clear  at  least  in  its  meaning, 
if  not  in  its  possibility.  The  thought  is  formally  complete. 
It  speaks  of  activities,  forces,  and  endowments,  and  names 
their  subjects.  But  in  order  to  make  this  view  sufficient, 
we  have  to  add  some  rather  peculiar  assumptions.  If  or- 
ganisms were  all  of  a  kind,  or  had  anything  like  a  common 
form,  it  would  be  comparatively  easy  to  accept  the  belief 
that  the  physical  elements  which  compose  a  germ,  together 
with  those  in  contact  with  it,  are  the  only  agents  concerned. 
But  the  forms  and  qualities  of  organisms  are  of  the  most 
diverse  kinds,  while  the  component  elements  are  all  of  a 
kind.  Hence  it  seems  as  if  the  elements,  because  able  to 
enter  into  any  organic  form,  were  indifferent  to  all  organic 
forms.  If  there  were  only  one  form,  we  might  speak  of  a 
"  subtle  tendency "  in  the  elements  to  that  form,  or  of  an 


360  METAPHYSICS 

"affinity"  or  "inherent  aptitude"  for  it.  But  when  they 
assume  all  organic  forms,  we  must  either  make  them  as  in- 
different to  those  forms  as  the  bricks  which  are  built  into  a 
variety  of  structures  are  to  the  plan  of  those  structures,  or 
we  must  endow  them  with  a  great  variety  of  "  subtle  ten- 
dencies "  and  "  inherent  aptitudes."  In  the  former  case, 
the  variety  and  constancy  of  form  seems  to  be  a  matter  of 
chance  or  accident ;  for  the  matter  contains  no  principle  of 
organic  form.  Yet  the  second  case  reduces  to  the  first,  for 
these  tendencies  are  mutually  exclusive  in  realization,  and 
the  elements  have  in  themselves  no  ground  for  realizing  one 
set  of  tendencies  rather  than  another.  The  coexistence  of 
the  tendencies  does  not  explain  the  selection.  Hence,  in 
each  case,  we  have  to  fall  back  on  the  arbitrary  constants 
which  enter  into  the  equation.  As  the  laws  of  motion  are 
consistent  with  all  motions,  so  the  elements  in  general  are 
adapted  to  all  forms.  The  ground  of  direction,  then,  is  to 
be  sought  in  the  conditions  under  which  they  work.  Under 
given  conditions,  they  can  build  only  a  given  organism. 
But  these  conditions,  again,  must  lie  very  deep.  If  they 
were  merely  general  conditions,  germs  might  be  inter- 
changed ;  whereas,  two  seeds  grow  side  by  side,  and  each 
to  its  typical  form.  The  germ  itself  contains  implicitly  all 
the  differences  which  become  explicit  in  the  organism.  But 
these  differences  are  so  many  and  great  that  no  one  would 
pretend  to  represent  them  by  difference  of  spatial  colloca- 
tion of  the  elements  which  compose  the  germ.  Such  collo- 
cation would  explain  nothing,  unless  it  were  attended  with 
peculiar  forces. 

Here  we  may  fall  back  on  the  conception  of  subtle  ten- 
dencies which  are,  in  some  way,  located  in  the  germ.  This 
notion  has  been  formulated  in  the  doctrine  of  "  physiologi- 
cal units,"  each  of  which  has  the  power  of  reproducing  the 
organism  under  appropriate  conditions.  But,  unfortunately, 


SOUL   AND  BODY  361 

even  this  notion  is  not  as  clear  as  could  be  wished.  It  at- 
tributes the  tendencies  to  the  germ,  and  forgets  that,  by 
hypothesis,  the  germ  is  a  compound  of  elements.  The  ten- 
dency, therefore,  no  matter  how  "  subtle,"  belongs  to  the 
elements  which  compose  the  germ.  And,  without  doubt, 
this  tendency  is  very  subtle,  for  it  is  really  an  implicit  ex- 
pression of  the  plan  of  the  organism.  It  implies,  then,  that, 
under  certain  conditions,  the  elements  act  with  constant 
reference  to  the  plan  of  an  organism ;  and  under  certain 
other  conditions,  precisely  similar  elements  act  with  refer- 
ence to  the  plan  of  some  other  organism.  If  we  should  see 
a  pile  of  bricks  moving  so  as  to  build  a  given  house,  we 
should  probably  conclude  that  some  invisible  builder  was 
present ;  but,  if  we  declined  this  view,  the  very  least  we 
could  say  would  be,  that  the  plan  of  the  house  is  implicit 
in  the  bricks,  and  that  their  activities  are  all  put  forth  with 
reference  to  this  plan.  If  we  should  refuse  this  admission, 
then  the  house-building  would  be  purely  a  chance-product 
— a  coincidence  of  moving  bricks.  But  if,  in  addition  to 
building  a  single  kind  of  house,  we  should  see  them  assum- 
ing all  possible  architectural  forms,  we  should  be  forced 
either  to  appeal  to  chance  or  to  admit  that  the  bricks  con- 
tain in  themselves  the  plans  of  all  possible  combinations. 
But  reason  can  allow  no  appeals  to  chance,  and  hence  we 
conclude  that,  to  make  the  elements  adequate  to  the  ex- 
planation of  organisms,  we  must  assume  that  the  plans  of 
all  organisms  are  implicitly  given  in  the  nature  of  the  ele- 
ments, and  so  given  that,  when  they  begin  building  upon  a 
certain  plan,  they  forsake  all  others,  and  cleave  to  it  alone. 
The  action  is  still  mechanical,  but,  in  this  action,  the  mystic 
nature  of  the  elements  unfolds  itself,  so  that  organisms  re- 
sult. 

This  gives  us  some  idea  of  the  complexity  of  the  problem, 
and  of  the  confusion  in  popular  thought  respecting  it.    This 


362  METAPHYSICS 

complexity  has  been  hidden  by  the  simplicity  of  the  terms, 
and  the  elements  have  seemed  adequate  because  of  the  tacit 
assumption  that  there  is  nothing  else  in  space,  and  because 
of  some  vague  and  mistaken  notions  about  continuity.  These 
subtle  tendencies  defy  all  representation,  and  even  all  con- 
ception. Their  mechanical  possibility  cannot  be  construed. 
They  are  really  nothing  but  a  specification  of  the  abstract 
notion  of  ground,  without  inquiring  whether  the  demand 
for  a  ground  can  be  satisfied  in  this  form ;  and  they  are  at- 
tributed to  the  atoms  as  a  matter  of  course,  because  of  the 
implicit  assumption  that  there  is  nothing  else  concerned. 

But  vitalism  is  equally  unclear.  In  the  first  place,  many 
of  its  upholders  neglect  to  say  whether  vitality  is  a  quality 
in  the  elements  which  conditions  their  agency,  or  whether 
it  is  a  separate  agent.  Many  of  the  arguments  for  vitality 
go  no  further  than  the  maintenance  of  the  former  position, 
and  thus  fail  to  escape  the  mechanical  theory.  But  sup- 
pose we  say  that  life  is  a  true  agent  which  is  separate  from 
the  physical  elements,  and  which  builds  them  into  form. 
Life  would  thus  appear  as  the  builder  of  organisms,  and 
matter  would  appear  as  simple  material. 

This  view  doubtless  derives  a  great  part  of  its  clearness 
and  sufliciency  from  the  analogy  of  man's  constructive  ac- 
tivities. In  itself  it  is  unclear  without  some  further  deter- 
minations. Is  this  agent  one  or  many?  Is  it  the  same  life 
which  works  in  all  organisms,  plants  and  animals  alike,  or 
is  there  a  separate  vital  agent  in  each  one  ?  In  the  former 
case,  how  does  this  agent  distinguish  between  the  plans  of 
the  different  organisms  which  it  is  constructing  and  main- 
taining all  around  the  globe  at  the  same  time  ?  The  readiest 
answer  would  be  that  it  is  intelligent ;  but  this  would  go  a 
long  way  towards  confounding  it  with  God.  If  we  decline 
this  view,  and  say  that  the  agent  works  differently  in  dif- 


SOUL  AND  BODY  363 

ferent  conditions,  it  is  still  necessary  that  it  shall  be  affected 
in  some  way  by  the  conditions  in  order  to  respond  with  the 
appropriate  activity.  That  is,  we  must  bring  it  into  a  sys- 
tem of  fixed  interaction  with  the  elements ;  and  when  this 
is  thought  out  into  its  implications  we  are  not  much  ad- 
vanced beyond  the  mechanical  view. 

If,  however,  we  prefer  to  view  the  vital  agent  as  many, 
and  posit  a  separate  subject  in  each  organism,  we  have  the 
same  difficulties  and  some  additional  ones.  The  vital  agent 
must  interact  with  the  physical  elements ;  and  in  this  inter- 
action the  laws  of  matter  would  be  as  prominent  as  the  laws 
of  life.  The  only  advantage  this  conception  would  have 
over  the  material  view  would  be  in  planting  the  "subtle 
tendencies"  in  a  single  definite  agent,  and  in  finding  the 
chief  formative  conditions  in  the  nature  of  that  agent.  This 
would  remove  the  necessity  of  departing  so  widely  from  the 
common  view  of  matter  as  we  otherwise  must;  since  we 
could  then  allow,  what  all  knowledge  seems  to  indicate,  that 
matter  in  itself  is  indifferent  to  organic  forms,  and  assumes 
them  only  as  it  comes  into  interaction  with  some  agent 
which  contains  the  ground  of  form  within  itself.  Life  does 
not  start  up  everywhere,  but  only  in  connection  with  things 
already  living. 

But  this  view  contains  some  special  difficulties.  The 
reality  is  no  longer  singular  and  universal  life,  but  discrete 
individual  lives;  and  these  lives  must  have  some  source. 
Have  they  always  existed  ;  are  they  separately  created  ;  do 
they  abide  after  the  organism  perishes?  These  questions 
crowd  upon  us.  The  law  of  continuity  is  in  active  protest. 
The  problem  is  insoluble  as  long  as  we  remain  on  the  plane 
of  the  finite. 

Thus  both  the  mechanical  and  the  vitalistic  view  of  life 
are  seen  to  be  exceedingly  obscure  when  only  the  problem 
of  organization  is  under  discussion.  The  matter  becomes 


364  METAPHYSICS 

still  worse  when  we  inquire  concerning  the  subject  of  the 
thought  and  sensibility  which  seem  to  be  manifested  in  con- 
nection with  the  organism.  Unless  appearances  are  unu- 
sually deceiving,  there  is  an  inner  life  of  feeling  of  some  sort 
in  connection  with  all  the  higher  animal  forms.  Neither 
theory  provides  for  this.  If  the  body  be  simply  a  function 
of  the  physical  elements,  it  is  sensitive  and  truly  living  only 
in  appearance.  The  difference  between  it  and  any  com- 
plex inorganic  mass  is  phenomenal  only,  not  essential.  The 
atom  of  hydrogen,  or  oxygen,  or  carbon,  that  may  be  cours- 
ing in  a  man's  blood  is  no  more  alive  than  similar  atoms 
blazing  in  the  sun  or  locked  in  the  coal-mine.  Of  course 
the  organism  has  many  qualities  which  other  combinations 
have  not ;  but,  in  fact,  since  matter  and  motion  are  all  that 
is  concerned  in  the  organism,  there  is  nothing  but  matter 
and  motion  in  it.  But  feeling  is  something  totally  unlike 
motion ;  and  no  analysis  of  motion  will  reveal  feeling  as 
one  of  its  constituents.  There  is  no  way  of  passing  from 
one  to  the  other.  The  organism,  then,  is  only  a  highly 
complex  group  of  physical  elements  without  any  proper 
life  or  feeling. 

The  deduction  of  life  from  the  non-living  has  led  to  many 
agonistic  efforts  and  some  notable  contributions  to  the  dic- 
tionary. A  much  admired  popular  formula  defines  life  as 
an  adjustment  or  correspondence  of  inner  relations  to  outer 
relations ;  and  we  seem  to  be  getting  a  deep  draught  of  wis- 
dom undefiled,  until  we  bethink  ourselves  to  inquire  what 
"  inner "  means ;  and  then  it  turns  out  that  inner  means 
nothing  to  the  purpose,  unless  it  is  referred  to  the  activity 
of  some  vital  agent.  Those  things  are  inner  to  the  body 
which  are  vitally  connected  with  the  organic  processes; 
and  those  are  outer  which  are  not  thus  connected,  even 
though  comprised  within  the  spatial  limits  of  the  body. 
But  when  it  comes  to  the  deduction  of  life  the  mechanical 


SOUL  AND  BODY  365 

theorists  always  delude  themselves  with  words.  They  point 
out  that  in  chemistry  we  pass  from  the  atom  to  the  mole- 
cule, and  from  the  simple  molecule  to  the  complex  molecule, 
and  from  the  complex  molecule  to  the  organic  molecule,  and 
from  the  simple  organic  molecule  to  complex  organic  mole- 
cules, and  from  these  again  to  groups  of  the  same.  But 
these  already  exhibit  signs  of  life  and  organization.  After 
a  little  skirmishing  with  the  formidable  terms  of  organic 
chemistry,  reproduction  and  heredity  are  quietly  brought 
in,  and  the  evolution  of  life  from  the  inorganic  is  com- 
plete. 

A  word  will  suffice  to  show  the  verbal  character  of  this 
process.  If  we  begin  with  matter  and  motion,  we  must  end 
with  it  also ;  and  whatever  cannot  be  construed  in  terms  of 
moving  matter  must  be  rejected  as  illusory.  There  is  no 
difficulty  in  passing  from  the  atom  to  the  molecule,  or  in 
passing  from  simple  molecules  to  complex  molecules  and 
groups  of  molecules;  but  there  the  advance  ceases.  All 
that  remains  is  to  increase  the  complexity  of  the  molecules 
and  the  molecular  groups;  for  this  is  the  only  direction 
which  the  redistribution  of  matter  can  take.  When,  then, 
the  theorist  next  presents  us  with  the  organic  molecule,  we 
are  a  little  puzzled  to  know  what  he  means  by  the  new  ad- 
jective. It  may  mean  simply  a  molecule  which  is  commonly 
found  only  in  connection  with  organisms ;  but  in  that  case 
it  is  nothing  to  the  purpose.  But  if  it  mean  something 
more  than  complex,  we  need  to  have  the  distinction  be- 
tween an  organic  molecule  and  a  complex  molecule  more 
clearly  stated.  It  may  be  said  that  an  organic  molecule  is 
essentially  only  a  highly  complex  molecule,  but  it  manifests 
different  phenomena.  We  reply  that  we  are  after  the  es- 
sential and  not  the  phenomenal.  There  is  no  dispute  as  to 
the  phenomena  of  organisms,  but  as  to  their  essential  nature. 
And  if  their  phenomena  are  all  explained  by  the  interaction 


366  METAPHYSICS 

of  the  elements,  then  organisms  are  essentially  atomic  com- 
plexes and  nothing  more. 

The  truth  is  this  deduction  is  purely  verbal  and  has  a 
strong  smack  of  question  -  begging  about  it.  If  we  should 
speak  only  of  complex  molecules  \ve  should  clearly  see  the 
impossibility  of  advancing  beyond  them.  Such  groups 
would  appear  as  products  of  physical  and  chemical  attrac- 
tions and  repulsions,  and  even  the  most  determined  evolu- 
tionist would  hardly  venture  to  speak  of  them  as  alive  or 
as  subject  to  experience  and  heredity.  But  if,  instead  of 
calling  these  groups  complex  molecules  and  groups  of  mole- 
cules, which  by  the  theory  is  all  they  can  be,  we  call  them 
organic,  then  by  the  sheer  force  of  the  terms  we  shall  find 
it  easy  to  pass  on  to  speak  of  organization  and  heredity ; 
and  the  way  will  be  open  before  us.  We  can  then  appeal 
to  life  and  biological  laws  without  any  reference  whatever 
to  the  possibility  of  interpreting  them  in  terms  of  matter 
and  motion.  But  if  thought  be  clear,  this  procedure  must 
be  seen  as  delusive.  There  is  nothing  in  the  most  complex 
organism  but  complex  molecules ;  and  the  only  difference 
between  the  elements  as  thus  grouped  and  as  otherwise 
grouped  is  purely  phenomenal.  A  living  thing  is  essentially 
an  inorganic  complex  which  seems  to  be  alive.  In  itself 
one  thing  is  as  dead  or  as  living  as  another.  The  distinc- 
tion is  only  in  appearance,  and  even  this  appearance  is  im- 
possible as  long  as  there  is  no  mind  to  which  it  appears.  A 
mind  which  could  grasp  things  as  they  are  would  see  in  an 
organism  only  a  complex  system  of  moving  atoms.  Along 
with  this  admission  goes  the  absurdity  of  the  notion  of 
heredity.  The  laws  of  the  elements  are  hardly  to  be  viewed 
as  acquired  or  inherited ;  and  since  these  laws  determine 
all  compounds,  the  organism  also  must  be  fixed.  Life,  then, 
is  phenomenal ;  and  an  animal  is  but  an  automaton  which 
only  seems  to  think  and  feel. 


SOUL  AND  BODY  367 

We  get  no  relief  from  this  conclusion,  if  we  endow  the 
atoms  with  the  most  mystic  qualities,  or  even  allow  them  to 
be  alive.  These  mystic  properties  remain  subjective  to  each 
atom,  and  manifest  themselves  externally  only  in  changes 
of  place  and  condition.  The  inner  life,  therefore,  would  not 
appear  as  any  factor  of  observation,  but  would  only  be  one 
of  the  inner  forces  which  condition  redistribution.  Such  a 
view  might  help  in  explaining  organization,  but  not  in  ac- 
counting for  the  life  of  the  organism.  For  on  this  view 
the  organism  still  remains  an  aggregate  without  any  sub- 
jective unity,  or  subjectivity  of  any  sort.  Hence,  the  feel- 
ing and  thought  which  the  animal  seems  to  manifest  are 
again  phenomenal.  A  mimicry  of  thought  and  feeling  is 
possible  in  an  aggregate  or  automaton ;  but  their  reality  is 
possible  only  to  some  unitary  subject  which  thinks  and 
i'eels.  To  say  that  the  organism  thinks  and  feels  is  thought- 
less ;  for  the  organism  is  just  such  a  reality  as  the  public 
in  social  science.  When  we  speak  of  the  public  thought 
and  feeling,  we  know  very  well  that  only  individual  persons 
think  and  feel.  The  public,  as  such,  neither  thinks  nor  feels, 
but  only  the  persons  who  compose  it.  We  must,  then,  reduce 
the  animals  to  automata  which  mimic  thought  and  feeling,  or 
we  must  allow  a  real  substantive  subject  of  their  mental  life. 

We  are  no  better  off  with  the  view  which  regards  God 
as  the  builder  of  the  organism.  For  still  the  organism  ap- 
pears either  as  a  pure  phenomenon,  or  as  a  complex  of  dis- 
crete activities,  and  as  such  it  is  without  any  mental  sub- 
ject. Hence,  any  thought  and  feeling  which  the  animal 
may  seem  to  show  are  illusory,  and  do  not  indicate  any  true 
thought  or  feeling  which  the  animal  has.  The  view  which 
regards  life  as  a  kind  of  universal  agent,  manifesting  itself 
in  different  forms,  is  subject  to  the  same  difficulties.  It 
provides  no  subject  for  the  individual  life  and  feeling  of  the 
individual  animal. 


368  METAPHYSICS 

Thus  it  appears  that  the  most  important  question  con- 
cerning life  is  not  that  of  organization,  but  that  of  the  sub- 
ject of  the  thought  and  feeling  which  animals  manifest. 
Where  it  is  merely  a  question  of  organization,  as  in  the 
vegetable  world,  there  are  several  possible  views,  each  of 
which  would  be  adequate ;  but  when  mental  manifestations 
appear,  as  in  all  the  higher  orders  of  animals,  then  we  must 
make  a  choice.  Either  we  must  view  these  manifestations 
as  purely  illusory,  and  make  the  animals  senseless  automata 
which  only  mimic  thought  and  feeling,  or  we  must  declare 
that  with  each  new  animal  a  new  factor  is  introduced  into 
the  system  as  the  thinking  and  feeling  subject  of  the  ani- 
mal's experience.  Thus  the  problem  of  life  comes  back 
again  to  the  problem  of  the  soul. 

This  long  excursus  was  undertaken  for  the  sake  of  show- 
ing how  confused  and  uncertain  popular  thought  is  on  this 
subject.  On  the  basis  of  the  popular  metaphysics  there  is 
no  way  out  of  the  confusion.  We  now  return  to  our  own 
conception  of  the  interaction  of  soul  and  body. 

In  this  view  the  soul  is  posited  by  the  infinite,  and  the 
body  is  simply  an  order  or  system  of  phenomena  connected 
with  the  soul  which  reproduces  to  some  extent  features  of 
the  general  phenomenal  order,  and  which  also  expresses  an 
order  of  concomitance  with  the  mental  life.  Thus  it  be- 
comes a  visible  expression  of  the  personality,  a  means  of 
personal  communion,  and  also  a  means  for  controlling  to 
some  extent  the  inner  life.  The  concomitance  is  the  only 
interaction  there  is;  and  its  determining  ground  must  be 
sought  in  the  plan  and  agency  of  the  infinite.  Only  in  this 
sense  of  a  physical  concomitance  is  it  permissible  to  speak 
of  a  physical  basis  of  thought,  or  of  a  physical  foundation 
of  mental  activity.  And  only  in  the  same  sense  of  concom- 
itance is  it  allowed  to  speak  of  the  soul  as  building  and 


SOUL  AND  BODY  369 

maintaining  the  organism.  Each  is  adjusted  to  the  other 
in  accordance  with  the  plan  of  the  whole  ;  but  so  far  as  the 
two  factors  are  concerned,  the  connection  is  logical,  not 
dynamic;  and  any  dynamic  relation  which  we  may  affirm 
must  be  seen  to  be  only  a  form  of  speech.  We  may  use 
such  language  for  convenience  of  expression,  as  when  we 
apply  causal  terms  to  phenomenal  relations,  but  we  must 
not  forget  its  metaphorical  character. 

In  estimating,  and  adjusting  ourselves  to,  this  general  re- 
sult we  need  to  recall  the  distinction  between  the  inductive 
and  the  metaphysical  stand-point.  In  studying  either  life 
or  mind  the  inductive  scientist  is  in  his  full  right  when  he 
looks  for  the  phenomenal  or  experienced  laws  and  condi- 
tions, and  traces  them  as  far  as  he  can.  At  the  same  time 
he  must  be  reminded  that  these  laws  remain  on  the  surface 
and  contain  no  causal  efficiency.  If  he  could  trace  the  phe- 
nomenal order  into  minute  details  the  nature  of  the  causal- 
ity would  remain  unrevealed.  And,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
metaphysician  who  is  persuaded  that  the  infinite  is  the 
ever-present  source  of  all  things  must  not  overlook  the  fact 
that  the  cosmic  causality  proceeds  in  certain  ways,  and  that 
a  knowledge  of  those  ways  is  of  great  practical  importance. 
With  this  understanding  we  may  carry  on  the  study  of  the 
physical  basis  of  life  and  mind  without  the  least  fear  of 
seeing  them  vanish  into  mechanical  by-products.  And  see- 
ing that  the  soul  is  that  with  reference  to  which  the  organ- 
ism has  its  existence,  we  may  also  speak  of  the  soul  as  the 
builder  and  maintainer  of  the  organism.  There  is  no  reason 
to  think  there  would  be  any  organism  if  there  were  no  inner 
life. 

This  general  view,  however,  according  to  which  the  in- 
finite is  a  silent  factor  in  all  finite  ongoing  will  tend  to  re- 
strict our  theorizing  when  it  far  transcends  experience  and 
practical  interests.  Our  knowledge  even  of  phenomena  is 


370  METAPHYSICS 

very  superficial,  while  of  the  underlying  plan  which  condi- 
tions the  form  and  movement  of  the  whole  we  have  the 
scantiest  knowledge.  As  this  is  more  and  more  seen  to  be 
the  case,  abstract  and  theoretical  deductions  will  gradually 
be  restricted  to  a  reasonable  degree  of  extension  to  adjacent 
cases ;  and  whatever  lies  beyond  these  will  be  handed  over 
to  magazine  science. 

The  physical  and  mental  series  are  separate  and  incom- 
mensurable ;  it  is  conceivable,  however,  that  there  should 
be  a  correspondence  between  them,  such  that  a  given  state 
of  the  one  should  always  attend  a  given  state  of  the  other. 
Without  some  order  of  this  kind,  the  mental  life  would  be 
lost  in  hopeless  confusion.  This  would  be  the  case  if  the 
same  sense  stimulus  might  result  in  the  perception  of  differ- 
ent objects,  or  if  the  same  volition  should  lead  to  different 
deeds.  Both  knowledge  and  action  would  become  chaotic. 
The  need  is  clear,  however,  only  for  those  mental  states 
which  result  in  objective  knowledge,  or  which  produce  ob- 
jective effects.  The  matter  is  much  more  uncertain  when 
mental  states  are  concerned  which  arise  within  thought  it- 
self and  without  any  assignable  physical  stimulus.  The 
matter  is  further  complicated  by  the  modifying  influence 
of  attention  or  mental  distraction,  because  of  which  the 
physical  state  often  fails  to  be  attended  by  its  appropriate 
mental  state. 

When  we  pass  beyond  the  experienced  concomitance  and 
affirm  an  absolute  order,  the  result  is  unedifying.  Such  a  view 
can  never  be  submitted  to  a  practical  test,  and  can  only  be  a 
matter  of  speculative  fancy.  Whoever  will  reflect  on  the 
enormous  complexity  of  thought  and  feeling  and  their  mul- 
titudinous shades,  together  with  the  still  greater  complexity 
of  contexts  in  which  they  are  perpetually  occurring,  will 
see  that  to  find  an  exact  physical  representative  for  each 


SOUL  AND  BODY  371 

state  of  thought  and  feeling,  we  must  run  into  the  molecular 
realm  forthwith.  Whoever  further  reflects  on  the  complete 
ignorance  on  our  part  of  what  it  is  in  the  brain  molecules 
or  phenomena  which  fits  them  to  attend  any  thought  at  all, 
or  one  thought  rather  than  another,  will  see  that  this  field 
can  only  be  the  subject  of  lawless  imagination.  Any  one 
with  a  sense  of  logical  responsibility  will  content  himself 
with  tracing  as  far  as  may  be  the  concomitance  in  experi- 
ence without  affirming  any  absolute  laws  whatever. 

The  wisdom  of  this  last  position  is  seen  on  contemplating 
the  unwisdom  of  those  who  have  sought  to  find  a  physical 
correspondence  for  every  mental  fact.  The  imagination 
has  run  riot  in  mythological  molecular  constructions.  "  Neu- 
rotic diagrams,"  "apperception  and  ideational centres"  have 
been  invented.  Cells,  vibrations,  and  nascent  motor  exci- 
tations in  rich  variety  have  been  feigned ;  and  these  are 
supposed  in  some  unexplained  way  to  stand  for  mental 
facts,  and  in  imaginary  fluctuations  and  permutations  to 
express  the  laws  and  relations  of  the  facts.  The  mental 
facts,  as  qualitative  data  of  consciousness  and  in  their  ideal 
logical  relations,  are  too  refined  for  our  understanding. 
Hence  we  first  interpret  them  into  a  series  of  physical  fic- 
tions, which  soon  pass  for  the  facts  themselves,  and  then 
we  victoriously  deduce  the  mental  life  by  an  exegesis  of 
our  metaphors. 

It  would  be  impossible  adequately  to  express  the  illogical 
and  fictitious  character  of  most  of  this  work.  .The  specu- 
lator is  unable  to  grasp  the  mental  facts  in  their  unpictura- 
ble  nature,  and  substitutes  for  them  some  physical  image. 
The  only  demand  he  makes  upon  this  image  is  that  it  shall 
be  easily  pictured.  Then  come  fictitious  and  improvised 
anatomy  and  a  great  cloud  of  whimsies  about  cells  and 
fibres  and  nascent  motor  excitations  and  inter-cellular  ac- 
tivities. But  whoever  affirms  such  things  is  bound  in  logic 


372  METAPHYSICS 

either  to  show  by  analysis  of  the  mental  life  that  we  must 
affirm  the  facts  in  question,  or  else  by  observation  and  ex- 
periment to  prove  that  these  facts  exist,  and  especially  that 
they  exist  in  the  alleged  correlation  with  the  mental  facts. 
That  brain-cells  and  fibres  exist  is  far  enough  from  proving 
that  they  have  any  such  functions  and  relations  as  our  pic- 
torial psychology  ascribes  to  them.  The  strict  application 
of  this  rule  would  probably  make  a  solitude  and  a  grateful 
silence  in  this  region,  and  would  result  in  a  somewhat  ag- 
nostic attitude  towards  all  speculation  on  this  subject  which 
goes  beyond  some  general  principles  which  may  be  verified 
in  experience.  Such  are. the  general  laws  of  concomitant 
development,  laws  of  habit,  laws  of  health,  laws  of  rest  and 
repair,  general  laws  of  the  influence  of  body  on  mind  and 
of  mind  on  body.  We  know  that  the  physical  echoes  the 
mental  and  that  the  mental  varies  with  the  physical.  Laws 
of  this  kind  lie  open  to  investigation ;  but  whatever  lies  be- 
yond them  in  the  way  of  abstract  speculation  is  to  be  re- 
ceived with  the  utmost  caution.  Most  of  what  has  been 
done  in  this  field  is  a  sad  reflection  on  human  intelligence. 

Origin  of  Souls 

On  this  subject  only  two  views  are  self -consistent,  the 
creation  of  souls,  or  the  reduction  of  mental  phenomena  to 
functions  of  organization.  The  second  view  is  materialism, 
and  has  been  finally  condemned. 

The  first  view  may  be  held  in  a  double  form.  We  may 
suppose  that  souls  were  all  produced  by  some  original  crea- 
tive act,  or  that  they  are  individually  produced  in  connec- 
tion with  the  individual  organism.  The  former  conception 
would  give,  so  far  as  this  life  is  concerned,  the  doctrine  of 
the  pre-existence  of  souls  and  possibly  some  form  of  trans- 
migration, or  metempsychosis. 


SOUL  AND  BODY  373 

This  doctrine  of  pre-existence  has  found  favor  with  some 
speculative  and  religious  dreamers,  but  it  is  so  utterly  with- 
out any  positive  foundation  or  speculative  advantage,  and 
involves  us  in  so  many  gratuitous  difficulties,  that  it  is  likely 
to  be  confined  to  the  dreamers.  An  existence  in  which  the 
solution  of  personality  is  so  complete  as  this  view  would  de- 
mand would  be  only  verbally  the  same.  Practically,  then, 
we  are  shut  up  to  affirm  the  individual  creation  of  souls  in 
connection  with  individual  earthly  existence. 

This  view,  however,  has  not  always  found  favor.  Theo- 
logians especially  have  found  it  a  stumbling-block,  and  have 
sought  a  more  excellent  way.  The  soul  of  the  child  is  said 
to  be  in  some  way  derived  from  the  parents,  the  doctrine 
of  traducianism.  It  is  held  that  there  is  a  law,  or  a  world- 
order,  according  to  which  souls  are  produced,  yet  without 
being  created  outright.  This  is  vague.  A  law,  or  world- 
order,  is  only  a  conception  and  always  needs  some  agent  or 
agents  for  its  realization.  Hence,  to  make  this  theory  in- 
telligible, we  must  know  what  the  agents  are  which  produce 
the  effect.  If  it  be  said  that  God  has  made  the  elements 
such  that  when  combined  in  certain  ways  mental  phenomena 
result,  this  is  simple  materialism.  If  it  be  said  that  when 
the  elements  are  combined  in  certain  ways  a  substantial 
soul  results,  this  is  to  allow  creation ;  but  it  does  not  tell  us 
what  creates.  But  the  fancy  that  the  elements,  or  the 
souls  of  the  parents,  have  power  to  create  a  being  beyond 
themselves,  or  that  they  give  off  something  out  of  which 
new  souls  can  be  made,  is  utterly  untenable.  Emanation, 
budding,  fission,  division,  and  composition  of  any  kind  are 
forbidden  by  the  necessary  unity  of  the  soul.  There  is 
nothing  to  do  but  to  fall  back  on  the  world-ground,  or  God, 
and  say  that  where  and  when  the  divine  plan,  which  is  the 
law  of  cosmic  activity,  calls  for  it,  there  and  then  a  soul 
begins  its  existence  and  development.  It  is  not  the  out- 


374  METAPHYSICS 

come  of  its  finite  antecedents,  but  is  a  new  beginning  in  the 
system  and  is  immediately  posited  by  the  infinite. 

There  are  two  classes  of  difficulties  that  meet  us  here. 
The  first  class  springs  from  the  imagination.  "We  try  to 
picture  the  operation  in  terms  of  s^ace.  We  tend  to  con- 
ceive the  soul  as  a  thing  to  be  brought  from  somewhere, 
probably  from  some  extra-siderial  region,  and  we  are  puz- 
zled concerning  the  bringer  and  his  space  relations.  In  ad- 
dition, there  is  a  fancy  that  the  divine  agent  must  appear 
among  the  phenomenal  antecedents,  a  conception  which 
both  science  and  religion  would  perhorresce.  The  matter 
admits  of  being  treated  in  a  very  pleasant  and  lively  fashion ; 
and  when  the  various  fancies  are  traced  in  detail  the  con- 
ception seems  to  perish  of  its  own  irreverent  absurdity. 
But  all  of  these  whimsies  disappear  when  we  see  that  all 
finite  reality  has  its  spaceless  roots'  in  the  omnipresent  di- 
vine, and  that  all  things  stand  or  move  or  come  to  pass  be- 
cause of  the  immanent  God.  The  divine  immanence  and 
the  non-spatiality  of  the  real,  in  distinction  from  the  appar- 
ent, remove  the  difficulties  arising  from  the  imagination 
and  the  deistic  type  of  philosophy  with  its  absentee  God. 

If  then  we  ask  how  souls  originate,  the  answer  will  fall 
out  differently  according  to  our  stand-point.  If  we  occupy 
the  phenomenal  or  inductive  stand-point  the  answer  will 
recite  the  various  phenomenal  conditions  revealed  in  expe- 
rience. If  we  are  seeking  for  the  essential  causality  no 
answer  can  be  complete  which  omits  God. 

The  second  class  of  difficulties  referred  to  arises  from  sev- 
eral sources,  theological  and  moral  exigencies  and  the  facts 
of  heredity.  All  of  these  taken  together  are  supposed  to 
disprove  the  direct  creation  of  souls. 

The  strictly  theological  exigencies  are  mainly  connected 
with  the  doctrine  of  original  sin  and  its  transmitted  guilt. 
Some  have  thought  that  a  doctrine  of  creation  would  cut 


SOUL  AND  BODY  375 

off  the  entail  or  the  corruption  of  blood.  This  difficulty  is 
fast  becoming  obsolete. 

The  moral  exigencies  arise  from  the  supposed  difficulty 
in  assuming  that  God  should  make  morally  imperfect  souls. 
And  human  beings,  by  the  time  they  exhibit  any  moral 
traits,  often  show  such  earthiness  that  we  hardly  like  to 
think  of  them  as  fresh  from  the  hand  of  God. 

This  difficulty  impresses  the  imagination  and  a  certain 
demure  type  of  piety,  but  traducianism  offers  no  way  out. 
Its  metaphysical  untenability  has  already  appeared.  Par- 
ents are  not  creators.  They  and  their  deeds  are  only  the 
occasions  on  which  the  world-ground  produces  effects  and 
introduces  new  factors  into  the  system.  Neither  can  the 
unaesthetic  and  unseemly  features  of  the  case  be  removed 
by  introducing  any  sort  of  mechanism  between  the  creator 
and  the  final  product.  Eesponsibility  cannot  be  diminished 
by  employing  machinery  to  do  our  work. 

The  argument  from  heredity  mostly  mistakes  a  theory  of 
the  fact  for  the  fact  itself.  The  fact  is  simply  a  certain 
similarity  between  parents  and  children.  There  is  likewise 
often  a  certain  dissimilarity.  The  likeness  which  the  gen- 
eral type  demands  is  supposed  to  be  a  matter  of  course. 
The  likeness  which  relates  to  specific  peculiarities  is  referred 
to  heredity.  If  it  refers  to  remote  ancestors  it  is  atavism, 
or  a  case  of  reversion,  etc.  The  unlikeness  is  referred  to 
variation,  or  possibly  the  instability  of  the  homogeneous,  or 
some  other  formidable  phrase. 

The  likenesses  and  unlikenesses  among  genealogically 
connected  individuals  are  the  fact ;  all  else  is  theory.  The 
likenesses  are  explained  by  heredity.  But  heredity  is  a 
metaphor.  In  a  literal  sense  one  individual  can  inherit 
nothing  from  another.  Soul  substance  admits  of  no  division. 
Qualities  can  neither  propagate  themselves  nor  be  passed 
along.  "We  are  led  by  experience  to  expect  certain  similar- 


376  METAPHYSICS 

ities  between  the  generations,  though  in  most  cases  we  have 
to  wait  for  the  facts  to  declare  themselves.  But  the  ulti- 
mate ground  of  the  relation,  whether  of  likeness  or  unlike- 
ness,  must  be  sought  not  in  the  finite  series  itself,  but  in 
the  plan  of  the  infinite  power  which  produces  individuals 
and  determines  their  nature.  Of  course  this  conclusion  does 
not  forbid  our  availing  ourselves  of  all  the  knowledge  which 
experience  may  furnish  in  this  field,  neither  does  it  deny 
that  this  knowledge  often  has  great  practical  value ;  it  only 
warns  against  the  fancy  that  the  facts  explain  themselves, 
or  that  they  can  be  explained  by  figures  of  speech.  The 
wild  work  of  popular  writers  on  this  subject  and  of  students 
of  genealogies,  particularly  of  their  own  family,  is  distress- 
ingly familiar.  The  theme  readily  lends  itself  to  fine  writ- 
ing, and  has  been  prolific  of  not  a  little  rhetoric. 

What  we  have  said  thus  far  applies  to  heredity  in  the 
mental  field.  As  a  theory  in  speculative  biology,  the  doc- 
trine of  heredity  generally  contradicts  itself.  In  a  scheme 
which  builds  on  fixed  physical  elements  with  fixed  forces 
and  laws,  there  is  no  place  for  heredity  of  any  kind,  except 
as  a  description  of  the  successive  phases  of  a  phenomenal 
order.  It  would  be  such  heredity  as  might  exist  among 
the  successive  combinations  in  a  kaleidoscope.  And  if  we 
begin  without  such  forces  and  laws  we  lose  ourselves  in  a 
primal  indefiniteness  which  would  found  nothing  and  be 
nothing ;  and  out  of  this  we  could  never  emerge  except  by 
verbal  incantations  about  differentiation  and  integration. 
It  would  be  an  interesting  task  to  determine  the  meaning 
of  heredity,  habit,  and  such  terms  in  a  purely  physical  sys- 
tem ;  and  it  might  not  be  easy  to  do  much  in  biological 
speculation  with  the  resultant  conceptions.  Out  of  some 
vague  sense  of  this  implicit  contradiction  has  arisen  in  un- 
clear minds  a  tendency  to  confound  both  realms — to  vitalize 
matter  and  devitalize  life.  Physical  laws  are  spoken  of  as 


SOUL  AND  BODY  377 

"  only  the  fixed  habits  of  the  elements,"  and  habits  in  living 
things  are  simply  the  greater  facility  due  to  the  removal  of 
mechanical  obstruction.  Thus  the  two  realms  are  happily 
approximated  in  word,  which  is  the  main  thing ;  and  the  work 
is  completed  by  a  discussion  of  the  "  psychology  of  the  cell" 
and  the  "  psychology  of  the  micro-organisms."  Both  physical 
and  mental  science  cannot  fail  to  be  greatly  advanced  by  these 
violent  plunges  into  the  depths  of  antithetical  absurdities. 

The  ontological  individuality  and  separateness  of  souls  va- 
cate all  such  questions  as  whether  the  human  mind  devel- 
ops from  the  brute  mind;  whether  they  differ  in  kind  or 
only  in  degree.  There  is  no  human  mind  and  no  brutes- 
mind,  but  minds,  no  one  of  which  develops  from  any  other,  ^ 
or  inherits  anything  from  any  other.  The  possibility  of  ar- 
ranging these  in  ascending  linear  order  is  only  a  logical  one, 
and  it  in  no  way  does  away  with  the  metaphysical  separate- 
ness  and  incommunicability  of  each  individual.  The  fact 
that  they  appear  in  connection  with  a  series  of  organisms 
genealogically  related  decides  nothing  as  to  what  the  indi- 
vidual is  when  he  comes,  or  what  the  essential  power  is 
which  produces  individuals.  Popular  thought  finds  the 
causality  in  the  phenomenal  antecedents,  where  it  never 
can  be.  For  the  rest,  the  traditional  debate  does  not  touch 
reality  at  all,  but  only  the  contents  of  a  pair  of  logical  ab- 
stractions, the  human  mind  and  the  brute  mind.  If  the 
two  abstractions  were  found  to  be  identical,  the  concrete 
problem  would  be  as  hard  as  ever ;  for  this  consists  not  in 
a  verbal  shuffling  of  logical  symbols,  but  in  the  production 
of  a  series  of  concrete  minds,  each  of  which  is  a  distinct  in- 
dividual and,  except  in  a  figurative  sense,  inherits  nothing 
from  any  other.  It  has  been  mistakenly  supposed  that  the 
origin  of  species  is  the  great  problem,  whereas  the  impor- 
tant question  concerns  the  origin  and  nature  of  individuals. 
All  else  is  logical  manipulation. 


378  METAPHYSICS 


The  Future  of  Souls 

On  this  point  speculation  cannot  say  much  that  is  posi- 
tive. The  fact  of  experience  is,  first,  that  in  our  present 
'existence  the  mental  life  has  intimate  and  complex  concom- 
itance with  the  physical,  and,  secondly,  that  with  the  re- 
'moval  of  the  body  the  phenomenal  manifestation  of  the 
soul  life  ceases.  We  know  death  only  from  the  outside; 
what  it  is  from  the  inside  is  beyond  us. 

The  fact  that  consciousness  varies  with  physical  condi- 
tions is  often  used  to  prove  that  apart  from  the  body  the 
mental  life  would  be  impossible,  and  hence  that  for  the  con- 
scious life,  at  least,  death  ends  all.  If,  then,  we  admit  a 
soul  in  connection  with  the  body,  we  must  look  upon  its 
conscious  life  as  bound  up  with  the  existence  of  the  body. 

But  the  matter  is  not  quite  so  simple.  We  do  not  see 
that  the  body  is  necessary  to  consciousness,  but  that  ab- 
normal physical  conditions  may  derange  or  hinder  the  de- 
velopment of  consciousness.  On  the  most  realistic  view  of 
the  body,  it  might  conceivably  be  altogether  other  than  it 
is,  and  the  mental  life  might  go  on  just  the  same.  We  see 
what  we  view  as  mental  life  in  connection  with  the  most 
diverse  organisms.  There  is,  therefore,  no  a/priori  connec- 
tion between  the  mental  life  and  any  particular  type  of  or- 
ganism ;  and,  indeed,  we  are  quite  unable  to  tell  in  any  case 
what  the  present  or  any  other  organism,  could  do  as  a  ground 
of  mentality.  The  relation,  whatever  it  is,  can  only  be 
viewed  as  factual  and  contingent.  The  actual  body,  then, 
is  no  analytically  necessary  factor  of  our  inner  life.  We 
may  suppose  the  necessary  stimulus  thereto  given  directly 
by  the  infinite,  or  we  may  suppose  a  succession  of  organ- 
isms to  provide  the  conditions  of  higher  and  higher  mental 
life. 


SOUL   AND  BODY  379 

As  to  the  fact  of  future  existence  pure  speculation  can- 
not decide.  It  destroys  knowledge,  but  it  makes  room  for 
belief.  Criticism  makes  short  work  of  the  pretended  dis- 
proofs of  immortality,  by  showing  that  they  are  only  weak- 
nesses of  the  dogmatic  imagination.  It  equally  overturns 
the  sense  dogmatism  which  finds  in  the  spatial  and  ph}Tsical 
the  supreme,  if  not  the  only,  type  of  the  real.  It  shows 
that  the  physical,  even  if  temporally  first  in  the  finite  order, 
can  lay  no  claim  to  be  the  truly  real  of  which  all  later  fac- 
tors must  be  viewed  as  only  products.  The  reality  of  the 
finite  would  not  be  the  physical  alone,  nor  the  mental  alone ; 
but  both  alike  must  be  viewed  as  phases  and  implications 
of  the  thought  and  plan  of  the  infinite.  By  showing  the 
phenomenality  of  all  spatial  existence  and  of  space  itself, 
criticism  further  removes  the  difficulties  which  arise  from 
the  attempt  to  construe  the  soul  and  the  immortal  life  spa- 
tially. The  decay  and  failure  of  the  body  do  not  analyti- 
cally imply  the  destruction  of  the  soul,  as  would  be  the 
case  if  the  body  were  its  causal  ground.  The  soul,  when 
the  body  fails,  has  not  to  go  wandering  through  space  to 
find  another  home ;  it  is  continuously  comprised  in  the 
thought  and  activity  of  the  infinite.  God  gave  it  life,  and 
if  he  wills  he  will  maintain  it.  This  actual  existence  of  all 
things  in  God,  while  it  does  not  remove  the  mystery  of  our 
being,  does  diminish  the  sense  of  grotesque  forlornness  which 
the  conception  of  our  disembodied  existence  is  pretty  sure 
to  awaken  when  we  conceivs  it  in  spatial  forms. 

Speculation  makes  room  for  belief,  but  for  positive  faith 
we  must  fall  back  on  the  demands  of  our  moral  and  relig- 
ious nature,  or  on  some  word  of  revelation,  or  on  both  to- 
gether. Our  metaphysical  reasonings  on  the  nature  of  sub- 
stance do  not  help  us  here.  Speculatively  we  can  only  lay 
down  a  formal  principle  without  being  able  to  draw  any 
concrete  inferences  from  it.  As  all  finite  things  have  the 


380  METAPHYSICS 

ground  of  their  existence  in  the  divine  plan,  we  must  say 
that  they  will  continue  or  pass  away  as  their  significance 
for  that  plan  demands.  Of  course  we  are  ready  to  say  that 
only  moral  values  are  eternally  significant,  but  it  is  well 
not  to  be  too  sure  of  our  deductions  in  the  concrete.  If 
so  many  seemingly  absurd  things  can  exist,  there  is  no 
telling  how  long  they  may  continue;  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  there  are  few  things  of  such  supreme  value  as  to 
make  their  vanishing  a  self-evident  absurdity. 


CHAPTER  III 
OF   MENTAL   MECHANISM 

IN  a  previous  chapter  we  have  treated  of  mechanism  and 
mechanical  explanation.  We  seek  to  break  up  the  complex 
into  the  simple  and  combine  it  again  from  its  elements. 
We  look  for  the  elementary  laws  of  procedure  and  then 
seek  to  understand  the  fact  as  a  result  of  those  laws.  In 
the  mechanical  and  inorganic  world  this  largely  takes  the 
form  of  analysis  and  synthesis  according  to  rule,  or  of  de- 
composition and  recomposition.  We  break  up  the  body 
into  elements  and  regard  it  as  resulting  from  their  union,  etc. 

As  the  inorganic  sciences  first  attained  to  any  settled  and 
successful  method  of  procedure,  they  very  naturally  tended 
to  give  law  to  the  studies  in  higher  realms.  Accordingly, 
the  attempt  has  very  generally  been  made  to  carry  this 
mechanical  method  into  the  organic  and  mental  field,  but 
only  with  imperfect  success.  Explanation  by  composition 
is  possible  only  when  dealing  with  numerical  and  inorganic 
wholes,  the  parts  of  which  may  exist  independently.  But 
the  living  body  is  not  the  sum  of  its  parts,  but  the  parts 
are  functions  of  the  body.  The  organic  law  of  the  whole 
precedes  and  determines  the  parts;  and  the  parts  are  not 
parts  existing  by  themselves,  but  only  in  connection  with 
the  whole.  Neither  are  the  parts  mechanically  united  by 
mere  juxtaposition;  they  unfold  organically  through  the 
life  within. 

No  mechanical  or  spatial  representation  of  organic  activ- 


382  METAPHYSICS 

ities  is  possible.  And  the  mechanical  study  of  life  must 
be  confined  to  a  study  of  the  observable  phenomenal  laws 
revealed  in  organic  processes.  This  study  is  of  the  greatest 
practical  value,  but  it  remains  on  the  surface.  When  it 
claims  to  reveal  life  itself  it  loses  itself  among  showy  ver- 
bal generalizations  which  at  bottom  mean  nothing  or  are 
mere  assurances  of  dogmatic  theory. 

The  same  is  true  of  the  mind  in  an  even  more  marked 
degree.  If  organic  activities  cannot  be  conceived  in  spatial 
form,  they  at  least  produce  spatial  forms.  They  are,  then, 
allied  to  space  in  a  way  which  removes  any  manifest  ab- 
surdity in  speaking  of  them  in  space  metaphors.  But  when 
we  come  to  the  facts  of  psychology,  neither  the  mental 
subject  nor  the  mental  states  have  any  spatial  properties, 
and  these  properties  cannot  be  ascribed  to  them  without 
absurdity.  Yet  because  we  approach  the  mental  life  from 
the  physical  side,  and  all  our  language  concerning  it  is  cast 
in  the  moulds  of  matter,  there  is  an  almost  universal  effort 
to  express  the  life  in  spatial  and  mechanical  terms ;  and,  in 
analogy  with  the  inorganic  sciences,  composition  is  put  for- 
ward as  the  great  type  of  explanation.  As  masses  are  com- 
pounded of  molecules,  and  molecules  of  atoms,  so  all  com- 
plex mental  states  are  compounded  of  simpler  ones,  and  are 
to  be  understood  through  them.  This  is  the  conception 
which  underlies  the  "  synthetic  psychology." 

This  view  is  perfectly  natural  and  perfectly  clear  to  one 
who  approaches  the  mental  life  from  the  physical  side,  and 
without  the  critical  training  which  enables  him  to  see  the 
mental  facts  in  their  unique  and  incommensurable  character. 
The  result  is  that  a  fearfully  large  part  of  psychological 
literature  is  a  mirage  of  words  and  physical  images,  which 
either  conceal  the  facts  entirely  or  distort  them  out  of  all 
likeness  to  themselves.  Nowhere  has  the  fallacy  of  lan- 
guage wrought  greater  havoc  and  ravage  than  in  this  field ; 


OF  MENTAL  MECHANISM  383 

and  psychology  has  no  more  pressing  duty  than  to  throw 
off  its  age-long  bondage  to  figures  of  speech.  Of  course  in 
studying  the  mental  life,  \ve  must  look  for  the  fundamental 
psychological  laws,  and  must  seek  to  exhibit  particular  facts 
in  their  relations  to  these  laws ;  and  if  we  choose  to  call 
this  procedure  the  mechanical  method  or  the  scientific 
method,  there  is  no  objection.  But  we  must  never  forget 
that  the  supreme  thing  is  to  know  the  facts  themselves, 
whether  we  can  make  anything  out  of  them  or  not.  Ex- 
planation is  desirable  when  we  can  get  it ;  but  explanation 
by  distortion  is  unprofitable  business. 

Composition,  we  said,  is  the  great  type  of  explanation  in 
the  inorganic  field.  We  have  the  atoms,  and  by  variously 
compounding  them  we  explain  molecules  and  masses.  The 
associational  psychology  is  the  analogue  of  this  in  the  field 
of  mind.  Elementary  mental  states,  as  sensations,  are  as- 
sumed to  be  the  only  original  raw  material  of  consciousness, 
and  out  of  them  by  composition  the  higher  forms  of  men- 
tality are  built  up.  This  view  is  constructed  entirely  on 
the  model  of  physical  mechanics,  and  more  especially  on 
the  model  of  molecular  mechanics.  The  sensations  and 
their  traces  in  memory  are  the  units  of  the  mental  life,  and 
by  their  combination  they  are  supposed  to  explain  all  the 
higher  forms.  This  view  finds  its  most  elaborate  exposition 
in  the  Herbartian  psychology  ;  and  in  all  its  forms  compo- 
sition is  the  type  of  explanation  relied  on.  Compound  sen- 
sations, groups  of  sensations,  conception  masses,  are  phrases 
of  constant  recurrence. 

All  this  is  illusion.  It  arises  from  hiding  the  facts  be- 
hind physical  and  spatial  metaphors,  and  then  mistaking 
the  metaphors  for  the  facts.  Hence  the  need  of  rigorously 
inspecting  our  terms  in  order  to  detect  any  parallax  with 
the  facts.  All  spatial  terras  as  applied  to  mind  and  con- 
sciousness must  be  seen  in  their  figurative  character.  Things 


384:  METAPHYSICS 

or  events  are  not  in  the  mind  or  in  consciousness  in  any 
spatial  form  or  relation.  They  are  neither  before  nor  be- 
hind, neither  to  the  right  nor  to  the  left  of  one  another. 
To  be  sure  we  use  spatial  terms,  but  to  fix  the  meaning,  we 
have  to  pass  behind  the  terms  to  the  experience. 

If  then  we  ask  what  being  in  consciousness  means,  the 
dictionary,  and  etymology,  and  the  imagination  will  not 
help  us.  We  must  return  to  the  experience,  and  then  it 
turns  out  that  being  in  consciousness  means  what  we  ex- 
perience when  we  are  conscious  of  something.  Objects  are 
separated  and  united,  not  spatially,  but  consciously  and  logi- 
cally. They  are  comprehended  in  the  spaceless,  partition- 
less,  unpicturable  apprehension  of  the  conscious  mind  ;  but, 
as  mental  events  or  forms  of  mental  activity,  they  have  no 
spatial  properties  or  relations  of  any  kind.  Except  in  a 
figurative  sense,  then,  nothing  is  in  consciousness.  The  ex- 
act fact  is  that  we  are  conscious  of  certain  things ;  and  this 
consciousness  admits  of  no  representation  in  space  images. 
It  is  absolutely  unique  and  can  only  be  experienced. 

With  the  vanishing  of  space  forms  and  relations  from  the 
mental  states,  the  notion  of  a  mental  mechanism  begins  to 
grow  obscure.  When  we  have  distinct  things  in  space  we 
can  easily  picture  various  combinations ;  but  when  the  spa- 
tial relation  is  denied  we  begin  to  grope  as  to  the  meaning 
of  mechanism.  The  matter  is  still  worse  when  doubt  is 
cast  on  the  substantiality  of  the  component  factors  and  on 
their  dynamic  relations ;  and  this  doubt  emerges  as  soon  as 
we  consider  the  alleged  elementary  elements  of  the  mental 
mechanism. 

What  are  sensations?  Because  of  the  implicit  working 
of  the  category  of  substance,  they  tend  to  take  on  a  substan- 
tive and  even  a  substantial  form.  They  float  vaguely  in 
unclear  thought  as  a  kind  of  something,  mindstuff,  units  of 
consciousness,  or  some  such  thing ;  and  the  analogy  of  molec- 


OF   MENTAL  MECHANISM  385 

ular  mechanics  comes  to  our  aid,  and  the  mental  mechanism 
forthwith  becomes  a  solid  reality. 

We  see  how  the  notion  arises,  but  before  we  accept  it  we 
must  examine  it  more  closely.  Are,  then,  sensations  things, 
fragments  of  mindstuif,  or  elementary  substantial  units  of 
mentality  ?  Probably  no  one  would  answer  in  the  affirma- 
tive when  the  question  is  thus  barely  put.  An  indefinite 
amount  of  psychological  language  and  theory  implies  their 
thinghood,  but  a  little  reflection  dispels  the  illusion.  Well, 
then,  once  more,  what  are  sensations  ? 

Suppose  we  call  them  mental  states,  or  affections  or  mod- 
ifications of  the  sensibility.  They  certainly  are  such ;  but 
what  can  we  make  of  such  sensations  in  constructing  a  men- 
tal mechanism?  To  begin  with,  the  states  as  occurring,  or 
as  mental  events,  vanish  with  their  date.  They  are  perish- 
ing phantasmagoria  without  anything  abiding  in  them  or 
after  them.  With  such  data  we  can  construct  nothing. 
But  possibly  it  is  their  "traces,"  subconscious  or  nervous, 
which  abide.  This  notion  of  "traces"  can  be  easily  pict- 
ured, and  is  very  popular.  But  the  traces  are  in  the  same 
dilemma.  The  traces  have  no  identity  or  constancy  in 
themselves.  They  are  mainly  mythological  constructions, 
but  in  any  case  they  abide  only  as  Niagara  abides.  In  fact, 
as  our  studies  in  epistemology  have  taught  us,  in  the  tem- 
poral world  of  psychology  nothing  abides.  It  is  only  in 
the  ideal  world  of  logic  that  anything  abiding  can  be  found. 
It  is  not  the  sensations,  then,  as  mental  events  which  abide, 
but  rather  and  only  the  constant  meaning  which  they  ex- 
press, or  of  which  they  are  the  bearers.  This  meaning, 
however,  is  a  purely  logical  and  ideal  function,  and  instead 
of  constructing  thought  it  is  its  product. 

And  this  leaves  us  more  in  the  dark  than  ever  as  to  the 
possibility  and  even  as  to  the  meaning  of  our  mental  mech- 
anism. Both  the  spatiality  and  the  substantiality  of  the 


386  METAPHYSICS 

factors  have  disappeared ;  and  the  real  working  factors 
turn  out  to  exist  only  in  and  through  thought  itself.  With- 
out the  universals  of  thought,  the  doctrine  vanishes  into  a 
phantasmagoric  flux;  and  with  them  it  begins  with  the  very 
universals  it  claims  to  generate. 

But  the  deepest  depth  is  not  sounded  until  we  inquire 
concerning  the  dynamic  relations  of  the  sensations.  If  we 
conceive  the  sensations,  either  as  floating  free  or  as  affec- 
tions of  a  mental  subject,  there  is  no  answer  to  this  ques- 
tion which  does  not  either  commit  us  to  nonsense,  or  else 
subordinate  the  mechanism  to  a  higher  principle.  The 
nonsense  results  when  the  sensations  are  conceived  as  par- 
ticular and  separate  existences,  endowed  with  special  forces 
and  united  thereby  into  mental  groups.  We  see  this  as 
soon  as  we  remember  the  adjectival  nature  of  sensation,  its 
phantasmagoric  and  vanishing  character  as  mental  event, 
and  the  impossibility  of  forming  any  conception  of  inherent 
forces  in  such  a  case. 

In  the  other  case,  where  the  sensations  are  regarded  as 
affections  of  a  mental  subject,  we  cannot  work  the  doctrine 
without  appealing  to  some  higher  principle.  At  first  it 
might  seem  that  as  affections  of  a  unitary  subject  they 
would  necessarily  be  brought  into  interaction,  and  then  it 
would  be  natural  to  consider  them  as  endowed  with  inher- 
ent forces,  whereby  they  modify  or  combine  with  one  an- 
other. Herbart's  theory  is  the  most  distinguished  effort  to 
establish  this  view. 

This  doctrine  seems  simple  and  clear  until  we  try  to  un- 
derstand it,  and  then  it  is  seen  to  be  ambiguous  and  uncer- 
tain. By  sensation  we  may  mean  the  logical  contents,  and 
we  may  mean  the  psychological  activity  involved.  Sensa- 
tions in  the  former  sense  have  only  logical  existence,  and 
hence  have  only  logical  Delations.  Dynamism  is  absurd 
when  applied  to  logic.  An  inference  is  not  a  dynamic  re- 


OF    MENTAL    MECHANISM  387 

sultant,  but  a  logical  consequence.  The  mechanism,  then,  if 
there  be  one,  must  refer  to  the  psychological  activities. 

But  to  endow  these  activities  with  forces  of  mutual  at- 
traction and  repulsion  is  unintelligible.  Being  themselves 
but  flowing  forms  of  action,  they  cannot  be  made  agents. 
If  we  decide  that  they  are  at  least  separate  states  of  the 
subject,  and  thus  must  influence  one  another,  and  hence 
must  be  endowed  with  forces,  we  are  no  further  on.  We 
are  still  in  the  midst  of  ambiguity.  We  oscillate  between 
the  substantial  and  the  adjectival  conception,  and  between 
the  psychologic  flow  and  the  logical  fixity.  In  any  case 
there  is  no  way  of  dynamically  representing  the  relations 
of  the  mental  states.  When  several  impulses,  a?,  y,  2,  are 
communicated  to  the  same  body  J/,  they  unite  in  a  com- 
mon resultant  7?,  in  which  x,  y,  and  z  no  longer  exist. 
If  we  should  suppose  them  to  persist  as  separate  impulses, 
and  should  next  endow  them  with  attractions  and  repul- 
sions for  one  another,  we  should  have  precisely  the  problem 
in  hand.  The  forces  are  unintelligible  and  the  unity  of  the 
subject  disappears. 

The  problem  is  insoluble  from  the  side  of  the  mental 
states.  Any  relation  which  they  may  have  must  be  through 
the  unity  of  the  mental  subject ;  and  what  they  are,  or 
what  their  mutual  relations  may  be,  depends  not  on  them- 
selves, or  on  any  assumed  interaction  among  them,  but 
rather  and  solely  on  the  unitary  mental  nature  which  at 
once  determines  their  existence,  and  prescribes  their  recip- 
rocal relations.  This  is  the  higher  principle  to  which  the 
view  must  finally  appeal ;  and  of  this  principle  no  spatial 
or  mechanical  representation  is  possible. 

This  result  contains  the  answer  to  another  scruple  which 
may  arise.  At  all  events,  we  might  say,  the  mental  present 
is  the  outcome  of  the  mental  past ;  and  what  is  this  but  to 
say  that  it  is  the  resultant  of  the  past  ?  If  then  we  could 


388  METAPHYSICS 

have  exhaustively  grasped  the  past,  we  should  have  seen  the 
present  necessarily  resulting. 

This  is  a  specimen  of  the  vague  and  hasty  generaliza- 
tions into  which  the  uncritical  mind,  full  of  notions  about 
continuity  and  law  and  totality,  is  sure  to  fall.  But  not  to 
mention  the  uncertainties  involved  in  the  assumed  reality 
of  time,  the  suggestion  becomes  relevant  only  through  the 
further  assumption  that  all  that  need  be  taken  account  of 
is  the  particular  mental  states,  or  that  the  mental  nature  is 
exhaustively  expressed  in  them.  This  cannot  be  allowed ; 
and  if  there  be  a  mental  nature  which  determines  the  rela- 
tions and  resultants  of  the  mental  states,  the  claim  is  un- 
important, even  if  true.  It  would  be  like  a  claim  that  the 
development  of  the  organism  is  intelligible  if  we  consider 
not  only  the  actual  disposition  and  interaction  of  the  parts, 
but  also  the  immanent  law  which  determines  the  direction 
and  type  of  growth.  This  would  indeed  be  true,  but,  as 
assuming  the  ground  of  the  progress  in  the  assumed  data, 
it  would  not  be  a  great  contribution  to  knowledge. 

In  the  Herbartian  view  the  mind  is  simply  the  unitary 
subject  which  holds  the  elementary  mental  states  together. 
All  else  in  consciousness  results  from  their  interaction.  The 
mind  is  the  passive  stage  across  which  they  pass,  or  on 
which  they  unite  or  divide,  mix  and  mingle.  This  exactly 
inverts  the  true  order.  The  entire  movement  can  be  under- 
stood only  from  the  side  of  the  unitary  nature,  and  in  no 
way  from  the  side  of  the  particular  mental  events.  The 
view  itself  arises  from  thinking  in  sense  forms  and  physical 
metaphors. 

Thus  the  spatiality,  the  substantiality,  and  the  dynamic 
quality  disappear  entirely  from  the  factors  of  our  mechan- 
ism. We  may  still  retain  something  which  we  call  mech- 
anism, but  at  all  events  all  attempts  at  constructing  the 


OF  MENTAL  MECHANISM  389 

higher  forms  of  intelligence  out  of  the  lower,  all  explana- 
tion by  composition,  must  be  abandoned.  Sensations  are 
not  stuff  which  can  be  variously  moulded,  or  substantial 
units  which  may  be  variously  grouped.  Neither  are  the 
higher  conceptions  compounds  which  admit  of  being  decom- 
posed into  something  else.  They  may  emerge  only  under 
sense  conditions,  but  they  are  in  no  sense  made  out  of  them. 

The  matter  may  be  abstractly  put  as  follows :  Suppose 
that  #,  b,  c,  d  are  elementary  sensations  which  are  followed 
by  M.  M  may  coexist  with  a,  J,  c,  d;  and  then  the  latter 
would  not  be  the  components  of  M,  but  its  conditions.  Or 
0,  b,  c,  d  may  disappear  from  consciousness  and  M  takes 
their  place.  In  this  case  we  may  say  that  a,  J,  c,  d  have 
fused  into  M ;  but  this  would  be  only  a  metaphor.  Or  we 
may  say  that  a,  b,  c,  d  are  M /  and  this  would  be  false.  It 
only  remains  that  we  say  that  a,  b,  c,  d  are  conditions  un- 
der which  the  mind  produces  M.  This  does  not  contain  a, 
J,  c,  6?,  and  is  not  made  out  of  #,  5,  c,  d,  but  arises  under  the 
conditions  a,  J,  c,  d.  And  in  order  to  do  this,  there  must  be 
a  specific  mental  nature,  N,  which  contains  the  ground  of 
the  new  reaction  M;  otherwise  there  is  no  ground  for  going 
beyond  the  original  «,  J,  <?,  d. 

With  this  result  there  remains  nothing  of  the  mental 
mechanism  beyond  the  general  notion  of  law;  and  this 
must  be  restricted  to  phenomenal  significance  and  a  reason- 
able degree  of  extension  to  adjacent  cases.  In  other  words, 
we  must  restrict  ourselves  to  the  laws  we  find,  and  must 
hold  them  for  what  they  are  practically  worth,  without 
erecting  them  into  an  absolute  system,  dynamic  or  other 
wise.  But  the  mechanism  of  the  constructive  and  synthetic 
school,  whereby  all  higher  forms  are  deduced  or  built  up 
from  lower  forms  must  be  resigned  to  the  pictorial  psychol- 
ogists and  writers  of  popular  pedagogics,  who  have  always 
found  their  advantage  in  it.  As  the  material  mechanism 


390  METAPHYSICS 

of  nature  must  be  restricted  to  phenomenal  significance,  and 
in  many  cases  even  to  a  device  of  method,  so  the  mental 
mechanism  must  be  similarly  restricted.  In  neither  case 
are  we  permitted  to  think  we  are  dealing  with  the  real  fac- 
tors which  produce  the  phenomena.  In  the  case  of  the 
mental  mechanism,  the  alleged  factors  are  absurd  when 
hypostasized  as  realities  and  endowed  with  forces.  We 
have  absolutely  no  categories  which  will  furnish  any  in- 
sight into  the  causality  involved;  and  we  must  content 
ourselves  with  describing  the  phenomenal  order  as  it  is  re- 
vealed in  experience.  All  else  is  rhetoric  or  fiction. 

The  English  associationalists  have  never  accepted  the 
Herbartian  ontology ;  but  they  have  agreed  in  viewing  the 
sensations  as  the  raw  material  of  the  mental  life,  and  in 
viewing  the  higher  forms  of  mentality  as  resulting  from  the 
lower  forms  under  the  law  of  association.  They  have  also 
been,  if  possible,  even  more  unclear  than  Herbart  in  their 
conception  of  their  own  position.  They  waver  between  re- 
garding the  association  of  ideas  as  an  ultimate  fact,  and 
viewing  the  relations  of  contiguity,  similarity,  etc.,  as  forces 
of  mental  cohesion  and  movement.  How  to  give  such  re- 
lations dynamic  significance  is  an  exceedingly  difficult  prob- 
lem, and  has  commonly  been  solved  by  simply  using  dy 
namic  terms.  What  it  is  which  is  associated  has  also  never 
been  clearly  thought  out.  Is  it  particular  states,  or  logical 
universals  ?  It  is  generally  given  out  that  it  is  the  former ; 
but  we  have  seen  that  the  former  are  nothing  whatever  for 
intelligence,  until  they  are  elevated  to  the  plane  of  the  uni- 
versal. Purely  particular  experiences  admit  of  no  associa- 
tion, because  they  admit  of  no  existence.  And  when  the 
theory  sets  out  with  the  universals  which  it  professes  to 
generate,  its  success  ought  not  to  surprise  us.  But  the  fun- 
damental conceptions  being  thus  unclear,  it  is  not  strange 
that  their  application  should  be  full  of  uncertainty. 


OF  MENTAL   MECHANISM  391 

In  addition  to  explaining  construction,  the  mechanical 
process  is  supposed  equally  to  explain  reproduction.  Here 
rhetoric  has  wrought  some  of  its  worst  ravages.  "We  first 
substitute  physical  images  for  the  facts ;  then  we  h}Tposta- 
size  the  images  and  endow  them  with  forces,  and  finally  we 
regard  the  images  as  having  veritable  identity  in  time.  The 
result  is  a  grotesque  mythology  which  is  solemnly  taught 
and  devoutly  received  as  the  sincere  milk  of  the  psychologic 
word,  but  which  in  fact  is  the  crying  scandal  of  psycholog- 
ical science.  This  hocus-pocus  necessarily  results  from  try- 
ing to  represent  the  unpicturable  facts  of  psychology  in  the 
picture  forms  of  the  spatial  imagination.  One  must  read 
in  the  synthetic  psychology  to  get  an  adequate  idea  of  the 
extent  to  which  these  mythological  fictions  have  infested 
the  science. 

It  is  easy  to  see  how  the  illusion  with  respect  to  reproduc- 
tion arises.  We  recall  the  past,  we  say,  and  forthwith  we 
judge  it  must  have  been  somewhere  in  the  mind ;  how  else 
could  it  be  recalled?  We  have  knowledge  of  many  things 
of  which  we  are  not  always  conscious ;  and  when  this  knowl- 
edge is  not  in  consciousness,  where  can  it  be  but  below  con- 
sciousness ?  And  this  sub-conscious  region  is  easily  figured 
as  the  vast  halls  or  dim  chambers  of  memory,  where  the 
past  is  stored,  or,  more  scientifically,  as  submerged  strata 
in  which  traces  of  the  ancient  life  remain,  or,  both  scientif- 
ically and  philosophically,  as  filled  with  latent  mental  modi- 
fications and  sub-conscious  or  sub-liminal  mental  states,  or, 
as  the  last  word  of  the  objective  method,  as  filled  up  with 
nascent-motor  excitations  with  ideal  attachments.  Or  we 
may  endow  the  ideas  with  attractive  and  repulsive  forces 
whereby  they  repress  or  re-enforce  one  another.  And  if 
we  next  endow  consciousness  with  a  "  threshold,"  and  sup- 
pose that  when  the  intensity  of  an  idea  is  above  a  certain 
limit  it  is  in  consciousness,  and  that  when  it  sinks  below 


392  METAPHYSICS 

that  limit  it  is  out  of  consciousness,  we  see  at  once  that  re- 
production is  a  simple  matter ;  it  is  simply  the  reappearance 
above  the  threshold  of  ideas  which  have  been  in  the  mind 
since  the  original  experience.  In  all  of  these  cases  repro- 
duction consists  in  bringing  back  into  consciousness  matter 
which  exists  in  some  form  outside  of  consciousness.  Mem- 
ory, of  course,  has  no  longer  any  mystery ;  for  we  see  how 
the  same  idea  sinks  below  and  rises  above  the  threshold. 
This  sinking  and  rising  are  respectively  forgetting  and  re- 
membering; and  the  identity  of  the  idea  throughout  the 
process  manifestly  secures  the  validity  of  recollection. 

The  critical  reader  is  familiar  with  the  vast  amount  of 
this  matter  in  popular  psychology.  A  first  criticism  must 
consist  in  inquiring  into  the  meaning  of  reproduction  itself. 
"What  is  reproduced,  the  original  fact  as  mental  event,  or 
the  logical  contents  of  that  fact  ? 

The  question  answers  itself.  The  original  fact  as  partic- 
ular  mental  event  vanished  with  its  date,  and  can  be  recall- 
ed as  little  as  its  date  can  be.  The  logical  contents,  on  the 
other  hand,  have  no  psychological  and  temporal  existence. 
They  are  a  product  of  thought,  and  exist  only  in  the  ideal 
world  of  logic.  With  this  insight  all  that  elaborate  ma- 
chinery vanishes  as  an  imaginative  fiction. 

The  reproduction  of  an  idea  is  a  permissible  phrase  in 
popular  speech,  but  in  reality  it  would  mean  the  production 
of  another  idea,  psychologically  considered,  but  with  the 
same  logical  contents  or  value.  But  this  sameness,  as  only 
a  logical  identity,  exists  only  for  thought  and  in  thought. 
And  it  exists  for  thought,  in  the  case  of  reproduction,  only 
as  the  mind  relates  the  ideas  to  itself  and  to  one  another 
under  the  form  of  time,  and  then  assimilates  the  new  idea 
to  the  old  by  identifying  the  contents  common  to  both. 
Hence  reproduction  is  impossible  as  a  psychological  fact  in 
any  case;  and  it  is  possible  as  a  logical  fact  only  to  a  mind 


OF  MENTAL  MECHANISM  393 

endowed  with  memory.  Reproduction  could  never  be  known 
as  such  by  a  mind  without  an  independent  power  of  mem- 
ory. In  such  a  mind  there  might  be  a  stream  of  similar  ex- 
periences, the  similarity  remaining  unrecognized,  but  there 
would  be  no  suspicion  of  reproduction. 

When  the  speculator  assumes  that  identically  the  same 
things  recur  in  reproduction  and  are  known  as  the  same  as 
a  matter  of  course,  reproduction  seems  fully  to  explain  mem- 
ory. Or  when  he  supposes  that  similar  events  occur  in  ex- 
perience and  that  this  similarity  is  recognized  as  self-evident, 
once  more  reproduction  seems  fully  to  explain  memory. 
But  when  it  is  seen  that  both  sameness  and  similarity  are 
logical  relations ;  and  that  they  can  exist  in  this  connection 
only  for  a  mind  which  can  give  its  experience  the  temporal 
form,  and  identify  the  constant  contents  in  the  changing 
states,  then  it  is  plain  that  we  must  invert  the  order  and 
explain  reproduction  by  memory  instead  of  explaining  mem- 
ory by  reproduction. 

For  the  uninitiated  of  course  this  will  be  an  unintelligible 
refinement.  As  experience  occurs  in  time  it  will  necessarily 
recur  in  the  old  temporal  form.  And  when  we  think  of 
the  original  experience  in  its  temporal  order  and  relations, 
it  seems  about  self-evident  that  there  is  nothing  for  it  to  do 
but  to  come  back  just  as  it  was.  And  when  it  comes  back 
the  mind  will  recognize  it  as  a  matter  of  course,  for  how 
could  it  be  otherwise  ?  But  when  we  remember  that  mem- 
ory, so  far  as  it  is  in  time,  is  in  the  present,  that  past  expe- 
rience is  neither  in  the  mind  nor  out  of  it  in  a  spatial  or 
representative  sense,  that  ideas  have  no  local  tags  or  tem- 
poral signs,  and  that  events  can  be  in  time  for  the  mind 
only  as  the  mind  gives  them  the  temporal  form  and  fixes 
their  temporal  relations,  the  matter  is  no  longer  so  simple. 

Memory  itself  can  be  explained  by  nothing  but  itself. 
If  we  should  suppose  experience  registered  in  the  mental 


394  METAPHYSICS 

mechanism,  or  written  out  in  full  on  the  nervous  or  spirit- 
ual substance,  or  should  suppose  a  mental  mechanism  con- 
tinually producing  a  set  of  similar  ideas,  not  a  step  would 
be  taken  toward  memory.  The  person  who  finds  in  such 
a  fact  a  full  explanation  of  memor}'  merely  mistakes  his 
knowledge  of  what  is  to  be  done  for  the  development  of 
that  knowledge  within  the  mental  mechanism  itself;  and 
that  is  quite  another  matter. 

In  so  far  as  we  distinguish  in  reproduction  anything 
other  than  memory  proper,  it  must  be  brought  under  the 
general  notion  of  habit.  In  the  mental  and  organic  world 
facility  increases  with  practice ;  what  has  been  done  can  be 
more  easily  done ;  there  is  a  tendency  to  repeat  past  forms 
of  activity,  or  to  complete  them,  if  any  factor  of  a  past 
form  be  given  in  present  experience.  Here  belong  the  laws 
of  mental  association.  But  of  these  laws  also  no  mechani- 
cal representation  is  possible.  The  facts  have  no  physical 
analogue ;  and  the  application  of  physical  images  only  mis- 
leads by  a  false  appearance  of  knowledge,  while  they  really 
prevent  us  from  perceiving  the  true  nature  of  the  facts. 
The  mechanical  and  dynamic  categories  are  illusory  in  this 
field.  The  facts  cannot  be  pictured,  but  only  experienced. 
If  we  would  know  what  they  are  we  must  enter  into  con- 
sciousness itself,  and  note  the  experience  in  question.  All 
that  is  possible,  then,  is  to  seek  some  expression  for  the 
facts  which  shall  give  them  without  distortion,  and  without 
admixture  of  misleading  theory.  We  venture  the  follow- 
ing statements : 

1.  Thoughts  and  mental  states  in  general  are  not  things, 
but  mental  acts  or  functions.     As  such,  they  exist  only  in 
and  through  the  soul's  act ;  and  when  the  act  is  not  per- 
formed they  exist  nowhere,  whether  in  consciousness  or  out 
of  it. 

2.  When  in  a  later  experience  any  elements  are  given 


OF  MENTAL   MECHANISM  395 

similar  to  those  in  an  earlier  experience,  the  earlier  experi- 
ence is  often  reproduced  in  its  significance. 

3.  Reproduction  in  no  way  brings  back  the  old  fact  as 
mental  event.     The  mind  performs  anew  the  ancient  func- 
tion, thus  producing  a  new  experience  but  with  a  content 
similar  to  the  old. 

4.  The  past  is  not  in  the  mind  at  all  except  in  a  figura- 
tive sense.     The  fact  is  exhausted  in  the  power  to  rethink 
the  past  and  to  know  it  as  past.     This  power  of  reproduc- 
tion and  recognition  admits  of  no  deduction  and  is  a  unique 
fact  of  the  mental  world.     All  attempts  to  tell  how  it  is 
possible  overlook  the  essential  features  of  the  fact ;  and  the 
various  faculties  invented  for  its  explanation  are  abstrac- 
tions from  the  fact  itself. 

Nobody  can  remember  for  another.  The  notion  of  an 
organ  or  mechanism  to  remember  with  is  ludicrous.  After 
notebooks,  memoranda,  brain  registers,  vibrations,  vibra- 
tiuncles,  and  nascent-motor  excitations  have  done  their  best, 
there  is  still  no  provision  for  the  unique  act  of  memory. 
The  living  mind  must  do  this  for  itself.  And  the  laws  of 
association  may  not  be  looked  upon  as  causal  or  as  being 
anything  more  than  descriptive  specifications  of  a  process 
which  admits  of  no  construction.  The  explanation  they 
give  consists  in  classification  and  leads  to  no  insight.  When 
a  so-called  fact  of  reproduction  occurs,  we  classify  it  under 
one  or  another  of  the  laws  of  association,  but  we  have  no 
knowledge  of  the  inner  nature  of  the  fact.  And  assuming 
the  law,  we  commonly  have  to  content  ourselves  with  find- 
ing our  way  from  the  fact  to  the  law  without  being  able  to 
reverse  the  process  and  pass  from  the  law  to  the  fact.  What 
associations  a  given  fact  will  call  up  is  beyond  us.  We  have 
to  wait  and  see ;  and  then  we  may  possibly  find  some  law 
exemplified.  Of  course  we  fancy  that  if  we  knew  all  the 
past  history  of  a  mind  and  its  present  circumstances  as  well, 


396  METAPHYSICS 

we  could  foretell  the  course  of  association ;  but  this  amounts 
only  to  saying  that  there  is  a  sufficient  reason  in  the  case. 
What  it  is  or  how  to  conceive  it  remains  as  dark  as  ever. 
The  attempt  to  conceive  it  in  mechanical  terms  and  spatial 
figures  leads  to  absurdity,  and  beyond  these  all  is  mystery. 

For  form's  sake  a  word  may  be  devoted  to  the  fancy  that 
this  mystery  of  reproduction  is  greatly  cleared  up  by  fall- 
ing back  upon  the  brain  as  the  seat  of  the  mental  mechanism. 
Only  suppose  ideas  to  have  physical  representatives  in  the 
brain  and  light  begins  to  break  in.  These  representatives 
abide,  and  by  their  dynamic  relations  determine  one  an- 
other, and  thus  mediately  they  determine  the  ideas.  Hence 
all  that  takes  place  in  consciousness  is  but  the  echo  of  a 
series  of  activities  in  the  brain. 

For  all  who  think  in  pictures  this  view  is  a  relief.  Re- 
production as  a  psychological  process  is  fairly  obscure,  when 
the  problem  is  understood ;  but  "  this  looks  better.  One 
sees  both  where  and  how."  It  is  in  the  brain  that  the  work 
is  done;  and  the  nerve  cells  or  nascent-motor  excitations 
are  fully  equal  to  the  task. 

With  a  few  additions  this  theory  would  be  adequate : 

1.  There  is  needed  an  independent  power  of  memory  in 
the  mind  itself.     Without  this  there  might  be  in  a  way  a 
recurrence  of  experience,  but  never  an  experience  of  recur- 
rence.    This  apart  from  the  fact  that  mind  is  needed  to 
make  the  mechanism  itself  possible. 

2.  There  is  needed  a  parallel  reproductive  activity  in  the 
mind  itself.     However  wonderfully  the  nascent -motor  ex- 
citations might  work,  the  product  would  be  non  -  existent 
for  the  mind  unless  it  built  it  up  within  and  for  itself. 

3.  There  is  need  for  some  exposition  of  the  meaning  of 
the  doctrine  itself.     Of  course  knowledge  is  not  in  the  brain, 
for  that  is  purely  a  function  of  consciousness ;  and  the  re- 


OF   MENTAL    MECHANISM  397 

lations  which  constitute  knowledge  are  not  in  the  brain, 
for  they  have  only  a  logical  existence  and  depend  entirely 
on  the  relating  activity  of  thought  itself.  And  what  is  true 
of  the  original  knowing  is  equally  true  of  the  later  remem- 
bering. It  all  lies  on  the  mental  side,  and  is  pure  nonsense 
when  located  on  the  physical  side. 

4.  Hence  there  is  special  need  for  more  light  on  the  nat- 
ure of  the  physical  representative.    Knowledge  being  many, 
is  the  representative  one  or  many?    If  one,  how  can  it 
equally  represent  the  many  ?    If  many,  is  it  a  cell,  a  fibre, 
a  vibration,  or  a  vibratiuncle  ?    Again,  if  one,  how  is  its  re- 
productive activity  differentiated  ?    And  if  many,  how  are 
the  many  activities  integrated  ?    By  differentiation  and  in- 
tegration respectively  perhaps. 

5.  There  is  need  for  some  proof  that  the  physical  repre- 
sentatives are  there.     No  doubt  the  cells  and  fibres  of  anat- 
omy are  there  as  phenomena,  but  what  is  needed  is  proof 
that  they,  or  anything  else,  stands  in  the  psychological  re- 
lations assumed  by  this  theory. 

With  these  additions  the  theory  might  be  made  adequate ; 
but  at  the  same  time  it  would  be  made  worthless.  The  con- 
fusion and  complexity  of  the  doctrine  have  been  unfolded 
at  length  in  my  work,  Introduction  to  Psychological  Theory. 

The  only  sense  in  which  the  brain  may  be  called  the  or- 
gan of  memory  is  that  in  which  the  brain  is  the  organ  of 
thought.  This  does  not  mean  that  the  brain  does  the  re- 
membering and  thinking  for  the  mind,  or  that  the  mind 
uses  the  brain  to  think  or  remember  with ;  but  only  that 
thought  and  recollection  are  cerebrally  conditioned.  This 
simple  fact  of  experience  is  made  the  occasion  for  the  fan- 
tastic whimsies  of  the  cerebral  theory  with  the  result  of 
immensely  increasing  our  difficulties  without  adding  any 
insight. 

In  the  Academy  at  Laputa,  as  reported  by  Gulliver,  there 


398  METAPHYSICS 

was  great  scientific  research  of  a  sort.  But  none  of  the  in- 
vestigations there  undertaken  equalled  the  vagaries  of  the 
cerebral  theory  of  reproduction,  consisting,  as  it  does,  main- 
ly of  improvised  anatomy,  fictitious  psychology,  and  picture 
logic. 

The  synthetic  or  constructive  psychology,  with  its  im- 
plicit category  of  composition  and  mechanical  combination, 
must  be  abandoned ;  and  psychology  must  be  largely  de- 
scriptive and  classificatory  rather  than  explanatory  in  the 
causal  sense.  The  description  and  classification  of  the  men- 
tal facts,  however,  are  important ;  and  when  the  work  is  ac- 
curately done,  it  is  much  more  valuable  than  fictitious  ex- 
planations. The  facts  will  remain  mysterious  in  their  inner 
ground  and  genesis,  but  they  will  be  known  as  facts.  And 
real  mysteries  are  more  valuable  than  unreal  fictions,  or 
sham  knowledge. 

It  is  important,  however,  that  in  the  classification  of  the 
mental  states  we  be  ever  on  our  guard  against  the  fallacy 
of  the  universal.  A  vast  amount  of  psychological  literature 
has  been  made  irrelevant  or  barren  by  this  fallacy.  The 
fancy  has  been  held  that  in  classifying  the  mental  facts  we 
come  upon  their  true  essence,  or  original  from  which  they 
spring.  Hence,  if  we  class  them  all  together,  they  are  sup- 
posed to  be  unified  and  traced  to  a  common  source.  This 
illusion  has  been  discussed  at  length  in  the  Theory  of  Thought 
and  Knowledge.  We  there  saw  that  classifying  things  does 
nothing  to  the  things  but  leaves  them  all  they  ever  were. 
We  unify  our  thoughts  or  get  a  more  convenient  expression 
for  many  things,  but  the  things  remain  as  distinct  as  ever. 
And  when  we  come  to  deal  with  the  things  as  existing  we 
have  to  pick  up  all  concrete  individual  elements  which  we 
dropped  out  in  the  classification. 

All  that  lies  beyond  this  description  and  classification  in 


OF  MENTAL  MECHANISM  399 

the  way  of  explanation  must  be  taken  as  we  find  it,  or  for 
what  we  can  make  out  of  it.  There  are  sundry  psycholog- 
ical laws  revealed  in  experience,  and  by  means  of  them  we 
can  get  a  kind  of  understanding  of  many  facts,  and  can  lay 
down  various  practical  rules  for  the  guidance  of  life.  But 
this  understanding,  even  when  it  is  more  than  simple  classi- 
fication, must  be  psychologically,  not  mechanically,  inter- 
preted. That  is,  it  must  not  be  interpreted  by  some  me- 
chanical scheme  of  interacting  forces  which  have  a  resultant 
in  time,  but  it  must  rather  be  interpreted  by  our  knowledge 
of  human  nature,  or  of  the  way  in  which  the  mind  works. 
In  the  latter  case  it  is  not  a  mechanical  resultant  under 
some  law  of  necessity,  but  rather  the  kind  of  thing  which 
our  psychological  experience  leads  us  to  expect.  How  this 
kind  of  thing  is  possible  may  lie  entirely  beyond  us,  being 
as  unanswerable  as  the  question  how  being  itself  is  possible ; 
but  as  we  find  it  given  in  experience,  we  practically  build 
on  it. 

For  instance,  suppose  a  new  interest  or  a  new  idea  arising 
in  the  mind  either  of  the  individual  or  of  the  community. 
We  get  absolutely  no  insight  by  endowing  the  new  idea 
with  dynamic  attractions  and  repulsions  whereby  it  modi- 
fies other  ideas  and  makes  a  place  for  itself.  We  may  in- 
deed use  such  language,  but  when  we  enter  into  ourselves 
we  find  it  impossible  to  make  out  any  tenable  meaning. 
But  by  our  general  knowledge  of  human  nature,  and  of  the 
way  in  which  the  mind  works,  we  are  enabled  to  form  some 
notion  of  what  to  expect.  Or,  after  the  fact  has  declared 
itself,  we  are  able  to  assimilate  it  to  our  general  knowledge 
of  humanity  so  that  it  falls  into  line  with  the  continuity  of 
experience.  This  is  the  only  explanation  possible  in  the 
case,  and  the  only  one  we  ever  get.  Such  insight  as  we 
possess  into  personal  character,  the  social  structure,  the 
philosophy  of  history,  is  obtained  in  this  way,  and  not  from 


400  METAPHYSICS 

a  fictitious  mechanism  of  ideas.  Of  course  no  one  denies 
the  laws  which  are  actually  found  in  experience.  Protest 
is  directed  only  against  distorting  these  laws  into  a  fictitious 
mechanical  dynamism. 

Understanding  of  this  type  is  further  complicated  by  the 
fact  of  freedom.  We  have  to  understand  the  action  of  a 
free  being,  and  not  the  movements  of  an  automaton,  or  the 
resultant  of  a  mechanical  combination.  But  here,  too,  some- 
thing can  be  done,  not  in  the  way  of  mechanical  deduction ; 
but  by  combining  our  knowledge  of  the  psychological  con- 
stants with  our  general  knowledge  of  the  way  in  which 
men  act,  we  can  form  some  practical  expectation  for  the 
future  and  get  some  idea  of  the  way  in  which  life  and  his- 
tory hang  together. 

In  estimating  this  result,  two  things  must  be  borne  in 
mind.  The  first  is  the  emptiness  of  most  general  terms  un- 
til they  are  illustrated  in  concrete  reality.  All  terms  which 
have  to  do  with  the  actual  remain  bare  forms  until  they  re- 
ceive their  contents  from  experience.  This  is  especially  the 
case  with  the  conscious  life.  Here  the  understanding  forms 
and  names  a  content  which  it  does  not  generate,  and  which 
can  be  realized  only  in  life  itself.  The  understanding  can 
name  a  certain  feeling  a  sensation,  a  color  sensation,  a  sen- 
sation of  red,  and  can  locate  it  in  the  category  of  quality ; 
but  all  this  is  empty  and  formal  without  the  original  feel- 
ing. And  when  we  are  dealing  with  the  latter,  we  see  what 
a  gulf  there  is  between  anything  the  understanding  can  ex- 
press in  its  formulas  and  the  actual  experience.  All  warmth, 
richness,  vividness,  and  immediacy  are  found  in  the  living 
experience ;  and  the  logical  form  is  only  an  instrument  for 
its  realization.  Logic  and  epistemology  give  the  general 
laws  of  thought  and  conditions  of  knowledge,  and  these  are 
of  great  importance  for  the  understanding  of  the  thought 
life ;  but  apart  from  these,  scientific  psychology  has  exceed- 


OF  MENTAL  MECHANISM  401 

ingly  little  value  for  the  knowledge  of  the  inner  life  or  of 
human  nature.  It  furnishes  a  terminology,  but  only  scanty 
insight.  It  reduces  the  multiplicity  of  life  to  a  few  general 
heads,  as  thoughts,  feelings,  volitions.  But  what  of  it? 
These  terms  are  vague  and  empty,  until  we  return  to  life 
again.  And  when  it  comes  to  a  real  insight  into  life  and 
human  nature,  a  professional  psychologist  would  be  about 
the  last  man  that  could  supply  it.  A  novelist,  a  poet,  a 
dramatist,  a  lawyer,  a  pettifogger,  a  stump-speaker,  a  society 
woman,  a  confidence  man,  might  well  have  a  knowledge  of 
human  nature  beyond  anything  that  all  the  psychologies 
in  the  world  could  furnish.  This  knowledge  must  be  gained 
from  the  study  of  life  and  literature,  and  not  from  formal 
psychological  treatises.  One  able  lecturer  on  experimental 
psychology,  indeed,  in  setting  forth  its  advantages,  urges  all 
lawyers  to  take  a  course  in  the  psychological  laboratory  for 
the  sake  of  greater  effectiveness  with  juries.  And  prophecies 
of  good  and  great  things  to  come  from  this  line  of  investi- 
gation have  abounded  and  still  abound;  but  up  to  date  there 
has  been  so  alarming  and  distressing  a  tendency  to  elaborate 
the  obvious  and  discover  the  familiar  that  one  is  compelled  to 
discount  the  high  expectations  created  by  the  advertisement. 
The  other  thing  to  be  borne  in  mind  is  the  fact  already 
often  referred  to,  the  impossibility  of  understanding  the 
mental  life  in  terms  of  anything  but  itself.  There  are  no 
back-lying  categories  by  which  the  mental  life  is  to  be 
tested,  and  through  which  it  is  to  be  understood.  It  is  its 
own  test  and  standard.  The  phenomenality  of  all  mechan- 
ism and  the  relative  and  methodological  nature  of  much 
mechanical  reasoning  must  put  us  on  our  guard  in  this  Held 
against  all  theorizing  which  cannot  be  verified  in  living  ex- 
perience. And  in  any  case,  we  may  never  view  the  mental 
mechanism  as  containing  the  productive  causality  of  the 
mental  life. 


402  METAPHYSICS 

It  is  on  this  practical  basis  that  human  life  and  history 
are  to  be  understood,  so  far  as  we  can  understand  them. 
In  this  way  it  is  possible  to  deal  with  the  individual  for 
practical  purposes ;  and  in  this  way  we  may  get  some  in- 
sight into  the  philosophy  of  history.  Not  by  fictitious  me- 
chanical constructions,  nor  by  feigning  unintelligible  neces- 
sities, but  by  applying  our  knowledge  of  mental  laws  to  the 
conditions  of  human  life,  we  can  get  some  idea  of  the  un- 
folding of  life  and  history  as  a  function  at  once  of  human 
nature  and  of  human  freedom.  To  be  sure  this  will  not 
give  us  an  "  exact  science,"  but  it  will  give  us  all  the  sci- 
ence we  are  likely  ever  to  have.  The  "  exact  science "  in 
this  region  up  to  date  consists  mainly  in  flourishes  about 
the  reign  of  law.  The  rest  is  largely  prophecy  and  adver- 
tisement; and  these  two  are  one. 

The  reign  of  law  is  an  excellent  phrase  and  represents  an 
important  fact,  but  we  have  to  use  it  critically,  not  dog- 
matically. We  must  inquire  what  the  laws  are  which  reign, 
how  they  are  to  be  understood,  and  what  insight  they  fur- 
nish. Laws  are  to  be  interpreted  in  their  own  field  and  in 
accordance  with  their  own  subject  matter,  rather  than  by 
analogies  borrowed  from  incommensurable  departments. 
Until  this  is  done  we  shall  have  ignorant  and  flighty  per- 
sons giving  mechanical  interpretations  of  life  and  history, 
and  setting  forth  that  due  reflection  upon  the  instability  of 
the  homogeneous,  or  the  conservation  of  energy,  or  the  fact 
that  motion  is  always  along  the  line  of  least  resistance,  will 
find  therein  a  complete  solution  of  all  our  problems.  But 
when  we  remember  that  there  are  laws  and  laws,  and  take 
the  laws  as  we  find  them,  we  may  hope  for  some  practical 
insight,  and  in  particular  we  may  hope  to  be  relieved  from 
the  mass  of  sham  knowledge  which  now  oppresses  us.  Any 
interpretation  of  phenomena  which  the  facts  themselves 
compel  will  always  be  accepted ;  but  grave  suspicion  at- 


OF  MENTAL  MECHANISM  403 

taches  to  all  deductions  from  abstract  phrases,  or  from  the 
reigning  cosmological  or  biological  speculation.  When  the 
fashion  changes  the  old  phrases  lend  themselves  equally  well 
to  any  other  deduction  whatever.  For  instance,  any  one  in- 
clining to  write  on  the  philosophy  of  history  can  reproduce 
the  familiar  contention  that  history  is  a  science,  that  social 
phenomena  are  subject  to  law,  and  then  naively  assume  that 
his  lucubrations  are  thereby  made  science  and  law ;  and  he 
will  not  be  so  far  off  from  the  beaten  track. 

Beyond  the  purely  psychological  laws  lie  the  laws  of 
logic.  These  are  the  great  formal  constants  of  thought; 
and  they  are  independent  of  all  mechanism.  They  admit 
of  no  dynamic  expression  or  representation. 


FREEDOM  AND  NECESSITY 

IN  the  previous  chapter  we  have  discussed  the  notion  of 
law  and  mechanism  in  mind.  We  have  now  to  consider 
the  general  problem  of  freedom. 

In  popular  thought  the  conviction  of  freedom  manifests 
itself  chiefly  in  connection  with  moral  responsibility  and  ex- 
ecutive moral  activity;  and  the  traditional  argument  for 
freedom  consists  in  appealing  to  the  sense  of  responsibility, 
and  in  pointing  out  that  freedom  is  a  manifest  implication 
of  this  and  other  facts  of  our  moral  nature.  This  argument 
is  by  no  means  without  weight.  For  common  sense  it  is 
the  chief  argument ;  and  for  the  critic  who  has  got  beyond 
the  superficial  dogmatism  of  mechanical  thinking,  the  argu- 
ment has  no  small  value.  In  the  study  of  various  classes  of 
facts  we  are  not  required  to  deal  with  them  all  in  the  same 
way,  unless  the  facts  themselves  admit  of  it.  Our  funda- 
mental obligation  is  to  deal  with  the  facts  in  accordance 
with  their  proper  nature.  If,  then,  in  studying  the  facts 
of  the  physical  world  we  are  led  to  the  assumption  of  an 
all-embracing  uniformity  of  law,  we  may  make  that  assump- 
tion for  the  physical  system.  But  if  in  studying  the  facts 
of  life,  of  conduct,  of  society,  we  find  it  necessary  to  assume, 
in  connection  with  law,  a  factor  of  freedom,  a  power  of 
choice  and  self  -  direction  within  certain  limits,  we  have 
equal  right  to  assume  it.  It  is  only  a  mind  misled  by  false 
notions  of  continuity,  and  without  a  due  appreciation  of 


FREEDOM  AND  NECESSITY  405 

logical  method,  which  can  take  offence  at  such  an  assump- 
tion. 

But  this  argument  from  moral  experience  is  by  no  means 
the  only  one.  The  assumption  of  freedom  has  manifested 
itself  again  and  again  in  our  previous  discussion  as  a  neces- 
sary factor  of  rationality.  There  has  been  a  very  general 
conviction  in  speculative  circles  that  the  belief  in  freedom 
is  an  offence  to  reason.  If  we  hold  it  at  all  it  must  be  out 
of  deference  to  moral  interests,  and  at  a  very  considerable 
sacrifice  of  our  intellectual  peace.  How  completely  this  in- 
verts the  truth  has  appeared  in  our  previous  discussion.  It 
has  there  appeared  that  faith  in  reason  itself  is  involved  in 
freedom,  and  that  the  denial  of  freedom  must  lead  to  the 
collapse  of  reason.  We  purpose  now  to  gather  up  these  vari- 
ous considerations  into  a  connected  statement,  in  order  that 
we  may  see  at  once  the  speculative  importance  and  neces- 
sity of  freedom,  and  also  the  superficial  conception  of  the 
categories  out  of  which  the  speculative  objections  to  free- 
dom spring. 

By  freedom  in  our  human  life  we  mean  the  power  of  self- 
direction,  the  power  to  form  plans,  purposes,  ideals,  and  to 
work  for  their  realization.  We  do  not  mean  an  abstract 
freedom  existing  by  itself,  but  this  power  of  self-direction 
in  living  men  and  women.  Abstract  freedom  exists  as  little 
as  abstract  necessity.  Actual  freedom  is  realized  only  as 
one  aspect  of  actual  life ;  and  it  must  always  be  discussed 
in  its  concrete  significance. 

A  very  large  part  of  the  discussion  of  this  subject  has 
been  vitiated  and  often  made  void  by  failure  to  keep  the 
concrete  definition  in  view.  Freedom  has  been  abstracted 
as  a  function  of  the  will  without  any  light  from  intelligence, 
or  impulse  from  desire.  This  is  a  fictitious  problem,  and,  as 
such,  can  receive  only  fictitious  solutions.  At  best  it  is  a 
mathematics  of  imaginary  quantities. 


406  METAPHYSICS 

Actual  freedom  is  no  such  fiction.  It  is  the  freedom  of 
thinking  and  feeling  human  beings  with  some  insight  into 
values,  and  a  complex  body  of  practical  interests ;  and  this 
freedom  means  simply  their  power  of  self-direction  within 
certain  limits  set  by  their  own  nature  and  the  nature  of 
things. 

Such  freedom  is  presupposed  in  every  department  of  life. 
It  is  implicit  in  the  assumption  of  responsibility  on  which 
ss  society  is  built.  The  moral  nature  in  both  its  mandatory 
and  its  retributive  aspect  is  absurd  without  it.  Moreover, 
this  power  seems  to  be  involved  in  the  very  thought  of  a 
personal  and  rational  life.  A  life  of  the  Punch  and  Judy 
type,  in  which  there  is  a  deal  of  lively  chattering  and  the 
appearance  of  strenuous  action,  yet  without  any  real  thought 
and  effort,  is  not  a  personal  or  rational  life  at  all.  A  life, 
also,  in  which  consciousness  is  merely  the  stage  on  which 
underlying  mechanical  impulses  masquerade  is  likewise  no 
rational  life.  The  purest  illustration  we  have  of  self-direc- 
tion is  in  the  case  of  thinking  itself.  We  direct  and  main- 
tain attention,  we  criticise  the  successive  steps  of  the  argu- 
ment, we  look  before  and  after,  we  think  twice  and  reserve 
our  decision.  The  process  goes  on  within  reason  itself,  rea- 
son supplying  the  motive,  the  norm,  and  the  driving  force. 
^Thus  life  itself  spontaneously  takes  on  the  form  of  freedom  ; 
and  if  freedom  were  an  unquestioned  fact  it  could  hardly 
manifest  itself  more  unambiguously  than  it  seems  to  do 
now. 

With  this  understanding  of  what  freedom  is  we  recur  to 
its  speculative  significance.  This  appears  first  in  its  bear- 
ing on  the  problem  of  error.  That  problem  lies  in  this  fact : 
First,  it  is  plain  that  unless  our  faculties  are  essentially 
truthful,  there  is  an  end  to  all  trustworthy  thinking.  But, 
secondly,  it  is  equally  plain  that  a  large  part  of  thought  and 
belief  is  erroneous.  Hence  the  question  arises,  as  a  matter 


FREEDOM  AND  NECESSITY  407 

of  life  or  death  for  rational  thought,  how  to  reconcile  the 
existence  of  error  with  faith  in  the  essential  truthfulness  of 
our  faculties.  In  discussing  this  problem  in  the  Theory  of 
Thought  and  Knowledge  we  saw  that  freedom  is  the  only 
solution  which  does  not  wreck  reason  itself.  In  a  scheme 
of  necessity  error  becomes  cosmic  and  necessary,  and  reason 
is  overwhelmed  in  scepticism. 

These  considerations  make  it  plain  that  the  question  of 
freedom  enters  intimately  into  the  structure  of  reason  itself. - 
It  is  a  question  not  merely  of  our  executive  activities  in  the 
outer  world,  but  also  of  our  inner  rational  activity.  Hence 
the  advantage  of  changing  the  venue  from  the  court  of 
ethics  to  the  court  of  reason.  In  the  former  there  is  always 
room  for  speaking  of  the  weight  of  motives,  or  of  the  strong- 
er impulse,  and  thus  we  fail  to  get  the  clear  illustration  of 
freedom  involved  in  the  passionless  operations  of  thought 
itself.  There  is  the  further  advantage  that  every  one  prac- 
tically allows  this  self-control  in  thought.  "We  are  able  to 
think  twice,  to  return  upon  the  argument,  to  tear  asunder 
the  plausible  and  misleading  conjunctions  of  habit  and  asso- 
ciation, and  to  reserve  our  decision  until  the  crystalline  con- 
nection of  reason  has  been  reached.  The  necessitarian  is 
impatient  of  bad  logic  in  his  opponent,  calls  upon  him  to 
clear  up  his  thoughts,  and  wonders  why  he  is  so  slow  in 
drawing  a  manifest  conclusion.  Even  the  materialist,  for 
whom  thinking  is  but  the  mental  shadow  of  certain  nervous 
processes,  expects  logic,  and  to  that  extent  attributes  free- 
dom. For  there  is  no  hesitation,  no  thinking  twice,  no  re- 
serving of  judgment  in  an  order  of  necessary  movement. 
There  might  possibly  be  to  an  outside  observer  a  mimicry 
of  such  hesitation ;  but  the  reality  could  not  exist.  In  such 
an  order  the  resultant  is  at  once  and  irrevocably  declared, 
as  in  the  movement  of  a  pair  of  scales.  If  we  should  make 
the  grotesque  assumption  of  a  series  of  mechanical  forces 


408  METAPHYSICS 

endowed  with  consciousness,  what  possible  meaning  could 
we  attach  to  their  demands  upon  one  another  for  logic,  or 
to  their  mutual  reproaches  for  failure  to  think  clearly,  or 
for  failure  to  hold  this,  that,  or  the  other  view  ?  Or  if  we 
suppose  the  scale-pans  or  their  loads  to  become  conscious, 
while  remaining  under  the  law  of  mechanical  resultants, 
what  meaning  could  be  attached  to  their  thinking  twice  and 
reserving  their  opinion  as  to  which  should  sink  or  rise? 
Imagine  a  scale-pan  debating  whether  to  rise  or  fall,  and 
finally  deciding  to  follow  the  heavier  weight.  The  farcical 
.  nature  of  the  performance  would  be  apparent  to  the  dullest. 
In  the  field  of  thought  proper,  every  one,  in  spite  of  him- 
self, assumes  that  reason  is  a  self-controlling  force.  Free- 
Vlom  in  thought  cannot  be  rationally  disputed  without  as- 
suming it.  Such  is  seen  to  be  the  real  standing  of  the 
necessitarian  argument  as  soon  as  we  transfer  the  discussion 
to  the  field  of  thought.  If,  then,  we  were  looking  for  the 
most  important  field  of  freedom  we  should  certainly  find  it 
in  the  moral  realm ;  but  if  we  were  seeking  the  purest  il- 
lustration of  freedom  we  should  find  it  in  the  operations  of 
pure  thought.  Here  we  have  a  self -directing  activity  which 
proceeds  according  to  laws  inherent  in  itself  and  to  ideals 
generated  by  itself.  And  any  one  wishing  to  find  his  way 
into  this  problem  of  freedom  will  do  well  to  consider  first 
of  all  the  relation  of  freedom  to  intelligence  itself,  and  the 
collapse  of  rationality  involved  in  the  system  of  necessity. 

Thus  far  on  the  significance  of  freedom  in  relation  to  the 
human  subject.  We  next  recall  our  conclusion  that  with- 
out assuming  a  free  cause  as  the  source  of  the  outer  world 
the  mind  is  unable  to  satisfy  its  own  rational  nature  or  to 
bring  any  line  of  thought  to  an  end.  We  found  the  con- 
ception of  causality  eluding  us  in  the  infinite  regress  and 
vanishing  into  the  absolute  flux,  where  thought  perishes, 
until  we  raised  the  conception  to  the  volitional  form.  We 


FREEDOM   AND  NECESSITY  409 

also  found  that  the  search  for  unity  and  the  desire  for  ex- 
planation and  for  the  unification  of  the  system  of  things  in 
a  common  source  are  alike  frustrated  until  we  pass  beyond 
the  order  of  necessary  and  mechanical  thinking,  and  rise  to 
the  conception  of  free  intelligence  as  the  source  and  abiding 
seat  of  all  existence.  As  we  need  the  conception  of  free- 
dom in  man  for  the  solution  of  the  problem  of  error,  so  we 
also  need  the  conception  of  freedom  as  the  source  of  the 
cosmos  to  make  it  amenable  to  the  demands  of  our  intelli- 
gence. 

Freedom,  then,  has  deep  significance  for  life,  for  science, 
for  philosophy,  for  reason  itself.  This  significance  will 
further  appear  if  we  next  recall  our  conclusions  respecting 
the  opposite  idea  of  necessity.  This  is  commonly  supposed 
to  be  clear  and  self-evident,  while  freedom  is  the  difficult 
notion.  This  illusion  is  pretty  sure  to  arise  in  the  early 
stages  of  reflection;  but  deeper  reflection  dispels  it.  We 
have  seen  that  the  only  clear  conception  we  have  of  neces- 
sity is  rational  necessity ;  that  is,  the  necessity  which  at- 
taches to  the  relations  of  ideas,  as  in  logic  and  mathematics. 
But  this  necessity  is  not  found  in  experience,  whether  of 
the  inner  or  the  outer  world.  The  elements  of  experience 
and  their  connections  are  all  contingent,  so  far  as  rational 
necessity  goes ;  that  is,  we  cannot  deduce  them  from  ideas 
or  connect  them  by  any  rational  bond.  The  necessity, 
then,  if  there  be  any,  is  metaphysical ;  and  this  logic  finds 
to  be  an  exceedingly  obscure  notion,  one  which  eludes  any 
positive  conception.  It  can  be  neither  sensuously  cognized 
nor  rationally  comprehended;  and  the  more  we  wrestle 
with  the  idea  the  worse  our  puzzle  becomes.  In  discussing 
the  categories  in  the  Theory  of  Thought  and  Knowledge  we 
found  it  impossible  to  do  anything  with  the  notion  without 
adding  to  it  the  further  notion  of  potentiality  ;  and  what  a 
necessary  metaphysical  potentiality  might  be  we  found  it 


410  METAPHYSICS 

hard  to  say.  It  must  be  in  some  sense  an  actuality,  or  it 
could  never  affect  actuality ;  and  yet  it  cannot  be  an  actual 
actuality  without  antedating  itself.  We  found  ourselves 
driven,  then,  to  distinguish  two  kinds  of  actuality,  potential 
actuality  and  actual  actuality,  without,  however,  the  least 
shadow  of  insight  into  the  distinction  between  them.  And 
in  order  to  do  this,  we  have  to  make  causality  temporal, 
which  is  impossible.  Non-temporal  necessity,  on  the  other 
hand,  would  be  motionless  and  would  lead  to  nothing.  Thus 
the  doctrine  of  necessity  finds  itself  in  unstable  equilibrium 
between  the  groundless  becoming  of  Hume's  doctrine,  in 
which  events  succeed  one  another  without  any  inner  ground 
or  connection,  and  a  doctrine  of  freedom,  in  which  the 
ground  of  connection  and  progress  is  to  be  found,  not  in 
any  unmanageable  metaphysical  bond  which  defies  all  un- 
derstanding, but  in  the  ever-present  freedom  which  posits 
events  in  a  certain  order,  and  thus  forever  administers  all 
that  we  mean  by  the  system  of  law,  and  founds  all  that  we 
mean  by  the  necessity  in  things. 

The  metaphysics  of  necessity  is  certainly  very  obscure, 
and  it  is  even  hard  to  keep  the  notion  from  vanishing  under 
our  hands.  Mr.  Mill  felt  so  strongly  both  the  difficulty  of 
the  notion  and  the  lack  of  proof  of  any  corresponding  fact 
that  he  proposed  to  banish  the  term  entirely  from  philosophy, 
and  replace  it  by  the  empirical  notion  of  uniformity.  But 
this  may  be  only  the  obscurity  which  attaches  to  all  ulti- 
mate facts ;  and  the  metaphysics  of  freedom  may  be  equally 
or  more  obnoxious  to  criticism.  This  indeed  is  very  gener- 
ally declared  to  be  the  case.  The  difficulties  alleged  con- 
sist mainly  of  misunderstandings. 

And,  first,  it  is  supposed  that  freedom  asserts  pure  law- 
lessness. This  is  a  closet  contention.  It  is  not  born  of  any 
observation  of  life  and  experience,  or  of  any  profound  re- 
flection, but  only  of  a  verbal  exegesis.  Freedom  every- 


FREEDOM  AND  NECESSITY  411 

where  presupposes  a  basis  of  fixity  or  uniformity  to  give 
it  any  meaning.  An  absolute  freedom,  unconditioned  by 
any  law  whatever,  is  simply  our  old  friend  pure  being,  and 
cancels  itself.  Even  for  the  absolute  being,  we  must  affirm 
a  fixed  nature  as  the  condition  of  freedom;  and  without 
this,  thought  perishes. 

Now  to  the  superficial  thinker  and  dealer  in  abstractions 
this  smacks  of  contradiction ;  and  so  it  must  as  long  as  we 
discuss  the  question  abstractly.  The  abstract  notion  of 
freedom  and  the  abstract  notion  of  necessity  are  contradic- 
tory ;  just  as  the  abstract  notions  of  concavity  and  convex- 
ity are  contradictory.  But  as  the  latter  notions,  though 
contradictory,  do  yet  contrive  to  coexist,  so  successfully  in- 
deed that  they  cannot  exist  apart,  so  it  may  be  that  the 
other  contradictions  may  be  reconciled  in  reality.  We  must 
then  look  away  from  the  abstract  notions  to  the  concrete 
facts,  if  we  would  get  any  light  on  this  problem.  There  is  • 
no  abstract  freedom  and  no  abstract  necessity.  We  are 
thrown  back  upon  experience  to  discover  what  the  facts 
really  are. 

And  here  we  find  a  certain  measure  of  self-control  and  a 
certain  order  of  uniformity.  The  former  "represents  the 
only  concrete  notion  of  freedom  which  we  possess ;  and  the 
latter  represents  the  only  concrete  notion  of  necessity.  Any- 
thing beyond  this  is  abstract  and  fictitious.  There  is  noth- 
ing in  experience  corresponding  to  it;  and  when  we  get 
into  these  depths  experience  is  our  only  test  both  of  reality 
and  of  possibility.  And  we  not  only  find  these  elements 
given  in  experience,  but  we  find  them  so  given  that  reality 
appears  inconceivable  and  impossible  without  both,  just  as 
concavity  and  convexity  must  be  united  in  any  real  curve. 

The  clearest  illustration  of  this  we  find  in  thought  itself. 
The  laws  of  thought  represent  absolute  fixities  of  mental 
procedure.  They  are  the  constants  of  the  mental  equation. 


412  METAPHYSICS 

without  variableness  or  shadow  of  turning.  They  repre- 
sent no  legislation  of  the  will,  and  admit  of  no  abrogation 
or  rebellion.  And  yet,  though  thus  secure  from  all  tamper- 
ing and  overthrow,  though  thus  existing  in  their  own  in- 
alienable right,  they  do  not  of  themselves  secure  obedience. 
For  this  there  is  needed  an  act  of  ratification  by  the  free 
spirit.  The  mind  must  accept  these  laws  and  govern  itself 
in  accordance  with  them.  It  must  watch  itself,  scrutinize 
its  processes,  tear  asunder  the  associations  of  habit  and  re- 
sist the  hasty  generalization,  if  it  would  reach  the  truth. 
Only  thus  do  we  become  truly  rational,  and  that  by  our 
own  free  act.  <  Thus  we  discover  freedom  and  uniformity 
united  in  reality ;  or  rather  we  discover  reality  as  having 
these  opposite  aspects.  It  is  not  compounded  of  them,  as 
if  they  pre-existed,  but  it  manifests  itself  in  this  antithetic 
way. 

Now  if  we  should  discuss  this  question  academically,  or 
with  abstract  notions,  it  would  admit  of  no  solution.  We 
should  be  in  the  same  plight  as  when  discussing  the  union 
of  unity  and  plurality,  or  simplicity  and  variety,  or  change 
and  identity.  We  found  that  the  mere  analysis  of  these 
notions  led  to  nothing.  We  had  to  fall  back  on  experience 
which  showed  us  the  ideas  actually  united  in  our  concrete 
intellectual  life.  And  we  further  found  that  we  have  no 
other  conception  of  the  concrete  meaning  of  these  ideas 
than  that  which  we  get  from  the  study  of  our  mental  ex- 
perience. 

In  any  case,  then,  the  assertion  that  freedom  means  law- 
lessness is  mistaken.  An  element  of  uniformity  must  al- 
ways be  allied  with  freedom  even  in  the  absolute  being. 
At  the  same  time  we  have  seen  that  this  element  becomes 
controlling  only  through  freedom. 

For  us  human  beings  this  element  of  fixity  is  very  prom- 
inent. To  a  great  extent  we  are  a  datum  for  ourselves. 


FREEDOM   AND   NECESSITY  4-13 

The  essential  nature  of  our  susceptibilities  and  constitutional 
activities  is  beyond  our  control.  So  also  are  the  laws  of 
thought  and  association,  and  the  general  laws  of  nature. 
"We  may  use  these  laws  for  the  attainment  of  our  ends,  but 
we  cannot  make  or  unmake  them.  We  are  also  members 
of  a  system  of  law ;  and  the  demands  which  this  system 
makes  upon  us  are  something  we  cannot  escape.  The  world 
of  sensation  and  the  resulting  desires  and  attention  and  re- 
flex action  are  only  to  a  slight  extent  within  our  power. 
We  are  shut  in  on  many  sides  by  walls  of  hewn  stone. 

Hence  human  freedom  has  only  a  limited  sphere.  It  does 
not  provide  the  laws  of  the  intellect,  of  the  sensibilities,  of 
external  nature,  or  the  possibility  of  its  own  action.  And 
within  its  own  sphere  it  is  far  from  absolute.  Only  a  cer- 
tain intensity  of  activity  seems  possible  to  it  in  given  cir- 
cumstances", and  when  the  resistance  to  be  overcome  is  too 
great  freedom  is  overborne.  Of  course  the  speculator  of 
the  all-or-none  type  will  take  offence  at  this  notion.  It  will 
be  equally  objectionable  to  those  who  insist  on  sharply 
drawn  frontiers.  But  both  of  these  classes  belong  to  the 
family  of  Unwisdom. 

This  general  conception  of  freedom  vacates  a  set  of  ob- 
jections drawn  from  the  postulates  of  science.  Science,  it 
is  said,  assumes  the  uniformity  of  law,  and  thus  excludes 
freedom.  Science  assumes  that  under  like  circumstances 
there  must  be  the  same  result.  Freedom  assumes  that  un- 
der like  circumstances  there  may  be  a  different  result.  The 
opposition  is  absolute  and  admits  of  no  mediation.  For 
mental  science  Mr.  Spencer,  in  his  Principles  of  Psychology, 
puts  the  matter  very  trenchantly :  "  Psychical  changes 
either  conform  to  law  or  they  do  not.  If  they  do  not  con- 
form to  law,  this  work,  in  common  with  all  works  on  the 
subject,  is  sheer  nonsense.  If  they  do  conform  to  law  there 
cannot  be  any  such  thing  as  free-will." 


414  .  METAPHYSICS 

This  is  peremptory ;  and  thus  we  seem  to  be  landed  in  a 
very  grievous  antinomy.  On  the  one  hand,  a  system  of 
necessity  destroys  reason,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  ad- 
mission of  freedom  is  fatal  to  science.  Fortunately  the 
antinomy  disappears  on  noting  the  purely  abstract  and  ver- 
bal character  of  the  objection.  It  tacitly  assumes  that  free- 
dom means  pure  lawlessness,  whereas  our  freedom  presup- 
poses the  order  of  law  as  its  condition.  Freedom  uses  this 
order,  and  science  studies  this  order.  Science  concerns  it- 
self with  the  modes  of  being  and  happening  among  things 
and  events ;  and  their  existence  and  nature  are  in  no  way 
affected  by  the  question  of  freedom.  The  forms  and  laws 
of  sensibility,  the  laws  and  categories  of  intelligence  are  not 
involved  in  freedom ;  and,  whether  we  affirm  or  deny  free- 
dom, these  laws  and  forms  exist  as  the  proper  subject  of 
psychological  study.  The  belief  in  freedom  vacates  the 
science  of  psychology  just  as  much  and  just  as  little  as  it 
vacates  the  science  of  physics  and  chemistry.  In  both  the 
physical  and  the  mental  realm  the  believer  in  freedom  finds 
an  agent  acting  in  accordance  with  an  order  of  law  and, 
by  means  of  that  order,  freely  realizing  his  own  aims.  Free- 
dom, then,  is  not  opposed  to  physics,  or  chemistry,  or  psy- 
chology, or  any  other  modest  science  which  studies  the  laws 
of  things  and  events,  but  only  to  "  Science  " — that  is,  that 
speculative  dream  which  aims  to  bind  up  all  things  in  a 
scheme  of  necessity;  and  this,  so  far  from  being  science  is 
simply  one  of  those  uncritical  whimseys  of  which  the  dog- 
matic intellect  has  ever  been  so  prolific.  Indeed,  this 
scheme  is  so  far  from  being  science  that  it  is  rather  the  de- 
struction of  all  science  and  of  reason  itself. 

The  heavy  speculative  objections  to  freedom  are  drawn 
from  the  supposed  demands  of  the  law  of  causation.  But 
these  also  rest  upon  a  misunderstanding  of  both  freedom 
and  causation.  Freedom  is  ascribed  to  the  will;  and  the 


FREEDOM  AND   NECESSITY 

will  is  abstracted  from  feeling  and  intelligence.  Thus  free- 
dom is  reduced  to  blind  and  lawless  arbitrariness,  and  loses 
its  value.  But  this  fiction  results  from  mistaking  the  ab- 
stractions of  psychology  for  separate  and  mutually  indiffer- 
ent factors.  Fortunately,  psychology  has  got  beyond  this. 
If  anything  is  free  it  is  not  the  will,  but  the  knowing  and 
feeling  soul ;  and  this  soul  determines  itself  not  in  the  dark 
of  ignorance,  or  in  the  indifference  of  emotionless  and  value- 
less life,  but  in  the  light  of  knowledge  and  with  experience 
of  life's  values.  Such  self-directing  activity  does  not  violate 
the  law  of  causation.  That  law  tells  us  only  to  seek  an 
agent  for  every  act,  but  it  does  not  tell  us  what  the  agent 
must  be.  So  far  as  the  law  goes,  a  self-directing  cause  is  at 
least  as  possible  as  any  other;  and  it  is  the  only  cause  of 
which  we  have  experience.  "Without  any  deep  speculation, 
the  question  of  free  causality  is  simply  one  of  fact,  so  far 
as  the  law  of  causation  is  concerned ;  and  when  we  look  into 
the  matter  critically,  it  turns  out  that  the  notion  of  causa- 
tion itself  vanishes  unless  we  raise  it  to  the  volitional  form. 
Of  course  we  cannot  tell  how  a  free  agent  is  made  or  is  pos- 
sible; but  still  less  can  we  tell  how  a  necessary  agent  is 
made  or  is  possible.  But  though  we  cannot  tell  how  a  free 
agent  is  possible,  we  have  some  experience  of  it  as  actual ; 
while  we  not  only  have  no  experience  of  necessary  agency, 
but  the  idea  itself  is  elusive  to  the  last  degree,  vanishing 
finally  either  into  a  groundless  becoming,  on  the  one  hand, 
or  into  the  infinite  regress,  on  the  other,  and  in  both  cases 
contradicting  itself. 

Another  quotation  from  an  able  writer  may  be  given  as 
an  illustration  of  the  abstract  method  of  viewing  this  ques- 
tion :  "  If  volitions  arise  without  cause,  it  necessarily  follows 
that  we  cannot  infer  from  them  the  character  of  the  ante- 
cedent states  of  feeling.  If  therefore  a  murder  has  been 
committed,  we  have  apriori  no  better  reason  for  suspecting 


416  METAPHYSICS 

the  worst  enemy  than  the  best  friend  of  the  murdered  man. 
If  we  see  a  man  jump  from  a  fourth-story  window,  we  must 
beware  of  too  hastily  inferring  his  insanity,  since  he  may 
be  merely  exercising  his  free-will;  the  intense  love  of  life 
being,  as  it  seems,  unconnected  with  attempts  at  suicide  or 
at  self-preservation.  We  can  thus  frame  no  theory  of  hu- 
man actions  whatever.  The  countless  empirical  maxims  of 
every-day  life,  the  embodiment  as  they  are  of  the  inherited 
and  organized  sagacity  of  many  generations,  become  wholly 
incompetent  to  guide  us ;  and  nothing  which  any  one  may 
do  ought  ever  to  occasion  surprise.  The  mother  may  stran- 
gle her  first-born  child,  the  miser  may  cast  his  long-treas- 
ured gold  into  the  sea,  the  sculptor  may  break  in  pieces  his 
lately  finished  statue,  in  the  presence  of  no  other  feelings 
than  those  which  before  led  them  to  cherish,  to  hoard,  and 
to  create." 

As  the  same  author  elsewhere  says,  "  Verily  the  free-will 
question  is  a  great  opener  of  the  flood-gates  of  rhetoric." 
This  is  more  abstract  closet  logic.  Freedom,  taken  abso- 
lutely and  verbally  exegeted,  would  imply  the  abstract  pos- 
sibility of  all  this ;  but  this  has  no  connection  with  the  con- 
crete problem.  Suppose  there  were  a  free  person  with 
experience  of  life's  meanings  and  insight  into  its  values  and 
obligations,  there  is  nothing  in  his  freedom  to  hinder  his 
acting  rationally,  or  to  excuse  him  for.  acting  irrationally. 
But  how  he  will  act  does  not  find  its  sufficient  ground  in 
the  "  antecedent  phenomena "  alone,  but  also  in  the  mys- 
tery of  self-determination.  And  this  is  something  which 
cannot  be  mechanically  analyzed,  or  deduced  as  a  necessary 
resultant ;  it  can  only  be  experienced.  The  attempt  to  an- 
alyze it  contradicts  it.  The  attempt  to  construct  it  denies  it. 
It  can  only  be  recognized  as  the  central  factor  of  personal- 
ity, the  condition  of  responsibility,  and  the  basis  of  the 
moral  life.  Criticism  cannot  hope  to  construe  it;  it  can 


FREEDOM  AND  NECESSITY  417 

only  point  it  out  as  a  fact,  and  show  that  the  objections  to 
it  rest  on  an  imperfect  understanding  of  thought  itself.  In 
particular,  criticism,  while  it  justifies  the  search  for  a  ground, 
points  out  that  only  free  and  active  intelligence  can  be  a 
ground  in  which  thought  can  rest.  The  notion  of  a  bound 
will,  which  has  often  appeared  in  theology,  is  either  a  con- 
fusion of  limitation  of  will  with  the  denial  of  freedom,  or 
else  it  is  an  application  of  the  law  of  the  sufficient  reason 
beyond  its  field.  Finally,  criticism  points  out  that  the  ne- 
cessitarian doctrine  in  general  rests  on  the  fancy  that  mind 
may  be  understood  as  the  result  of  its  own  consequences. 

There  is,  however,  in  the  uncritical  dream  of  the  neces- 
sitarian an  implicit  speculative  aim  which  deserves  consid- 
eration. This  is  based  on  the  desire  for  totality  and  sys- 
tematic completeness.  There  is  an  unwillingness  to  leave 
anything  unrelated  and  uncomprehended.  Hence  the  ever- 
recurring  fancy  that,  if  we  knew  all,  we  should  find  every- 
thing bound  up  in  a  rigid  and  all-comprehending  system. 
But  this  aim,  which  is  a  legitimate  one,  is  thwarted  by  a 
profound  ignorance  of  the  conditions  of  its  own  attainment. 
Hence  the  thought  to  find  the  systematic  totality  in  a  meta- 
physical necessity  of  the  mechanical  type.  The  impossibil- 
ity of  this  we  have  already  seen.  Such  totality  can  exist 
only  in  and  through  intelligence. 

But  in  our  revolt  against  necessity  we  must  be  on  our 
guard  against  the  opposite  abyss  of  lawless  caprice.  A 
world  in  which  events  fall  out  by  chance  and  haphazard  is 
also  intolerable  to  intelligence.  And  the  fancy  that  this  is 
the  only  alternative  to  necessity  has  been  one  great  sup- 
port of  the  latter  doctrine.  As  long  as  this  fancy  is  held 
the  mind  must  vacillate  between  the  two  extremes,  being 
driven  out  from  either  as  soon  as  it  grasps  its  implications. 
The  only  way  out  lies  in  carrying  everything  back  to  in- 
telligence, while  resolutety  eschewing  every  attempt  to  com- 


•418  METAPHYSICS 

prehend  intelligence  as  the  result  of  its  own  categories,  or 
to  do  anything  with  it  but  experience  and  use  it. 

In  the  case  of  the  world  we  can  get  on  only  as  we  carry 
all  things  back  to  the  notion  of  the  absolute  intelligence 
who  is  working  a  rational  work  in  accordance  with  a  rational 
plan.  In  this  plan  everything  will  have  its  place  and  func- 
tion, and  will  be  comprehended  in  an  all-embracing  purpose. 
In  this  work  we  shall  have  no  unintelligible  metaphysical 
necessities  called  laws,  but  rather  uniformities  of  procedure 
which  are  freely  chosen  with  reference  to  the  plan.  At  the 
same  time  we  shall  have  no  lawless  and  chance  events,  as 
all  will  arise  in  accordance  with  the  purpose  of  the  whole. 
/Metaphysical  necessity  in  the  world  must  be  replaced  in  our 
f  thought  by  the  conception  of  uniformity  administered  by 
l^  freedom  for  the  attainment  of  rational  ends.  Here  in  the 
unity  of  the  free  Creator,  in  the  unity  of  his  plan,  and  in 
his  ever-working  will  is  the  only  place  where  the  world  has 
unity,  completeness,  and  systematic  connection.  Any  ne- 
cessity other  than  this  is  found  in  our  relation  to  the  uni- 
formities of  the  system  and  is  relative  to  ourselves.  We 
call  it  necessary  because,  so  far  as  we  are  concerned,  it  is 
fixed. 

But  as  this  plan  is  very  imperfectly  known  to  us,  criti- 
cism warns  us  against  erecting  even  the  phenomenal  uni- 
formities into  an  absolute  system,  whether  in  the  inner  or 
the  outward  world.  In  the  physical  world  we  must  take 
the  phenomenal  uniformities  for  what  we  can  make  of  them, 
and  regard  all  our  theoretical  machinery  as  only  a  series  of 
devices  for  representing  the  facts,  the  value  of  which  is  to 
be  found  entirely  in  their  practical  convenience,  and  not  at 
all  in  any  speculative  insight  which  they  furnish.  And 
when  we  are  tempted  to  extend  them  th rough  infinite  space 
and  time,  we  should  do  well  to  limit  them  to  a  "  reasonable 
degree  of  extension  to  adjacent  cases."  In  the  inner  world, 


FREEDOM  AND  NECESSITY  419 

as  pointed  out  in  the  last  chapter,  we  must  not  interpret 
our  laws  by  any  physical  analogies,  but  take  them  as  we 
find  them  given  in  experience.  And  the  explanations  in 
this  field  must  also  be  carried  on  without  subordinating 

o 

them  to  physical  images  and  mechanical  science.  They  must 
be  constructed  psychologically,  not  physically ;  and  their 
value  will  consist  not  in  a  deduction  of  life  and  history  from 
the  antecedent  phenomena,  considered  as  component  forces, 
but  rather  in  our  insight  into  the  facts  on  the  basis  of  our 
knowledge  of  the  way  in  which  living  men  think  and  feel 
and  act.  This  insight  is  purely  sui  generis,  and  is  only 
darkened  when  construed  in  mechanical  terms.  In  this  way 
a  valuable  practical  insight  into  human  affairs  is  possible, 
an  insight  which  would  be  profitable  for  doctrine,  for  re- 
proof, for  correction,  and  for  instruction ;  but  this  insight 
will  never  be  gained  until  we  construe  human  life  on  its 
own  basis  as  a  life  of  freedom  as  well  as  of  law,  as  a  life  of 
reason  as  well  of  association,  as  an  ethical  life  as  well  as  a 
life  of  sense ;  and  until  this  great  cloud  of  physical  meta- 
phors and  analogies  which  has  overshadowed  and  darkened 
psychology  shall  be  dispersed  again  into  its  native  nothing- 
ness. 

Thus  we  have  discussed  the  fundamental  notions  which 
mark  the  outlines  of  psychological  study.  The  great  weak- 
ness of  this  science  at  present  is  that  investigators  common- 
ly have  no  consistent  conceptions  on  these  points,  and  in- 
terpret their  facts  by  a  grotesque  or  impossible  metaphysics. 
Often  enough,  the  more  naive  mistake  their  metaphysical 
and  rhetorical  imaginings  for  the  mental  facts  themselves. 
And  there  will  be  no  progress  in  the  science,  until  we  have 
brought  forth  fruits  meet  for  repentance.  We  must  discern 
the  unique  and  incommensurable  character  of  the  mental 
facts,  and  interpret  them  in  accordance  with  their  own 


420  METAPHYSICS 

proper  nature.  We  must  also  discern  the  complete  futility 
of  all  mechanical  and  necessitarian  reasoning  in  this  Held, 
and  note  its  origin  in  a  superficial  conception  of  thought 
and  its  categories.  Then  the  mythology  which  has  so  long 
infested  this  field  will  be  put  away ;  aud  psychology  will 
at  last  become  a  sane  and  sober  science, 


CONCLUSION 

AFTER  wandering  so  far  and  wide  through  dry  places,  we 

sum  up  the  results  of  our  work  by  calling  attention  to  some 
leading  points  which  we  conceive  to  have  special  significance 
for  the  progress  of  speculation. 

The  first  point  is  the  impossibility  of  construing  the  mind 
as  the  resultant  of  the  interaction  of  any  number  of  physi- 
cal or  impersonal  elements.  Along  with  this  goes  the  par- 
allel conviction  of  the  impossibility  of  constructing  thought 
by  any  mechanical  juxtaposition  or  associational  union  of 
particular  mental  states,  arising  in  or  .through  the  nerves, 
or  representing  simple  affections  of  a  passive  sensibility. 
The  failure  of  this  view  is  complete,  and  philosophy  is  rap- 
idly coming  to  the  recognition  of  the  fact. 

The  result  is  that  thought  is  to  be  viewed  as  an  organic 
activity,  unfolding  organically  from  within  and  not  mechan- 
ically put  together  from  without.  And  from  this  it  further 
results  that  knowledge  can  never  be  a  passive  reflection  of 
an  existing  order,  still  less  can  it  be  a  passive  reception  of 
ready -made  knowledge  from  without.  It  must  rather  be 
viewed  as  an  active  construction  of  the  object  within  and 
for  our  thought  and  by  our  thought  itself. 

In  the  Theory  of  Thought  and  Knowledge  the  formal 
nature  of  the  categories  as  immanent  principles  of  intelli- 
gence has  been  set  forth.  In  the  present  volume  we  have 
sought  to  fix  their  concrete  significance,  and  we  have  come 
upon  many  surprises.  It  seemed  at  first  that  the  categories 


422  METAPHYSICS 

are  principles  of  reality,  and  that  reality  must  be  under- 
stood through  them ;  but  it  soon  became  clear  that  only 
phenomenal  reality  can  be  thus  understood.  Reality  for 
intelligence  is  intelligible  in  the  forms  of  intelligence.  But 
in  popular  thought  there  is  always  supposed  to  be  reality 
beyond  intelligence  and  independent  of  it.  This  is  just  real 
and  exists  on  its  own  account.  Intelligence  may  possibly 
know  it,  but  intelligence  has  at  present  nothing  to  do  with 
its  existence. 

This  conception  of  an  extra-mental  reality,  external  to 
all  consciousness  and  in  antithesis  to  all  consciousness,  rep- 
resents the  deepest  and  dearest  conviction  of  common-sense 
realism.  We  have  learned  how  it  arises.  It  is  partly  due 
to  the  conviction,  which  no  one  questions,  that  our  thought 
grasps  an  order  which  it  does  not  make  but  finds.  This 
independence  of  our  thought  is  mistaken  for  an  indepen- 
dence of  all  thought;  and  crude  realism  results.  The  illusion 
further  rests  on  the  failure  to  distinguish  between  the  phe- 
nomenal and  the  ontological  reality.  Common -sense  un- 
hesitatingly takes  phenomena  for  substantial  realities,  and 
takes  the  phenomenal  categories  as  the  deepest  facts  of  real 
existence.  In  this  way  it  builds  up  a  mechanical  and  ma- 
terial system  which  often  proves  a  veritable  Frankenstein 
for  its  creator. 

But  when  we  came  to  study  this  extra-mental  reality  we 
found  it  extremely  elusive,  and  finally  we  discovered  it  to 
be  no  less  illusive.  The  various  categories  whereby  realistic 
thought  constructs  reality  proved  to  be  simply  the  bare 
forms  of  intelligence,  projected  beyond  intelligence,  and 
thereby  made  meaningless.  Being,  causality,  unity,  iden- 
tity turned  out  to  be  unintelligible  and  impossible  apart 
from  intelligence.  It  finally  appeared  that  the  world  of 
things  can  be  defined  and  understood  only  as  we  give  up 
the  notion  of  an  extra-mental  reality  altogether,  and  make 


CONCLUSION  423 

the  entire  world  a  thought  world;  that  is,  a  world  that 
exists  only  through  and  in  relation  to  intelligence.  Mind 
is  the  only  ontological  reality.  Ideas  have  only  conceptual 
reality.  Ideas  energized  by  will  have  phenomenal  realitv. 
Besides  these  realities  there  is  no  other. 

This  is  what  is  called  my  idealism — a  name  for  which  I 
have  no  special  liking  or  dislike,  provided  the  thing  be  un- 
derstood. Historically,  it  might  be  described  as  Kantianized 
Berkeleianism.  In  itself  it  might  be  called  phenomenalism, 
as  indicating  that  the  outer  world  has  only  phenomenal 
reality.  It  might  also  be  called  objective  idealism,  as  em- 
phasizing the  independence  of  the  object  of  individual  sub- 
jectivity. It  is  idealism,  as  denying  all  extra-mental  ex- 
istence and  making  the  world  of  objective  experience  a 
thought  world  which  would  have  neither  meaning  nor  pos- 
sibility apart  from  intelligence.  And  this  is  the  conception 
to  which  speculative  thought  is  fast  coming.  From  all 
sides  thought  is  seen  to  be  converging  upon  this  conviction, 
as  the  only  one  which  makes  thought  possible.  In  this  view 
the  world-old  conflict  of  the  Eleatic  and  Heraclitic  factors 
of  thought  is  brought  to  an  end.  The  almost  equally  old 
antithesis  of  realism  and  nominalism  finds  here  its  only 
possible  mediation.  The  mechanical  and  materialistic  view 
finds  a  recognition  of  its  phenomenal  truth,  together  with 
an  escape  from  its  essential  error.  It  makes  some  intelli- 
gible provision  for  rational  law,  system,  science,  philosophy, 
morals,  and  religion,  which  can  hardly  be  said  to  be  the  case 
with  the  traditional  realistic  view  when  unfolded  into  its 
consequences. 

In  our  study  of  the  categories  we  have  made  another  dis- 
covery, namely,  that  they  are  either  purely  formal,  and 
hence  phenomenal,  or  else  that  they  admit  of  being  truly 
conceived  only  in  the  forms  of  living  experience.  Here  we 
come  upon  what  may  be  called  a  transcendental  empiricism, 


424:  METAPHYSICS 

in  distinction  from  the  traditional  sense  empiricism.  That 
is,  instead  of  testing  our  fundamental  experience  by  the 
categories,  we  must  rather  find  the  meaning  of  the  catego- 
ries in  experience.  This  experience,  however,  is  not  the 
passive  experience  of  sense,  but  the  active  self-experience  of 
intelligence. 

We  come  here  into  contact  with  one  of  Kant's  obscure 
doctrines,  the  schematism  of  the  categories.  Kant  pointed 
out  that  the  categories,  abstractly  taken,  do  not  admit  of 
being  properly  conceived.  They  must  be  applied  to  a  given 
sense  matter,  or  else  the  understanding  must  be  helped  by 
some  representation  borrowed  from  intuition.  When  both 
elements  are  lacking,  there  is  really  no  conception,  but  only 
a  mental  vacuum.  Kant  found  the  mediating  representa- 
tion in  the  temporal  intuition,  and  out  of  this  he  evolved 
the  schematism  of  the  categories.  A  schema  is  a  temporal 
representation  whereby  the  corresponding  category  is  made 
apprehensible  by  intelligence.  Thus  the  schema  of  reality 
is  time  full;  that  of  negation  is  time  empty.  The  schema 
of  causality  is  antecedence  and  sequence.  Possibility,  im- 
possibility, and  necessity  are  represented  by  sometime,  never, 
and  ever. 

In  all  of  this  Kant  was  on  the  right  track,  but  he  had 
not  thought  through.  The  categories,  conceived  as  imper- 
sonal abstractions,  do  defy  all  conception  ;  but  Kant's  sche- 
matism does  not  help  the  matter.  The  temporal  form  does 
not  help  us  to  any  real  conception.  No  reflection  on  tem- 
poral antecedence  and  sequence  will  assist  us  in  conceiving 
causation.  And  the  case  of  the  categories  is  really  worse 
than  Kant  represented ;  for  when  abstractly  taken,  they 
not  only  defy  conception,  but  they  contradict  themselves ; 
and  they  continue  to  do  so  until  they  are  brought  out  of 
their  abstraction  and  are  looked  upon  as  modes  of  intellect- 
ual manifestation.  As  we  have  so  often  said,  intelligence 


CONCLUSION  425 

cannot  be  understood  through  the  categories,  but  the  cate- 
gories must  be  understood  through  our  living  experience  of 
intelligence  itself.  Intelligence  is  and  acts.  This  is  the 
deepest  fact.  It  is  not  subject  to  any  laws  beyond  itself, 
nor  to  any  abstract  principles  within  itself.  Living,  acting 
intelligence  is  the  source  of  all  truth  and  reality,  and  is  its 
own  and  only  standard.  And  all  the  categories,  as  abstract 
principles,  instead  of  being  the  components  of  the  mental 
life,  are  simply  shadows  of  that  life,  and  find  in  that  life 
their  only  realization.  This  may  be  called  ray  transcenden- 
tal empiricism. 

Something  of  the  same  kind  must  be  said  concerning  the 
general  problem  of  knowledge.  The  relation  of  subject  and 
object  in  knowledge  is  absolutely  unique.  As  we  have  said 
in  discussing  space,  it  admits  of  no  spatial  or  other  repre- 
sentation, and  can  only  be  experienced.  The  mind  on  the 
sense  plane  attempts  to  conceive  the  relation  in  space  terms. 
The  subject  and  object  stand  over  against  each  other  in 
space,  and  thus  the  matter  is  cleared  up,  especially  as  the 
subject  is  easily  confounded  with  the  physical  organism. 
This  is  one  body  among  other  bodies ;  and  when  other 
bodies  act  upon  it,  what  is  this  but  an  affection  of  the  sub- 
ject by  the  object ;  and  what  can  this  affection  be  but 
knowledge?  Of  course  this  is  infantile  from  a  speculative 
stand-point ;  but,  when  we  put  it  away,  there  vanishes  the 
last  possibility  of  representing  the  relation  of  knowledge  in 
terms  of  anything  but  itself.  This  becomes  still  clearer 
when  we  reflect  on  the  phenomenalism  of  spatial  existence. 
As  long  as  we  had  an  identical  and  common  object  in  a 
common  space,  to  which  all  might  have  free  access  for  the 
sake  of  rectifying  and  justifying  their  ideas,  we  could  form 
some  conception  of  the  possibility  of  knowledge.  But  when 
both  space  and  the  object  become  phenomenal,  and  when 
the  community  of  the  object  becomes  only  the  apprehension 


426  METAPHYSICS 

of  a  thought  content  valid  for  all,  and  when,  finally,  this 
thought  content  retreats  from  space  and  time  into  unpict- 
urable  dependence  on  the  infinite  intelligence  and  will,  we 
are  utterly  beyond  all  possibility  of  representation.  Our 
earlier  contention  that 'knowledge  arises  in  the  mind  only 
through  its  own  activity  remains  unshaken  and  unshakable ; 
but  if  we  try  to  explain  knowledge  in  its  essential  nature, 
or  to  justify  it  by  anything  beyond  itself,  we  soon  find  the 
task  hopeless.  After  theory  has  exhausted  its  resources, 
there  are  deeps  in  the  problem  of  knowledge  which  recall 
Jacobi's  claim  that  all  knowing  involves  revelation.  In  any 
case  knowledge  must  finally  be  its  own  standard ;  and  in 
the  deepest  things  we  must  be  content  with  knowing  not 
how  we  know,  but  that  we  know. 

In  discussing  the  problem  of  apriorism  and  empiricism  in 
the  Theory  of  Thought  and  Knowledge  we  discovered  that 
they  both  leave  a  very  important  question  unanswered ; 
namely,  Can  the  nature  of  things  be  practically  trusted? 
And  we  also  discovered  that  no  answer  can  be  found  in  the 
field  of  the  speculative  reason.  This  conviction  becomes 
more  emphatic  as  the  result  of  metaphysical  analysis.  A 
great  deal  of  our  knowledge  has  been  restricted  to  phenom- 
enal validity,  and  has  been  found  to  be  very  superficial  even 
there.  In  addition,  much  apparent  knowledge  has  been 
seen  to  be  purely  relative  to  our  human  stand-point  and 
without  any  claim  to  proper  universality.  Our  speculative 
assurance  is  mainly  formal,  and  it  gives  very  little  security 
for  the  concrete  order.  Our  convictions  here  must  be  prac- 
tical rather  than  speculative,  and  they  must  be  held  for 
what  they  are  practically  worth,  and  not  as  speculative 
principles.  Our  faith  in  them  must  rest  upon  their 
practical  necessity,  and  possibly  upon  some  conviction 
of  an  ethical  and  aesthetic  nature.  In  any  case,  logic 
admonishes  us  to  be  very  wary  of  them  when  carried 


CONCLUSION  427 

beyond  the  reasonable  degree  of  extension  to  adjacent 
cases. 

This  sounds  something  like  Kant's  practical  reason ;  and 
in  some  respects  it  is  identical  with  it.  It  is  reached,  how- 
ever, in  a  different  way.  The  conclusion  rests  on  no  scepti- 
cism of  reason,  but  on  reason's  own  testimony  concerning 
itself.  The  crude  dogmatist  knows  a  deal  more  than  he 
has  a  right  to  know ;  and  when  he  is  cross-questioned  the 
illusion  appears.  Our  reason  is  not  contradictory,  but  lim- 
ited ;  and  the  limitation  appears  on  examination.  And 
when  knowledge  fails,  we  have  to  fall  back  on  belief  based 
on  the  necessities  or  the  intimations  of  practical  life.  Here 
the  test  of  truth  is  not  speculative  insight,  but  practical 
necessity  or  practical  absurdity.  And  truth  of  this  sort 
must  never  be  mistaken  for  a  speculative  principle,  but  only 
for  a  practical  postulate. 

Finally,  we  emphasize  the  futility  of  all  attempts  at  phi- 
losophizing on  the  plane  of  impersonal  existence.  On  that 
plane  thought  is  blocked  in  every  direction.  If  we  seek  for 
explanation  we  never  find  it.  Things  themselves  are  dis- 
solved away  into  elusive  phantoms.  The  law  of  the  suf- 
ficient reason  shuts  us  up  to  the  infinite  regress.  We  can- 
not deduce  motion  from  the  motionless,  or  change  from  the 
changeless;  and  thus  we  remain  in  the  eternal  flow.  On 
the  other  hand,  it  is  equally  clear  that  thought  can  take  no 
step  without  some  strictly  changeless  and  abiding  existence. 
Here  is  an  antinomy  almost  as  old  as  speculation,  which  is 
commonly  ignored,  but  rarely  removed.  The  most  favorite 
device  is  to  carry  the  change  and  changelessness  into  one 
being,  and  to  suppose  that  in  some  way  the  unity  of  this 
being  would  hold  the  increments  of  change  together  and 
bridge  over  the  contradiction.  But  Ms  device  we  have 
seen  to  be  a  failure.  And  all  impersonal  devices  are  failures. 
Thought  remains  in  deadlock  here  until  we  carry  the  prob- 


428  METAPHYSlCb 

Jem  up  to  the  plane  of  free  intelligence,  and  find  in  thought 
the  source  of  both  change  and  identity,  of  unity  and  plural- 
ity, and  of  all  outgo  whatsoever.  This  is  the  deep  specu- 
lative significance  of  freedom. 

It  results  from  this  that  all  explanation  lies  within  the 
sphere  of  the  products  of  thought,  and  must  not  be  extended 
to  thought  itself.  We  explain  the  work  of  intelligence  by 
tracing  it  to  intelligence,  but  intelligence  itself  simply  is. 
It  accounts  for  everything  else,  but  it  accepts  itself.  When 
we  seek  to  construe  intelligence  in  any  way  we  fall  into  il- 
lusion. Component  factors,  antecedent  mechanism  are  fic- 
tions of  unclear  thought.  When  we  come  to  intelligence 
we  must  stop  in  our  regress  and  understand  it  as  intelli- 
gence. Here  our  transcendental  empiricism  again  appears. 
Intelligence  has  no  means  of  understanding  itself  as  product. 
It  is  the  source  of  all  products,  and  for  knowledge  of  itself 
it  must  fall  back  on  experience. 

Persons  who  follow  blindly  the  law  of  the  sufficient  rea- 
son, something  as  children  who  ask,  Who  made  God  ?  may 
possibly  object  that  in  this  case  there  is  a  gulf  between 
thought  and  its  products;  and  they  would  like  to  be  able 
to  trace  the  product  into  thought  itself,  and  then  trace  it 
out  again.  For  the  complete  satisfaction  of  reason  the 
road  between  the  creator  and  the  created  must  admit  of 
being  travelled  in  both  directions.  But  this  too  is  illusory. 
Of  course  we  must  suppose  intelligence  to  be  intelligence, 
and  hence  to  know  what  it  is  doing  and  why  it  does  it ;  but 
in  no  other  sense  can  we  trace  the  product  into  intelligence. 
For  the  rest,  the  only  gulf  in  the  case  is  that  between  the 
agent  and  the  act,  the  doer  and  the  deed.  We  may  trace 
the  deed  to  the  doer,  but  to  trace  it  into  the  doer  involves 
confusion  and  nonsense.  The  producer  is  not  the  work,  but 
he  is  revealed  through  the  work ;  and  the  work  is  under- 
stood through  the  producer.  This  is  a  relation  which  is 


CONCLUSION  429 

perfectly  intelligible  in  experience ;  and  beyond  it  we  can- 
not go.  When  we  seek  to  construe  the  back-lying  intelli- 
gence we  have  no  guide  but  experience,  and  this  does  not 
take  us  far  even  in  our  own  case.  When  we  turn  the  con- 
tents of  the  infinite  consciousness  into  a  kind  of  eternal  and 
necessary  logical  mechanism  we  simply  fall  back  to  the 
lower  mechanical  categories  which  thought  alone  makes 
possible,  and  subject  thought  to  its  own  implications  and 
products.  Such  a  view  begins  in  confusion  and  ends  in 
self-destruction. 

Herewith  our  work  ends.  According  to  an  Oriental 
proverb,  God  knows  it  better.  Without  recurring  to  this 
high  consideration,  we  may  well  believe  that  a  great  many 
younger  and  brighter  minds  also  know  it  very  much  better. 
Yet  so  it  seems  to  me ;  and  I  have  set  it  down  in  the  hope 
that  so  it  may  seem  to  others  also. 


THE    END 


DATE  DUE 


GAYLORD 


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